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Abstract
This thesis consists of three stand-alone papers which address different questions regarding the
economics of education and pay.
The Effect of Free Pre-school Education on Children’s Subsequent Academic
Performance: Empirical Evidence from England (Chapter 2)
This chapter address the question of whether starting formal education part-time at age three
has a positive effect on children’s academic attainment when they reach age 7 and whether this
depends on the sector providing the early education. Using a panel of English Local Education
Authorities I initially utilise the fact that mandatory provision of free early education for 3-year
olds was introduced at different times according to the deprivation of the LEA and then estimate
effects separately for more and less deprived LEAs. Exploiting the time dimension of the panel
dataset, I am able to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the LEA level that
may confound estimates from other British cohort studies which rely primarily on cross-sectional
variation. I find that early education in public sector nursery and primary schools in the more
deprived LEAs has a small positive effect on attainment in reading and writing. These findings
suggest that state maintained nursery settings are more effective than private sector providers
of early education, especially in more deprived LEAs.
The Causal Effect of Education on Wages Revisited (Chapter 3)
In this chapter I estimate the causal effect of education on wages comparing estimates that
are derived using variations in schooling associated with (a) early smoking behaviour, and (b)
the raising of the minimum school leaving age. Earlier research using similar methods covers
a wide range and my work is motivated by the concern that what is sometimes claimed as the
return to education is only the return for a specific group and this might be rather different to the
average return to education in the population. Each of my instruments estimates a ‘local average
treatment effect’ and I analyze the extent to which these differ and which is more appropriate
for drawing conclusions about the return to education in Britain. I implement each instrument
on the same data from the British Household Panel Survey, and use the over-identification to
test the validity of my instruments. I also exploit the dual sources of exogenous variation in
schooling to derive a further IV estimate of the return to schooling. I find that each of my IV
estimates of the return to education are not significantly different to each other (approximately
12%) and are substantially higher than the Ordinary Least Squares estimate (4.6%).
xvii
The Lifetime Public Premium in Earnings: The View from Europe (written with
Fabien Postel-Vinay and He´le`ne Turon) (Chapter 4)
The focus of most of the current literature on public-private pay inequality is on differences in
earnings levels, however the public-private differences are equally marked in terms of earnings
mobility, earnings dispersion and job loss risk. Forward-looking agents care about earnings
and job mobility as well as earnings levels, thus an assessment of the existence of a “public
premium” should be based on measures of the lifetime value of employment in either sector.
Using data from the European Community Household Panel survey, we evaluate the difference
in lifetime value of employment in the public and private sector, taking into account differences
in average earnings, earnings dispersion and earnings persistence. In addition to considering the
effect of observed individual characteristics, such as education and labour market experience, the
estimation strategy allows for unobserved heterogeneity – for example in terms of “public service
motivation” – to influence the dynamics of individuals’ employment and earnings patterns. The
common format of the ECHP permits the analysis to be carried out for six different European
countries – Germany, The Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. This is first time this
modelling strategy has been applied to European data, affording an international perspective




In this thesis I address three separate economics questions, concerned with the formation of
human capital and how it is rewarded in the labour market. My interest is in how education
affects individual’s outcomes, both in the short and longer-term, and the implications this has
for policy. I also assess the inequalities between the public and private sectors of the labour
market over a working lifetime.
The first main chapter (chapter 2) addresses the question of whether starting formal ed-
ucation part-time at age three has a positive effect on children’s academic attainment when
they take their first standard assessment tests at age seven. Moreover, does the answer to this
question depend on which sector provides the pre-school education? I have constructed a panel
dataset of English Local Education Authorities’ pre-school attendance rates and subsequent test
scores. To estimate the effect of free early education places for 3-year olds on the subsequent
scores, initially I utilize the fact that the policy making mandatory the provision of free early ed-
ucation was introduced at different times according to the deprivation of the LEA. The 65 most
deprived LEAs had the policy introduced one year earlier than the remaining 85 LEAs. In order
to assess whether the effect is different for these poorest LEAs, I then estimate effects separately
for the more and less deprived LEAs. Exploiting the time dimension of the panel dataset, I am
able to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the LEA level that may confound
estimates from other British cohort studies which rely primarily on cross-sectional variation.
The main finding is that early education in public sector nursery and primary schools in more
deprived LEAs has a small positive effect – approximately 1/3 of a standard deviation of the
results distribution – on attainment in reading and writing. These findings suggest that state
maintained nursery settings are more effective than private sector providers of early education,
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especially in more deprived LEAs. This has important implications for the Government’s early
years education policy, suggesting that expansion of state provision, rather than ‘contracting
out’ of early education to the private sector, would have a beneficial effect on children’s human
capital formation, as measured by their early test scores.
Having looked at how early education affects subsequent educational attainment, the next
chapter turns to the question of how education is rewarded in the labour market. In this chapter I
estimate the causal effect of education on wages, comparing ordinary least squares estimates with
two alternative instrumental variable estimates: one exploits variation in schooling associated
with early smoking behaviour, the other uses the raising of the minimum school leaving age.
There is a large body of work in this area, and various instruments have been used as researchers
attempt to derive an estimate of the return to education, purged of the bias in OLS. My work is
motivated by the concern that what is sometimes claimed as the return to education is only the
return for a specific group – a ‘local average treatment effect’ (LATE) – and this might be rather
different to the average return to education in the population. Each of my instruments estimates
a LATE and I analyze the extent to which these differ and which is more appropriate for drawing
conclusions about the return to education in Britain. Raising the school leaving age affected
only those who had wanted to leave school early and therefore this estimate captures the effect
of additional schooling for those at the bottom of the schooling distribution who were forced to
stay in school longer. In contrast, I find that early smoking affects the schooling decisions of
individuals across the whole distribution, thus I interpret this estimate as closer to the average
return to additional education. I implement each instrument on the same data from the British
Household Panel Survey, and use the over-identification to test the validity of my instruments. I
also exploit the dual sources of exogenous variation in schooling to derive a further IV estimate
of the return to schooling. I find that both instruments are valid and that the OLS estimate is
considerably downward biased (around 4.6%) compared with the IV estimates of 12.9% (early
smoking), 10.2% (RoSLA) and 12.5% (both instruments).
The final main chapter analyses the question of whether public sector workers enjoy an
earnings premium in a number of different European countries. At present, the majority of
the literature on public-private pay inequality concentrates on differences in earnings levels and
whether observed differences can be explained by non-random sorting of workers into employ-
ment sectors. Comparisons of cross-sectional earnings levels, even after controlling for selection,
give an incomplete picture if the sectors also differ with regard to earnings dispersion and earn-
2
ings mobility. We show that for the countries that we study – Germany, The Netherlands,
France, Italy, Spain and Portugal – the public and private sectors differ in terms of earnings
dispersion and mobility, and also with respect to job mobility. Forward-looking agents care
about earnings and job mobility as well as earnings levels, thus a more complete assessment
of the existence of a “public premium” should be based on measures of the lifetime value of
employment in either sector. To this end, we use data from the European Community House-
hold Panel survey to evaluate the difference in the lifetime value of employment in the public
and private sector. The modelling strategy takes into account cross-sector differences in average
earnings, earnings dispersion and earnings persistence. The estimation allows observed individ-
ual characteristics, such as education and labour market experience, to influence the dynamics of
individuals’ employment and earnings trajectories. In addition, the model allows for the effects
of two different dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity: firstly with regard to labour market
mobility – for example in terms of “public service motivation” or propensity to be unemployed;
secondly with regard to individual patterns of earnings levels and mobility. The common format
of the ECHP allows us to apply the same modelling strategy to all six countries. This is the first
time that this modelling strategy has been applied to European data, affording an international
perspective on public-private pay inequalities.
3
Chapter 2
The Effect of Free Pre-school




In modern society we need to decide what is the right age at which to start educating our
children – in most countries the answer is deemed to be between the ages of 4 and 7. But is
this the best strategy? Moreover, does the answer depend on whether the earliest education
is provided through the state schools system or contracted out to private nurseries and other
private sector settings? This paper sheds light on these questions, exploiting the introduction
of a policy to provide free early education places for all 3-year olds in England.
There are strong theoretical motivations for the government to be involved as a provider in
the early education sector. Both equity and efficiency arguments plus child development and
psychology literature point to the importance of early education for later academic and other
socio-economic achievements. Since being elected in 1997, the New Labour government has
implemented a number of policies designed to improve the life chances of all children, particularly
those with poor initial endowments, and also to allow parents greater access to the labour market
through improving childcare availability. Indeed, the first National Childcare Strategy (1998)1
1See the First National Childcare Strategy: www.surestart.gov.uk/ doc/0-BB628F.doc.
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had these explicit dual aims of improving child outcomes through early experiences and allowing
more parents to return to the labour market – and thus improving child incomes, bringing the
benefits associated with parental employment and higher family income.
Part of this wider policy agenda has been the introduction of free part-time early education
places for all children in England, initially just for all 4-year olds but subsequently extended to
all 3-year olds. An early education place consists of a minimum of five sessions of play-based
learning per week, each session lasting two-and-a-half hours, for 33 weeks of the year. These
places can be accessed at a range of settings and parents can obtain a place for their child at
no formal cost to themselves. The policy to introduce these free places for all 4-year olds was
introduced in 1998, and at least 96% of all 4-year olds in England were accessing a free early
education place by 1999 – the majority of which were in maintained nursery schools or nursery,
reception or infant classes in maintained primary schools2. Places can be taken in the private
sector in which case these providers are paid by the Government via the Nursery Education
Grant (NEG).
The Government pledged to extend provision to include 3-year olds, however since the main-
tained schools sector capacity is filled to a large extent by 4-year olds, much of the expansion
has been borne by the ‘other’ sector – comprising private, voluntary and independent providers
and a small number of maintained settings other than nursery and primary schools – and paid
for via the NEG. This extension to 3-year olds was introduced in 1999-2000 initially only in the
65 most disadvantaged Local Education Authorities. This was then fully rolled out to all LEAs
in 2000-2001, with the aim of providing a free place for all 3-year old children by September
2004.
In this paper I will address the question of whether this expansion of free early education for
3-year olds – largely in the private sector but paid for by the Government – has had a positive
impact on educational attainments at Key Stage 1 (KS1). As this is the first point at which
children take standard national assessments3, KS1 results are a useful benchmark, moreover
they have been shown to have predictive power for later academic outcomes and are therefore
an early indicator of potential future attainment4. Using data on each LEA’s take-up rate of
free early education places in each sector in each year from 1998-2003, and linking this with the
results of KS1 assessments in the LEA when the same cohort of 3-year olds took their tests, I
2According to figures from “Statistics of Education: Provision for children under 5, January 2002”, Tables 3
and 8, and National Statistics population estimates.
3See Table 2.1 (on p.14) for an outline of how the Key Stages relate to age and school year.
4See Sammons et al. (1995).
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create a 5-year panel of data at the level of the LEA5. Initially I look at a simple indicator for
the policy being in operation and whether this has any effect on overall results in KS1 reading,
writing and maths. I then look in more detail at how the expansion in the proportion of 3-year
olds attending early education has effected LEA level results in these subjects. In addition, I
allow the impact of the policy to differ according to whether the LEA was one of the poorer
LEAs that were in the first phase of the policy roll out (the ‘pathfinder’ LEAs), which allows
me to assess whether the targeted LEAs have benefited more. However, allowing differential
impacts inevitably weakens the identification strategy as it reduces one source of variation in
the explanatory variable of most interest.
The results indicate that there was little or no impact on reading, writing or maths, of the
introduction of the free early education place policy. Looking in more detail at the effect of the
increasing attendance of private sector settings by 3-year olds I find no significant effects and this
continues to be the case when the impacts are allowed to differ according to whether the LEA
was in the first phase of the roll-out. However evidence is found to support the conclusion that,
in the poorer LEAs, increasing attendance by 3-year olds in maintained nursery and primary
schools has a positive effect on the proportion of children attaining the expected level in KS1
reading and writing, while attendance of these settings by 4-year olds in the better off LEAs is
associated with a larger positive effect on the proportion of children attaining the highest level
in KS1 reading and writing. This is in line with the findings of the Effective Provision of Pre-
school Education (EPPE) project which studied the attainments of 3,000 children in England
over a similar time-period. My contribution is to examine whether the implementation of the
policy at the aggregate level translates to improved outcomes within the LEA as a whole when
the children first sit standard assessments – or whether any effect is mitigated by the first two
years of primary school.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 outlines the theoretical arguments for the gov-
ernment’s involvement in the early education sector; Section 2.3 reviews the current literature
on the effects of early education on later scholastic and socio-economic outcomes. Section 2.4
describes the background to the free early education place policy, its historical context, and
what it entails. Section 2.5 details the model, while Section 2.6 outlines the data and it’s con-
struction before describing the data. Section 2.7 presents the results of the estimation and their
implications before Section 2.8 concludes.
5It is a 5-year rather than 6-year panel due to data unavailability in 2002, see data section.
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2.2 Why Does the Government Provide Early Years
Education?
There are strong motivations for the government to be involved in the pre-school childcare and
early education market. The theoretical case for government involvement derives from both
equity and efficiency concerns, and is supplemented by an increasing body of empirical evidence
both from the US, and to a lesser extent the UK, suggesting that early education programs can
have a significant positive effect on children’s academic and social outcomes both in the short-
and medium-to-long term, especially for children from disadvantaged backgrounds.
From an equity point of view, the government may wish to compensate individuals who
have poor socio-economic outcomes and can do so by intervening either to adjust final outcomes
or to adjust initial endowments. Aside from cost and efficiency concerns, a further problem
with attempting to compensate individuals through altering final outcomes is that this creates
severe moral hazard issues – and indeed poverty and unemployment ‘traps’. Intervening early to
compensate individuals who have unequal endowments in terms of cognitive and non-cognitive
skills, environments and opportunities, avoids such moral hazard problems.
It is also argued that market failures – information failures and externalities – can be ad-
dressed by the government through involvement in the early education sector. Evidence shows
that parents are consistently poor at judging the quality of nurseries and childcare or knowing
what factors make for good pre-school settings (Blau and Currie, 2004). This in itself does not
justify government provision in this area, however, this informational asymmetry is compounded
by the failure of parents to recognise and fully capitalise the value of early education for their
children which is likely to lead to an under-investment. This is particularly costly to society as
well as the individuals, since there are considerable externalities associated with early education
in terms of the human capital of the workforce, social cohesion, and even reduced crime6.
Moreover, though childcare and early education are slightly different areas, they are neces-
sarily linked. Whilst early education – particularly for disadvantaged children – attempts to
address differences in endowments and enhance future prospects, settings providing early edu-
cation are also providing a substitute for traditional childcare, allowing both parents or the one
6Interventions providing pre-school education in the US, such as the Perry Pre-School Program, the Carolina
Abecedarian Program, the Syracuse Pre-School Program and Head Start, have had a large degree of success in
improving medium- to long-term outcomes for children from disadvantaged families; see Waldfogel, 1999; Currie,
2001, for excellent reviews of the benefits of such programs. In the UK, the EPPE project has demonstrated
that pre-school is beneficial for the whole population and that disadvantaged children particularly benefit – see
Melhuish, 2004.
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parent in a single parent family to enter the labour market. This is a considerable motivation
behind the current UK Government’s policy to provide early education – it is part of a package
of measures designed to allow parents to return to work and lift themselves and their families
out of poverty7.
While there are motivations from equity, market failure and externality arguments, these
would to some extent be moot if it were not for efficiency considerations with respect to early
investments in children – if they are not effective in improving outcomes the arguments in their
favour would be much less cogent.
Initial work on human capital (Becker, 1964) treated ‘ability’ as a fixed genetic feature of
which individuals have different endowments. More recent work, drawing on the child devel-
opment literature, has advanced a more nuanced understanding of cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities, how they interact, how they can be developed and the extent to which they are mal-
leable (Shonkoff and Phillips, 2000; Ridley, 2003). However, even if we ignore these aspects,
the efficiency arguments for early investment are supported by the fact that investments in
children are harvested over a longer time horizon than later investments, making them more
cost-effective, ceteris paribus.
Moreover, of much greater significance for the efficiency case is recent research, primarily by
Heckman and co-authors (Cuhna et al., 2005; Carneiro and Heckman, 2003), into the impacts on
child outcomes of investments in children made at different times during childhood. This research
suggests that investments made early in the child’s lifetime are of much greater benefit in terms
of medium- to longer-term outcomes – schooling and socio-economic – than investments made
later. This is because of the dynamic and synergistic nature of human capital development which
exhibits self-productivity and complementarity. Skills attained early in the life cycle facilitate
the attainment of further skills later and also increase the productivity of later investments –
as Carneiro and Heckman put it “skill and ability beget future skill and ability” (2003, p.1).
Studies of child development (Shonkoff and Phillips, 2000; Shore, 1997) emphasize that there
are critical stages for the development of different types of abilities and that if the opportunity
for the formation of these abilities is missed then attempts to rectify this at a later stage
are problematic and expensive (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003). Deficits in cognitive and non-
cognitive skills emerge early as the result of differing inherited characteristics but crucially also
differences in experiences in the home and early environments which affect the development of
7See the First National Childcare Strategy: www.surestart.gov.uk/ doc/0-BB628F.doc
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skills and the realisation of the potential of initial endowments. If uncorrected these deficits
lead to low skilled adults with the opportunity for correction substantially reduced once the
critical stages in childhood are passed. This implies that there is no trade-off between efficiency
and equity when it comes to early investments whereas there may be for investments made at a
later stage (Cunha et al., 2005). It is noted however that investment later in childhood can still
be productive and it is not the case that reaching a certain age represents a cut-off point after
which skills cannot be developed – children show great resilience to recover from poor initial
environments or the absence of positive experience (Waldfogel, 2007; Yaqub, 2002). However,
as children age it becomes increasingly expensive to effectively remediate problems.
In sum, there are strong theoretical arguments that investments made early in childhood are
much more efficient than those made later in childhood and later in life, and these arguments
are supported by numerous empirical studies.
2.3 Current Literature
There are several excellent reviews of early intervention programs that have been in operation
in the US (see Blau and Currie, 2004; Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Melhuish, 2004; Waldfogel,
1999; Currie, 2001). The programs themselves generally fall into two categories: (a) small scale,
intensive interventions of high quality and high cost; and (b) larger scale, public programs,
lower cost and intensity. In each case the programs are targeted at children from disadvantaged
families.
Few small scale intervention programs have been designed in such a way as to allow objective
evaluation. However, there are a small number that use a randomised design and are relatively
free of attrition and also follow children for a sufficient length of time to allow assessment of
more than just short-term effects. Though the treatment and control group sizes in these small
scale studies are typically less than 100 children, they can shed light on the effectiveness of early
interventions in children’s lives. The programs generally involve an enriched part- or full-day,
centre-based pre-school programme, for at least two years and in some cases more than two years.
The pre-schools are implemented by highly trained staff with a high teacher/student ratio. The
larger scale programs, the most famous being Head Start, similarly involve a part-time enriched
pre-school and quality family services for participating children, though at a lower cost than the
more intensive small scale programs.
Evaluating these various programs there has emerged something of a consensus that the small
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scale targeted interventions show a clear benefit for disadvantaged children. These programs
can increase test scores in the short term, though there is less evidence that they can actually
improve cognitive ability (as measured by IQ) in the long run. Nevertheless they do improve
measured school success in terms of special educational needs, grade completion, high-school
graduation and likelihood of going to college. Importantly, studies into adulthood have shown
that the improved scholastic success of these programs is followed by improved employment,
earnings, social engagement and reduced crime.
The evidence in support of positive effects of larger scale programs is less conclusive. Kresh
(1998) evaluates 30 years of research into the effects of Head Start and concludes that while the
immediate effects are substantial they are less evident in the longer term. This though is partly
because there have been very few well designed studies of the longer term effects (Currie, 2001).
Two studies (Garces et al., 2000; Oden et al., 1996) that do follow Head Start children into
adulthood find longer term beneficial effects on college attendance, earnings and criminality.
Similarly Reynolds et al. (2000, 2001) find that the effects of the large-scale Chicago Child-
Parent intervention on educational attainment, social development and crime, persisted up to
the age of 20. For the larger scale programs, there is consensus that in the short term there are
certainly cognitive development gains witnessed in test scores, though these appear to ‘fade out’
after a number of years; however benefits in school, social and behavioural achievement remain.
Given that the smaller scale programs are more highly funded, tightly controlled and run by
more highly trained staff, it is not that surprising that they produce greater effects (Blau and
Currie, 2004). However, Melhuish (2004) concludes that there are still substantial worthwhile
benefits of the larger scale programs, with effects depending on the population and context – for
example where crime is endemic, the large scale pre-school programs are effective in reducing
criminality.
While there is thus a body of robust evidence from the US that high quality targeted in-
terventions are effective in producing short and medium-to-long term benefits to disadvantaged
children, there have been fewer studies evaluating the effect of pre-school programs for the child
population in general. As it is my aim to look at both the effects on the more disadvantaged
areas and the wider population, it is important to place my contribution in the context of the
effect of pre-school education on all children as well as the disadvantaged in particular.
There are a small number of studies from both sides of the Atlantic that can shed some
light on this area. Two recent longitudinal studies in the US have found significant positive
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effects. Magnuson et al. (2007) use data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal study, a
nationally representative cohort of 12,800 US children, and find that after controlling for child
and family characteristics, the children who attended a pre-school centre had developed better
literacy and maths skills at the age of 6, with greater and more lasting effects found for the
more disadvantaged. Similarly the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
carried out its Study of Early Child Care (NICHD-SECC) using longitudinal data on a cohort
of 1,300 children in the US, finding that after controlling for background factors, attending a
pre-school between 3 and 5 years of age increases cognitive scores at age 5. However it was also
noted that the quality of the pre-school experience was crucial in determining the effects – there
is not an unqualified positive effect of any pre-school per se (Waldfogel, 2007).
Specifically looking at the effects of expansion of provision, Cascio (2004) exploits differences
in the timing of the introduction of funding for kindergartens across the US in the 1960s and
1970s to estimate the effect of public pre-school attendance on scholastic success. She finds
evidence that white children who were near age 5 at the time of the reforms were 20% less likely
to be retained in a grade, while for racial minorities this reduction was between 30% and 40%,
and concludes that more disadvantaged children benefit from government sponsored pre-schools.
Similarly Berlinski et al. (2006) look at the effect of a large expansion of the pre-primary
infrastructure in Argentina, aimed at increasing pre-school attendance, on subsequent school
achievement. It is found that there is a significant positive effect of a year of pre-primary
schooling on Spanish and Mathematics scores at the end of the third grade (age 9), of ap-
proximately 0.23 standard deviations of the distribution of results. The pre-primary schools in
Argentina are almost always attached to a primary school, so this study is similarly looking at
the effects of state sponsored pre-school education on early outcomes.
Levin and Schwartz (2007) look at whether vouchers should be given to parents to allow them
to go public or private in their pre-school, through an experiment in Georgia. They conclude
that allowing choice of establishment is indeed better, though their criteria are less focused on
academic achievement.
In the UK there have been a number of cohort studies which provide data rich enough to
investigate the effect of pre-school experience on later outcomes.
Jowett and Sylva (1986) using a small sample of working-class children who started school in
September 1978, and controlling for child and family background characteristics, found that chil-
dren attending nursery education performed better in primary school across a range of cognitive
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and non-cognitive dimensions than those who attended a playgroup.
The 1970 British Cohort Study collected a wide range of information on a sample of ap-
proximately 8,500 children born in one week of April 1970. Subsequently just over half of these
children attended some sort of centre-based pre-school education, and these children were found
to have higher cognitive attainment at ages 5 and 10 than those who had no pre-school experi-
ence, after controlling for socio-economic factors and maternal education (Osborn and Milbank,
1987). A positive effect was found for all types of pre-school settings compared to none, and
there is a slight suggestion that nursery education had slightly greater benefits for disadvantaged
children. However, Feinstein et al. (1998) have also analysed the British Cohort Study of 1970
and the 1958 National Child Development Study – which similarly follows a cohort of children
born in Britain in one particular week in 1958. They find that while pre-school has a positive
effect on cognitive abilities up to the age of 11, their analysis of the 1970 cohort suggests pre-
school has a negative effect on vocabulary when the children were 5, and reading skills when the
children were 11. Given the contrasting conclusions from these studies using the same data, it
is with caution that we conclude the positive effect of nursery education on later child outcomes
from this evidence.
More recently, Goodman and Sianasi (2005) have exploited the 1958 NCDS data and the
longer time horizon to estimate the effect of pre-school experience on later child and adult
outcomes. Using a sample of 12,500 children and after controlling for child, parent, family and
neighbourhood characteristics, attending any pre-compulsory education (includes early school
start as well as a pre-school centre) was found to have a positive effect on cognitive skills at age
7, which last through to age 16, though diminishing in size. Attending a nursery or playgroup
in particular raised test scores, though this impact proved to be short-term.
While these UK studies provide some evidence of the effects of pre-school, it is difficult to
extrapolate conclusions concerning the effects of attending a pre-school in the 1960s or even
the 1970s to the present day, given changes over recent decades in educational practice and
pedagogy, particularly in the early education sector.
To specifically investigate the impact of current pre-school experiences on young children’s
intellectual and social development, the UK government launched the Effective Provision of
Pre-School Education (EPPE) study in 1997. A sample of 3,000 children, from a range of social
backgrounds, has been followed from the age of 3 and continues to be followed through their
school careers. These children attended a range of different pre-school settings and there was
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also a sample (around one-tenth of the size of the main sample) of ‘home’ children who had no
pre-school experience at all, in order to be able to estimate the effect of pre-school compared
to none, as well as the effects of different types of setting. Multi-level modelling is used to
evaluate the effects of different types of pre-school, controlling for background factors such as
birth weight, gender, parental qualifications/occupations, home language and the home learning
environment. However, despite rich data, there is no experiment or natural experiment exploited
in the study.
Briefly, the EPPE study finds that pre-school attendance by 3- and 4-year olds improves
children’s cognitive development and social behaviour on school entry, controlling for a rich set
of background characteristics. Moreover, starting pre-school earlier is associated with positive
intellectual gains, though there is no evidence that full day attendance had any greater impact
than half day – the majority of children attended pre-school only half day. In terms of the addi-
tional effectiveness for disadvantaged children, the research suggests that pre-school can be an
effective intervention for the reduction of special educational needs for the most disadvantaged
and that high quality pre-school when aged 3 and 4 can improve reading skills and reduce preva-
lence of anti-social/worried behaviour. Whilst not claiming to eliminate initial disadvantages,
pre-school can mitigate these effects and help children to start school on a more equal footing
with their more advantaged peers (Sylva et al., 2004).
It was also found that, controlling for background factors, the types of pre-school that are
most effective at increasing intellectual and social outcomes, are nursery schools and classes and
integrated centres – where there is care and education combined. While high quality can be
found in all settings and types of provider, it was found that nursery schools and classes had the
highest scores in terms of pre-school quality, while private day nurseries, playgroups and local
authority centres had lower scores. This is important as there was a significant relationship
between quality of the centre and improved outcomes for children (Sylva et al., 2004).
Importantly, the time frame over which the EPPE study has been carried out fits almost
exactly with that of data that I have constructed. Moreover, the EPPE study has subsequently
looked at the performance of children at the end of Key Stage 1, when the children are 7 years old.
The follow up at age 7 was designed to assess whether the effects of pre-school on development,
evidenced at school entry, persist further into schooling such that there is a significant influence
of pre-school experience on performance in national assessments at the end of Key Stage 1 –
after the children have spent at least two full years in primary school (see Table 2.1).
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Year Group Reception 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Age of pupils at end of year 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Key Stage Foundation Stage KS 1 KS 2 KS 3 KS 4
Table 2.1: Key Stages of Compulsory Education in England
The EPPE results show that attending a pre-school centre compared with none, continues to
be associated with significantly higher attainment levels in reading and mathematics, controlling
for child, family and home learning environment effects (Sammons et al., 2004) – so the ‘home’
group have not caught up with their peers who did attend pre-school. The strongest relationship
is with reading attainment: attending pre-school is associated with an approximate one-quarter
of a standard deviation increase in decimalised reading score8. For maths the positive effect
is approximately one-sixth of a standard deviation. Thus the effect that is clear upon school
entry has not ‘washed out’ by the end of KS1. While it has been reduced somewhat, there
remains a significant attainment gap between those that do and those that do not attend pre-
school after controlling for relevant background factors. It is not possible to fully disentangle
the effects of duration, quality and effectiveness of pre-school attended in comparison with the
‘home’ group; however the findings show that these factors remain predictors of better cognitive
attainment at KS1. Within the group of children who did attend pre-school, there is no longer
a significant effect of longer duration or higher quality on outcomes at the end of KS1, however
measures of the effectiveness of a pre-school centre at promoting cognitive progress continued
to show a significant positive impact on attainments at KS1, which suggests that while the
greatest differences are between those that had pre-school experience and those that did not, the
nursery school and integrated settings continue to have the greater positive effect. Importantly,
it is found that while the overall effect is similar across all socio-economic groups, there is
a particular benefit of pre-school for disadvantaged children in that it raises them above the
minimum expected levels at KS1, which means that on average, these disadvantaged children
begin KS2 at a level that allows them to access the KS2 curriculum (Sammons et al., 2004).
The government should be concerned about results at KS1 due to the links between early
school performance and later scholastic and labour market attainments as witnessed in many of
the US and UK studies cited above. Moreover, Currie and Thomas (1999) cite cogent evidence
that cognitive outcomes at age 7 are a strong predictor of a range of later outcomes including
school qualifications, employment and earnings. In the UK, Feinstein (2000) demonstrates the
8This is calculated as: the assessment level plus (the child’s raw test score − the lowest raw score possible in
that level)/(the highest raw score possible in that level).
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predictive power of early attainment for later academic achievement. Looking specifically at
KS1 results, Sammons et al. (1995) show that performance at this level is a good predictor of
success at GCSE, the key high school qualifications that play a large role in determining the
post-compulsory schooling destination of young people in the UK.
My contribution is to estimate the effect of the introduction of free early education places
for all 3-year olds, at the aggregate level of the Local Education Authority – as the policy was
implemented at the level of the LEA, it makes sense to evaluate the policy effects at this level.
Local Education Authorities are the bodies responsible for the local administration of state
sector education in England, and so it is important to examine how changing the education
provision in LEAs over time affects overall results within these areas. If universal provision of
free early education from age 3 is as effective as is suggested by the literature, we should see
lasting positive effects of the policy. As I have the KS1 results from 2001-2006 for each LEA and
given that the policy was introduced at two time points, depending on the level of deprivation
in the LEA, this provides an identification strategy for evaluating whether the policy has had
an effect on KS1 results. Given the zero price of the early education places, and the evidence
of the excess demand for childcare, I assume that demand for early education places is 100%
and that differences in take-up of places are the results of differences in supply between LEAs9.
Unlike the EPPE study which does not have an experiment or natural experiment, I exploit this
policy of effectively increasing supply of early education places (by utilising the private sector)
to estimate their causal effect.
Moreover, since for each LEA I have the take-up of places in both the maintained nursery
and primary schools and in the ‘other’ sector – comprising private, voluntary and independent
providers and a small number of maintained settings other than nursery and primary schools
– and given that the policy worked through utilising ‘other’ sector provision of early education
places, I can evaluate whether the increase in take-up in what is largely the private sector, has
had any effect on subsequent results at KS1. As detailed above, these KS1 reading, writing and
maths tests, taken at age 7, are the first standard national assessments that children take after
starting school and thus provide a useful benchmark.
Furthermore, I can address the question of whether there was greater benefit for the LEAs
deemed to be in greatest need of the provision i.e. the ‘pathfinder’ LEAs. However, allowing
the policy effect to differ between these two groups of LEAs weakens the identification strategy
9This assumption of demand being 100% is made by other authors also, see Brewer et al., 2004, p.165
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as I can no longer fully exploit the difference in timing of the policy’s introduction to identify
the policy effect. When looking at the simplest model with just separate dummies for the
introduction of the policy in the poorer and better off LEAs, the identification comes from the
assumption of common year effects but separate policy effects that are constant within type of
LEA over time. In the model allowing for different effects of the actual levels of take-up in the
‘poorer’ and ‘better off’ LEAs, the identification is based on the fact that this is a policy change,
from zero places provided for free in the ‘other’ sector to a positive and increasing number being
provided and taken up. As the places for 3-year olds are provided for free, the take-up of these
places in each setting should not be driven by income which is correlated with characteristics
of the children and also therefore with outcomes. To the extent that all budget constraints
are affected, the effect of this policy change should provide estimates of the effect of free early
education in each sector on results. Again it is necessary to assume common year effects so that
the effects of differences in take-up variables can be identified.
Different effects depending on which setting provides an early education place has impli-
cations for the way in which the Government should provide early years education – whether
through expansion of capacity in state maintained school settings or by continuing to fund
provision through the ‘other’ sector settings.
The advantage of having area level data is that it has been possible for me to build a panel
of LEA inputs and results, and look at repeated measures of the KS1 assessments for each
LEA, controlling for the fixed characteristics of each LEA, and evaluate the effect of the altering
early education inputs. Analysis at the level of each individual child does not permit a panel
to be created which would allow the fixed characteristics of the child and his/her family to be
controlled, rather relying on richness of controls to capture heterogeneity – which may or may not
be deemed sufficient. Therefore it is an advantage to have LEA level data allowing a panel to be
created to control for time-invariant unobserved factors and analyse the effects of this change in
policy implemented at the LEA level. The data that I have also has the advantage of delineating
clearly the places provided by maintained nursery and primary schools and those provided in
other settings, allowing an explicit contrasting of these two provider types. Moreover, the data
covers LEAs across the length and breadth of England over more than half a decade, which will
help to add to the picture of early education and its effectiveness across England during this
time.
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2.4 Context and Policy Detail
2.4.1 Background to the Free Early Education Places Policy
The Government has a broad agenda aimed at breaking cycles of poverty and social exclusion,
and a well-publicised target of cutting child poverty in half by 2010 and eradicating it within
a generation10. A cornerstone of the Government’s strategy is helping people to break free
from reliance on benefits and move into work – particularly lone parents, with a target of
70% employment among lone parents. The strategy operates on several levels, one of which is
motivated by the reality that access to affordable, high quality childcare – or rather lack of access
– is a factor that can restrict employment opportunities, particularly for the poorest families,
and especially single-parent families.
Chevalier and Viitanen (2001) suggest that a lack of childcare was blocking maternal employ-
ment in the UK in the mid-1990s11 and estimate that supply was pretty inelastic with demand
outstripping supply by more than 50%12. This implies that the provision of good quality, afford-
able childcare by the Government, would reduce this queue, allowing mothers to return to work.
The Government has responded to this and one part of their national childcare strategy has
been to seek to ensure that there is high quality, affordable childcare for all children aged 0-14
in every community. Moreover, given the innate substitutability between childcare and early
education places, this provides an additional motivation – on top of the potential positive effects
on children’s attainments – for the Government to be involved in providing free early education
places. This is even more so the case in the disadvantaged communities in which there had been
a lower supply of childcare and nursery places due to the risks to private providers in setting
up in these areas and, on the demand side, financial constraints on poor parents making them
unable to purchase the optimal levels of childcare and/or nursery for their children. For this
reason the Government has specifically targeted several other initiatives at the poorest 20% of
wards – through Early Excellence Centres, Sure Start Local Programmes and the Neighbour-
hood Nurseries Initiative13. These initiatives, like the free early education place policy, work to
10This pledge was given by the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in March 1999.
11See also reports by the Daycare Trust into lack of childcare availability:“The childcare gap: Briefing Paper
1” London: Daycare Trust, 1997; “Delivering the National Childcare Strategy: Briefing Paper No.1” London:
Daycare Trust, 1999.
12The First National Childcare Strategy (www.surestart.gov.uk/ doc/0-BB628F.doc) also makes reference to
the unmet demand for childcare, stating that 4 out of 5 non-working mothers would work if they could access the
childcare of their choice (p. 14).
1329 Early Excellence Centres were piloted in 1997 with 2/3 of them in the poorest 20% of population wards;
subsequently rolled out to a total of 107 centres. Sure Start Local Programmes were introduced in 1999 in the
poorest 20% of population wards, by 2002 there were 260 and by 2004 there were 524. The Neighbourhood
Nurseries Initiative introduced in 2001 aimed to provide quality childcare places in the 20% most deprived wards
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increase the supply of care and early education in the poorest areas. The ‘other’ sector places
in the very poorest wards will include these Government maintained places, so we cannot in-
terpret the ‘other’ sector purely as the private sector for the very poorest areas, however as an
LEA comprises many population wards (on average 23), even in LEAs containing some of the
poorest wards, there will be private providers. As well as these supply side interventions, there
has been an increase in financial assistance to pay for childcare, via the childcare tax credit14.
These initiatives, including the expansion of early education places, aim to improve outcomes
for children and their parents.
Clearly there are broader benefits accruing to society when mothers are able to return to
work, thus in evaluating whether the expansion of free early education places has brought positive
benefits, it is acknowledged that my focus is narrowly on the effects on the children’s results
only. Even in the absence of positive effects of the policy on child attainments, there would
remain a case for the Government to fund early education based on these maternal employment
effects and the associated benefits.
2.4.2 Historical Context
Before 1997, the law did not oblige LEAs to make educational provision for children under
compulsory school age, and the decision of whether to provide free nursery education, and if
so how much to provide, was left to each individual LEA – leading to substantial variation in
provision. According to Brewer et al. (2005) across the country provision ranged from zero free
pre-compulsory education places provided, to a high of 27.5 places per 100 children in 1986.
This variation in access to nursery education according to postcode and income persisted into
the 1990s.
The Conservative government introduced a nursery voucher scheme in April 1997, which
entitled all parents of 4-year olds to a voucher worth £1,100 to purchase nursery provision for
their child from either a maintained, private or voluntary organisation, in an attempt to create
a market for nursery education – allowing parents to choose the best place to send their child
and in theory raising quality through competitive forces.
In May 1997 the new Labour government were elected and whilst initially they continued
in England.
14Initially (April 1997) there was the income disregard for means-tested family credit for families using formal
childcare, this was replaced by the childcare tax credit introduced when the working families’ tax credit replaced
family credit (October 1999), this childcare tax credit was itself replaced by the childcare element of the working
tax credit (April 2003 to present).
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the roll-out of the piloted voucher scheme, they had a manifesto commitment to scrap the
vouchers on the basis that they were costly and did not generate quality nursery places15. The
nursery education voucher scheme was replaced by a local structure of Early Years Development
and Childcare Partnerships and Plans16, detailing how each LEA would provide sufficient early
education places for children of the prescribed age within their area, whether this was supplied
by the LEA itself (i.e. maintained places) or not17. Initially the prescribed age was 4 years old
but there were plans already to extend the scheme to include 3-year olds.
The first National Childcare Strategy was launched in May 1998, part of which involved
the immediate mandatory introduction of free part-time early education places for all 4-year
olds whose parents request one18 and also established that this would be extended to cover all
3-year olds, phased in according to the level of deprivation of the LEA. The 65 most deprived
LEAs in England would extend the free early education places to 3-year olds in 1999-2000,
while for the remaining 85 LEAs the extension to 3-year olds would not occur until 2000-200119 .
Prior to 1999, any LEA could provide free early education places for 3-year olds as long as
they had capacity in their maintained nursery and primary schools. However, in order to meet
the commitment of places for all 3-year olds whose parents wanted a place, the private sector
needed to be utilised. To pay for nursery education places supplied by providers other than
the LEA itself, the Nursery Education Grant (NEG) was already available for places for 4-year
olds from 1998. In tandem with the roll out of free places for 3-year olds, from 1999-2000 the
NEG was available for 3-year olds’ places in the 65 poorest LEAs and in the following year in
the remaining 85 LEAs. Originally the target was to have a free place available for all 3-year
olds by September 2004, though this was actually achieved by April 2004. When introduced in
1998-1999 the NEG was a maximum per child per year of £1,100. This rose each year so that
it was £1,221 per child per year for 2002-200320 .
For the period of my data, the funding for free early education places was paid directly to
providers (maintained and non-maintained) by central Government21. Therefore, it is not the
case that there is a potential trade-off between spending on under-5s and spending on over-5s
15The Labour Party Manifesto, 1997. The alleged costliness was due to vouchers being given to the parents
directly which entailed high administration costs.
16Early Years Development and Childcare Partnerships and Plans were originally (1998) just Early Years
Development Partnerships and Plans but were renamed to include Childcare in April 1999.
17This was established in law by the School Standards and Framework Act, 1998 (August).
18It was legal requirement officially from April 1999 as part of the School Standards and Framework Act, 1998.
19See the National Childcare Strategy: www.surestart.gov.uk/ doc/0-BB628F.doc.
20The NEG in the other years has been: 1999-2000, £1,160; 2000-2001, £1,188; 2001-2002, £1,218.
21Since April 2003 this has changed such that early education funding has been provided to LEAs by central
Government via the formula spending share.
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within the LEA – LEAs could not choose to focus funds on one at the expense of the other,
thus there should not be a problem of the estimated effect of increased early education provision
being mitigated by reduced primary spending.
There is currently a pilot scheme looking at extending the free early education places to cover
12,000 two-year olds living in the most disadvantaged communities22 – hence it is pertinent to
ask whether the extension of provision to 3-year olds in having a measurable effect on test results.
2.4.3 What is a Free Early Education Place and Where Can One Be Taken?
A free early education place consists of five sessions of early education per week, each session
lasting a minimum of two-and-a-half hours (i.e. a morning or an afternoon), for 33 weeks of
the year. All settings providing free early education places must be working towards Early
Learning Goals and other features of the Foundation Stage Curriculum – which is the first stage
of the National Curriculum focusing on the needs of 3- to 5-year olds and implemented primarily
through planned play activities designed to develop children’s emotional, physical, social and
intellectual capabilities. Places are usually delivered in three 11-week terms – based on the terms
of nursery schools and classes in the maintained sector23.
Maintained sector providers of free early education places are funded and run by the local
authority and are either: nursery schools and nursery classes, infant classes in primary schools,
day nurseries, Children’s Centres/Family Centres or other local authority providers such as
Special Schools. Within the maintained sector, the vast majority of free early education places
are provided in nursery schools and nursery or infant classes of primary schools, and children
are not usually admitted before their third birthday.
In the non-maintained sector, early education places are provided by voluntary, private or
independent bodies or by groups of parents, in a variety of settings such as non-maintained
nursery schools, private nurseries, playgroups, childminders, or nursery classes attached to inde-
pendent schools. These non-maintained sector providers must be registered with the LEA and
named as partner in the Early Years Development and Childcare Partnership.
In order to fulfil this requirement, each setting must meet 14 national standards verified by
an inspection by the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted). The national standards specify
22Detailed in the Government Spending Review, 2004.
23From 2006 this has been extended to provision for 38 weeks of the year, in three terms of between 11 and
14 weeks. In its 10-year strategy released with the pre-Budget Report 2004, the Government sets out a plan to
extend the free early education place provision to 15 hours per week by 2010, with the eventual goal of 20 hours
per week.
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that childminders can look after no more than 6 children under the age of 8; no more than 3
of which can be under the age of 5, and of these 3 no more than 1 may be under 1 year old.
Private nurseries and playgroups must have a manager with a specified level of qualifications
and number of years experience, as must all of the employees of the facility. Moreover a group
can never exceed 26 children and there must be at least two adults on duty at any time. The
staff-child ratio that must be adhered to for children in the pre-school age bracket is a minimum
of 1:8. Maintained Children’s Centres and Family Centres also have to meet these national
standards.
Maintained nursery and primary schools are also inspected by Ofsted and required to meet
certain recommended standards, ensuring that there is a minimum of 2 members of staff for every
26 children in a nursery class in a maintained nursery or primary school24. One member of staff
must be a qualified teacher and the other a qualified nursery assistant. These requirements are
also imposed on private nursery schools and nursery classes attached to independent schools.
So while all settings aim to deliver the same Foundation Stage Curriculum, they essentially
represent different technologies for this delivery. Pre-school education had been provided by
non-nursery/primary school settings prior to the introduction of the free early education place
policy, however it is only since the advent of this policy in 1999-2000/2000-2001 that these
early education places with their structured and regulated form and their own curriculum and
teaching requirements, have existed outside the maintained schools system.
It is worth noting that at the start of the period (1998), while nursery schools and nurs-
ery/infant classes in primary schools were already being inspected by Ofsted, the ‘other’ settings
– largely the childcare as opposed to formal education settings – had their quality regulated by
a decentralised system, where it was essentially left to each LEA to ensure the quality of its
childcare providers. (It was partly because of this rather fragmented system that Ofsted were
given the responsibility to ensure the quality of childcare providers in September 200125). Given
that Ofsted were already inspecting nursery and primary schools, it is unsurprising that the
EPPE study has found that the ‘process’ quality is highest in the nursery schools and nursery
classes, as opposed to the other childcare settings.
The potential differences in quality across settings provides further motivation for the ques-
tion I am asking. Has the increased NEG payment from the Government, allowing 3-year olds
24The minimum is 2 members of staff for every 20 children if the main teacher has other administrative duties
(i.e. is also the head teacher).
25See Moore, L. (2000) “Who’s Looking After the Children? Inspection of Registration and Inspection Ar-
rangements for Under Eights Day Care Services.” Social Services Inspectorate Report CI(2000)18.
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to access early education in non-school settings, had any effect on children’s results? Would a
better strategy be to increase the capacity of maintained schools rather than effectively con-
tracting out the commitment to provide early education? If the maintained nursery schools and
classes are on average of better quality, it is relevant to ask whether the increased use of the
private sector is having a negative impact on outcomes and does this depend on the deprivation
level of the LEA?
2.5 The Model
2.5.1 Initial Policy Evaluation
In evaluating whether the policy of allowing free early education places for all 3-year olds has
had an effect on results, the first basic model to look at is a simple linear panel regression model
with fixed effects at the level of the LEA, and with just a simple [0,1] dummy to indicate the
years in which the policy is in operation:
Rsjt+3 = α0 + α1policyjt +T
′ϕ+ cj + jt+3 (2.1)
where Rsjt+3 are the results outcomes: the percentage of children in LEA j at time t+3 who
attain a specified level in subject s, where s ∈ {reading, writing, maths}. The levels that I look
at are L2B or higher, which is the level that children are expected to attain at KS1, and L3 or
higher which represents very high achievement at KS1;
policyjt is the [0,1] dummy to indicate that the policy is in operation in LEA j at time t;
T is a vector of year dummies; cj is the fixed effect for LEA j ; and jt+3 is the idiosyncratic
error term for LEA j at time t+3.
It is necessary to estimate the model using the fixed effects estimator due to the nature
of selection into the group of LEAs that have the policy implemented in the first phase. As
outlined above, it was the ‘poorer’ LEAs, the 65 deemed to be in greatest deprivation, that
were given the Nursery Education Grant to pay for early education places for all 3-year olds
in 1999-2000, while the ‘better off’ LEAs did not receive the funding until 2000-2001. These
first 65 LEAs to receive the policy funding are the ‘pathfinder’ LEAs, with the remaining 85
LEAs the ‘non-pathfinder’ LEAs. As well as being the first to have the policy implemented,
these ‘poorer’ LEAs also have a results distribution which is lower than the distribution for the
‘better off’ LEAs. Consequently, in a cross sectional estimate of the effect of policy on results,
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we will pick up some of the negative effect of being a poorer LEA through the coefficient on
the policy dummy – there is a correlation between the fixed unobserved component of the error
term and the policy dummy, biasing the coefficient downwards.
Implementing a fixed effects regression controls for all of the time invariant characteristics of
the LEA, treating the unobserved component of the error term for each LEA as a parameter to
be estimated and therefore allowing a clean estimate of the policy effect. So the selection issue
is dealt with since selection into the early treatment group is on the basis of fixed unobservable
characteristics that are subsumed in the fixed effect and thus controlled for. The policy effect
is identified through differences between LEAs in their within variation in policy status and
results.
Included in the model are a set of year dummies with the first results year the omitted
comparison year in each case. It is necessary to include year dummies to take account of any
common trends in results due to the year of the test – though the assessments are standard
across the country, there may be countrywide cohort effects or marking leniency changes that
equally effect all LEAs in the different years. As the policy is implemented at a different time for
two different groups of LEAs there is not a problem of the year dummies and the policy dummy
being collinear. It is necessary to assume that the year effects are common across the two groups
of LEAs in order for this identification strategy to be successful. However I believe that this is
a reasonable assumption given that there should be no reason why the year effects would not be
common to all LEAs if they are driven by variations in marking standards, since the assessments
are marked to an externally implemented national criteria that is standard across the country.
Moreover there is no reason a priori to assume that there are differing cohort effects depending
on whether an LEA is in the pathfinder group or not.
As I also wish to look at the extent to which the policy has affected the areas of most
concern i.e. the LEAs that were deemed most in need of the policy and therefore had the
policy implemented first, I also estimate the policy evaluation regressions allowing for a different
policy effect depending on whether the LEAs were the poorer ‘pathfinder’ or the better off ‘non-
pathfinder’ LEAs:
Rsjt+3 = γ0 + γ1policyjt ∗ pfj + ξ1policyjt ∗ (1-pfj) +T
′φ+ cj + jt+3 (2.2)
where all variables are as per their definitions above, with pfj a [0,1] dummy for the path-finder
LEAs. Thus the coefficient γ1 is the policy effect for the poorer LEAs and ξ1 is the policy effect
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for the better off LEAs. Clearly this weakens the identification strategy as I can no longer fully
exploit the difference in timing of the policy’s introduction between the two groups of LEAs.
The assumption of common year effects means however that I can identify separate policy effects
for the two groups of LEAs without them being collinear with the year dummies.
Whether estimated separately or in single policy dummy variable, it is also necessary to
assume that the policy effect is an intercept shift that is constant in each year that the policy
is in operation – otherwise it is clear that some of the policy effect in the later years, when
all LEAs have the policy in operation, could be subsumed in the year dummies thus we could
not delineate the separate policy effect were we not to assume it to be constant and identified
through the years when the policy dummies are not equal to each other.
2.5.2 A more detailed look at the policy implementation
In addition to looking at the basic model assessing the policy effect by looking at results before
and after the policy implementation, I now want to move on to implement a more sophisticated
approach. While the policy itself specifies that all 3-year old children are entitled to a free
early education place that the LEA must provide either in a maintained school setting, another
maintained setting, or fund with another provider, it is the case that 3-year olds could attend
maintained school settings and receive an early education place prior to the policy introduction,
if the LEAs had the capacity. Therefore it is necessary to control for the take-up of places in
the maintained nursery and primary schools both before and after the policy implementation.
As discussed above, the expansion of free early education places for 3-year olds, since 1999-
2000, has essentially been in the private sector as 4-year olds account for much of the maintained
sector capacity. However, all children are entitled to an early education place when they are
4 years old also. Since the introduction of the policy for 3-year olds was a shock to the whole
pre-compulsory education market – for 4-year olds as well as 3-year olds – the effects may work
through a number of avenues which need to be considered in the model. Therefore rather than
looking at what happens when these children are 3-year olds in isolation, I look at what is
happening at each age, within the same structure: I include the take-up rate of early education
places by 3-year olds in an LEA and the take-up rate of early education places by 4-year olds in
the same LEA the following year i.e. when these same 3-year olds are 4 years old. The effects
of changes in these take-up rates on results in KS1 tests two years later – when these children
are assessed at the end of Year 2 – is estimated.
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The main question that the model asks is: controlling for the take-up in each sector of free
early education by 4-year olds, what is the effect on KS1 assessments, of introducing free early
education places for these children when they were 3 years old?






′φ+ cj + jt+3 (2.3)
again Rsjt+3 are the results outcomes: the percentage of children in LEA j at time t+3 who
attain a specified level (2B or 3) or higher in subject s, where s ∈ {reading, writing, maths};
S3jt is the percentage of the 3-year old population in LEA j at time t, taking a free early
education place in a maintained nursery school or a nursery class in a maintained primary
school;
O3jt is the percentage of the 3-year old population in LEA j at time t, taking a free place with
a private, voluntary or independent provider or in a non-school maintained setting26;
S4jt+1 is the percentage of the 4-year old population in LEA j at time t+1, taking a free early
education place in a maintained nursery school or nursery/infant/reception class in a maintained
primary school;
O4jt+1is the percentage of the 4-year old population in LEA j at time t+1, taking a free place
with a private, voluntary or independent provider or in a non-school maintained setting27;
CC′jt captures the availability of childcare places generally in the market in LEA j at time t





where dnpjt is the places available in day nursery per 100
children aged 3 or 4 in LEA j at time t. cmpjt and pgpjt are similarly defined for childminder
places and playgroup places respectively.
Xjt+3 is a vector of the characteristics of schools in LEA j at time t+3, such as the average KS1
class size and the ethnic composition of schools. As before, T is a vector of year dummies; cj is
the fixed effect for LEA j ; and jt+3 is the idiosyncratic error term for LEA j at time t+3.
As each of the take-up rate variables is defined as the proportion of the population of the
relevant age in the LEA taking their free early education place in that setting, the omitted
category are the children who do not take a free early education place. The interpretation of
26As outlined above, this ‘other’ sector includes a small number of maintained settings other than nursery
schools/classes but it is essentially private, voluntary or independent provision.
27see footnote 26
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these coefficients is therefore the effect of increasing the take-up rate in a particular setting (by
increasing supply) compared to not taking up a free early education place in any setting.
We know from looking at the data itself and from previous research (see Brewer et al., 2005;
Melhuish, 2004) that LEAs have different characteristics – in terms of demographic composition,
class and socio-economic status (SES) mix, employment, education. These differing character-
istics have had an effect through time to alter the levels of provision of early education and
childcare services within each LEA, so different areas start the panel with different initial en-
dowments. Moreover, while it is possible to some extent to control for observable differences
between the LEAs, there may be unobserved characteristics of the LEA that are correlated with
both the take-up rate of early education places in each sector, and the results in KS1 assessments.
For example, it may be that an LEA has a high proportion of high SES families and that these
families put a strong emphasis on education. We would expect that take-up of early education
places in this LEA would be relatively high – both before and after the policy introduction –
and that independent of early education, KS1 results would also be higher given the parental
attitude towards the education of their children. In a cross sectional estimate this would result
in an upward bias in the estimated coefficient on early education place take-up.
As we know that the balance between take-up in public and private settings, and the take-
up rates themselves, differ between LEAs according to observed characteristics, and we expect
that this is also the case for unobserved characteristics such as attitudes and tastes, we cannot
make inferences of causal effects from cross-sectional estimates because of the bias resulting
from these confounding unobserved characteristics. Estimates using the between estimator, find
that having high levels of childcare provision – particularly playgroups and childminders – and
lower levels of maintained sector place take-up is associated with higher assessment results.
However it is clear that this is picking up the correlation between unobserved characteristics
of the LEAs (such as socio-economic status mix) that influence both the amount of childcare
places available, the take-up in the maintained sector and also the KS1 results. In addition, the
between estimates show that having high levels of take-up by 3-year olds in the ‘other’ sector
is associated with lower results, though again as we know that the time-average take-up in the
‘other’ sector is higher for the poorer LEAs because they have the funding for these places before
the better off LEAs, the significant negative effect on results is capturing the correlation between
the unobserved characteristics that lead to this higher average take-up and also lead to lower
average KS1 results. For details of the between estimator results see Appendix A.7.
26
Implementing the model as a fixed effects regression means that we lose the information from
the cross-sectional variation in take-up; however, Hausman tests on the correlation between the
fixed unobserved component of the error term and the regressors provide evidence supporting
the prior that there is correlation between these time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the
LEA and the regressors (for details of the Hausman test results see Appendix A.7).
By implementing the model as a fixed effects regression, we circumvent this problem of bias
owing to the correlation between the fixed unobserved factors – that we suspect are correlated
with the outcomes – and the regressors in the model. All of the time-invariant characteristics
of the LEA that may cause a bias in estimates, plus factors such as the size of and number of
schools and the quality of teaching will be subsumed in the fixed effect – to the extent that these
factors are constant throughout the time-span of the panel. Given that the panel is quite short –
spanning 6 years – it is reasonable to assume that the class/SES mix of the LEA remains stable
over the time of the panel. Similarly, I do not believe it too heroic an assumption to make, that
the average quality of teaching within the entire LEA’s schools remains approximately constant
throughout the time of the panel.
As detailed above, the fact that the policy was introduced at two different time points
provides additional variation in the key explanatory variable – the take up rate of early education
places in the ‘other’ sector. Moreover, key to the identification strategy is the fact that changes
in take-up of early education places by 3-year olds in this sector are theoretically exogenous to
income. While previously attempts to quantify the effect of, for example, private sector nursery
attendance on outcomes was undermined by the differential use of these settings according to
their costs, the fact that the policy change allows private places to be taken by any 3-year old
child and paid for by the Government, means that the use of early education places in each
setting is theoretically no longer affected by budget constraints. In terms of identification, the
fixed effect deals with between LEA differences in take-up rates that are correlated with time-
invariant unobserved characteristics which are also correlated with results. Within each LEA,
the identifying assumption has to be that changes in take-up rates in each sector are exogenous
– i.e. implying that they are random between the maintained school settings and the ‘other’
sector settings. As this may not be the case there is a selection issue: the coefficient on the
take-up rate in each sector may be biased up or down by picking up the effect not of the setting
itself but of the characteristics of the type of children that attend that setting. However, to the
extent that the key selection mechanism is income, this selection issue is dealt with – there is
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no cost of these places in either type of setting and therefore there is no selection according to
which families can afford to pay for private places. Arguably it may continue to be the case
that, within an LEA, changes in the take-up in the two sectors continues to differ according to
tastes that are correlated with income, nevertheless income itself as a direct confounding factor
has been removed. Moreover, it is not clear how this selection would work – would better off
parents within an LEA send their children to private settings or, would they be more likely to
use the maintained school setting, in the knowledge that they are inspected and rated highly
as early education providers? Similarly would poorer parents look to use the private settings
that were previously unavailable to them or choose maintained school settings? Therefore I
believe it reasonable to work on the assumption that changes in each sector within an LEA are
exogenous – that the shock of the policy introduction did not lead to differential take-up across
the sectors according to characteristics that are also correlated with results, and therefore I can
obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of changes in take-up in each sector on KS1 results.
The fixed effect estimated for each LEA accounts for time-invariant heterogeneity at the
LEA level, and as before, the time-dummies included in the model will account for any common
time variation that affects results. There may still be time-varying heterogeneity at the level of
the LEA that could bias estimates. However, it is difficult to imagine what this time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity could be. Almost by definition, anything that is a distinct characteris-
tic of an LEA must be reasonably time-invariant in order to be a recognised feature of the LEA
- as opposed to some random variation. Therefore the LEA level fixed effects included in the
estimation should do a good job of accounting for differences between the LEAs, and allow me
to estimate the effect that ‘other’ sector free early education places have on outcomes, purged
of the effects of heterogeneity between the LEAs that is correlated with the take-up rates and
the outcomes.
There is a problem with the identification of the effect of the increased ‘other’ sector take-up
by 3-year olds, in that, as the initial take-up is zero in all LEAs but increasing year-by-year
as the policy is implemented, this inevitably reduces the variation between LEAs in terms of
their within variation in this variable. However, the fact that the policy was introduced at two
different time points adds to the variation in this variable and strengthens the identification
strategy.
Furthermore, there is also inevitably a strong correlation between this take-up rate and the
year dummies. However, since we have the take-up rate of ‘other’ sector places in this more
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complex model, as opposed to just [0,1] policy dummy, means that there is more local variation
to exploit for identification, over and above just the switching on of a year dummy.
The error term for each observation, ujt+3, is comprised of cj and jt+3. The fixed effect, cj ,
contains the non-time varying characteristics of the LEA, therefore implementing a fixed effects
regression will reduce the correlation between the error terms of the LEAs as it controls for the
presence of the cj . However there may still be some correlation in the errors of observations
from the same LEA (i.e. some correlation between the jt+3 parts of the error for observations
from the same LEA) thus clustering at the level of the LEA is necessary. The clustering allows
the idiosyncratic errors for an LEA to be correlated over time but the idiosyncratic errors
across LEAs are assumed independent. Moreover, clustering automatically provides the robust
standard errors that allow for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Importantly, the estimates
of the standard errors do not assume a specific functional form for the within LEA correlation
or heteroskedasticity.
Given that the LEAs first to receive the NEG for 3-year olds have higher levels of deprivation
and lower educational attainment outcomes, we would expect – and the Government hopes – that
increasing take-up of free early education places in the poorer LEAs would have a greater effect
than in the more prosperous areas. In the second specification of this more complex model, I am
again interested in looking at whether this proves to be the case – whether there are differing
effects dependent on whether or not the LEA is one of the 65 the Government identified as
having higher levels of deprivation. Therefore, I re-estimate the following specification of the
model:
Rsjt+3 = β0 + β1S3jt ∗ (1-pfj) + λ1S3jt ∗ pfj + β2O3jt ∗ (1-pfj) + λ2O3jt ∗ pfj (2.4)






′φ+ cj + jt+3
All variables are as defined above, and in addition Zjt is a vector of characteristics of LEA j
at time t, capturing the deprivation level of the LEA at the time that the children were 3 years
old – elements include the male economic inactivity rate, the male average weekly pay rate, and
the manufacturing jobs rate.
The other difference from the earlier specification is that the slope coefficients on the take-
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up rate of places in each sector and at each age, are allowed to differ according to whether the
LEA was one of the ‘poorer’ pathfinder LEAs who were first to receive the NEG or not. The
β coefficients refer to the effects of take-up for the ‘better-off’ LEAs, while the corresponding
λ coefficients capture the effects for the pathfinder LEAs. Clearly the allocation into these two
separate groups was not random, it was on the basis of the characteristics (deprivation level)
of the LEAs, which may be varying to some extent over time. Therefore it is important that I
control for this as far as possible in the model – or else the estimated coefficients could be biased
through picking up effects of being (non-)deprived on the KS1 results. The Government produces
indices of multiple deprivation which consider a range of indicators of disadvantage. However,
these indices are constructed only periodically, and during the time-range of my data there is
only one available index of multiple deprivation constructed for the year 2000. Obviously if
this time-invariant characteristic was included it would immediately be subsumed into the fixed
effect.
The fact of being one of the poorest LEAs in 1998 – when the decision was made over
which LEAs would receive the funding first – is a fixed characteristic and therefore part of
the fixed effect and thus not a problem. That the groups of LEAs are different in terms of
deprivation would not bias their coefficients as long as deprivation is just a fixed characteristic
of the LEA that does not change during the time period of the panel. However as this is not
the case, deprivation has different dimensions that are variable, this may introduce a bias into
the separately estimated coefficients. It could be that in the poor LEAs certain characteristics
change over time in a different way to the changes in these characteristics in the more prosperous
LEAs. If this is the case, then we would worry that it is the changes in these other variables
that are influencing the outcomes and therefore would be biasing the coefficient on the ‘other’
sector take-up rate which we know is changing differentially according to the deprivation level
of the LEA. Therefore in order to control for characteristics correlated with deprivation, which
determined allocation to the pathfinder group, I include in the vector Zjt time-varying features
of the LEA that can indicate levels of disadvantage. This should prevent the coefficients on the
take-up rate variables in each group being biased by the influence of these other time-varying
factors correlated with deprivation level.
As outlined above, the identification strategy is weakened when looking at separate effects of
changing take-up of places by 3-year olds in the ‘other’ sector, since I can no longer exploit the
variation owing to the pathfinder group of poorer LEAs having the policy implemented a year
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before the remaining LEAs. However, the change in policy itself – from zero places in the ‘other’
settings being funded to a positive and increasing amount being funded by the Government – is
still a change that is exogenous to parents’ income in each group of LEAs and should therefore
be able to provide identification of the causal effect of these free early education places on later
outcomes. I continue to assume that any year effects on results are common across all LEAs,
and therefore the separate effect of take-up in each of the different groups can be identified as
distinct from the year dummy effects. Again the fact that there is more local variation in the
take-up variables than in the year dummies improves the identification.
It is noted that while I can answer the question of whether the increased funding for early
education places for 3-year olds had any positive (or negative) effects on children’s KS1 perfor-
mances, there are a number of things that I am unable to answer. For example, it is not possible
to distinguish between a zero effect, and an effect that is ‘washed out’ by the end of Year 2.
However, in some respects this does not matter in that, if there is an initial effect but it washes
out after two years of schooling, then there is really no effect – no lasting effect in any case, and
it is effects that last into middle-childhood and beyond that are of concern.
In assessing the success of the policy, I am focusing narrowly on any effects on KS1 results,
however, there are other positive effects of early education on social, behavioural and emotional
outcomes that are not captured in KS1 results28 which are increasingly being recognised as
of great importance in terms of scholastic and later success in the labour market and society
in general (see Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Melhuish, 2004; Waldfogel, 2007). Moreover, as
mentioned above, there are potentially very large benefits, in terms of child outcomes, parental
outcomes and societal outcomes, if the policy facilitated the return to work of parents, partic-
ularly lone-parents. Thus I am not attempting to formally quantify the costs and benefits of
the policy, I am focused narrowly on the effectiveness of this policy in terms of improving early
educational attainment as measured by Key Stage 1 results.
2.6 Data
2.6.1 Data Sources
The dataset that I use to estimate the model has been constructed using data from a number of
sources. The primary sources of data are the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) who
28To the extent that behavioural improvements facilitate learning there will be some capture of these effects
though not explicitly.
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provide information on the number of free early education places taken, by age, for each sector in
each LEA in January each year; and National Statistics who provide data on the population, by
age, in each LEA in January each year. Using these two sources I have constructed the take-up
rates of free early education places separately for 3-year olds and 4-year olds in each LEA in
January each year (for details of the variables construction see the Data Appendix (Appendix
A.1)).
The first year of data is for children who were 3-years old in January 1998, and I have the
information annually until January 2003 – creating a panel that spans 6 years.
The DfES also provides the information on the number of childcare places available in the
different childcare settings – day nursery, playgroups and childminders29 – in each LEA in each
year30. As I am interested primarily in the effect of the expansion of funded places for 3-year
olds, I am interested in the childcare market in each LEA at the time that children are 3 years
old. However, since there are 4-year old children in this market also demanding childcare places,
I estimate the number of places available relative to the size of the population aged 3 or 4 at
the time the cohort in question are aged 3 – in recognition of the fact that these childcare places
are not just for 3-year olds (again, see the Data Appendix (A.1) for details).
The responsibility for collection of this childcare information was with the Department of
Health in 1998 but transferred to the DfES for 1999-2001 before being transferred to Ofsted in
September 2001. However, when Ofsted took on the responsibility of collecting the information
on capacity, they were also charged with the responsibility to inspect the quality of childcare
providers, and this transition resulted in the failure to collate the data on childcare place pro-
vision in 2002. Therefore 2002 is missing from the data, putting a one-year hole in my 6-year
panel, leaving 5 years of usable data: 1998-2001 plus 2003.
The DfES also provides information on the characteristics of maintained schools in each
LEA31, allowing controls to be added for the effects of average class size for KS1 classes, and
the ethnicity of pupils in maintained primary schools in the LEA – which I use to construct the
percentage of non-white children in each LEA’s maintained primary schools.
29In 2003 the childcare data categories change to be full-day care and sessional day-care (in addition to child-
minders) - however the definitions of full-day care and sessional day-care are such that they continue to be day
nursery and playgroup respectively. The only substantive change is that the full day care category includes places
in family centres which were previously a separate category.
30The DfES childcare data is for March each year, thus is slightly after the free early education place data,
though it is fair to assume that the availability of childcare places in March is a good approximation to the
position in January.
31Available at www.dfes.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/VOL/index.shtml in the annual Statistics of Education: Schools
in England, LEA level included publications.
32
Using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS)32 I construct variables to attempt to control
for the level of deprivation in the LEA. Using the LFS local area data for the relevant quar-
ter, I construct for each LEA various measures of the local economic structure and prosperity
such as the economic inactivity amongst working age males, the unemployment rate amongst
working age males, the unemployment rate and economic inactivity rate for 16-24-year olds, the
professional occupations rate, and the manufacturing occupations rate.
From the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings33 I also construct the following mean and
median pay measures for full-time male workers: gross weekly pay, weekly pay excluding over-
time, weekly pay basic, gross hourly pay, and hourly pay excluding overtime, for each LEA in
each year that I look at data for 3-year olds.
All of the independent variables data is annual for the years 1998 to 2003, though as men-
tioned, the missing childcare data in 2002 makes it a 5-year rather than 6-year panel.
The dependent variables data also comes from the DfES, who publish the results of national
Key Stage 1 standard assessments34. For each of the results years 2001-2006, the DfES publish
the percentage of children in each LEA’s maintained schools attaining various levels in their KS1
assessments of reading, writing and mathematics. As mentioned above, the outcome variables
that I am interested in are the percentage of children attaining the expected level, 2B or higher,
and the percentage of children attaining level 3 or higher. This allows me to look at different
parts of the distribution of results and examine whether early education is more effective in
raising children to the expected standard or raising them to a level above this standard, and
whether this depends on the deprivation level of the LEA. The results at level 3 or higher are
only available from the results year 2002 onwards, thus the analysis at this level relies on four
years of data for each LEA (results years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006) rather than five.
For the years 2001 to 2004, the published results refer to the children’s attainments in a
standard national task/test, thus this is a consistent dependent variable. From 2005 onwards
however, the assessment altered slightly to be a teacher assessed level for the child – based on
their performance in the standard national task/test but also taking into account the teacher’s
own knowledge of the child. Clearly this is something that could potentially affect results, and
could affect things differentially across LEAs depending on the teachers’ attitudes within each
32Provided by the Data Archive, under project number: 18375.
33Available from National Statistics via the NOMIS official labour market statistics website
www.nomisweb.co.uk.
34Available at //www.dfes.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/index.shtml in the National Curriculum Assessments of
7 year olds by Local Education Authority publications for each year.
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LEA35. In light of the potential problems caused by this alteration in assessment method, I
robustness check any results by running the regressions both with and without 2006 results data
included (see Appendix A.6).
Clearly there is a time-lag between the time that the children access their free early education
place, and the end of Year 2 in primary school, when they have their KS1 assessments. This
means that in terms of results data, the panel runs from 2001 to 2006, with a missing year in
2005 owing to the missing childcare data in 2002. The link up of the data is as follows:
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 t Early education data when age 3 (Jan)
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 t+1 Early education data when age 4 (Jan)
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 t+3 KS1 SATs scores when age 6/7 (May)
Table 2.2: Panel Structure
With regard to the policy, for the first two ‘waves’ of the panel, 3-year olds could have an
early education place in a maintained nursery or primary school if the LEA had capacity and
allowed 3-year olds to be admitted. By the time of wave three (January 2000), the Nursery
Education Grant was available to the ‘poorer’ LEAs allowing early education places to be taken
by 3-year olds in the private sector, and by wave four (January 2001) this was extended to all
LEAs. By the time the first pseudo-cohort of 3-year olds were 4-years old i.e. January 1999, the
NEG was available for all LEAs for 4-year olds and all were entitled to a free early education
place.
The structure of the link-up immediately leads on to a number of data issues.
2.6.2 Data Issues
There is a measurement error issue inherent in the data, owing to the structure of schooling in
England and the timing of the collection of the data on the number of children aged 3 and age
4 taking a free early education place. The law states that children attain compulsory school age
when they turn 5 years old and must be in full-time schooling from the start of the academic
term following their 5th birthday. However, in reality all LEAs operate an admissions policy
that sees children begin school either at the start of the academic term or at the start of the
35Anecdotal evidence has suggested that teachers are likely to deliberately mark children’s levels down in the
KS1 assessment, motivated by the prospect of a falsely inflated ‘value-added’ measure when the children are
subsequently assessed at KS2.
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academic year during which they will turn 5. Children start in a Reception or an infant class,
and will not start Year 1 until the September when they have already reached age 5. Most will
have turned 6 by the end of Year 1, and thus the majority of children will have turned 7 by the
end of Year 2 when they take their KS1 assessment tests.
The measurement error arises because the school year-group that a child is in, is determined
by their age at 31st August. However, the data on children taking free early education places
records the children’s age in January36. This means that children recorded as age 3 and taking
a free early education place in January could be in one of two school years. For expositional
purposes we can make the simplifying assumption that births are evenly spread throughout the
year, in which case two-thirds of the children recorded as age 3 on 1st January (year t) will
have turned 4 by August 31st of that year, and will therefore be starting Reception class in
the September of that year (t). They will start Year 1 in the following September (year t+1),
start Year 2 in the September after that (year t+2) and will sit their KS1 assessments in the
May of the year following this (year t+3). The other one-third of children aged 3 in January
will have only just turned 3 in the months from the previous September to December, and so
by 31st August (year t) will still be 3 and therefore not starting Reception until the following
September (year t+1) and not start Year 1 until the September after that (year t+2) and will
not therefore take their KS1 assessments until year t+4.
LEAs operate different policies in terms of whether it is the start of the academic year that
the child turns 5 or the start of the academic term that the child turns 5 that they are brought
into Reception class, however, this does not affect when they will start Year 1. Those that
start in the academic term rather than academic year that they turn 5, have potentially fewer
terms in Reception class but will start Year 1 when they are age 5 – the number of terms in
Reception class adjusts such that children are always age 5 when they start Year 1 (see the Data
Appendix (A.1) for a practical example of how the school starts are determined by month of
birth irrespective of the regime of the LEA).
Data from National Statistics37 shows that in the years of my data (i.e. births in the calendar
years 1994-1999) just over two-thirds of annual births in England and Wales were in the first
eight months (this is the case for each year bar 1996 in which it was 66.04%)38. This implies
36Children are recorded in January according to their age on 31st December in the previous year.
37Birth Statistics, Review of the Registrar General on births and patterns of family building in England and
Wales, 2003, National Statistics Series FM1 no. 32, 2004.
38Percentages born in the first 8 months: 1994. 67.35%; 1995, 67.18%; 1996, 66.04%; 1997, 67.28%; 1998,
66.85%; 1999, 67.02%.
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that, at the aggregate level, for two-thirds of children the link up of 3 years between the year
that they are observed as a 3-year old and the year that they take their KS1 assessment will be
correct.
This measurement error creates a problem with the accuracy of the estimates of the effect
of free early education places on results – because for each year, one-third of the pupils assessed
were 3-year olds in the data four years earlier rather than three years earlier. Put another way,
approximately one-third of the cohort that we measure as 3-year olds and link to the results
data three years later do not in fact take their assessment until four years after we recorded
them as 3-year olds.
The measurement error should not cause a systematic bias in the estimates since it results
purely from the distribution of births throughout the calendar year – and as such is should
not be correlated with the right-hand side variables. As the provision of free early education
places for 3-year olds changes, this will not cause any change in the proportion of births in
the months September to December. Moreover, I assume that within each LEA over time, the
distribution of ability does not covary with the change in the provision of free early education
places for 3-year olds, in which case there should not be a systematic bias introduced to the
relevant coefficients on the right hand side. It may be the case that the size of the measurement
error differs between LEAs, but as long as this is not correlated with the early education place
take-up variables, there will not be a systematic bias introduced.
We know that the proportion of births in the first eight months of the year in England and
Wales as a whole remains approximately constant (at two-thirds) throughout the time span of
births for the children in my panel of data, whilst the provision of free early education places
changes – therefore at the aggregate level there is no relationship between the measurement error
and key explanatory variables. I make the assumption that this stability of the measurement
error is a feature also exhibited at the level of the LEA, such that there is no systematic bias
introduced.
Another issue in the data, concerning this time-lag between the free early education and
the KS1 assessments, is the possibility of movement between LEAs in the interim. This again
potentially creates a measurement error issue. However, again this should not introduce a
systematic bias into coefficient estimates, only attenuate the estimate of the causal effect of free
early education on KS1 outcomes. If movement between LEAs in the interim between having an
early education place as a 3- or 4-year old and taking KS1 assessments aged 7, is correlated with
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changing provision of free early education places then this would bias estimates of the effect of
free early education provision. However, there is no reason to believe that this would be the case
– it is not obvious why increasing (decreasing) take-up of early education places in an LEA would
lead to movement into or out that LEA after a child has taken a place but before he/she has
completed the first couple of school years. This problem is not something that I can control for
given the limitations of the data that I have, thus it is necessary that I assume that movements
across LEA boundaries are not correlated with early education take-up. If this assumption is
indeed valid then there should not be a systematic bias introduced into the coefficients.
In sum, these measurement error problems should lead not to a systematic bias in the coef-
ficients but to an attenuation bias in the coefficient estimates. As there is certain measurement
error in the data I must assume that there is an attenuation bias operating, therefore I consider
the positive coefficients to be the lower bound of the estimate of the effect (and any negative
coefficients to be the upper bound of the estimate of the effect).
There is an issue concerning the construction of the take-up rate variables themselves, owing
to a difference in the measurement of take-up across the sectors. For attendance in the main-
tained nursery and primary schools, the number of children attending at least one funded session
is recorded – i.e. at least one morning/afternoon per week. In the ‘other’ sector, the part-time
equivalent number of places is recorded, such that a child attending for three sessions per week
would be counted as 0.6 places. However, the data indicates that these measures are close to
being equal, furthermore in evaluating take-up the DfES publications and other authors (see
Brewer et al., 2005) treat these take-up rates as comparable and I also make the assumption
that they are comparable quantities (for further details of the reasoning behind this assumption
see Appendix A.1).
Another small consideration in interpreting the data is the fact that free early education
places can be redeemed in some childcare settings39, which raises the possibility of double count-
ing – we count children taking their free early education place in the ‘other’ sector with, for
example, a childminder, and also count the provision of childminding places in the LEA. How-
ever, the childcare availability variables are included as an indication of the levels of provision
of childcare in the local area, since this is a relevant factor in the early education market, as a
substitute to nurseries and other more formal early education settings. At worst this correlation
would lead to a reduction in the ability to identify the effect of private sector early education
39As long as the provider is a member of the Early Years and Childcare Development Partnership.
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places as distinct from the effect of the availability of childcare places. Moreover, there is a
non-overlap between the two sectors. Firstly take-up of places in the ‘other’ sector includes
those taken in independent schools and other maintained settings that are not nursery or pri-
mary schools, and these are not covered by the childcare availability variables. Secondly the
childcare availability variables cover all places available, regardless of who is paying for them –
there will be children receiving their free early education places at the childcare providers and
being paid for by the NEG, but there will also be many other places being taken and paid for
by the parents.
Related to this, there may also be the possibility that children are recorded taking their free
early education place and then go on to attend an independent school and thus do not have
their results included when I estimate the effects on results in maintained schools. If children
are recorded taking their early education place in the maintained sector but then go to a private
or independent school (i.e. a non-maintained school) for their primary education then this will
present a measurement error but it should not be an error that is correlated with changes in
the explanatory variables – it is not clear why increased (decreased) take-up by 3-year olds of
early education places in the maintained sector would lead to more parents choosing to send
their child to a non-maintained primary school. Thus the measurement error should not be
correlated with this explanatory variable.
However, there may be a problem of systematic measurement error, to the extent that
children who attend an independent school for their free early education place stay in the
independent sector for their primary education – which possibly could be the case. If this is the
case, then increasing take-up by 3-year olds of free early education in the ‘other’ sector will be
correlated with an increased measurement error.
Unfortunately data is not available at the LEA level, on the number of children taking free
early education places at independent schools (they are counted as part of the ‘other’ sector but
the independent schools contribution to this sector is not separately recorded). However, this
information is available for England as a whole. From this data, it can be seen that in January
2000, the independent schools account for just 6% of the free early education places taken by
3-year olds in the ‘other’ sector, which itself accounted for 14.5% of free early education places
taken by 3-year olds. Thus in terms of the total number of free early education places taken by
3-year olds, this is less than 1%40. The only other years in which the independent schools could
40It is 0.9%, based on figures calculated from “Provision for children under five years of age in England: January
2004 (Final)”, National Statistics Statistical First Release for the DfES, SFR 39/2004, October 2004.
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provide a free early education places for 3-year olds were 2001 and 200341.
In 2001 the independent schools accounted for 5% of free places for 3-year olds taken in
the ‘other’ sector, though this sector had increased to be 35% of the free early education places
taken by 3-year olds. This means that in terms of the total number of free early education places
taken by 3-year olds, independent schools accounted for 1.7%.
By 2003, the independent schools were providing 6% of the ‘other’ sector free places taken
by 3-year olds, but the sector had increased to account for 56% of the total number of free
places taken by 3-year olds. However, this still means independent schools are only accounting
for 3.2% of the total number of free early education places taken by 3-year olds.
There is clearly an increase in the use of independent schools in providing free early education
places for 3-year olds – this is the Government’s policy in action – and this may mean an increase
in the use of independent schools for primary education and therefore an increased measurement
error correlated with the explanatory take-up variable. However, the relatively small share of the
total market this represents suggests this should not present a serious bias problem. Moreover,
examination of the pattern for 4-year olds suggests that it is not the case that an increase in
children using independent schools for their free early education place as a 3-year old necessarily
leads to increased independent school attendance at primary age.
For 4-year olds, the share of free early education places taken in the ‘other’ sector, and within
this, the share taken in independent schools, remain almost constant at approximately 19% and
18% respectively which means that independent schools are accounting for around 3.5% of free
early education places taken by 4-year olds, each year42. This is important because it reveals that
overall the independent schools part of the early education market for 4-year olds is not growing
either in terms of its share of the ‘other’ sector or its share of the free places in total. Therefore
this suggests that the measurement error may not be increasing with time, as it is not the case
that overall the independent school attendance by 4-year olds is increasing. Secondly, early
education for 4-year olds in independent schools is likely to be a stronger predictor of primary
education attendance than 3-year olds attendance in independent schools. As the attendance
of 4-year olds in early education in independent schools is not increasing, this suggests that the
3-year olds attending independent schools for a free early education place may not necessarily
remain there as 4-year olds – the populations in question are approximately the same size
as it is approximately the same children just one year later. Thus as the proportions of 4-
41It was available in 2002 but I do not use 2002 data due to the missing childcare data.
42All of the percentages for 4-year olds are calculated from data in the DfES nursery attendance publications
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year olds in independent schools are not increasing it must be the case that some children are
attending independent schools for early education when 3-year olds but not when 4-year olds.
This indicates that the measurement error problem, which would lead to systematic bias in
coefficients if increasing independent school attendance for early education by 3-year olds led to
increased attendance in independent schools for primary education, may not be realised.
There is also a caveat concerning the accuracy of the population data obtained from National
Statistics. Usually at the level of the LEA, population figures are aggregated to 5-year age bands,
and it is unusual for single year of age population estimates to be released – they are done so
only with warning as to their accuracy43. In the estimation samples that I use, the smallest
population figures are 367 for 3-year olds and 366 for 4-year olds, though the next smallest are
1171 and 1156 respectively. Therefore the cell sizes are almost exclusively greater than 1,000
which I consider to be sufficient to be reliable.
It also needs to be considered that the population statistics provided from National Statistics
are estimates of resident populations – which does not necessarily mean that the child will attend
a provider in the LEA in which they live. The fact that some residents will not use facilities
in their home LEA potentially leads to measurement error in the take-up rates – something
that is acknowledged by the DfES themselves when they attempt to compute take-up rates (see
“Provision for children under five years of age in England January 2000”, National Statistics
Bulletin for the DfES, Issue No. 01/01, January 2001). However, this is again not something
that I can correct in the data, and it is likely to be the case that the majority of pre-school
children will attend a place in their own LEA.
2.6.3 Samples
The 1990s saw a number of waves of local government re-organisation in England, the last of
which was completed in April 1998, with boundaries remaining constant since then. In parts of
the country that still have counties, there is one LEA for each county; elsewhere there is one
LEA in each unitary authority, metropolitan district or London borough44. As the final changes
concluded just after the time of the first year of data that I use, some LEAs are affected. In
order to avoid, as far as possible, problems of having to apportion data to new LEAs that did
43They cannot be officially termed “National Statistics” as the smaller than usual cell sizes mean that the
potential percentage error is larger than is allowed for figures to be declared as “National Statistics”. The LEAs
that are most likely to be affected by problems of this sort are the smallest LEAs, and these LEAs are much more
likely to be excluded from my estimation samples due to other missing data.
44The 150 LEAs correspond to 36 Metropolitan Authorities, 33 London boroughs, 47 Unitary Authorities and
34 County Councils.
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not exist in 1998 or did exist in 1998 but with different boundaries, I have restricted the main
estimation sample to 120 of the 150 LEAs in England. Of the 120 in the main sample, 115
were in existence with entirely the same boundaries and jurisdiction for the entire period from
1998-2003. The remaining 5 LEAs45 were in existence for the entire time period but had their
boundaries changed between the 1998 data and subsequent years. For these latter 5 LEAs,
though their boundaries are changed, their early education place data and population data refer
to the correct geographical areas so this is not a problem.
The main estimation sample therefore consists of 120 LEAs. For analysis of level 2B or
higher results there are 575 observations in total, with each LEA contributing between 3 and 5
observations, with a mean of 4.79 observations per LEA. For level 3 analysis there are a total
of 464 observations, with each LEA contributing between 3 and 4 observations with a mean of
3.87 observations per LEA. The reason for the slight unbalancing of the panel is that there are
some observations (25 in the 5-year panel, 16 in the 4-year panel) that are data mis-reporting
or coding errors resulting in large outlying values, which I exclude.
The exclusion of some LEAs results in the loss of a number of the pathfinder group of 65
LEAs who were first given the NEG for 3-year olds. Remaining in the sample of 120 LEAs are
56 of these most deprived 65 LEAs, thus they make up 47% of the estimation sample of LEAs.
In addition to this main estimation sample, I robustness check my results by also considering
a further sample, which includes an additional 10 LEAs who were either boundary changing
LEAs46 or new LEAs in 199847 and therefore do not have the consistent boundaries that the
main sample LEAs have. I also consider a further sample of “all observations”, in which any
observations from an LEA that has all the necessary variables for the regression is included
regardless of the unbalancing effect on the panel (for details of the samples see Appendix A.1).
The Data Appendix (A.1) contains details of the LEAs included in each sample, and a full
list of the pathfinder LEAs that were given the NEG funding first.
2.6.4 Data Descriptives
Tables 2.3 to 2.10 summarise the dependent and independent variables for the main estimation
sample, both overall and separately for the two groups defined by whether they received the
Nursery Education Grant for 3-year olds in 1999-2000 (i.e. the poorer, ‘pathfinder’ group) or
45Cambridgeshire, Kent, Lancashire, Nottinghamshire and Shropshire.
46Cheshire, Devon and Essex.
47Blackburn with Darwen, Blackpool, Medway, Nottingham (City), Peterborough (City), Telford and Wrekin,
Thurrock.
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2000-2001 (the better off, ‘non-pathfinder’ group).
As the identification in the model comes from within LEA changes in the independent vari-
ables affecting changes in the results within an LEA, it is useful to construct the within range
of each variable for each LEA. The mean and median within range of each variable is reported
in the final column of each table, to illustrate the extent of within LEA variation.
Table 2.3 shows that the mean percentage of children attaining L3 or higher in reading, across
all LEAs is 27.00%. The median within range is 5%-points, and we can see from the breakdown
of the standard deviation, that the within standard deviation is just under half of the overall,
which shows that while there is obviously greater variation in results across LEAs, there is still
variation within LEAs over time. For maths at L3 or higher we find a similar level of attainment
(26.68% of an LEA’s children on average attaining this level) and a similar overall distribution,
though with more within variation – the within standard deviation is around two-thirds of the
overall standard deviation and the mean and median within range are approximately double
(at 10.06 and 10 respectively) the corresponding figures for reading. The mean percentage of
children in an LEA attaining L3 or higher in writing is substantially lower, at 13.23%, than is
the case for the other two subjects, though there is a quite a lot of variation much of which is
within LEA variation over time – the within standard deviation is approximately three-quarters
of the overall standard deviation, and at approximately 7%-points the mean and median within
range is high compared to the mean attainment at this level.
As would be expected, the percentage of children attaining the expected level – 2B or higher –
is much greater for each subject with 68.83 the mean percentage of children in an LEA attaining
this level for reading, 59.55% for writing and 73.82% for maths. For each subject however the
within variation is lower than for the L3 or higher results, reflected in the within standard
deviations and the average within ranges. Appendix A.2 illustrates the results distribution for
each subject and level using kernel density plots, with normal curves overlaid – the plots in this
appendix’s Figure A.1 show that in each case results are close to being normally distributed.
Looking at Table 2.4, we see the same distributions broken down according to whether the
LEA was one of the poorer ‘pathfinder’ LEAs who were first to receive the NEG funding for
3-year olds. While the degree of within variation is generally the same for each group, and so
for each mirrors the overall level of within variation for the subject, the means in each group
differ as we might expect. For each subject and level, the poorer LEAs have a lower mean
attainment than the other LEAs by approximately 6%-points, which is more than one overall
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standard deviation in each case. The only exception to this is writing L3, which has a much
lower mean overall and the difference in means between the two groups is 3%-points which is just
under one overall standard deviation. In each case the difference in means between the groups
is statistically significant. Figure 2.1 uses kernel density plots to illustrate the distributions
of results for each subject and level for the main sample dataset, this time separately for the
pathfinder and non-pathfinder LEA groups, with the mean for each group marked in each case.
The top row shows that for L3 or higher results, the shape of the distribution for each group
of LEAs is similar, with the distribution for the pathfinder LEAs shifted to the left of the
distribution for the non-pathfinder LEAs, with the shift being slightly smaller for writing. For
L2B or higher results (bottom row), the pictures confirm what the table tells us: that the poorer
LEAs’ distribution is to the left of the distribution for the better-off LEAs, and also show that
the better-off LEAs have a tighter distribution around the mean for each subject at this level,
particularly so for maths.
These graphs confirm that there is not anything abnormal about the distributions of results
in either group of LEAs, with the poorer LEAs that were targeted for increased early education
funding first, having lower results in each subject at each level, looking at the data for the entire
time period.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 respectively show the mean attainment at L2B or higher and L3 or higher
for each subject, separately for the two groups of LEAs, by year. The final column shows the
difference in means between the groups and these are plotted in Figure 2.2 below. Looking
at each group of LEAs separately, it is clear that the means for each subject and level show
variation over time, in some cases a large degree of variation – for example maths L3 or higher
in 2006 has a dramatic reduction compared with the earlier years. However, interestingly the
difference in means between the groups either remains approximately the same or increases. As
can be seen clearly in the Figure 2.2 there is certainly no evidence that the gap between the
groups of LEAs is narrowing in terms of results in any subject at either level, either as a result
of the free early education places policy or any other initiative. If anything, for L2B or higher
the gap is increasing in all subjects.
In Appendix A.2, Figures A.2 to A.7 show kernel density plots of the overall distributions
(both groups of LEAs together) for each subject and each level, with each year plotted sepa-
rately. The Figures show that while the shape of results distribution remains approximately
the same over time for a given subject and level, there are definite shifts of the distribution left
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or right dependent on the year. This is particularly the case for the level 3 or higher results.
These differences in the positioning of the distributions over time confirm the necessity for in-
cluding year dummies in the regression model to take account of these movements of the whole
distribution over time.
Table 2.7 shows the distribution of the main explanatory variables for the main estimation
sample. The mean take-up rate of free early education places for 3-year olds in the maintained
nursery and primary schools is 43.09%, though there is a large variation across LEAs – the overall
minimum being 1.02% with an overall maximum of 104.26%. These take-up rates in excess of
100% can occur due to the measurement error problems detailed above, mainly because of the
possibility of children attending a place in an LEA different to their residential LEA. However,
rates in excess of 100% occur in only a small number of LEA-years (5 out of 575). There is
much less variation within LEAs overtime than there is overall, though the median within range
is 4.37%-points so there is clearly some within variation.
As we would expect, the variation in the take-up rate of free places for 3-year olds in the
‘other’ sector is very much driven by within variation over-time – since the policy is introduced
in two stages over time from an initial base of zero provision, the within variation is necessarily
larger and the between variation less. The take-up rate gets as high as 74.53% in one LEA
by the end of the time period, but the fact that all LEAs start at zero and do not have any
places for the first two or three years weights the mean down to 12.89% overall. The mean and
median within ranges are each just over 35%-points indicating the level of take-up that persists
on average at the end of the time-period – since each minimum is necessarily zero and in most
cases (117 out of 120 LEAs) the highest take-up is in the final year observed.
The take-up rates in nursery and primary school settings for 4-year olds are much higher
than is the case for 3-year olds, on average almost double at 81.71%, and while there is variation
overall (standard deviation overall is 11.99%-points) this is very much driven by across LEA
differences, within variation being much smaller (within standard deviation is 2.12%-points).
The mean and median within range of 5.02 and 4.37%-points respectively show that there
is within LEA variation. Again there are some take-up rates in excess of 100% due to the
aforementioned measurement error issue (19 LEA-years out of 575).
Take-up by 4-year olds in the private sector is much lower than in the public sector, with a
mean take-up rate of 15.36%, and some LEA-years where there is no take-up in this sector48.
48This is the case in 22 out of 575 main sample observations. 21 of these were set to zero in the variable’s
construction due to an implied negative take-up in this sector in the LEA-year (see Data Appendix (A.1) for
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Again there is variation (overall standard deviation is 10.31%-points) but it is mainly between
LEAs (standard deviation 9.96%-points) rather than within LEAs over time (within standard
deviation is 2.69%-points). However, the mean (6.03) and median (4.99) within range show that
there is within LEA variation over the time of the panel.
In terms of the provision of childcare places, the table shows that playgroups places (mean
24.41 places per 100 children aged 3 or 4) are much more abundant than the day-nursery (mean
9.20) or childminder places (mean 10.22). Childminder and day nursery place provision have
similar overall distributions, though childminder provision variation is more between LEAs with
little within-LEA variation, whereas a large part of the variation in day-nursery place provision
is within LEAs over time. Playgroup place provision has a much greater range overall and while
there is a large amount of between LEA variation, there is within LEA variation with a mean
within range of 8.45%-points, median 6.84%-points.
As expected, the overall distributions mask substantial differences in take-up rates and pro-
vision between the more and less advantaged LEAs, as can be seen in Table 2.8. It has been
documented (Brewer et al., 2005) that more deprived areas have access to fewer private providers
and therefore have to rely heavily on the maintained sector, and this is clearly seen in the take-up
rates for free early education places for 3-year olds between the more and less deprived LEAs.
The mean take-up rate of places in the maintained schools sector in the poorer LEAs is 59.39%,
compared to just 28.77% in the better off areas and this difference is statistically significant.
The variation is slightly greater overall and between LEAs for the better off LEAs, which is
what we would expect given that the better-off LEAs are a more heterogeneous group than
the poor LEAs which by definition are all similar in terms of deprivation. As the policy of
increasing provision of free early education is differentially targeted towards the more deprived
LEAs we would expect that they would have the greater within variation over time and this is
what we observe in terms of the average within ranges for this variable for the two groups of
LEAs. Figure 2.3 shows for each year, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the distribution
of take-up rates by 3-year olds, of free early education places in the maintained nursery and
primary schools, separately for the two groups of LEAs. The Figure illustrates the difference in
the distribution of this take-up rate between the groups of LEAs, the poorer, ‘pathfinder’ group
of LEAs, having a much higher take-up and less of a spread, exhibited by the relative closeness
of the three percentile lines shown. The take-up rate is lower on average in the better off LEAs
details).
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and as we would expect with this more heterogeneous group, there is a greater spread of take-up
rates, as can be seen in the right panel of the Figure. Over time the overall distributions for
each group of LEAs are very stable with in each case a slight upward trend in the take up rate
at each point in the distribution.
For the main variable of interest – take-up by 3-year olds of free early education places in the
‘other’ sector – the two groups have means that are very similar (13.85% for the poorer LEAs,
12.05% for the better off) and indeed the difference is not statistically significant. However,
there are two effects at work: on the one hand the better-off LEAs have access to more private
provision, but on the other hand, the poorer LEAs had the NEG funding for 3-year olds a year
earlier thus were increasing take-up from zero sooner. Again the mean and median within range
provide an indication of average take-up rates at the end of the period since all LEAs begin
with zero take-up and take-up is almost always increasing within LEA over time. We can see
that the better-off LEAs have a mean within range of 41.79%-points (median 43.71) compared
with a mean within range of 28.79%-points (median 30.66%-points) in the poorer LEAs. Thus
despite having the funding for free early education places in the private sector a year later than
the poorer LEAs, this indicates that the better-off LEAs have over-taken in terms of average
take-up in the private sector by the end the of the panel. This pattern is confirmed if we look
at Figure 2.4 which shows for each year, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the distribution
of take-up rates by 3-year olds of free early education places in the ‘other’ sector for each group
of LEAs. For 1998 and 1999 (and also for 2000 for the better off LEAs) there were no free early
education places in the ‘other’ sector, hence the horizontal lines at zero for the 25th and 75th
percentiles and the median for these years. However we see that the take-up rate shoots up to a
median of 16.6% in 2000 for the poorer LEAs and continues to increase year on year thereafter.
The better off LEAs receive the funding for the first time in 2001 and their median take-up
in this sector rises to 9.7% in this year – which is below the corresponding figure of 25.2% for
the poorer LEAs in 2001. However, by 2002 the better off LEAs have a higher take-up rate
at each point of the distribution shown here, and the gap is massively increased by 2003, with
the median take-up rate in this sector for the better off LEAs reaching 43.7%. This graphic
dramatically illustrates the way in which the better off LEAs quickly surged ahead in terms of
the take-up of what are largely privately provided early education places.
As is the case with 3-year olds, the more deprived LEAs have a greater take-up of maintained
sector places by 4-year olds (88.08% mean take-up in the more deprived LEAs, 76.10% in the
46
less), and though this difference is statistically significant, it is not as stark a contrast. Though
the better-off LEAs have greater access to private provision of early education, by the age of 4
many children are attending the reception or infant class of the primary school that they will
attend, and as private school attendance is much lower than maintained school attendance –
particularly at primary level – the difference in take-up by 4-year olds of pre-compulsory school
places between the poorer and better-off LEAs is not nearly as large as is the case when the
children are 3. Again the between LEA variation is greater for the better-off LEAs while the
poorer LEAs have slightly greater within variation both in terms of the average within range
and also the within standard deviation.
As the Nursery Education Grant funding for private places for 4-year olds was available to
all LEAs from the start of the panel, it is not surprising to see that the better-off LEAs have a
greater take-up rate of private sector places, more than double the average take-up rate of the
poorer LEAs (20.36% versus 9.69%), a difference that is statistically significant. There is more
between LEA variation amongst the better-off LEAs and also there is slightly more within LEA
variation amongst these LEAs too, though again we may expect this to be the case as take-up
of free early education by 4-year olds in the private sector is likely to be associated with private
school attendance for primary school which we expect to see less of, and see less change in, for
the poorer LEAs.
In terms of childcare places provided, while the day nursery and childminder place provision
is similar in the two groups of LEAs, slightly less provided in the poorer LEAs as we would
expect (though not a statistically significant difference for day nursery places), it is playgroup
place provision where the difference is large. The better off LEAs provide on average 31.22
playgroup places per 100 children aged 3 or 4, compared with an average of just 16.65 in the
poorer LEAs. This may explain why the take-up of free early education places by 3-year olds in
the maintained schools sector is much lower in the better off LEAs, if many are using childcare
settings rather than more formal education settings at age 3.
Table 2.9 contains the descriptive statistics for the additional control variables included in
the regressions when I allow differing effects for the poorer and better-off LEAs. This is then
broken down for the two groups of LEAs in Table 2.10. As we would expect, the poorer LEAs
have a higher economic inactivity rate amongst working age males (19.66% versus 13.05%) and
the difference is statistically significant, while the variation between LEAs and within LEAs over
time is similar for each group. The average manufacturing occupations rate and the average of
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median male worker weekly gross pay however are not statistically different between the two
groups of LEAs and indeed the poorer LEAs actually have a higher average of median male
worker weekly gross pay. We can see that within LEA variation is very similar for this variable
in the two groups but between LEA and overall variation is greater in the poorer LEAs – this
is because of a small number of LEAs in the poorer group who nevertheless have high levels
of median gross income49. The earnings measures available in my data are not ideal in that
they are based on workplace rather than residential location. This allied to the fact that some
of areas that qualified for the early NEG funding as a ‘deprived’ LEA actually have some very
prosperous areas in addition to very poor areas, means that we get this slight anomaly. This
means that a few large outliers skew the data – while the mean of median male gross weekly
pay is higher in the poorer LEAs, the median of this variable is lower: £389.80 in the poorer
LEAs versus £401.95 in the better-off LEAs.
In terms of average KS1 class size, the groups are almost identical in mean (25.65, poorer
LEAs; 25.63 better-off) and also in terms of the variance of the distribution both between and
within LEAs.
It is noticeable that the poorer LEAs have a significantly higher average percentage of non-
white children in their maintained schools: 27.38% compared with 10.75% in the better-off
LEAs. There is slightly more variation in the poorer group of LEAs both across and within
LEAs, with some poorer LEAs having a particularly high concentration of non-white children
– the highest overall in any LEA-year being 80.91%, and the highest time-average for a poorer
LEA being 77.47%, compared with the corresponding figure of 58.64% for the better-off LEAs.
It is important therefore to include these covariates to control for any potential effects that this
may have on KS1 results.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Simple Policy Dummy Analysis
The initial model is a panel regression with a simple [0,1] policy dummy for the years in which
the policy is in operation; the results are displayed for reading, writing and maths at each level,
in model #1 columns of Tables 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13 respectively. Looking at the tables we see
that, despite the introduction of the policy at two different time points, we cannot identify a
significant effect of the policy introduction on reading, writing or maths results at either level.
49Tower Hamlets, Southwark, Camden, Westminster, Islington, Hammersmith and Fulham.
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At level 2B or higher the estimated policy effect is almost zero for reading, while for writing
the coefficient is +0.255 indicating that the policy had the effect of increasing the percentage
of children attaining level 2B or higher by 0.255%-points, though it is not significantly different
from zero. Similarly for maths, the estimated coefficient of -0.250 suggests that the policy
reduces attainment at level 2B or higher by a quarter of one percentage point though again
it was not significant. The year dummies are highly significant in all years for writing and in
two of the four later years for reading and for maths, and when this common year variation is
removed, it appears that there is not sufficient variation in results within LEAs to identify the
effect of the policy.
The story is similar for level 3 or higher results, each of the year dummies are significant
at the 1% level for each subject, and once this common variation is removed, the remaining
variation in results is not sufficient to identify the policy effect.
Appendix A.3 shows the results of the model for the robustness check samples and confirms
that we do not get any significant coefficients for either level in any of the samples, though there
is generally a consistency to the point estimates for each subject and level across the samples.
The second specification of the policy evaluation model allows the policy effect to differ
according to whether the LEA was one of the poorer LEAs that had the policy implemented in
the first phase of its introduction. The results for this model can be seen in Tables 2.11, 2.12
and 2.13 but under the model #2 columns. We can see that for level 2B or higher reading and
writing, we continue to fail to identify policy effects in either group of LEAs. It is interesting
that while not significant estimates, for writing at this level there is a positive effect of the
policy for each group of LEAs, whereas for reading the effect is estimated to be negative for the
poorer LEAs but positive for the better off LEAs. This pattern for reading is also witnessed in
the maths results at level 2B or higher, but for maths while the positive effect for the better
off LEAs is not statistically significant, the negative effect for the poorer LEAs is significant
at the 5% level. The estimate of -0.772 suggests that in the poorer areas, the policy led to a
0.772%-point fall in the percentage of children attaining level 2B or higher in KS1 maths. To
put this in context, the average attainment at this level in the poorer LEAs is 70.79% with a
within standard deviation of 2.02%-points. Therefore the policy effect is equal to a reduction of
approximately 1/3 of a within standard deviation. Table A.6 in Appendix A.3 shows that this
result is consistent across the samples, remaining of similar magnitude and significant at the 5%
level and in one sample at the 1% level.
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Turning to the level 3 or higher results for model #2, Table 2.11 shows that for reading
there is a positive effect of the policy for each group and in the case of the poorer LEAs there is
a marginally significant (p=0.112) coefficient of 0.425 estimated. This suggests a 0.425%-point
increase in the policy years for these poorer LEAs. The mean attainment in reading at this level
in these LEAs over the period is 23.41 with a within standard deviation of 1.90, therefore the
policy effect is equivalent to approximately one fifth of a within standard deviation of results
for these LEAs.
Similarly for writing level 3 or higher we see from Table 2.12, that there is a marginally
significant (p=0.107) coefficient of -0.728 estimated for the policy effect in the poorer LEAs.
This suggests that the policy decreased the average percentage of children in the poorer LEAs’
maintained schools attaining level 3 or higher in writing by 0.728%-points, which is approxi-
mately one quarter of a within standard deviation (2.76%-points), with the mean being 11.39%.
The effect for the better off LEAs is positive but not significant.
Table 2.13 shows that for maths at level 3 or higher, while the policy effect for the better
off LEAs is not significantly different from zero, the policy effect coefficient estimated for the
poorer LEAs is -0.825 and is significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the policy led to
a 0.825%-point reduction in the percentage of children in the poorer LEAs’ maintained schools
attaining level 3 or higher in KS1 maths, which is approximately one fifth of a within standard
deviation (4.03%-points), while the mean is 23.50%.
Appendix Tables A.7, A.8 and A.9 show that these results are robust to the choice of sample
and in many cases strengthen in significance in the alternative samples. Moreover, the Appendix
A.3 Tables A.10 to A.15 show that all of these results remain when we exclude the 2006 data
on account of the change in assessment method introduced in 2006.
It appears that there is a significant policy effect on results but that it is only in evidence
when we allow the policy to have different effects in the two groups of LEAs, and the effect is
only in the poorer LEAs. While there is a slightly significant positive effect on reading level 3 or
higher in the poorer LEAs, for writing and maths it is a significant negative effect of comparable
or greater relative magnitude. The negative policy effect on maths results in the poorer LEAs
is also in evidence in attainment at level 2B or higher. These are interesting results and slightly
alarming in that the policy was designed to be a benefit to the poorer LEAs in particular and
it is in these areas that the policy is having a significant and mainly negative impact on results.
To investigate further I estimate the more complex model, exploiting variation in the actual
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take-up rates to examine the way in which this policy is working.
2.7.2 Policy Effects Through Early Education Place Take-up
Looking at the results from first specification of the more complex model in Tables 2.14 – 2.16, we
see that despite the fact that the expansion of the ‘other’ sector provision of free early education
places began at different times in the two groups of LEAs, there is a failure to identify any effect
of this expansion on results in reading, writing or maths at either level 2B or higher or level 3 or
higher. Indeed, aside from the year dummies, there are very few coefficients that are significant
in any regression. It appears that, as with the analogous basic policy evaluation regressions, the
variation common to all LEAs according to the year of the test, dominates other differences in
results to such an extent that we cannot identify any significant parameters.
The exception to this is the effect of the take-up, by 3-year olds, of free early education
places in maintained nursery schools and nursery classes in maintained primary schools on the
proportion of children achieving level 2B or higher in reading. As can be seen in Table 2.14,
we find a significant positive effect, though the coefficient of 0.037 is very small – a 10%-point
rise in the 3-year olds take-up rate of these places would lead to a 0.4%-point increase in the
percentage of children achieving level 2B or higher at KS1 reading. To put this in context, over
the time of the panel, the mean take-up rate by 3-year olds of free early education places in
maintained nursery schools and nursery classes in maintained primary schools is 43.09% and
the mean percentage of children attaining level 2B or higher in reading is 68.83% with a within
standard deviation of 1.70. Therefore the effect is equivalent to an increase in attainment of
approximately one quarter of a within standard deviation.
Appendix A.4 Table A.16 shows that this result is robust to the choice of sample. The result
is also robust to the exclusion of the childcare variables (see Appendix A.5 Table A.23), which
allows the panel to be extended by one year – 2002 data can be used as it is only the childcare
variables that are missing in this year (see Appendix A.5 for details).
As discussed in section 2.5, the introduction of the policy to make mandatory the provision
of free early education places to all 3-year olds, was a shock to the whole market and therefore
the influence may be felt not only through the places in the ‘other’ sector that were taken up
from an initial position of zero take-up, but also through the maintained schools sector take-up.
However, while it is true that the selection into the maintained schools’ places as opposed to
the ‘other’ sector is no longer on the basis of cost, since all places are free, in order to be able
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to interpret the effects of increased take-up in each sector as causal I make the assumption that
there is not systematic selection on other unobservable parental tastes. The estimated fixed
effects deal with any time-invariant heterogeneity between LEAs, however within an LEA, it is
necessary to assume that allocation to places in each sector is not correlated with unobserved
parental characteristics.
While it is disappointing not to find more significant effects at this stage, an important part
of this study involves evaluating whether there are differential effects of the changing balance
between public and private providers of free early education places, according to the level of
deprivation of the LEA. Tables 2.17 – 2.19 display the results of the regressions when I allow the
effect of each of the early education take-up rate variables to vary according to whether or not
the LEA was one of the poorer LEAs who were allocated the NEG first. Many of the control
variables to capture selection into the first group of LEAs to receive the NEG did not prove to
have any significant effect, thus in the interests of parsimony have been dropped.
2.7.3 Reading
In the policy evaluation regressions when we allow the policy effect to differ for the ‘poorer’ and
‘better off’ LEAs we found the effect on reading level 2B or higher was negative for the poorer
LEAs, positive for the better off LEAs, though in neither case significant. Table 2.17 shows that
the coefficients on take-up in the non-school sector, that is the ‘other’ sector, follow this same
pattern as we would expect, however again neither effect is significant.
What we do find is that it is the poorer LEAs that are driving the result that increasing the
take-up by 3-year olds of free early education places in maintained nursery and primary schools
has a positive effect on achievement in reading at level 2B or higher, as Table 2.17 shows. The
coefficient is still small at 0.059, implying that a 10%-point rise in the take-up rate of these
places by 3-year olds in the poorer LEAs would lead to a 0.6%-point increase in the percentage
of children achieving level 2B or higher at KS1 reading. The mean take-up of these places by
3-year olds in the poorer LEAs is 59.39% and the mean percentage of children achieving level 2B
or higher in reading in these LEAs is 65.68% with a within standard deviation of 1.66. Therefore
the effect of a 10%-point increase in take-up would be equivalent to an increase of approximately
one-third of a within standard deviation for these LEAs. Appendix A.4 Table A.17 shows that
this result is robust to the choice of sample, and the result is also robust to the exclusion of the
childcare variables (see Appendix A.5, Table A.24).
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As with the policy evaluation regressions, a further robustness check involves running the
regression again but with the data from results year 2006 excluded. The assessment method for
each of the subjects changed in 2006 hence the need to consider excluding 2006 as the results
may be differentially biased in 2006, meaning that a dummy for 2006 would not control for this
effect. Appendix A.6 Table A.30 reveals this result remains significant and robust to the choice
of sample; indeed the coefficient increases slightly and is significant at the 1% level as opposed
to just the 5% level, which is the significance level when we include 2006 data.
Turning to the effects at level 3 or higher, the marginally significant positive policy effect
for the poorer LEAs that we found in Table 2.11 is not in evidence in Table 2.17 – we find the
coefficient on ‘other’ sector take-up to be estimated to be zero to 3 decimal places.
However, we do see in Table 2.17 that there is some evidence that take-up of free early
education places in maintained nursery and primary schools by 4-year olds in the better off
LEAs, has a positive effect on the percentage of children in an LEA attaining level 3 or higher
in their KS1 reading. The coefficient of 0.159 indicates that an increase in the 4-year olds take-
up rate of these places in the better off LEAs is associated with a 1.59%-point increase in the
percentage of children attaining level 3 or higher. To put this in context, the mean take-up rate
of free places in the maintained nursery and primary schools by 4-year olds in these less deprived
LEAs is 76.10%, and the mean percentage of children attaining level 3 or higher in these LEAs is
30.15% with a within standard deviation of 2.14. Therefore the effect of a 10%-point increase in
take-up is approximately equal to an increase of just under three quarters of a within standard
deviation.
Though this result is found in both of the balanced panel samples (see Appendix A.4 Table
A.20), the level of significance increases to 10% in the second sample, and the result is not
robust to unbalancing the panel (sample 3). When the childcare variables are excluded the
result remains but only in the main sample (see Appendix A.5, Table A.27). As can be seen in
Appendix A.6 Table A.33, when we exclude the 2006 data, this result becomes much stronger,
becoming significant at the 1% level in both the main and second balanced panel samples.
It is notable that some of the variables that are included to control for selection into the
group of LEAs who received the NEG for 3-year olds first, are significant in each regression. In
the level 2B or higher regression the male economic inactivity rate amongst working age males
is significant and negative in each sample, which is what we would expect to be the case – as
the inactivity rate increases the results for children in these LEAs decrease. Similarly, there is
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a negative coefficient on the proportion of men and women who are employed in manufacturing
occupations for results at level 2B or higher. This again is the sign that we would perhaps
expect – to the extent that manufacturing jobs capture socio-economic status of the LEA, as
the proportion of manufacturing jobs increases we might expect that results would decrease.
In the regressions for level 3 or higher, the male economic inactivity rate is no longer signif-
icant, and neither is the manufacturing jobs rate (which in the interest of parsimony is dropped
from the specification). The median gross weekly pay of male workers is significant and had a
positive effect, again as we would expect – as the pay of workers increases, the results of children
in the LEA increase.
It is in line with what we would expect that factors contemporary to the time that the children
take the test have a larger impact on results than factors from earlier in the lifetime of the children
– and it is clear that average class size for KS1 classes seems to have a significant effect on results
for reading at each level. As we would expect, as the average class size increases, results decrease:
increasing the average class size by 1 child has the effect of decreasing the percentage of children
attaining level 2B or higher by 0.67%-points and the percentage of children attaining level 3 or
higher by 0.78%-points. As the mean percentage attaining level 2B across all LEAs is 68.83%
with a within standard deviation of 1.70 and the corresponding figures for level 3 are 27.00%
and 2.03, it is clear that even changing average class size has only a relatively small effect on
results.
2.7.4 Writing
In the policy evaluation regressions when we allow the policy effect to differ for the two groups
of LEAs, for both there was a positive policy effect on results at level 2B or higher but in
each case it was not significant. The effect of the ‘other’ sector place take-up continues to be
non-significant for each group of LEAs in Table 2.18, with the coefficient for the poorer LEAs
actually being slightly negative though very close to zero.
While there were no significant results for writing in the regressions estimating common
effects for the two groups of LEAs at level 2B or higher, Table 2.18 shows that when we allow
for different effects we find that there is evidence of a small positive effect of take-up of free
early education places in maintained nursery schools and nursery classes in primary schools by
3-year olds in the poorer LEAs, on the percentage of children attaining level 2B or higher in
writing at KS1. As with the result for reading, the coefficient is very small at 0.07, indicating
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that a 10%-point increase in take-up by 3-year olds in these poorer LEAs would result in a
0.7%-point increase in the percentage of children attaining level 2B or higher. As outlined
above, the mean take-up rate by 3-year olds of free early education places in maintained nursery
and primary school settings in these LEAs is 59.39%, while the mean percentage of children in
these LEAs attaining level 2B or higher in writing is 56.30% with a within standard deviation
of 2.19. Therefore a 10%-point increase in take-up is associated with an increase in attainment
at this level equivalent to approximately just under one-third of a within standard deviation.
This result is robust to the choice of sample (see Appendix A.4, Table A.18), whether or not we
include 2006 data (see Appendix A.6, Table A.31) and whether or not we include the childcare
variables (see Appendix A.5, Table A.25). There is some sensitivity to sample choice when we
exclude the childcare variables and the 2006 data. The level of significance is at least 5% for all
samples when 2006 data is included, drifting to 10% when 2006 data is excluded.
The first main result therefore, is that there is a small but significant and robust effect of take-
up of free early education places in maintained nursery schools and nursery classes in maintained
primary schools, by 3-year olds in the poorer LEAs, on the percentage of children achieving level
2B or higher in KS1 reading and writing. It is perhaps not surprising that settings that increase
results for reading also affect results for writing given the obvious complementarity between the
two skills, and it appears that in the poorer LEAs there is a positive effect of increasing take-up
of free early education in the state maintained schools sector.
Turning to level 3 or higher results, in the policy evaluation regressions when we allow the
policy effect to differ for the two groups of LEAs, we found a significant negative policy effect
on results at level 3 or higher for the poorer LEAs, and a non significant positive effect in the
better off LEAs. Table 2.18 shows that the signs on the estimated coefficients for take-up of
‘other’ sector places by 3-year olds in each group of LEAs concur with the policy evaluation
regressions though in neither case are they significant.
We also see in Table 2.18 that there is some evidence that take-up of free early education
places in maintained nursery and primary schools by 4-year olds in the better off LEAs, has a
positive effect on the percentage of children in an LEA attaining level 3 or higher in their KS1
writing. The coefficient of 0.157 indicates that a 10%-point increase in the take-up rate of these
places by 4-year olds in the less deprived LEAs is associated with a 1.57%-point increase in the
percentage of children attaining level 3 or higher. To put this in context, as outlined above, the
mean take-up rate of free places in the maintained nursery and primary schools by 4-year olds
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in these less deprived LEAs is 76.10%, while the mean percentage of children attaining writing
level 3 or higher in these LEAs is 14.84% with a within standard deviation of 3.19. Therefore
the effect of a 10%-point increase in take-up is approximately equal to an increase of half of one
within standard deviation. As with reading at this level, though this result is found in both of
the balanced panel samples (see Appendix A.4, Table A.21), the level of significance increases
to 10% in the second sample, but unlike in the case of reading, the result is significant at the
5% level in the unbalanced panel sample. As with the corresponding effect on reading, when the
childcare variables are excluded the result remains, but only in the main sample (see Appendix
A.5, Table A.28). Again mirroring the case of reading at this level, when we exclude the 2006
data, the result becomes stronger, becoming significant at the 5% level in the sample 2 and
remaining so in the main sample and the unbalanced panel sample (see Appendix A.6, Table
A.34).
Therefore, the second main result is that there is a significant and robust effect of take-up
of free early education places in maintained nursery and primary schools, by 4-year olds in the
better off LEAs, on the percentage of children achieving level 3 or higher in KS1 reading and
writing. Again we see a common positive effect – almost identical in terms of the coefficient –
on reading and writing, of the state maintained nursery and primary school settings providing
free early education places, though in this case it is the higher level of attainment and the better
off LEAs.
It is also clear that for reading and writing regressions, the extra variation that comes from
including the actual take-up rates of free early education places in the ‘other’ sector rather than
just a simple dummy for the policy implementation does not lead to greater identification of the
policy effects. As shown in Tables 2.17 and 2.18, we cannot identify the effect of the introduction
of these non-school sector free places for results in either subject or at either level.
In the writing regressions, the covariates included to attempt to control for selection into
the group of LEAs that had the policy implemented earlier, are not always significant or of
the expected sign. In the regression for level 2B or higher attainment both the male economic
inactivity rate and the manufacturing jobs rate have negative coefficients of similar magnitude
to the corresponding coefficients in the reading regression at this level, however in the case of
writing, they are not quite significant. In the regression for level 3 or higher, the male wage and
economic inactivity variables – that were included for the reading regression at this level – are
not anywhere near significant and therefore dropped from the model in the interest of parsimony.
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However, the manufacturing jobs rate is included and has a significant positive coefficient. The
sign is in contrast to the case for reading at this level and is not what we would expect to be
the case.
In the regressions at each level, we find that the average class size for KS1 enters again
with a significant negative coefficient. For level 2B or higher the coefficient is -0.948 suggesting
that for every extra child added to the average class size, the percentage of children attaining
this level decreases by approximately 1%-point. While the coefficient on average KS1 class size
from the level 3 or higher regressions (-0.450) suggests that for every additional child added to
the average class size, the percentage attaining level 3 or higher falls by less than half of one
percentage point. Since the mean percentage of children attaining level 2B or higher in writing,
across all LEAs is 59.55% with a within standard deviation of 2.10, the effect is approximately
half of one within standard deviation. For level 3 or higher it is relatively even smaller since the
mean percentage attaining this level across all LEAs is 12.23% with a within standard deviation
of 2.99, thus the effect of increasing average class size by 1 child is less than one sixth of a
within standard deviation. Therefore, similarly to the case of reading, average KS1 class size
has a significant and robust effect on all levels of writing attainment, though again the effects
are relatively small in magnitude.
2.7.5 Maths
In the policy evaluation regressions with differing effects for the poorer versus the better off
LEAs, there was a significant negative policy effect for the poorer LEAs on attainment at level
2B or higher, and a positive but not significant effect for the better off LEAs. As we can see
from Table 2.19, the coefficient on take-up in the ‘other’ sector for the poorer LEAs is negative
but is not quite significant. However, the positive coefficient on take-up of ‘other’ sector places
by 3-year olds in the better off LEAs is significant at the 5% level. In magnitude the coefficient
is very small at 0.018, indicating that a 10%-point increase in the percentage of 3-year olds in
these LEAs taking a free early education place in a setting in the ‘other’ sector would lead to an
increase of less than one-fifth of one percentage point in the percentage of children attaining level
2B or higher in maths. The percentage of children attaining this level in maths in the better off
LEAs is 75.48% with a within standard deviation of 1.66. The effect of a 10%-point increase in
take-up is therefore equivalent to just under one ninth of a within standard deviation. Moreover,
while the result may be robust to the exclusion of the childcare variables (see Appendix A.5,
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Table A.26), it is not robust to the choice of sample (as can be seen in Appendix A.4, Table
A.19). Furthermore, the result is not robust to the exclusion of 2006 data (see Appendix A.6,
Table A.32).
At level 3 or higher, the policy evaluation regressions found a significant negative policy effect
in the poorer LEAs. Table 2.19 shows that we do still pick up this effect in the coefficient on
3-year olds take-up of ‘other’ sector places in the poorer LEAs, though the coefficient of -0.025
is just outside the 10% level of significance (p=0.102). Though this result is not robust to the
choice of sample (see Appendix A.4, Table A.22) or the exclusion of the childcare variables (see
Appendix A.5, Table A.29), it is robust to the exclusion of results year 2006 data (see Appendix
A.6, Table A.35) in which case it is significant at the 10% level. The coefficient suggests that a
10%-point increase in ‘other’ sector take-up in the poorer LEAs would decrease the percentage
of children attaining level 3 or higher by a quarter of one percentage point. To put this in
context, the mean take-up rate of ‘other’ sector places amongst 3-year olds in these LEAs is
13.85% and the mean percentage of children attaining level 3 or higher in maths in these LEAs
is 23.50% with a within standard deviation of 4.03, so the effect is around one sixteenth of a
within standard deviation.
Table 2.19 also shows that there is some evidence of an effect of take-up of free early education
places in maintained nursery and primary schools by 4-year olds in the better off LEAs on results
in maths at level 3 or higher. The coefficient of 0.155 suggests that a 10%-point increase in the
take-up of places in these settings by 4-year olds in these LEAs is associated with a 1.55%-point
increase in the percentage of children attaining level 3 or higher in maths. To provide some
context, the mean take-up rate in these school settings amongst 4-year olds in these LEAs is
76.10% and the mean percentage of children attaining level 3 or higher in maths in these LEAs
is 29.48% with a within standard deviation of 4.15, thus the effect is equivalent to just over one
third of a within standard deviation. It is noticeable that the coefficient is very similar to the
effect that we find for both reading and writing attainment at level 3 or higher in these better
off LEAs.
The result is largely robust to the choice of sample (see Appendix A.4, Table A.22) and also
to the exclusion of the childcare variables (see Appendix A.5, Table A.29) – indeed the result
is much stronger in all samples in this case. When excluding the results year 2006 data the
coefficient is just outside the 10% level of significance (p=0.103) in the main estimation sample
(see Appendix A.6, Table A.35).
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Therefore there is some evidence to suggest that the positive effect that we see for read-
ing and writing of early education places being taken in the maintained nursery and primary
school settings by 4-year olds in the better off LEAs is also present in maths – and of a similar
magnitude.
At each level, the covariates included to control for selection into the group of LEAs who
received the NEG first, are generally not significant. At level 2B or higher there is a slightly
significant effect of the manufacturing jobs rate, with a negative coefficient as we may expect.
However this is the only such variable that is significant and this is only at the 10% level and only
in the main sample. Including different variables in different combinations as controls does not
yield any significant coefficients for these variables. Similarly, at level 3 or higher, the particular
covariates we use as controls does not seem to make a difference – in the Tables 2.19, A.22 and
A.35 we use the same covariates as we use for the reading level 3 or higher regressions and none
are significant in any sample. Including different combinations of control variables does not yield
any significant effects of these variables. As we know from the reading and writing regressions
that there is variation in these control variables – it is not simply the case that they do not vary
sufficiently in any LEAs to be able to obtain any identification – their non-significance in the
maths regressions leads me to conclude that they are not having any significant impact on the
results in maths and therefore are not biasing the coefficients for either group.
As with the reading and writing regressions, the average class size at KS1 has a significant
negative effect on results at both levels for maths. For level 2B or higher, an increase of 1 child
in the average class size has the effect of reducing the percentage of children attaining this level
by 0.425%-points, which is just under one quarter of a within standard deviation (1.84). For
level 3 the effect is to reduce the percentage achieving this level by 0.726%-points, which is just
over one-sixth of a within standard deviation (4.09).
We can see that the proportion of children in the LEA at the time of the KS1 tests, who
are from non-white ethnic origin has a significant (at 1% level) negative effect on the proportion
of children attaining level 2B or higher in maths, though this only seems to affect level 2B or
higher as there is no measured effect on level 3 or higher attainment.
2.7.6 Discussion of the Implications of these Results
The policy evaluation regressions show that there is a significant effect on some subjects’ results
of the policy introduction but that it is not universal – the effect is different in the two groups
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of LEAs and only significant for the poorer LEAs. Common variation due to the year effects
accounts for much of the variation in results, with the remaining local variation insufficient to
identify a common policy effect in the simplest regressions. In several cases the policy has a
different signed effect between the groups and it appears that these effects counter act each other
such that when estimated as a single effect it is not significantly different to zero. In other cases
it is only a marginally significant effect in the poorer LEAs and not significant in the better
off LEAs such that when estimated as a single parameter the poorer LEAs’ effect is not strong
enough to identify a significant overall effect.
In terms of evidence of the policy effects working through the actual take-up rates of ‘other’
sector places themselves, it is only in maths scores that we see the significant policy effects
mirrored by the significant ‘other’ sector take-up rate impacts. In the better off LEAs there is a
positive (though not significant) policy effect for maths at level 2B or higher and this is echoed
and significant in the main sample estimation of the effect of the take-up rate of ‘other’ sector
places in these LEAs. For level 3 or higher results the policy evaluation regressions suggest a
negative policy effect on results in the poorer LEAs, and this effect is identified in the coefficient
on the take-up of ‘other’ sector places in these LEAs, in the more complex model regressions.
However, these maths results are sensitive to the choice of sample and do not remain in all of
the other robustness checks.
Looking at the more indirect effects, it appears that for both reading and writing the main-
tained nursery and primary school settings have a small but significant positive effect on attain-
ment at the intermediate level for the poorer LEAs when accessed by 3-year olds. These settings
are also associated with a larger and significant positive effect on attainment at the higher level
for the better off LEAs when accessed by 4-year olds.
However, for 4-year olds it is not possible to interpret this as a causal effect. The introduction
of free early education places for 3-year olds was a shock to the market for childcare and early
education for 3-year olds but much less so for 4-year olds. The choice of setting for 4-year olds
is likely to be much more influenced by the consideration of where the child will be for their
primary school education – the nursery and primary school settings for 4-year olds include the
reception class, which children can attend for between one and three terms depending on the
choice of the parents and the birthday of the child. Table 2.20 shows the percentage of 4-year
olds attending a nursery or primary school that are in an infant or reception class as opposed to
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a nursery class, for each region of England for 1998-200250 . It is clear that a large majority of
4-year olds in nursery and primary school settings are in fact in an infant or reception class in
the primary school – and thus in the school that they will attend for their primary education.
Therefore the choice to send the child to a maintained school setting rather than a private setting
at age 4 is likely to be strongly influenced by the parents’ preferences over primary schools and
therefore it is not appropriate to assume that within the LEA, allocation of 4-year olds to school
or ‘other’ sector settings is uncorrelated with unobservables. We would suspect there could be
a significant upward bias in the estimated effect: parents with strong preferences over their
child’s education are likely to try to get their 4-year old into a reception class in a particular,
good, primary school rather than use a free place in a private nursery setting. The children of
these parents are also more likely to achieve higher results due to the parental preferences over
education, leading to an upward bias in the coefficient on 4-year olds attendance of maintained
school places.
It is worth noting that this argument does not apply to the case of 3-year olds since it is
policy that attendance at a maintained school as a 3-year old does not have any influence on
the probability of gaining a place in the reception intake at that school. Thus the link between
early education place setting and primary school place does not exist for 3-year olds in the way
that it does for 4-year olds and is therefore much less likely to create a selection problem. In
theory the early education places for 3-year olds in the school and in the ‘other’, non-school,
settings are identical so a parent with strong educational preferences should view them as equal
and not select on this into either particular sector.
The effect of maintained school settings’ attendance by 3-year olds in the poorer LEAs on
their reading and writing results is in line with what our prior may be. I am comparing the
effect of attendance in one of the settings with staying at home and not attending any setting
and it appears that, compared with staying at home, a greater proportion of the LEA’s children
attending a maintained nursery setting aged 3 is associated with more children attaining the
expected level (i.e. at least level 2B) on their KS1 assessment. If we expect that the average home
environment for children in these poorer LEAs is less educationally beneficial to a child than
attendance part-time in a nursery school setting, then we would expect that increasing take-up
by 3-year olds in these LEAs would be associated with positive effects on child outcomes. Given
that reading and writing in particular are skills more readily advanced through nursery school
502001 is missing due to data non-collection in this year, this is also the case for 2004.
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attendance (as opposed to maths skills), we might expect that we would find effects on results
in these areas.
If we believe that for the better off LEAs, the quality of home inputs is on average better,
then it may be no surprise that attendance in more formal settings aged 3 or 4 does not seem to
affect the intermediate level of attainment but attendance at age 4 does have a significant effect
on attainment at the higher level – and for maths also. As discussed, there is likely to be an
upward bias in the coefficient due to selection. However, it is also consistent with the idea that
children who develop skills early can be encouraged to develop further and beyond expectations
in the more formal nursery and primary school settings whereas this may be more difficult at
home.
It is noticeable that the effects at level 3 are greater in magnitude and relative size than
the results at level 2B and again this could be due to an upward bias but is also in line with
what our prior may be. Bearing in mind that I am unable to distinguish between no effect at
all and an effect that is mitigated by the first two years of formal schooling, it is perhaps to
be expected that the first years of schooling would do a better job of mitigating any advantage
that nursery attendees had over their home-staying class mates at the intermediate level, to the
extent that the measured effect on KS1 results whilst statistically significant in the poorer LEAs,
is relatively small. For the higher level results, it may be more likely to be the case that the
advantage of early exposure to the formal educational setting remains, if this gives the platform
on which to build – with the initial schooling having a greater gap to make up if these children in
better off LEAs who attend early education places are in a better position to build on their early
advantage. As Table 2.20 shows that a large proportion of 4-year olds in nursery and primary
school settings are in fact in an infant or reception class in the primary school, the “result” for
4-year olds suggests that results are better at the higher levels for reading, writing and maths
in the better off LEAs when more children start school at age 4 rather than remaining at home
aged 4.
It has to be borne in mind that the measurement error issues outlined in section 2.6, would
suggest that the estimated coefficients are lower bounds for the estimates of the true parameters.
However, even taking this into account, in terms of policy implications conclusions are slightly
tempered by the magnitudes of the robust results that I find. As discussed above, if the take-up
of early education places in maintained nursery and primary schools, by 3-year olds in the poorer
LEAs, could be raised by 10%-points, the effect would be to increase the percentage attaining
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level 2B or higher in reading by just 0.6%-points and in writing by 0.7%-points. Over the time
of the panel, the mean percentage of children in these poorer LEAs attaining level 2B or higher
in reading is 65.68% with a within standard deviation of 1.66%-points - so we can see that even
a 10%-point change in take-up is making only a relatively small impact. Similarly the mean
attainment in these LEAs for writing level 2B is 56.30% with a within standard deviation of
2.19%-points thus even more so for writing, the impact of increasing take-up even by 10%-points
is relatively small.
One way in which to assess these findings is to consider what the estimated effect would
be, ceteris paribus, if all of the 3-year olds in the poorer LEAs who attend ‘other’ sector places
switched to maintained schools places. At the end of the panel, the median take-up of places in
the ‘other’ sector by 3-year olds in the poorer LEAs was 30.29% (mean 28.77%). If the take-up
in the maintained schools sector increased by 30%-points the effect on reading level 2B would be
to raise results by approximately 1.8%-points which is just over one within standard deviation.
For writing level 2B the effect of a 30%-point increase in maintained school place take-up would
be an increase of approximately 2.1%-points which is just under one within standard deviation.
Therefore this admittedly basic calculation (not taking into account capacity constraints or
allowing non-linear effects in increasing take-up) suggests that expanding the maintained schools
provision of places for 3-year olds in the poorer areas, in the stead of ‘other’ sector places, would
lead to a significant increase in reading and writing results.
One other way in which to assess the size of these significant parameters, is to compare the
effect of a 10%-point increase in the take-up rate of free early education places in the maintained
schools sector, by 3-year olds in the poorer LEAs, with the effect of reducing the average KS1
class size by one child51.
The effect of increasing take-up by 3-year olds in the poorer LEAs by 10%-points, would for
reading level 2B or higher, have an effect equivalent to reducing the average KS1 class size by
one child. Put in this context, we can see that though the effect of raising this take-up rate
seems very small, it is of the same order as reducing class size by one child. For writing level 2B
or higher, the effect of increasing take-up rate by 3-year olds in the poorer LEAs by 10%-points
is not quite as great in comparison to reducing the average class size. Such an increase in take-
up rate would correspond to a reduction of approximately three-quarters of one child, or put
another way, it would take an increase in the take-up rate by 3-year olds in the poorer LEAs, of
51Clearly this exercise makes the simplifying assumption that there is a monotonic effect of reducing KS1 class
sizes, which in reality is not likely to be the case.
63
approximately 14%-points to have an effect on results equivalent to a reduction by one child in
the average KS1 class size. Again, in this context, the seemingly small effects of an increase in
3-year olds in poor LEAs taking their free early education place in maintained schools settings,
is seen to be of more substantial size than initially thought.
Moreover, these results are in line with the EPPE study which found that nursery schools
and classes were the better pre-school environments for 3- and 4-year olds to attend prior to
compulsory schooling, which adds to their credence.
2.8 Conclusions
The aim of this study was to evaluate whether the policy of introducing free early education
places for all 3-year olds has had any impact on results at Key Stage 1, and moreover to see
whether there has been any additional effect in the areas deemed most in need of free early
education places. As the Government has invested in the Nursery Education Grant system to
allow the funding of places in private settings in order to circumvent problems of capacity in the
maintained sector, it is worth examining whether, in terms of educational outcomes, this has
been a successful policy.
In terms of whether the policy has had any overall effect, the policy evaluation regressions
revealed that it is only in the poorer LEAs that there are identifiable policy effects – so the areas
that the Government targeted were affected by the policy’s introduction.
Though the policy increased provision for 3-year olds in the non-schools sector – comprised
largely of private sector places – there were no measured robust effects of this increase on results
in reading or writing either overall or for either the more or less deprived LEAs when estimated
separately. There is slight evidence that increased use of the private sector for 3-year olds’ early
education actually had a negative effect on results in maths at the higher level for the poorer
LEAs but a positive effect on the level children are expected to attain in the better off LEAs.
My main finding is that there is a small but significant and robust positive effect of take-
up of free early education places in maintained nursery and primary schools, by 3-year olds in
the poorer LEAs, on the percentage of children attaining level 2B or higher in KS1 reading
and writing. Though quite small in magnitude (approximately one-third of a within standard
deviation), these effects are comparable to reducing average KS1 class size by almost one child
in the case of reading, and three-quarters of a child in the case of writing. The results suggest
that switching all provision of early education for 3-year olds to maintained school settings
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rather than private settings would increase results in reading and writing by approximately one
standard deviation in the poorer LEAs. My findings are in line with the EPPE study which
suggests that children attending maintained settings for pre-school perform better on school
entry and at age 7.
It is also cautiously concluded that there is a significant and robust positive effect of the
take-up of free early education places in maintained nursery and primary schools, by 4-year
olds in the better-off LEAs, on the percentage of children attaining level 3 or higher in KS1
reading, writing and maths. The effects are still small in absolute terms but represent increases
of three-quarters of a within standard deviation (reading), half of a within standard deviation
(writing) and one third of a within standard deviation (maths). Given that the majority of
4-year olds attending a free early education place in a maintained nursery or primary school are
actually attending a reception or infant class in a primary school, the results here suggest that,
in the better off LEAs, increasing the proportion of children who start primary school early has
a positive effect on KS1 results increasing the percentage of children who exceed expected levels
of attainment. However this “result” is only tentative due to concerns over an upward bias in
the estimated coefficient.
In terms of educational outcomes, the magnitude of the effect of increasing provision of free
places for 3-year olds is small, even in maintained settings, suggesting that improving results
alone may not necessarily be a justification for such universal provision. However, there are
other externalities associated with early education that need to be considered. These include
behavioural and socialisation gains from early education, and the development of non-cognitive
skills which then facilitate learning and allow children to make the most of the education that
they receive and the natural abilities that they have been endowed with. Moreover, there are
wider benefits accruing to children, parents and society as a whole, as a result of parents –
particularly single parents – being aided in returning to the labour market as a result of the free
early education places policy, in conjunction with other policies such as the childcare element of
the working tax credit.
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2.9 Full Description of Variables in the Tables
3-year olds early education (EE) take-up school (sch) sector (t) = percentage of the 3-year old population
in the LEA at time t that took a free early education place in a maintained nursery school or a nursery or infant
class in a maintained primary school.
3-year olds early education (EE) take-up ‘other’ sector (t) = percentage of the 3-year old population in
the LEA at time t that took a free early education place in with an alternative maintained or private, voluntary
or independent provider.
4-year olds early education (EE) take-up school (sch) sector (t+1) = percentage of the 3-year old
population in the LEA at time t+1 that took a free early education place in a maintained nursery school or a
nursery or infant class in a maintained primary school.
4-year olds early education (EE) take-up ‘other’ sector (t+1) = percentage of the 3-year old population
in the LEA at time t+1 that took a free early education place in with an alternative maintained or private,
voluntary or independent provider.
childcare places available: day nursery (dnp) (t) = percentage of the 3- and 4-year old population in the
LEA at time t that could have a place in a day nursery. Day nurseries look after children for up to the full working
day.
childcare places available: childminder (cmp) (t) = percentage of the 3- and 4-year old population in the
LEA at time t that could have a place with a childminder. Childminders look after children for up to the full
working day.
childcare places available: playgroup (pgp) (t) = percentage of the 3- and 4-year old population in the
LEA at time t that could have a place at a playgroup. Most playgroups run five sessions a week of between 2.5
and 4 hours. If sessions are run morning and afternoon children are only to attend either or.
3-year olds early education (EE) take-up school (sch) sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) = percentage of the
3-year old population in the LEA at time t that took a free early education place in a maintained nursery school
or a nursery or infant class in a maintained primary school, for the pathfinder group of LEAs to receive the NEG
funding for 3-year olds.
3-year olds early education (EE) take-up school (sch) sector ‘better off’ LEAs (t) = percentage of the
3-year old population in the LEA at time t that took a free early education place in a maintained nursery school
or a nursery or infant class in a maintained primary school, for the LEAs who were not in the pathfinder group
of LEAs to receive the NEG funding for 3-year olds.
3-year olds early education (EE) take-up ‘other’ sector (t) = percentage of the 3-year old population in
the LEA at time t that took a free early education place in with an alternative maintained or private, voluntary
or independent provider, for the pathfinder group of LEAs to receive the NEG funding for 3-year olds.
3-year olds early education (EE) take-up ‘other’ sector (t) = percentage of the 3-year old population in
the LEA at time t that took a free early education place in with an alternative maintained or private, voluntary
or independent provider, for the LEAs who were not in the pathfinder group of LEAs to receive the NEG funding
for 3-year olds.
4-year olds early education (EE) take-up school (sch) sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t+1) = percentage of
the 4-year old population in the LEA at time t+1 that took a free early education place in a maintained nursery
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school or a nursery or infant class in a maintained primary school, for the pathfinder group of LEAs to receive
the NEG funding for 3-year olds.
4-year olds early education (EE) take-up school (sch) sector ‘better off’ LEAs (t+1) = percentage of
the 4-year old population in the LEA at time t+1 that took a free early education place in a maintained nursery
school or a nursery or infant class in a maintained primary school, for the LEAs who were not in the pathfinder
group of LEAs to receive the NEG funding for 3-year olds.
4-year olds early education (EE) take-up ‘other’ sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t+1) = percentage of the 4-year
old population in the LEA at time t+1 that took a free early education place in with an alternative maintained
or private, voluntary or independent provider, for the pathfinder group of LEAs to receive the NEG funding for
3-year olds.
4-year olds early education (EE) take-up ‘other’ sector ‘better off’ LEAs (t+1) = percentage of the
4-year old population in the LEA at time t+1 that took a free early education place in with an alternative
maintained or private, voluntary or independent provider, for the LEAs who were not in the pathfinder group of
LEAs to receive the NEG funding for 3-year olds.
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) = % of working age males who are economically inactive
at time t.
manufacturing jobs rate (t) = % of total employed who are employed in manufacturing occupations at time
t.
median weekly gross pay, f-t male workers (t) = median weekly gross pay for male full time workers, all
industries/occupations at time t, £s.
average KS1 class size (t+3) = average class size for KS1 classes across the whole LEA at time (t+3) when
the children take their KS1 assessments.
% of non-white children (t+3) = percentage of children in maintained primary schools in the LEA who are
of non-white ethnic origin at time (t+3) when the children take their KS1 assessments.
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2.10 Tables
Table 2.3: Summary of Dependent Variables, Main Sample
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Observations Within Range
reading L3 overall 27.00 5.32 14.00 44.00 N = 464 Mean 4.77
between 4.91 15.25 41.00 n = 120 Median 5
within 2.03 18.50 32.25 T¯ = 3.87
reading L2B overall 68.83 4.99 53.00 82.00 N = 575 Mean 4.06
between 4.72 55.50 78.20 n = 120 Median 4
within 1.70 64.43 75.43 T¯ = 4.79
writing L3 overall 13.23 4.41 1.00 25.00 N = 464 Mean 7.12
between 3.24 6.50 22.00 n = 120 Median 7
within 2.99 2.98 18.73 T¯ = 3.87
writing L2B overall 59.55 5.52 44.00 72.00 N = 575 Mean 5.1
between 5.13 45.75 69.60 n = 120 Median 5
within 2.10 53.15 66.15 T¯ = 4.79
maths L3 overall 26.68 6.12 11.00 43.00 N = 464 Mean 10.06
between 4.54 16.00 38.75 n = 120 Median 10
within 4.09 13.93 34.93 T¯ = 3.87
maths L2B overall 73.82 4.76 58.00 86.00 N = 575 Mean 4.58
between 4.40 61.75 82.80 n = 120 Median 4
within 1.84 67.22 79.22 T¯ = 4.79
Notes: The within figures for minimum and maximum have the overall mean of the variable added back in to
make results comparable.
subject LX = percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained schools achieving level X or higher in thier
KS1 subject assessment.
subject ∈ {reading, writing, maths}
68
Table 2.4: Summary of Dependent Variables, Main Sample, separately by ‘pathfinder’ group
membership
‘pathfinder’ LEAs
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Observations Within Range
reading L3 overall 23.41 4.12 14.00 34.00 N = 217 Mean 4.54
between 3.71 15.25 30.67 n = 56 Median 4
within 1.90 16.16 27.41 T¯ = 3.88
reading L2B overall 65.68 4.56 53.00 76.00 N = 269 Mean 3.88
between 4.31 55.50 74.20 n = 56 Median 4
within 1.66 61.28 70.88 T¯ = 4.80
writing L3 overall 11.39 3.59 2.00 20.00 N = 217 Mean 6.63
between 2.30 7.00 17.25 n = 56 Median 7
within 2.76 3.89 16.89 T¯ = 3.88
writing L2B overall 56.30 5.24 44.00 71.00 N = 269 Mean 5.32
between 4.81 45.75 66.80 n = 56 Median 5
within 2.19 49.90 61.50 T¯ = 4.80
maths L3 overall 23.50 5.34 11.00 36.00 N = 217 Mean 10.09
between 3.54 16.00 31.50 n = 56 Median 10
within 4.03 11.50 30.50 T¯ = 3.88
maths L2B overall 70.79 4.49 58.00 81.00 N = 269 Mean 5.07
between 4.07 61.75 79.20 n = 56 Median 5
within 2.02 64.19 76.19 T¯ = 4.80
‘non-pathfinder’ LEAs
reading L3 overall 30.15 4.12 20.00 44.00 N = 247 Mean 4.97
between 3.52 22.75 31.00 n = 64 Median 5
within 2.14 21.65 35.40 T¯ = 3.86
reading L2B overall 71.59 3.48 60.00 82.00 N = 306 Mean 4.22
between 3.04 64.40 78.20 n = 64 Median 4
within 1.73 67.19 78.19 T¯ = 4.78
writing L3 overall 14.84 4.45 1.00 25.00 N = 247 Mean 7.55
between 3.11 6.50 22.00 n = 64 Median 8
within 3.19 4.59 20.34 T¯ = 3.86
writing L2B overall 62.41 3.95 49.00 72.00 N = 306 Mean 4.91
between 3.44 53.60 69.60 n = 64 Median 4
within 2.01 56.21 69.01 T¯ = 4.78
maths L3 overall 29.48 5.34 14.00 43.00 N = 247 Mean 10.03
between 3.38 23.00 38.75 n = 64 Median 10
within 4.15 16.73 37.73 T¯ = 3.86
maths L2B overall 76.48 3.11 66.00 86.00 N = 306 Mean 4.14
between 2.63 68.00 82.80 n = 64 Median 4
within 1.66 71.08 71.08 T¯ = 4.78
Notes: The within figures for minimum and maximum have the overall mean of the variable added back in to
make results comparable.
subject LX = percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained schools achieving level X or higher in thier
KS1 subject assessment.
subject ∈ {reading, writing, maths}
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Table 2.5: Level 2B or higher attainment: Main Sample, by year, separately by ‘pathfinder’ group membership
‘Pathfinder’ LEAs ‘Non-Pathfinder’ LEAs
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Difference in means
reading L2B 2001 52 65.06 4.75 53 75 reading L2B 59 70.47 3.33 62 78 reading L2B 2001 5.42
2002 55 64.84 4.62 54 74 62 70.53 3.27 60 77 2002 5.70
2003 54 65.02 4.44 53 74 60 71.00 3.11 61 76 2003 5.98
2004 53 66.42 4.55 55 75 61 72.48 3.49 65 80 2004 6.06
2005 54 68.31 4.27 60 76 63 74.60 3.14 67 81 2005 6.29
2006 55 67.07 4.14 60 76 64 73.38 3.29 67 82 2006 6.30
writing L2B 2001 52 54.58 5.44 44 68 writing L2B 59 60.51 3.94 49 68 writing L2B 2001 5.93
2002 55 55.29 5.23 44 66 62 61.65 3.85 50 68 2002 6.35
2003 54 58.06 5.17 44 71 60 64.02 3.62 54 72 2003 5.96
2004 53 57.60 4.95 46 69 61 63.36 3.92 52 71 2004 5.76
2005 54 57.56 4.96 47 69 63 64.14 3.72 56 74 2005 6.59
2006 55 55.98 4.76 46 65 64 62.50 3.57 56 71 2006 6.52
maths L2B 2001 52 72.35 4.00 64 81 maths L2B 59 77.20 2.69 67 82 maths L2B 2001 4.86
2002 55 72.11 4.19 63 80 62 77.37 2.59 70 83 2002 5.26
2003 54 69.56 4.40 58 78 60 75.47 2.82 66 81 2003 5.91
2004 53 71.45 4.41 63 80 61 77.18 3.44 69 86 2004 5.73
2005 54 70.26 4.65 62 82 63 76.41 3.00 68 84 2005 6.15
2006 55 68.58 4.33 62 78 64 75.23 3.25 68 82 2006 6.65
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Table 2.6: Level 3 or higher attainment: Main Sample, by year, separately by ‘pathfinder’ group membership
‘Pathfinder’ LEAs ‘Non-Pathfinder’ LEAs
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Difference in means
reading L3 2002 55 25.38 4.24 16 34 reading L3 62 32.29 3.87 22 44 reading L3 2002 6.91
2003 54 23.48 3.98 14 31 60 30.18 3.45 22 39 2003 6.70
2004 53 23.77 3.57 15 30 61 30.48 3.74 22 44 2004 6.70
2005 54 22.48 4.18 14 32 63 29.46 3.71 21 39 2005 6.98
2006 55 21.04 3.52 14 28 64 27.75 4.09 20 39 2006 6.71
writing L3 2002 55 7.45 2.46 2 13 writing L3 62 10.23 3.51 1 16 writing L3 2002 2.77
2003 54 13.69 2.93 9 20 60 17.22 3.73 6 25 2003 3.53
2004 53 13.21 2.70 7 19 61 16.67 3.39 7 24 2004 3.46
2005 54 12.69 2.86 7 20 63 16.59 3.19 11 29 2005 3.90
2006 55 11.31 2.37 7 18 64 15.34 3.39 9 25 2006 4.03
maths L3 2002 55 27.69 3.76 21 36 maths L3 62 33.13 3.30 26 43 maths L3 2002 5.44
2003 54 25.02 4.13 16 33 60 31.48 3.68 21 40 2003 6.46
2004 53 23.81 3.96 15 32 61 30.23 3.96 22 40 2004 6.42
2005 54 19.07 4.02 12 27 63 25.13 3.89 18 35 2005 6.05
2006 55 17.51 3.37 11 25 64 23.34 4.21 14 36 2006 5.83
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Table 2.7: Summary of Independent Variables, Main Sample
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Observations Within Range
3-year olds early education take-up, overall 43.09 24.17 1.02 104.26 N = 575 Mean 6.41
schools sector between 23.89 1.40 101.34 n = 120 Median 4.37
within 3.62 18.50 73.07 T-bar = 4.79
3-year olds early education take-up, overall 12.89 17.52 0.00 74.53 N = 575 Mean 35.72
‘other’ sector between 6.11 1.68 27.38 n = 120 Median 35.31
within 16.42 -14.49 66.41 T-bar = 4.79
4-year olds early education take-up, overall 81.71 11.99 43.38 108.65 N = 575 Mean 5.02
schools sector between 11.80 49.55 101.87 n = 120 Median 4.37
within 2.12 73.73 92.08 T-bar = 4.79
4-year olds early education take-up, overall 15.36 10.31 0.00 50.17 N = 575 Mean 6.03
‘other’ sector between 9.96 0.65 44.77 n = 120 Median 4.99
within 2.69 3.62 27.03 T-bar = 4.79
childcare places available: day nursery overall 9.20 4.11 0.00 28.00 N = 575 Mean 6.68
between 3.12 3.23 17.41 n = 120 Median 6.6
within 2.69 -0.82 20.29 T-bar = 4.79
childcare places available: childminder overall 10.22 4.47 1.94 29.58 N = 575 Mean 3.24
between 4.16 2.39 26.65 n = 120 Median 2.43
within 1.56 -0.19 20.18 T-bar = 4.79
childcare places available: playgroup overall 24.41 12.07 3.59 62.98 N = 575 Mean 8.45
between 11.41 6.53 52.81 n = 120 Median 6.84
within 3.95 2.22 39.72 T-bar = 4.79
Notes: The within figures for minimum and maximum have the overall mean of the variable added back in to
make results comparable.
See Full Description of Variables in the Tables, page 66, for definition of each variable.
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Table 2.8: Summary of Independent Variables, Main Sample, separately by ‘pathfinder’ group
membership
‘pathfinder’ LEAs
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Within Range
3-year olds EE take-up, overall 59.39 16.70 8.83 104.26 Mean 6.96
schools sector between 16.55 9.38 96.03 Median 5.06
within 3.25 34.79 76.76
3-year olds EE take-up, overall 13.85 15.01 0.00 69.82 Mean 28.79
‘other’ sector between 6.66 2.39 27.38 Median 30.66
within 13.45 -13.54 56.29
4-year olds EE take-up, overall 88.08 9.22 60.35 108.65 Mean 5.37
schools sector between 9.02 63.53 101.84 Median 4.89
within 2.23 81.62 98.45
4-year olds EE take-up, overall 9.69 7.68 0.00 4.42 Mean 5.79
‘other’ sector between 7.35 0.99 31.92 Median 4.79
within 2.52 2.31 21.36
childcare places available: overall 8.83 4.12 0.65 28.00 Mean 6.12
day nursery between 3.20 3.23 17.41 Median 5.56
within 2.59 -1.19 19.92
childcare places available: overall 8.04 3.19 1.94 20.29 Mean 2.74
childminder between 2.93 2.79 15.16 Median 1.99
within 1.30 2.40 18.01
childcare places available: overall 16.65 8.72 3.92 58.99 Mean 6.84
playgroup between 8.43 6.53 52.35 Median 5.87
within 3.08 3.95 30.66
Observations: N = 269 n = 56 T¯ = 4.80
‘non-pathfinder’ LEAs
3-year olds EE take-up, overall 28.77 20.34 1.02 104.02 Mean 5.92
schools sector between 20.41 1.40 101.34 Median 3.80
within 3.93 6.43 58.75
3-year olds EE take-up, overall 12.05 19.44 0.00 74.53 Mean 41.79
‘other’ sector between 5.49 1.68 25.34 Median 43.71
within 18.66 -13.29 65.57
4-year olds EE take-up, overall 76.10 11.33 43.38 104.86 Mean 4.71
schools sector between 11.28 49.55 101.87 Median 4.20
within 2.02 68.12 82.24
4-year olds EE take-up, overall 20.36 9.75 0.00 50.17 Mean 6.24
‘other’ sector between 9.41 0.65 44.77 Median 5.20
within 2.83 8.61 31.21
childcare places available: overall 9.52 4.07 0.00 22.22 Mean 7.17
day nursery between 3.03 3.31 15.25 Median 6.95
within 2.78 1.79 17.19
childcare places available: overall 12.13 4.55 1.98 29.58 Mean 3.68
childminder between 4.17 2.39 26.65 Median 2.82
within 1.75 1.73 19.55
childcare places available: overall 31.22 10.38 3.59 62.98 Mean 9.86
playgroup between 9.29 13.04 52.81 Median 8.73
within 4.58 9.04 46.54
Observations: N = 306 n = 64 T¯ = 4.80
Notes: The within figures for minimum and maximum have the overall mean of the variable added back in to
make results comparable. See page 66 for Full Description of Variables in the Tables.
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Table 2.9: Summary of Additional Independent Variables, Main Sample
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Observations Within Range
economic in activity rate, overall 16.14 5.55 0.00 40.10 N 575 Mean 7.12
working age males between 4.74 6.11 29.33 n 120 Median 6.64
within 2.93 6.68 26.90 T-bar 4.79
manfacturing jobs rate overall 16.54 6.70 1.81 41.01 N 575 Mean 6.02
between 6.22 3.53 33.26 n 120 Median 5.48
within 2.50 5.14 29.90 T-bar 4.79
median weekly gross pay, overall 405.11 63.13 266.10 679.00 N 575 Mean 72.53
full-time male workers, £s between 56.23 303.06 610.48 n 120 Median 70.75
within 28.57 306.15 519.55 T-bar 4.79
average KS1 class size overall 25.64 1.15 22.90 28.30 N 575 Mean 1.38
between 1.01 23.66 27.88 n 120 Median 1.30
within 0.55 24.06 28.10 T-bar 4.79
% of non-white children overall 18.51 21.36 0.00 80.91 N 574 Mean 4.81
between 21.16 0.94 77.47 n 120 Median 3.79
within 2.22 8.93 29.43 T-bar 4.78
Notes: The within figures for minimum and maximum have the overall mean of the variable added back in to
make results comparable.
See Full Description of Variables in the Tables, page 66, for definition of each variable.
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Table 2.10: Summary of Additional Independent Variables, Main Sample, separately by
‘pathfinder’ group membership
‘pathfinder’ LEAs
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Within Range
economic inactivity rate, overall 19.66 4.81 8.58 40.10 Mean 8.42
working age males between 3.51 12.77 29.33 Median 8.12
within 3.31 10.20 30.42
manfacturing jobs rate overall 16.79 7.50 3.10 41.01 Mean 6.37
between 7.06 6.78 33.26 Median 6.28
within 2.53 8.61 24.54
median weekly gross pay, overall 406.89 72.02 283.40 679.00 Mean 69.38
full-time male workers, £s between 66.20 313.62 610.48 Median 62.65
within 28.40 307.93 521.33
average KS1 class size overall 25.65 1.13 22.90 28.30 Mean 1.36
between 1.01 23.66 27.88 Median 1.30
within 0.53 24.53 27.35
% of non-white children overall 27.38 25.05 0.78 80.91 Mean 5.64
between 25.07 1.25 77.47 Median 5.53
within 2.50 19.74 38.30
Observations: N = 269 n = 56 T¯ = 4.80
‘non-pathfinder’ LEAs
economic inactivity rate, overall 13.05 4.15 0.00 35.49 Mean 5.99
working age males between 3.38 6.11 24.96 Median 5.61
within 2.56 4.94 23.58
manfacturing jobs rate overall 16.32 5.92 1.81 32.49 Mean 5.71
between 5.42 3.53 27.37 Median 5.08
within 2.48 4.92 29.68
median weekly gross pay, overall 403.54 54.20 266.10 577.10 Mean 75.30
full-time male workers, £s between 46.31 303.06 526.82 Median 76.45
within 28.77 344.72 480.82
average KS1 class size overall 25.63 1.16 22.90 28.00 Mean 1.40
between 1.03 23.66 27.40 Median 1.30
within 0.57 24.05 28.09
% of non-white children overall 10.75 13.36 0.00 64.69 Mean 4.08
between 13.12 0.94 58.64 Median 3.11
within 1.95 1.16 17.96
Observations: N = 306 n = 64 T¯ = 4.78
Notes: The within figures for minimum and maximum have the overall mean of the variable added back in to
make results comparable. See page 66 for Full Description of Variables in the Tables.
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Table 2.11: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Reading
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving the
specified level in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3)
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel (Level 2B or higher), 4 year panel (Level 3 or higher)
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
Independent Variable #1 #2 #1 #2
policy (t) -0.007 0.184
0.276 0.235
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.156 0.425†
0.320 0.266




year=2003 0.119 0.189 -2.208*** -2.322***
0.239 0.228 0.174 0.182
year=2004 1.791*** 1.783*** -1.784*** -1.833***
0.317 0.319 0.287 0.277
year=2006 2.471*** 2.463*** -4.587*** -4.635***
0.354 0.355 0.317 0.312
constant 67.969*** 67.969*** 29.046*** 29.046***
0.140 0.140 0.112 0.112
R2 within 0.397 0.398 0.61 0.611
R2 between 0.000 0.109 0.013 0.233
R2 overall 0.045 0.065 0.083 0.058
ρ 0.91 0.908 0.917 0.919
#obs 575 575 464 464
#groups 120 120 120 120
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust Standard Errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; † p=0.112
Notes: Model #1: common policy effect
Model #2: allowing for different effects of the policy in the ‘poorer’ and ‘better-off’ LEAs.
Interpretation of the coefficients: The dependent variable is the percentage of children in an
LEA’s maintained schools attaining the specified level in KS1 reading. The estimated coefficient
on the policy dummy in the pathfinder LEAs for level 3 or higher of 0.425 suggests that the intro-
duction of the policy in these LEAs is associated with a 0.425%-point increase in the percentage
of childrenin the LEA attaining level 3 or higher in reading at KS1.
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Table 2.12: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Writing
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving the
specified level in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3)
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel (Level 2B or higher), 4 year panel (Level 3 or higher)
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
Independent Variable #1 #2 #1 #2
policy (t) 0.255 -0.057
0.362 0.325
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.422 -0.728†
0.447 0.448




year=2003 3.221*** 3.143*** 6.625*** 6.941***
0.310 0.315 0.292 0.335
year=2004 2.804*** 2.813*** 6.268*** 6.403***
0.407 0.406 0.396 0.406
year=2006 1.454*** 1.463*** 4.612*** 4.746***
0.459 0.460 0.413 0.423
constant 57.752*** 57.752*** 8.911*** 8.909***
0.166 0.166 0.155 0.152
R2 within 0.355 0.356 0.76 0.764
R2 between 0.001 0.069 0.007 0.187
R2 overall 0.047 0.032 0.353 0.410
ρ 0.88 0.882 0.78 0.765
#obs 575 575 464 464
#groups 120 120 120 120
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust Standard Errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; † p=0.107
Notes: Model #1: common policy effect
Model #2: allowing for different effects of the policy in the ‘poorer’ and ‘better-off’ LEAs.
Interpretation of the coefficients: The dependent variable is the percentage of children in an
LEA’s maintained schools attaining the specified level in KS1 reading. The estimated coefficient
on the policy dummy in the pathfinder LEAs for level 3 or higher of -0.728 suggests that the intro-
duction of the policy in these LEAs is associated with a 0.728%-point decrease in the percentage
of childrenin the LEA attaining level 3 or higher in writing at KS1.
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Table 2.13: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Maths
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving the
specified level in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3)
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel (Level 2B or higher), 4 year panel (Level 3 or higher)
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
Independent Variable #1 #2 #1 #2
policy (t) -0.250 -0.469
0.285 0.346
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.722** -0.825**
0.331 0.407




year=2003 -2.265*** -2.045*** -2.002*** -1.834***
0.213 0.224 0.251 0.290
year=2004 -0.149 -0.173 -2.803*** -2.731***
0.350 0.346 0.422 0.425
year=2006 -2.605*** -2.630*** -9.516*** -9.445***
0.372 0.365 0.447 0.452
constant 74.984*** 74.985*** 30.592*** 30.591***
0.131 0.128 0.138 0.137
R2 within 0.438 0.451 0.841 0.842
R2 between 0.002 0.284 0.016 0.185
R2 overall 0.068 0.138 0.384 0.412
ρ 0.889 0.884 0.849 0.842
#obs 575 575 464 464
#groups 120 120 120 120
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust Standard Errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Model #1: common policy effect
Model #2: allowing for different effects of the policy in the ‘poorer’ and ‘better-off’ LEAs.
Interpretation of the coefficients: The dependent variable is the percentage of children in an
LEA’s maintained schools attaining the specified level in KS1 reading. The estimated coefficient
on the policy dummy in the pathfinder LEAs for level 3 or higher of -0.825 suggests that the intro-
duction of the policy in these LEAs is associated with a 0.825%-point increase in the percentage
of childrenin the LEA attaining level 3 or higher in maths at KS1.
78
Table 2.14: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Reading, Model #1
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving the specified level in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3)
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel (Level 2B or higher), 4 year panel (Level 3 or higher)
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t) 0.037** 0.017 -0.008 0.031
3-year olds early educ take-up, ‘other’ sector (t) 0.000 0.008 0.006 0.009
4-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t+1) -0.013 0.046 0.055 0.043
4-year olds early educ olds take-up, ‘other’ sector (t+1) -0.001 0.023 0.023 0.026
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.015 0.037 0.010 0.039
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.052 0.049 -0.035 0.043
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.011 0.017 -0.014 0.020
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.651*** 0.161 -0.765*** 0.169
year=2002 -0.168 0.163
year=2003 0.230 0.213 -1.959*** 0.158
year=2004 1.969*** 0.267 -1.444*** 0.253
year=2006 2.895*** 0.458 -4.062*** 0.426
constant 83.634*** 5.509 44.596*** 5.930
R2 within 0.432 0.641
R2 between 0.007 0.011




LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Interpretation of the coefficients: The key independent variables, 3-year olds and 4-year olds take-up rate of
free early education places in school and ‘other’ sector settings, are take-up rates expressed as percentages.
The dependent variable is the percentage of children in an LEA’s maintained schools attaining the specified level
in KS1 reading. The estimated coefficient on 3-year olds’ take-up of free early education places in maintained sch-
ools of 0.037 suggests that a 10%-point increase in the percentage of 3-year olds taking a free place in a maintained
school is associated with a 0.37%-point increase in the percentage of children in the LEA attaining level 2B or high-
er in reading at KS1.
See Full Description of Variables in the Tables, page 66, for definition of each variable.
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Table 2.15: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Writing, Model #1
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving the specified level in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3)
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel (Level 2B or higher), 4 year panel (Level 3 or higher)
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t) 0.011 0.019 0.012 0.024
3-year olds early educ take-up, ‘other’ sector (t) 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009
4-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t+1) -0.017 0.048 0.047 0.054
4-year olds early educ olds take-up, ‘other’ sector (t+1) 0.012 0.029 -0.030 0.030
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.010 0.045 0.055 0.044
childcare places available: childminder (t) -0.072 0.058 -0.037 0.063
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.005 0.019 -0.036 0.023
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.943*** 0.217 -0.456** 0.183
year=2002 0.830*** 0.229
year=2003 3.413*** 0.316 6.542*** 0.273
year=2004 3.090*** 0.371 6.069*** 0.333
year=2006 2.040*** 0.631 4.218*** 0.504
constant 83.215*** 6.441 17.426** 6.977
R2 within 0.398 0.770
R2 between 0.003 0.051




LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Interpretation of the coefficients: The key independent variables, 3-year olds and 4-year olds take-up rate of
free early education places in school and ‘other’ sector settings, are take-up rates expressed as percentages.
The dependent variable is the percentage of children in an LEA’s maintained schools attaining the specified level
in KS1 reading. The estimated coefficient on 3-year olds’ take-up of free early education places in the ‘other’ sec-
tor of 0.010 suggests that a 10%-point increase in the percentage of 3-year olds taking a free place in the ‘other’
sector is associated with a 0.10%-point increase in the percentage of children in the LEA attaining level 2B or high-
er in writing at KS1 (though it is not a statistically significant result).
See Full Description of Variables in the Tables, page 66, for definition of each variable.
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Table 2.16: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Maths, Model #1
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving the specified level in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3)
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel (Level 2B or higher), 4 year panel (Level 3 or higher)
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t) -0.013 0.024 -0.018 0.032
3-year olds early educ take-up, ‘other’ sector (t) 0.010 0.009 -0.004 0.012
4-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t+1) 0.010 0.039 0.070 0.047
4-year olds early educ olds take-up, ‘other’ sector (t+1) -0.025 0.026 -0.018 0.029
childcare places available: day nursery (t) -0.029 0.038 0.027 0.05
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.054 0.049 0.034 0.069
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.020 0.017 -0.002 0.028
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.348** 0.166 -0.697*** 0.168
% of non-white children (t+3) -0.129*** 0.046 -0.005 0.085
year=2002 0.037 0.178
year=2003 -1.964*** 0.226 -1.977*** 0.289
year=2004 0.093 0.317 -2.886*** 0.425
year=2006 -2.075*** 0.498 -9.282*** 0.641
constant 86.098*** 4.907 43.138*** 6.673
R2 within 0.459 0.846
R2 between 0.425 0.012




LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Interpretation of the coefficients: The key independent variables, 3-year olds and 4-year olds take-up rate of
free early education places in school and ‘other’ sector settings, are take-up rates expressed as percentages.
The dependent variable is the percentage of children in an LEA’s maintained schools attaining the specified level
in KS1 reading. The estimated coefficient on 3-year olds’ take-up of free early education places in the ‘other’ sec-
tor of 0.010 suggests that a 10%-point increase in the percentage of 3-year olds taking a free place in the ‘other’
sector is associated with a 0.10%-point increase in the percentage of children in the LEA attaining level 2B or high-
er in maths at KS1 (though it is not a statistically significant result).
See Full Description of Variables in the Tables, page 66, for definition of each variable.
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Table 2.17: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Reading, Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving the specified level in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3)
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel (Level 2B or higher), 4 year panel (Level 3 or higher)
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err Coeff. Rob. St. Err
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.059** 0.024 0.033 0.043
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.037 0.023 -0.024 0.037
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.013 0.015 0.000 0.012
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.010
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.005 0.058 -0.055 0.050
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.021 0.068 0.159** 0.069
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.027 0.038 0.047 0.033
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.000 0.028 0.011 0.040
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.014 0.036 -0.012 0.040
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.060 0.052 -0.02 0.043
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.012 0.016 -0.015 0.020
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.057** 0.026 -0.031 0.028
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.046* 0.027
median weekly gross pay, male f-t workers (t) 0.009* 0.005
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.668*** 0.164 -0.779*** 0.166
year=2002 -0.222 0.171
year=2003 0.248 0.236 -2.007*** 0.190
year=2004 1.935*** 0.315 -1.557*** 0.274
year=2006 2.843*** 0.524 -4.220*** 0.510
constant 85.024*** 5.254 41.508*** 6.189
R2 within 0.447 0.655
R2 between 0.189 0.453




LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Interpretation of the coefficients: The key independent variables are take-up rates expressed as percentages. The dep. var is the % of
children in an LEA’s maintained schools attaining the specified level in KS1 reading. The estimated coefficient on ‘poorer’ LEAs’
3-year olds’ take-up of free EE places in maintained schools of 0.059 suggests that a 10%-point increase in the % of 3-year olds taking
a free place in a school is associated with a 0.59%-point increase in the % of children in the LEA attaining L2B+ in KS1 reading.
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Table 2.18: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Writing, Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving the specified level in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3)
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel (Level 2B or higher), 4 year panel (Level 3 or higher)
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.070** 0.031 0.016 0.039
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.012 0.020 -0.011 0.028
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.005 0.017 -0.016 0.015
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.009
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.056 0.061 -0.008 0.069
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.009 0.073 0.157** 0.077
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.029 0.057 -0.020 0.045
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.020 0.033 -0.001 0.039
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.008 0.045 0.029 0.044
childcare places available: childminder (t) -0.060 0.060 -0.034 0.063
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.009 0.019 -0.039* 0.023
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.047 0.029
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.061 0.039 0.082** 0.041
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.948*** 0.228 -0.450** 0.174
year=2002 0.754*** 0.230
year=2003 3.433*** 0.350 6.890*** 0.330
year=2004 3.084*** 0.426 6.582*** 0.406
year=2006 2.048*** 0.717 4.927*** 0.598
constant 84.247*** 6.243 13.768* 7.005
R2 within 0.410 0.779
R2 between 0.162 0.321




LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Interpretation of the coefficients: see Table 2.17
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Table 2.19: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Maths, Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving the specified level in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3)
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel (Level 2B or higher), 4 year panel (Level 3 or higher)
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.021 0.037 0.016 0.043
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.014 0.034 -0.051 0.039
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.020 0.014 -0.025† 0.015
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.018** 0.008 -0.003 0.013
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.022 0.054 -0.014 0.061
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.060 0.049 0.155** 0.072
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.056 0.040 0.029 0.041
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ‘better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.028 0.029 -0.020 0.047
childcare places available: day nursery (t) -0.033 0.038 0.010 0.050
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.067 0.047 0.050 0.069
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.022 0.018 -0.007 0.029
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.010 0.023 0.028 0.036
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.052* 0.029
median weekly gross pay, male f-t workers (t) 0.005 0.006
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.425** 0.164 -0.726*** 0.170
% of non-white children (t+3) -0.120*** 0.045 0.005 0.086
year=2002 0.041 0.186
year=2003 -1.766*** 0.236 -1.869*** 0.307
year=2004 0.200 0.340 -2.819*** 0.432
year=2006 -2.023*** 0.535 -9.270*** 0.671
constant 88.156*** 4.680 40.709*** 6.550
R2 within 0.482 0.850
R2 between 0.627 0.427




LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; † p=0.102
Notes: Interpretation of the coefficients: see Table 2.17
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Table 2.20: The Percentage of 4-year olds in nursery and primary school who are in an infant
or reception class in a primary school, by Government Office Region and Year∗
1998 1999 2000 2002
ENGLAND 70.41 71.31 72.23 75.01
NORTH EAST 69.51 68.73 69.79 70.65
NORTH WEST 75.16 74.92 75.35 76.93
YORKSHIRE AND THE HUMBER 61.14 61.99 62.11 67.74
EAST MIDLANDS 59.01 60.98 66.08 69.42
WEST MIDLANDS 73.88 73.99 73.91 75.09
EAST OF ENGLAND 66.33 67.98 69.82 75.20
LONDON 61.47 64.29 65.53 68.20
INNER LONDON 60.12 66.09 67.35 68.15
OUTER LONDON 62.28 63.21 64.33 68.23
SOUTH EAST 79.26 79.65 80.19 82.87
SOUTH WEST 88.75 89.37 89.25 89.97
* Data unavailable for 2001 and 2004
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2.11 Figures
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Figure 2.2: Differences in Attainment: how much higher are the Non-Pathfinder LEAs’ Results













































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year that the children take their KS1 tests
reading L2B writing L2B
maths L2B










































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year that the children take their KS1 tests
reading L3 writing L3
maths L3
L3 or higher attainment
86
Figure 2.3: Percentiles of the Take-Up Rate of Free Early Education Places by 3-year olds in
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Figure 2.4: Percentiles of the Take-Up Rate of Free Early Education Places by 3-year olds in
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The Causal Effect of Education on
Wages Revisited
3.1 Introduction
This paper estimates the causal impact of education on wages using two alternative methods of
instrumentation. I compare estimates that are derived using variations in schooling associated
with early smoking behaviour, with estimates derived by exploiting the impact on schooling of
the raising of the minimum school leaving age. The latter instrument follows in the tradition
of Card (1995) and similar papers1, which use institutional factors or elements of the budget
constraint to create instruments. This earlier research using instrumental variable methods
covers a wide range and my work here is motivated by the worry that these instrumental variable
methods identify a ‘local average treatment effect’ which might be rather different to the average
effect on the treated and that will differ across instruments. These IV estimates isolate the
return to education for the group whose education decision is most affected by the institutional
feature exploited or the change in their own budget constraint, which may be quite a specific
and unrepresentative group. The raising of the minimum school leaving age affected only those
who that had wanted to leave school early and therefore, in this case, IV estimates the effects
of additional schooling for those at the bottom of the schooling distribution who were forced to
stay longer. In contrast, I find that early smoking affects the schooling decisions of individuals
1The first notable paper to use instrumental variables to estimate the return to education was Angrist and
Krueger (1991). A UK study by Harmon and Walker (1995 inter alia) also exploited the minimum school leaving
age change.
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across the whole of the distribution – that is, it is not only individuals at a certain point in the
schooling distribution who are affected. I interpret the estimates from this latter exercise as closer
to an average effect of additional schooling akin to least squares but corrected for endogeneity.
My contribution is to investigate the extent to which this effect differs from the local effect at
the bottom of the distribution, implementing the alternative instrumental variables strategies
using the same data from the British Household Panel Survey. In addition, as I have multiple
instruments I am able to test the validity of the exclusion restrictions, something that is rarely
possible to do, and also to simultaneously exploit two differing sources of exogenous variation
in order to derive a further estimate of the return to education. The next section introduces
the problem of estimating the return to education, section 3.3 then discusses potential solutions.
Section 3.4 proposes early smoking as an instrument for education, before Section 3.5 describes
the data. Section 3.6 explains the estimation procedure, section 3.7 the results and section 3.8
analyses these results and considers various tests of the instrument. Section 3.9 then compares
the smoking instrument estimates with ones derived from the raising of the school leaving age,
and then section 3.10 exploits the presence of two instruments to formally test the validity of
these instruments. Section 3.11 offers some concluding remarks.
3.2 The Problem of Estimating the Return to Education




iϕ+ βSi + i (3.1)
in which wi is the wage, Xi is a vector of the individual’s characteristics, including experience
and experience-squared, and Si is the number of years of schooling, determined by:
Si = X
′
iγ + ui (3.2)
This human capital earnings function tells us the expected (log) wage that an individual will
earn given his/her observable characteristics and years of education. It is well known that if
this relationship in equation (3.1) is estimated by least squares the estimate of the parameter
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β can only be interpretable as the causal effect on wages of one additional year of schooling
if E(Xi i) = 0 and E(Si i) = 0. If however E(Si i) 6= 0, though we can still interpret the
equation as the conditional expectation of ln wi given Xi and Si, we cannot interpret β as the
causal effect of education on wages since education is endogenous with respect to the causal
effect β. The potential for the unobserved characteristics which determine schooling choice to
also be correlated with wage, has for a long time been a concern to labour economists. If we
are to draw valid conclusions regarding the economic return to education we must isolate the
causal effect of education on wages. Clearly this is not straightforward because of this concern:
we anticipate that factors affecting the education choice an individual makes also independently
affect their earned wage, we expect E(ui i) 6= 0.
Earlier research concentrated on the issue of ‘ability bias’ which suggested that E(Si i) > 0
because the residual picks up ability which is positively correlated with both wages and school-
ing. This ability bias explanation suggested that OLS was unambiguously biased upwards. In
contrast, in his influential paper of 1977, Griliches proposed that measurement error in the
schooling variable would lead to an attenuation of the OLS coefficient on schooling, biasing it
towards zero. Griliches concluded that ‘ability bias’ was in reality small and was overwhelmed
by the bias introduced by measurement error, with the result that OLS under-estimated the
actual return to education. Card (1994) reported that in the micro-survey data commonly used
by labour economists, measurement error in the schooling variable accounts for approximately
10 percent of the variance in observed schooling. This would lead to a 10 percent attenuation
bias in the OLS coefficient – and even more if other covariates in the regression are correlated
with the real level of schooling (Card, 1994). This estimate of around 10% concurs with evidence
from Ashenfelter and Kreuger (1995) (using data from twins and reporting the measurement
error to be between 8% and 12%), and furthermore, studies in which the education variable is
deemed to be much more reliably measured (for example Uusitalo, 1999, in which the schooling
information comes directly from school records) still find the IV estimates to be considerably
higher than the OLS.
At the start of the 1990s, a number of economists suggested that OLS estimates of the return
to education may suffer from a further bias – ‘discount rate bias’ (see Lang, 1993; Card, 1994).
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In Becker’s model of human capital formation, with standard assumptions2, an individual will
accumulate human capital to the point where the marginal rate of return on the last unit of
education is equal to his/her discount rate. To illustrate this: (see Kling 2000) assume that the
individual’s earnings opportunities are summarized by the function y=g(S) which specifies the
earnings available for each level of education, S. Further assume that individuals earn nothing
whilst in school, and discount the future at a constant rate r. Then in deciding upon the level of







As standard in the literature, taking the log of this to be the individual’s utility function over
(S), having substituted y out of the utility function, gives:
U∗(S) = log(g(S)) − rS − log(r) ≡ log(g(S)) − φ(S) (3.4)
where φ(S) = log(r) + rS. The optimal level of schooling is determined where the marginal








If we further assume that g(S) is log-concave then this solution equates the marginal rate of
return to schooling with the individual’s discount rate.
An individual’s discount rate reflects both his/her access to finance to fund current in-
vestment in education whilst deferring earnings and also his/her rate of time preference. If
individuals differ in their preferences and in their financial resources, this will result in different
discount rates and lead to variation in the point at which they stop acquiring education – a
higher discount rate resulting in a lower optimal level of education. Therefore schooling level
choice may differ amongst individuals of the same ability because of differences in individual
discount rates (Lang, 1993). The natural question that arises is: what effect will discount rate
variation have on the OLS estimates of the return to schooling – does the unobserved discount
2i) workers maximize the discounted present value of lifetime wealth; ii) time in school is independent of time
in work, or alternatively lifetimes are infinite; iii) there are no direct costs of education; iv) effect of experience
on earnings is multiplicative.
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rate that affects education also affect wages?
Intuition tells us that there is reason to believe that it might. It could be the case that
individuals who have a higher discount rate because of their rate of time preference, have more
ambition or determination to get into the labour market and earn money. This drive is rewarded
in higher wages and also these individuals are more likely to choose career paths with steep
wage curves. Consequently a higher discount rate is associated with lower education but also
a higher wage controlling for education, thus E(ui i) < 0. In this case the OLS estimation
of the return to education is negatively biased. However, it may be that the opposite is true:
Munasinghe and Sicherman (2000) present strong evidence from the NLSY3 that smoking can
proxy for rate of time preference, and that after controlling for a rich set of covariates, smokers
(high discount rate individuals) experience lower initial wages and lower wage growth than non-
smokers (low discount rate), which would suggest that high discount rate individuals are not
selecting into steep wage growth occupations. If the wages of high discount rate individuals
are lower (conditional on education) and grow more slowly then OLS estimates will be upward
biased.
Discount rate and ability are both sources of variation in levels of schooling, moreover these
two sources of variation interact in a complex way. Momentarily ignoring the demographic
and background characteristics in X that affect schooling, the demand for schooling function is
S=S(a, r): schooling level choice depends positively on the individual’s innate ability (a) and
negatively on their discount rate (r). We can invert this function to get innate ability as a
function of schooling and the discount rate: a=a(S, r). So “. . . even if the discount rate and
innate ability are uncorrelated, they are correlated once we condition on the level of schooling.
For a given level of schooling, individuals with higher discount rates will have more innate ability”
(Lang, 1993, p10). While a higher discount rate reduces an individual’s level of schooling, when
we hold that level of schooling constant, those with higher discount rates will have higher ability
and this will be rewarded with a higher wage. Recalling the model, this makes sense: we know
that if two individuals have chosen the same level of schooling it means that for each, at that
point, the marginal return to schooling is equal to their discount rate. Thus the individual with
the higher discount rate has a higher marginal return at that level of education, indicating that
3National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, US data
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they have higher ability. Therefore a higher value of discount rate will reduce schooling, but
conditional on schooling in the wage equation, a higher discount rate will mean higher ability and
a higher wage: thus E(ui i) < 0. Therefore this potential mechanism through which discount
rate affects the joint process of education and earnings again suggests a negative bias in the OLS
estimates. If both ability bias and discount rate bias affect the OLS estimate of the return to
education but work in opposite directions, then a priori we cannot determine what the net bias
in the coefficients will be. It is possible that the OLS is higher or lower than the ‘true’ return
to education.
3.3 Solving the Endogeneity Problem
Over many years, economists have attempted solve the problem of the endogeneity of education
in a number of ways. Firstly, a number of studies attempt to control for the effect of ability bias
directly by including measures of ability such as IQ and other test scores in the model. However,
aside from concerns over whether these types of variables are a good proxy for wage earning
ability, Lang (1993) demonstrates that depending on the functional form chosen for the earnings
equation, adding ‘ability’ variables to the model may not necessarily improve their explanatory
power and in fact may result in perverse signs for the these variables. The variety of findings in
the empirical literature (see Lang, 1993) for the signs and significance of these variables justified
Lang’s concerns. Moreover this ‘ability’ variable ‘solution’ does nothing to counter the problem
of discount rate bias.
Another approach is to use twins or siblings and exploit differences in their education levels
and earnings under the assumption that using twins (especially identical twins) or siblings,
eliminates differences in innate ability, and provides an unbiased estimator of the return to
education. However, Bound and Solon (1998) argue forcefully that the twins methodology is
problematic, highlighting a number of non-trivial issues. Moreover, this strategy also constrains
us to the assumption that twins/siblings are identical with respect to discount rates – which
unlike ability (which is arguably genetic) is a taste parameter and so this would appear to be
an even stronger assumption. A further concern for this approach is that when identification
relies on differences in education, there are two points at which measurement error can occur,
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consequently identifying the return to education through differences in education is likely to
be subject to greater measurement error (Harmon and Walker, 1995). Therefore it is far from
certain that twin studies can offer a solution and return an unbiased estimate of the return to
education.
An alternative strategy which has been the focus of much of the literature, is to identify a
variable (or ideally a set of variables) which affect schooling but do not independently enter into
the earnings equation and are uncorrelated with the error term in the wage equation. If such
variable(s) can be found, then they can be used to construct instrumental variables estimates of
the return to education. We will only arrive at a consistent estimator for the return to education
if the model is statistically identified. Recalling the model from the start of this section, the
moment conditions that we want to impose:
E(Xii) = 0⇒ E((lnwi −X
′
iϕ− βSi)Xi) = 0 (3.6)
E(Sii) = 0⇒ E((lnwi −X
′
iϕ− βSi)Si) = 0 (3.7)
would be sufficient to identify the model’s parameters – providing us with a consistent estimator
for β. The corresponding sample moments provide K equations to estimate K parameters,
therefore we can estimate ϕˆ and βˆ. However, when we know E(Si i) 6= 0 the lower equation
no longer holds and we do not have enough equations to solve for the number of parameters
to be estimated. The instrumental variables solution is to use the instrument to derive an
additional moment condition that does hold, and replace E(Si i) = 0 and its corresponding
sample moment condition with the new condition.
If such an instrument, Sˆi, can be found then the violated moment condition can be replaced
with E((ln wi - X
′
iϕ - β Si)Sˆi) = 0. Provided Sˆi is not a linear combination of the Xis then the
corresponding sample moment condition along with the other non-violated moment conditions
will be sufficient to identify the parameters ϕˆ and βˆ.
Allowing heterogeneity across individuals in marginal costs of education (due to differences
in discount rates) and in marginal returns to education, according to individual characteristics
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in the vectors X and Z, we can write:
g′(S)
g(S)
= bi; bi = Xiγ1 + u1i (3.8)
φ′(S) = r = ri + kS; k ≥ 0; ri = Xiγ2 + Zipi + u2i (3.9)
Marginal returns to school are constant, whereas the marginal costs of schooling are increasing
in the level of schooling. This is plausible if individuals can finance education initially from fam-
ily resources, then perhaps from government funding and later only through their own private
sources, and if the time and psychic costs of education increase with the level of the qualifica-
tion/education in question. Equating equations (3.8) and (3.9) gives an explicit solution for the




= Xiγ˜ + Zip˜i + ui (3.10)
We can get back to the Mincerian specification of the human capital earnings function
(equation (3.1)) by integrating the marginal benefits of education over the years of education
(and here we specify explicitly the heterogeneity in returns across individuals by allowing the β




ds = log(yi) = ai + bisi = Xiϕ+ Siβi + i (3.11)
In this model, we can have ability influencing individual earnings both through the individ-
ual intercept term ai (this is the ‘unobserved ability’ that has been the focus of much of the
literature), and through the marginal benefit of an additional year of education captured in bi,
which varies according to the individual’s characteristics. Any candidate instrument must be
independent of the individual ability intercept term ai, which means that Zi must be orthogonal
to i (and indeed to ui). The IV estimate – based on 2SLS in which the first stage is estimated
by (3.10) and the second stage is estimated by (3.11) – of the schooling coefficient β is a weighted
average of the marginal returns to education (the βi) for those whose schooling choice is influ-
enced by the instrument, conditional on X. In order to give this LATE interpretation, there is a
monotonicity requirement that all individuals have the same signed response to the instrument
i.e. in the case of RoSLA this is that p˜i is greater than or equal to zero for all individuals i.e.
no-one chooses less education as a result of the change in the minimum school leaving age.
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There is a large literature in this area in which a number of instruments have been used.
Many studies are reviewed in Card (2000). Some studies exploit institutional features or policy
changes while others rely on variations in costs across individuals (in each case these instruments
alter the marginal cost functions ri). The latter includes instrumenting using college proximity
(for example, Card, 1995), while the former group includes the seminal Angrist and Krueger
(1991) paper exploiting differences in schooling owing to the interaction of quarter-of-birth and
state variation in when children have to commence compulsory schooling.
While IV has the advantage that we can potentially derive estimates purged of the biases
discussed above, it also has some shortcomings. Weak instruments (that is, those that although
uncorrelated with wages are hardly correlated with schooling) and invalid instruments (those
that although correlated with schooling, may also be correlated with wages) may be worse than
no instruments at all.
Some authors (Staiger and Stock, 1997, and Bound et al., 1995) have highlighted that many
existing instrumental variables studies have been undermined by a lack of precision in their first
stage estimates. If the instrument used is only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor
(schooling) then the IV estimates are potentially as biased as the OLS estimates. Bound and
Jaeger (1996) show how quarter-of-birth interactions with state and year, used in Angrist and
Krueger (1991), form weak instruments that cause IV to be more biased that OLS.
Further, Bound et al. (1995) show that even a small correlation between the instrument
and the error term in the wage equation can result in a large bias in the IV estimates even in
large samples. This problem is compounded if the instrument is weak: the magnitude of the
bias in the IV approaches the bias in the OLS as the R2 from the first stage regression of the
endogenous explanatory variable on the instruments approaches zero. While this R2 statistic
in not routinely reported, the problem of weak instruments may be quite prevalent since most
of the IV studies surveyed in Card (2000) suffer from imprecision and the IV returns are not
significantly different to those from OLS. Since the work of Staiger and Stock, Bound et al. and
more recently Stock and Yogo (2004), it has become more common to report the first stage
R2 and the F -statistic on the exclusion of the instruments from the first stage, which help to
establish the relevance of a candidate instrument. Therefore it it is crucial to establish that
there is a strong relationship between the instrument and the endogenous regressor (schooling)
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i.e. that the instrument is relevant.
However, it is not routinely possible to test an instrument for correlation with the error term
in the wage equation (i.e. test the validity) as to do that we would first need to estimate the
wage equation to give us a valid error term which requires a consistent estimator for ϕ and β,
but we can only find a consistent estimator if we have an alternative instrument that we know is
valid and strong in the first place. The advantage in having multiple instruments – as I have in
this study – is that this allows me to determine the validity of the preferred instrument (early
smoking), exploiting the validity of the other instrument available (RoSLA).
An additional problem with the IV strategies is that what they capture is a ‘local average
treatment effect’ (LATE), as outlined above in the formal modelling. The basic problem is that
while OLS provides an estimate of the average marginal return to another year of schooling,
the IV estimator provides a weighted average marginal return to another year of schooling
with the weighting determined by the extent to which individuals’ behaviour is changed by the
‘treatment’ (Angrist and Imbens, 1995). Card (1998) notes that depending on whether the
marginal returns to education for individuals in the ‘treatment’ group are higher or lower than
the average marginal return to education, the IV estimator may over- or under-estimate the
average marginal return to education for the population as a whole. In these circumstances
it is not possible to generalise from the IV estimates to all individuals. Prior to Angrist and
Imbens formalisation of LATE reasoning, Lang’s (1993) paper, in which the term ‘discount rate
bias’ was first used, criticised Angrist and Krueger (1991) on the basis that what they were
identifying was in fact a LATE, though Lang termed it ‘discount rate bias’. Kling (2000) has
demonstrated how Card’s 1995 paper using the proximity of a four-year college to instrument for
education does indeed capture the return for less advantaged families whose schooling decisions
were most effected by the reduced cost associated with a college being nearby. This was Card’s
intuition in the paper, and Kling has formally shown that Card’s estimates do indeed capture a
LATE. This is not necessarily a problem – the estimate is not invalid, however it does affect the
interpretation. Card captures a LATE and from a policy perspective it is an important LATE
to know.
I have already argued that, for a given level of education, those with higher discount rates
will have higher ability. Therefore when we take a given level of education, for example the 10
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years education that was the minimum prior to the date when the school leaving age in England
was raised from 15 to 16, those with high discount rates will have greater ability than those who
choose to leave at 15 because of low returns to education. Thus to the extent that individuals
in the low education group have high discount rates because of higher than average costs of
education rather than lower than average returns to education, LATE reasoning suggests that
IV estimates that isolate this group will find returns that are higher than the average marginal
return to education, and may be higher than the OLS estimates (Lang, 1993; Card, 2001).
Alternatively, one could argue that the majority of individuals in this group whose behaviour
is affected by the raising of the school leaving age, are low discount rate, low ability and would
have located at the minimum prior to the raising of the school leaving age because their return to
schooling has fallen to the same (low) level as their discount rate already. In this case, we would
expect that the IV estimates of the return to education would be below the average marginal
return to an additional year of education. Figure 3.1 shows the education leaving age density
when the minimum school leaving age is 15 compared with when it is 16. It is clear that in the
upper ranges the densities are very similar, and that the increase in minimum school leaving age
affects only the lower part of the distribution of leaving ages. This concurs with the evidence
of Chevalier et al. (2004) who use a large sample of data from the General Household Survey
(GHS) and find – using a number of tests of the equality of distributions – that RoSLA only
affected the attainment of those at the bottom of the schooling distribution, there was not a
ripple effect further up. Similarly, Oreopoulos (2006) concludes that the earlier (1947) RoSLA
only affected the lower part of the distribution, and Harmon and Walker (1995) using both the
1947 and 1973 RoSLA find that only the lower portion of the distribution is affected. Whether
these individuals affected by the policy are predominantly high discount rate or predominantly
low ability will determine whether we expect the IV estimate from the raising of the school
leaving age to be higher or lower than OLS.
Therefore it is important to identify an instrument that avoids these three prominent prob-
lems: being correlated with the structural equation error term, being only weakly correlated
with the endogenous regressor or capturing a LATE that is not informative when it comes to
answering the question we want to ask – what Murray (2006) terms the bad, the weak and the
ugly instruments.
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3.4 Instrumenting Education Using Early Smoking
3.4.1 Theory
Evans and Montgomery (1994) proposed using whether or not an individual smoked when they
were young as an instrument for schooling4. The intuition for the instrument starts from the
acknowledgement that just as schooling is not randomly assigned across the population, the
decision to engage in (un)healthy habits is not randomly distributed. Evans and Montgomery
note that “one of the most persistent relationships in health economics is that more educated
people have better health and better health habits” (1994, p1). This view is supported by
a number of reviews of the empirical evidence on the link between health and education by
Grossman (see Grossman, 2005). After extensively reviewing the evidence Grossman concludes
that that completed years of formal schooling is the most important correlate of good health,
and this statement applies whether health is being measured by mortality rates, morbidity
rates, self-evaluated health status or psychological well being (Grossman, 2000). In the UK,
Oreopoulos (2006) uses data from the General Household Survey (GHS) which asks individuals
to self-report their health status, and finds that an additional year of schooling increases the
chance an individual will report good health by 6.0 percentage points, and reduces the chance
of reporting poor health by 3.2 percentage points. There remains a debate as to whether or not
this education-health relationship is causal i.e. through more education people learn the dangers
of poor health habits and are thus less likely to engage in them, with Evans and Montgomery
citing a quite different explanation for the relationship due to Victor Fuchs (1982). Fuchs argues
that unobserved differences in the rate of time preference determine both the number of years
schooling that an individual attains and their investments in health, as both decisions involve a
trade off between current costs and the discounted value of future benefits.5
As with Becker’s model of human capital accumulation, in a health accumulation model
individuals invest in health until the marginal return to health investment equals their discount
rate. If an individual has a higher discount rate because of her rate of time preference, she cares
4This IV strategy has also been pursued by Chevalier and Walker (2001) using GHS and National Child
Development Study (NCDS) data, and by Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2002) for Austrian data.
5It is worth noting that the explanations of the health/education correlation as being causal or driven by
unobserved time preference are not mutually exclusive: it may be that education promotes better health habits or
improves the efficiency of health inputs but individuals may still choose to act differently in light of this education
according to their rate of time preference.
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less about the future and more about the present and will therefore ceteris paribus quit formal
education at a younger age and be less likely to invest in good health habits (and be more likely
to engage in unhealthy habits). If the correlation between health habits, such as smoking, and
education is driven by a common unobserved factor (time-preference) then some health habits
could potentially be used as in instrument for education.
Not all health habits can be used as an instrument for two reasons. Firstly, some health habits
have consumption as well as investment value. Going to the gym or playing squash for example,
have consumption value and are likely to be correlated with family income/background and
possibly correlated with the unobserved component of earnings. Secondly, some health habits
such as heavy drinking or drug abuse would be unsuitable as they are likely to have an effect on
current wage through their effect on productivity. I follow Evans and Montgomery in arguing
that smoking as a teenager is a health habit that can be used as a valid instrument for education.
The decision that an individual makes at age 16 as to whether to continue in education or
not is likely to be significantly affected by his/her discount rate – whether that is because of
access to financial resources or because of the individual’s rate of time preference. In the UK
this is the first point at which individuals can choose to leave education, moreover it remains the
case that staying in school post-16 and taking A-levels is still the major route into university,
therefore the decision to remain at school at 16 is likely to be affected by the individual’s discount
rate. Moreover, whether an individual chooses to smoke at 16 is also likely to be determined
in large part by their rate of time preference. Whether I look at the largest sample of working
age men available in the BHPS or my estimation sample it is the case that of the individuals
who have ever smoked, approximately 61% were smoking when age 16, and approximately 80%
were smoking when age 186. Therefore it is clear that the majority of individuals who ever
smoke, first take that decision at around the same time that they are making decisions over the
continuation of their education. Evans and Montgomery find that the concurrence in the timing
of the smoking and school leaving decisions generates a statistically precise and quantitatively
large correlation between years of education and early smoking and, unsurprisingly, the same
relation is found in UK data. Thus smoking at 16 satisfies the first criterion for an instrument: it
6The precise figures for the estimation sample (largest possible sample) are 60.47% (61.00%) smoking at age
16, 81.11% (79.73%) smoking at age 18.
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is relevant as it is strongly correlated with completed education. Moreover, as will be illustrated
below, the effect of early smoking on years of schooling is sizeable (just under one year less
education is completed on average by those who smoke when 16 ceteris paribus), therefore the
instrument works through a substantial variation in education (Angrist and Krueger, 1991, in
particular has been criticized on the basis not only that the correlation between their instrument
and education is low – i.e. low t-statistic(s) on the instrument(s) – but also that it induces only
a very small variation in education attained, approximately only 0.1 years of education).
The second criterion is validity: the instrument must not be correlated with wage. As I
am using a past health habit, smoking at age 16, to instrument for education in the equation
for current wage, there should not be a correlation via an income effect: the contemporary
wage can have no impact on the disposable income of 16 year old deciding whether or not to
smoke. Moreover, theoretically whether one smoked at 16 should have no independent direct
effect on current wage. It is by no means certain that current smoking affects current wage via
a productivity effect, thus a link between smoking at 16 and current wage would be even more
speculative. So there is no reason to think that smoking at 16 would affect current wage – and
as individuals age and move further away from being 16 this is even more so the case. Moreover,
there is a good degree of movement between smoking and non-smoking amongst my sample of
men, with 42.0% of men who did smoke when they were 16 having stopped by the time they
are first observed in the data, and 38.4% of the men who are smokers when first observed in
the data were not smokers at age 16. Given these arguments I believe that smoking at 16 can
legitimately be excluded from the wage equation.
However, due to the very nature of the unobservables in the wage equation, it is not possible
a priori to rule out a correlation between smoking at 16 and the unobservables that do affect
wage. If the rate of time preference that characterises early smokers does lead them into higher
than average wage jobs (as one part of the discount rate bias story suggests) then this would
invalidate the instrument and the estimates derived would continue to be biased. Whether or
not the instrument is valid is an empirical point, and usually it is not possible to formally test
for the validity of an instrument. Fortunately, given I have more than one instrument I have an
over identified system and can therefore test the validity of the instruments. In section 3.10 I
test the validity of both instruments and cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments
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are indeed valid. Moreover, I can use the RoSLA instrument to just identify the system and
also include early smoking as an explanatory variable and find that it does not have a significant
coefficient in the wage equation, which again indicates that it can be excluded from the structural
equation. Both of these tests are predicated on the assumption that the RoSLA instrument is
valid, which I do not believe is a strong assumption given that the raising of the school leaving
age was an exogenous policy change. If we accept that early smoking satisfies these two criteria
of relevance and validity then an indicator for early smoking can be used as an instrument: it
can be the Zi in equation (3.10), influencing schooling through changing the marginal costs of
schooling in a way which is orthogonal to ability.
3.4.2 Is it a spurious relationship?
This observed relationship between smoking at age 16 and educational attainment could be
driven by something other than rate of time preference, something that also affects wages and
therefore makes the instrument invalid. It could be argued for example, that poorer socio-
economic background lowers education and increases the likelihood of smoking – i.e. smoking at
16 is more a reflection of socio-economic background than discount rate. Clearly socio-economic
background may influence the decision to smoke at 16, however, my preferred specification of the
model includes variables to control for background characteristics at the time that the individual
was a teenager and therefore should take this effect out of the coefficient on the early smoking
indicator. If it is the case that smoking at 16 is channelling the effects of such characteristics then
adding background characteristics into the schooling demand equation would seriously reduce
the impact and significance of the smoker at 16 variable. As it is, the coefficient on smoker at
16 changes only from -1.08 (with a standard error of 0.11) to -0.88 (s.e. 0.11) when we add in
the background characteristics. The background characteristics that I am able to include are
dummies for the occupational class of each parent when the individual was 14, and a dummy to
indicate whether the person lived with both natural parents from birth up until the age of 16.
These variables should do a good job of capturing the individual’s background socio-economic
circumstances at the time when they are making decisions over education (and whether or not to
smoke). Therefore the fact that when they are included in the model, the smoker at 16 indicator
still has a quantitatively large effect on schooling and is precisely estimated suggests that it is
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not socio-economic background that is picked up in the early smoker indicator.
Like Fuchs, in their work on rational addition Becker and Murphy (1988) posit that the
decision to smoke reflects discount rate in that it indicates the rate of time preference and
this is what I argue – that smoking at 16 reflects rate of time preference. One way in which
Fuchs supported his hypothesis was to show that education at age 24 when education levels vary
considerably, is as important a predictor of smoking at 17 – when most individuals have the same
level of education – as it is a predictor of smoking at 24 (see Farrell and Fuchs, 1982). Using
a larger dataset than my actual estimation sample, I implement a probit of current smoking
using completed years of schooling amongst the explanatory variables, and repeat the probit
for smoking at age 16. The marginal effects estimated at the mean of the explanatory variables
suggest that for each additional year of schooling the probability of being a current smoker falls
by 2.7% (significant at below the 1% level). In the probit for smoking at 16, it is estimated that
each additional year of completed education reduces the probability of having smoked at age 16
by 3.8% (significant at the 1% level) (see Table 3.1). Thus completed education is a significant
determinant of early smoking – suggesting that it is not greater education that determines the
decision (not) to smoke – education predicts early smoking as well as later smoking, suggesting
that another underlying factor (time preference) is determining both.
Moreover, with regard to the question of whether it is a knowledge effect, it is less likely
to be the case that the education-smoking link is causal, to the extent that formal schooling
is not the main avenue through with knowledge of the detrimental (indeed potentially fatal)
health consequences of smoking are disseminated. Since the mid-1960s, the negative effects of
smoking on health have been known and increasingly communicated to the public via various
awareness campaigns and indeed successive governments have been increasingly direct in their
discouragement to smoke both via taxation and the media. As a result, it is decreasingly likely to
be the case that only through continued education (past the compulsory level) that individuals
are made aware of the negative health effects of smoking. The hypothesis that the relation
between education and smoking is in fact driven by the time preference of the individual rather
than being a causal or knowledge effect can be tested and this is something that I return to in
section 3.8.
The correlation between smoking and education is also consistent with an alternative hy-
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pothesis: that those with lower unobserved ability will acquire less education and are more likely
to smoke. I have outlined how ability and discount rate bias interact in a complex fashion thus
it is difficult to completely disentangle the different effects. There is no doubt that to the extent
that smoking at 16 is correlated with lower ability there will be some effect of ability picked
up by the smoking at 16 variable. However, if it is the case that we are primarily picking up
some measure of ability then we would expect that – by definition – smoking at 16 only affects
the education of individuals at the lower end of the ability distribution. If we assume that the
residual from the OLS log wage regression is a reasonable proxy for ability, we can divide this
residual wage distribution into quintiles and examine whether smoking at 16 is a feature only
of low ability (low residual wage) individuals or if it is something that individuals of all abilities
engage in.
Table 3.2 shows the numbers who smoke at age 16 in each quintile of this residual log wage
distribution. The left-side panel of the table shows that in the lowest quintile approximately
44% of the males smoked at 16. This figure falls to approximately 39% in the next quintile up
and the next after that (30%) before rising again in the fourth quintile (34%). Despite a fall
in the last quintile, the figure for the percentage of individuals who smoked at age 16 are still
as high as 23% in the highest quintile of the residual log wage distribution. There are fewer
smokers at 16 in the higher quintiles of the distribution but that is to be expected, given that
smoking at 16 is likely to be in some part be correlated with lower ability. Nevertheless there
remain substantial numbers of smokers at 16 in the highest quintiles of the residual log wage
distribution which indicate the highest ability individuals.
In addition, Figure 3.2 plots the density of education leaving age for smokers at 16 and
non-smokers at 16. If it was only low educated, low ability individuals who smoke at 16 then
we would expect the densities to look very different with very little mass in the upper ranges
for the early smokers. However, while the non-smokers at 16 density does have a greater mass
around 21 and less around 15/16 suggesting more non-smokers go to university, there is still a
non-negligible proportion of smokers at 16 in the right tail of the distribution. This is consistent
with the idea that A-levels are the main route into university – we would expect that more lower
discount rate individuals to remain in school at 16 and the result of this is the lower percentage
leaving at 16 and the resulting higher percentage leaving at around 21. Elsewhere the picture is
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similar but with the smokers at 16 distribution to the left of the non-smokers. This is consistent
with the discount rate hypothesis which says that there are smokers and non-smokers at 16 of
all abilities and that smoking at 16 has an effect to reduce education at all points of the ability
distribution.
It is certainly true that younger cohorts have consistently acquired more education, and for
the men in my sample, smoking at 16 has generally been decreasing: 39.8% of the cohort born
in the 1940s smoked when 16, this fell in successive cohorts to 30.0% (those born in the 1950s),
27.8% (60s) before rising again amongst those born in the 1970s, of whom 36.3% smoked when
16. This general pattern would also lead to a shift of the curve to the right for non-smokers
at 16, therefore to be sure that it is the case that smokers at 16 do get less education than
non-smokers at 16, Figure 3.3 produces the same plot for the cohorts born in the 40s, 50s, 60s
and 70s (which accounts for 88.0% of the men in my sample)7. For each cohort the picture
broadly follows the pattern of Figure 3.2: there is more mass in the right tail for non-smokers
but still a sizable density in the right tail for smokers at 16. This illustrates that for all cohorts
there are smokers at age 16 across the entire distribution of education levels, but that smokers
at 16 acquire less education on average8.
Therefore in answer to the criteria for a suitable instrument: early smoking is not “bad”,
there is no reason to suspect that smoker status at 16 should violate the exclusion restriction
(and this is something that I test, see section 3.10, to ensure the instrument is valid); it is not
“weak” as there is a strong, very significant and sizeable ceteris paribus effect of early smoking
on years of schooling; and it is not “ugly”, though it captures a LATE – the group of individuals
who have lower education because of a higher than average discount rate – this is a group
comprised of individuals of all abilities and is therefore an informative group to consider the
return to education for, arguably more representative of the population as a whole than groups
identified by other IV estimation strategies.
7The corresponding graph for individuals born in the 1930s reflects a similar pattern but only accounts for
9.4% of the sample
8The cohort born in the 1970s have a restricted education leaving age in that the majority of this cohort are
22 years old or younger, hence their distribution is slightly truncated.
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3.5 Data
I use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which is a nationally representative survey
of the population which began in 1991 and follows the sample individuals each year. In 1999
in addition to the core survey there was a supplementary component in which questions were
asked regarding previous health habits. I have constructed an 15-wave pooled-panel dataset
containing variables describing individuals’ characteristics, a dummy to indicate whether the
individual smoked when 16, education, and current hourly wage rate. Since the previous health
habits question was only asked in wave 9, I only have observations from individuals present in
wave 9, but I have all waves of observations for these individuals. I include males who are in
full-time employment (30+hours per week), are not self-employed and are in the age range 19
to 65 inclusive9.
There are issues of measurement error when using number of years of schooling as the
measure of education, however in order to make my results comparable with the majority in
the literature I use the observed number of years of schooling as my education variable10. The
BHPS does not ask how many years education an individual has nor when the individual first left
full-time education, rather it asks the age at which the individual left school and age at which
he/she left further education. As I construct my years of schooling variable from age when
left school or age when left further education if the individual went on to further education,
I encounter problems when people return to full-time education after a number of years away.
If an individual completes GCSEs, A-levels, a standard 3-year degree, then a Masters degree
and then a PhD (3 years) this would equate to 21 years of education, therefore I exclude any
individual with more than 21 years recorded education. This excludes observations from just 84
individuals (3.6% of those with years of schooling calculated).
With respect to earnings, it is standard to use the log of hourly earnings and so again for
comparability this is what I have constructed – the log of real wage (using 2006 pounds as the
base)11. I trim the log wage distribution such that the top and bottom 1% within each year are
9This age range captures ‘prime-age’ males and ensures that smoking at 18 is not the same as current smoking
for any individuals, as smoking at 18 will be used as an instrument as evidence in support of the rationale behind
the early smoking instrument.
10Formally: Years-of-schooling = (age left education - 5); thus I assume a school start age of 5, which is the
compulsory school start age in the UK.
11Current hourly wage is not explicitly recorded, however following other BHPS users (for example Booth and
Frank (1999)) I constructed the natural log of hourly wage rate by constructing hourly wage as: wi = PAYGUi
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excluded.
The dataset constructed contains 21,256 observations from 2,266 males with each individ-
ual having between 1 and 15 observations; the mean number of observations per individual is
9.38, median 1012. Table 3.3 contains summary statistics for the estimation sample, with the
breakdown by early smoking status in Table 3.4.
3.6 Estimation
I cannot exploit the panel to eliminate unobserved ability since completed years of education
is a fixed effect but I can use the repeated observations to improve precision – although I need
then to adjust the standard errors to take account of there being repeated observations of the
same individuals at different times13. I do this by allowing clustering for each individual in the
variance-covariance matrix which allows for there to be a correlation between the error terms for
each individual but no correlation between the error terms of different individuals. The robust
standard errors generated do not impose any assumptions on the functional form of the potential
correlations and heteroskedasticity controlled for in the error.
I aim to produce estimates that are comparable with other research so I begin by estimating
a conventional human capital earnings function where the dependent variable is the natural log
of real hourly wage, and the explanatory variables are age, age-squared, and years-of-schooling.
I also include controls for ethnicity, for region (using the 13 standard regions) in order to pick up
regional effects such as real wage differentials, year-of-birth14 and its square to pick up cohort
effects15 and dummies for parental characteristics. As discussed, I include parental character-
istics because in their absence, the smoking at 16 variable could be picking up background
/{4.33(JBHRSi + 1.5JBOTi)} where PAYGUi is gross monthly earnings before tax and other deductions in
current main job; JBHRSi is standard weekly hours worked; and JBOTi is overtime hours worked each week. It
is assumed overtime is paid at 1.5 times the normal hourly wage, 4.33 ≈ no. weeks per month. Therefore wi =
(Monthly Gross Earnings/No. hours worked per month) = Hourly wage rate.
12I order to avoid issues around differential attrition, I have re-estimated the models using both inverse proba-
bility weighting and also including in the regressions a variable indicating the number of observations that each
individual has, and in each case the results remain, available from the author.
13As the first stage involves regression of years-of-schooling – which is time-invariant– on characteristics, I
re-estimate the model using just one observation (their first) for each member of the sample but then all of the
observations in the second stage, bootstrapping to get the correct standard errors in each stage. The results for
the early smoker instrument and for the RoSLA instrument are in the appendix Tables B.2 and B.3 respectively.
There is no substantive change in the conclusions.
14Year-of-birth is rescaled such that 1897=1,. . . , 1989=93, since in the range 1897-1989 the birth years in my
total dataset, year-of-birth and year-of-birth-squared are perfectly collinear.
15Including a higher order polynomial in a suitably rescaled year-of-birth does not alter the results nor add to
precision in the estimates and so in the interests of parsimony only a quadratic is used.
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characteristics correlated with education and smoking at 16. As mentioned above, the parental
characteristics variables that I have are the standard occupational classification of the job of
both the individual’s father and mother when the individual is 14 years of age, and a dummy
to indicate that the individual lived with both natural parents from birth up to the age of 16.
Including year dummies in the model would be problematic since I include both age and year-of-
birth, however I do include controls for whether it was the early-, mid-, late-1990s or post-2000 to
allow for business cycle effects 16. Mincer’s specification of the human capital earnings function,
included experience and experience-squared. In the absence of information on labour market
experience, Mincer suggested potential experience – age minus schooling minus 6 (assuming
individuals begin schooling aged 6) – could be used as an approximation. However, using this
approximation would mean that measurement error in the education variable would necessarily
transmit into the experience and experience-squared variables and moreover, the endogeneity of
schooling (our main concern) will lead to potential experience and its square being endogenous,
resulting in three endogenous regressors. Age and age-squared are the standard candidates to
use as instruments for experience and its square, and are widely used as such, therefore this is
the approach that I have taken.
I estimate the model first by OLS. I then implement the IV regression using the smoker at
16 indicator as the instrument generating the variation in years-of-schooling.
3.7 Results
The first column of Table 3.5 reports the OLS estimate of the human capital earnings function,
the second column reports the IV results using smoking at 16 as the instrument. The third
column reports the results from the reduced form equation for years of schooling. Looking at
the third column of Table 3.5 we can see that individuals who smoke when they are 16 have on
average 0.88 fewer years of schooling than those who do not smoke when they are 16. The robust
standard error is 0.108 giving an absolute value of the t-statistic of 8.13. Therefore smoking
when 16 is strongly significant for education, and the parameter precisely estimated. This is
encouraging given the concerns raised by Staiger and Stock (1997) and Bound et al. (1995)
16These dummies are significant in the wage equation, though their inclusion/exclusion does not alter the
coefficient on the instrument (1st stage) or Sˆi in the second stage
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concerning the precision of first stage estimates. The R2 of 0.246 is higher than the R2 for
first stage regressions in some other IV studies17, and the F -statistics of 66.17 suggests a very
strong instrument. The partial-R2 of the effect of the instrument on years-of-schooling having
partialled out the effect of the other covariates is 0.0289 which is high relative to the guidelines
given by Bound et al. (1995). The high F and R2 statistics suggest that the bias inherent in IV
estimation in finite samples will be smaller than the OLS bias.
Therefore controlling for parental characteristics and year-of-birth, smoking at 16 reduces
education by almost 1 year and is precisely estimated. The coefficients on year-of-birth and
year-of-birth-squared suggest that from the 1920s onwards, later year of birth is associated with
a greater number of years of schooling until the mid-1950s at which point this levels off for a
decade before starting to decrease. Turning to the parental occupation dummies, we can see
some significant effects on years of schooling18, particularly for the father’s occupational class.
As we might expect almost all of the higher occupational strata dummies (the lower numbers) are
associated with sizeable positive effect on an individual’s education and are precisely estimated.
This is particularly true of management (1), professional occupations (2) and associate profes-
sional/technical occupations (3), increasing education by 1.1 and 2.3 and 1.5 years respectively.
Much fewer of the mother’s occupation variables are significant, though a mother in a profes-
sional occupation (2) has sizeable positive and significant effect on education (associated with
1.4 years higher education). The fact that these parental characteristics dummies are strongly
significant in the schooling equation but then not significant in the IV wage equation suggests
that parental characteristics have a strong influence on education controlling for discount rate,
but then controlling for education these parental characteristics do not influence wage.
Turning to columns 1 and 2, the OLS estimate suggests that an additional year of schooling
increases wage by 4.6% whereas the IV estimate suggests the return is 12.9%. We expect that
the IV results will be less precisely estimated than the OLS, and while the robust standard error
on years of schooling in the instrumented regression is higher at 0.020 compared to 0.003 in
the OLS regression, this still gives a t-statistic of 6.31 and is therefore still precisely estimated
and significant at all conventional levels. The dramatic difference in the estimated coefficients
17Harmon and Walker (1995) for example have a first stage R2 of 0.147.
18The omitted category are plant or machine operatives.
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suggests that years of schooling is an endogenous variable, and this conclusion is strengthen
if I include the residual from the first stage reduced form equation as a regressor in the OLS
estimates, providing a Hausman test of the endogeneity of schooling. The absolute value of the
t-statistic on this residual is 4.78.
There is nothing unexpected in the coefficients on the other variables. The dummy for
the South-East region is significant in both the OLS and IV wage regressions, and is precisely
estimated in each. Since the South East region contains London, it is expected that there will
be a positive coefficient on wages given the London weighting. The R2 for the OLS regression of
0.265 is comparable to other IV studies19where it is usually in the range 0.25 to 0.35. Though
the R2 for the instrumented regression is lower at 0.072 the fact that I am using instrumental
variables suggests that goodness of fit is not what I am primarily seeking, my main concern is
to find a consistent estimator of the causal effect of education on earnings and that is what the
instrumented regressions allow me to estimate.
Estimation of the IV using the Fuller LIML estimator rather than 2SLS or IV-GMM, in order
to be as robust as possible to any bias in the IV estimates, does not result in any notable change
to the estimated coefficients or standard errors (the return to schooling in the IV estimation
becomes 12.8 rather than 12.9), and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic suggests the there is
minimal bias in the IV coefficients.
3.8 Analysis
The results that I find are in line with those found in other studies. Angrist and Krueger (1991)
find a return to schooling of 7.0% by OLS rising to 10% by IV (quarter of birth and state
interactions). Card (1995) finds an increase in the estimated return to schooling from 7.3% by
OLS to 13.2% by IV (college proximity). In studies using UK data, Harmon and Walker have
consistently found results similar to my findings: using Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data
for 1978-1986 they find estimates of 6.1% by OLS and 15.3% by IV (RoSLA, 1995), using the
NCDS20 they find estimates of 5.0% by OLS and 9.9% by IV (peer effects and education system
level effects, Harmon and Walker, 2000), and using the GHS data they find results of 4.9%
19Card (1995); Angrist and Krueger (1991); Harmon and Walker (1995).
20National Child Development Study.
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by OLS rising to 14.0% by IV (RoSLA and educational reforms, Harmon and Walker, 1999).
Chevalier and Walker (2001) find using an earlier smaller sample of BHPS men (using just 6
waves) an OLS estimate of 6.4% rising to 20.5% using IV (RoSLA). Chevalier and Walker also
construct estimates using smoking status at 16 and NCDS data, estimating a return of 6.1% by
OLS, rising to 8.0% by IV; and using GHS data they estimate an OLS return of 6.4% rising to
9.5% when instrumenting using smoking status at 14/16/18.
More recently Oreopoulos (2006) has used the 1947 raising of the school leaving age in
Britain, from 14 to 1521, and GHS data to compute a standard IV estimate and a regression
discontinuity IV estimate of the return to schooling, arguing that as this was a reform which
affected around half of the population, the estimated LATE is closer to the average treatment
effect (ATE). Oreopoulos estimates the return for British males (aged 32-64) to an additional
year of education to be 5.5% by OLS, rising to 9.4% by IV, though the IV estimate is imprecisely
estimated. Implementing a regression discontinuity design, Oreopoulos estimates a return of
15.0% for men, though again the estimate is rather imprecise22.
Therefore my results of 4.6% by OLS rising to 12.9% by IV are of similar magnitude to the
studies above, particularly the Harmon and Walker (1995).
3.8.1 Testing for a spurious relationship
Is it a background effect?
As outlined in section 3.4.2, it may be argued that the early smoker indicator is picking up
differences in background characteristics between those who do and do not smoke at 16, and
that these characteristics also affect wage. Hence the need to control as much as possible
for socio-economic characteristics of the individuals at the time that they are making their
decisions over education and smoking. As a robustness check I also estimate the model without
the parental characteristic variables included, see Table 3.6. As alluded to in 3.4.2, the effect
of removing the background characteristic variables is that the coefficient on the smoker at 16
indicator in the reduced form schooling demand equation increases to -1.08 (robust s.e. 0.113,
21Harmon and Walker, 1995, exploit both this 1947 raising of the school leaving age, and the later increase
from 15 to 16 in 1973 to derive their IV estimates.
22When Oreopoulos implements his IV and RD models for all individuals – i.e. including females as well as
males – the estimated returns are precisely estimated (1% level) and suggest returns of 14.7% (RD) and 15.8%
(IV).
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t =-9.61). The F -statistics on the exclusion of the instrument is 92.39, with the partial-R2 of
the instrument of 0.0400, again both suggesting a strong instrument, with a total R2 for the
first stage of 0.143, again comparable with similar studies. The estimated return to education
in the wage equation is 12.1% (robust s.e. 0.016, t =7.56). Therefore while the nature of the
result remains unchanged, it is clear that the parental characteristics variables inclusion is not
driving the result.
Is it a knowledge effect?
It could be argued that the correlation between health and education is indeed a causal rela-
tionship: individuals with more education have more knowledge of the health consequences of
certain habits and are less likely to engage in them. However, as outlined above, to the extent
that public information campaigns have made the health risks of a particular habit known to
the majority of the population, the correlation between education and that habit is more likely
to be due to variations in unobserved factors such as discount rates. In the 1940s and 1950s
we would expect less of a correlation between smoking and education, because smoking was not
known then to be an investment in health choice. However, given the vast amount of information
available to the public since the 1960s concerning the risks of smoking, it is fair to deduce that
compared to other health habits, the correlation between smoking and schooling is more likely
to reflect individuals’ investment choices driven by time preference rather than knowledge.
To test this hypothesis, we can postulate that if there has been an increase in the general
availability to the public of information on the risks of smoking, then we would expect that
decisions to smoke at age 16 taken after the effects were widely known are more likely to re-
flect differences in discount rates, thus the negative correlation between schooling and smoking
at 16 should be higher for individuals who reach 16 after the effects of smoking were widely
known. If however the link between smoking and education is due to knowledge effects, after
the knowledge of the effect of smoking is widely known, the correlation should disappear. The
first Surgeon General’s report highlighting the health consequences of smoking was published in
1964, therefore I have repeated the estimation and rather than including smoking at 16 alone
as an instrument, I interacted this variable with a dummy indicating that the individual turned
16 before the report was published and a dummy indicating that the individual turned 16 after
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the report was published (i.e. in 1965 or later). If the relationship becomes stronger i.e. if
the t-statistic on the smoking term interacted with the turned 16 post-1964 indicator is greater
in absolute value than the turned 16 pre-1964 interaction term this would suggest that the
relationship is reflecting differences in discount rates.
In Table 3.7, I report the first stage regression coefficients on these interaction terms when
we use these terms rather than just smoking at 16. We can see that both the interaction terms
are precisely estimated, significant and that the term for individuals who turned 16 in 1965
or later has a coefficient which is larger in absolute value by 0.1 years of education and has a
substantially lower standard error, thus suggesting a stronger relationship post-1964.
A further test of the hypothesis that there is a causal link between education and smoking
is to remove individuals who have less than the 11 years of education that the majority of
individuals should have by the time that they are 16 and make the decision over whether or
not to smoke and whether to continue in education. Re-estimating on this sample produces the
results in Appendix B Table B.1. As can be seen, estimation on this sample does not alter the
coefficient on education.
Is it an ability effect?
Another issue is the question of whether smoking at 16 is just picking up differences in ability.
As already discussed, if smoking at 16 was picking up (lack of) ability, we would not expect
that smoking at 16 would occur across the whole residual wage distribution as we have seen
that it does – non-trivial numbers smoked at 16 in the upper quintiles of the log wage residual
distribution. If we continue to use the residual wage distribution as a proxy for ability and, again
dividing it into five quintiles, look at the first stage reduced form schooling equations, we can
see that the effect of smoking at 16 is actually increasing as we move up the distribution. The
left side of Table 3.8 shows that in the lowest quintile, schooling is reduced by 0.77 years, this is
equivalent to a reduction of 6.21% of the mean number of years of education in this group. In
the second and third quintiles the reduction in education associated with early smoking is even
greater both in absolute terms and relative to mean education in these quintiles. The fourth
quintile is affected the least by early smoking but still it is associated with three-quarters of a
year less education, and in the highest quintile the estimated reduction is 0.88 years, 6.9% of
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mean education in this quintile. We can see in the Table 3.2 that there are significant numbers
of individuals who smoke at 16 in all of the quintiles thus these results are not due to small
numbers of smokers at 16, and the coefficient on smoking at 16 is significant at the 1% level
in all quintiles. Far from only affecting the low ability individuals, this evidence indicates that
smoking at 16 has a greater absolute and relative effect on the highest ability individuals. This
supports the hypothesis that individuals of all abilities smoke at 16 because of their rate of time
preference.
To further pursue the hypothesis that individuals who have lower ability are likely to get less
education and more likely to smoke, I have replicated my results using smoking at age 18 rather
than smoking at age 16. Age 18 is the point at which individuals in the UK have to decide
whether to remain in education and go to university, and this decision is likely to be affected by
their rate of time preference. Moreover, it is more difficult to argue that smokers at 18 are more
likely to be lower ability than higher ability individuals. The right panel of Table 3.2 shows the
numbers who smoke at age 18 in the quintiles of the residual log real wage distribution. The
Table illustrates that in the lowest quintile the smokers at 18 out number non-smokers (54%
v 46%), and this remains the case in the next quintile up (52% smokers v 48% non). As with
smoking at 16, the numbers who did smoke are generally lower as we move up the quintiles yet
in the highest quintile, still as much as 35% of the individuals smoked at 18. There are a higher
number of individuals who smoked at 18 in the upper quintiles than in the corresponding table
for smoking at 16, indeed in each quintile there are more smokers at 18 than there were at 16,
at least a 10%-point swing to smokers from non-smokers compared with the 16 measure. This
further supports the idea that teenage smoking is a habit that high discount rate individuals of
all abilities engage in.
Using smoking at 18 as the instrument, I obtain the results in Table 3.9. Looking at the
third column, the reduced form equation for schooling, smoking at 18 reduces education by 0.75
years. This is lower than the corresponding reduction associated with smoking at 16 but this is
consistent with the time preference story: smokers at 18 have a higher discount rate than non-
smokers at 18 but ceteris paribus smokers at 16 will have a higher discount rate than smokers
at 18. If smokers at 18 have a lower discount rate relative to those who smoke at 16, they will
remain in education longer thus we expect that the reduction in education for smoking at 18 is
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not as much as it is for smoking at 16. The robust standard error on smoking at 18 is 0.108,
giving a t-statistic with an absolute value of 6.93, therefore the parameter remains precisely
estimated. The first stage regression is very similar to first stage regression using smoking when
16. The R2 for this first stage regression is 0.242 so again high relative to other studies’ findings.
Turning to column 2, the estimated return to schooling when we instrument with smoking
at 18, is slightly higher at 13.5% than the corresponding figure using smoking at 16 (12.9%), but
not by very much. The parameter remains precisely estimated, robust standard error of 0.023
giving a t-statistic of 5.76.
Of the other covariates in the model, each has a coefficient and standard error very close to
the estimate when I use smoking at 16, though the R2 for this new IV estimate is slightly lower
at 0.042.
As I get very similar results with smoking at 18 as I do using smoking at 16, and given the
distribution of smokers at 16 and 18 throughout the wages distribution, I believe that this is
evidence to support the hypothesis that early smoking is picking up the discount rate of the
individual rather than being a proxy for ability. Estimates using smoking at 17 rather than 16
or 18 give similar results.
3.8.2 Testing for the discount rate hypothesis
One final test of whether early smoking is picking up differences in time preference is to test
whether early smoking is correlated with other future oriented behaviours such as saving, in-
vesting and taking precautionary health measures. Home-ownership is one such measure of
future orientated behaviour, and Table 3.10 presents a probit of home-ownership in which the
explanatory variables are those included in the wage equation (bar years-of-schooling)23 , plus
log wage itself and the early smoking indicator. The marginal effects estimated at the means
of the explanatory variables suggest that smoking at 16 is associated with a 4.4% reduction in
the probability of being a home owner, and is significant at the 1% level. Thus, controlling
for human capital and other background characterisitcs to capture heterogeneity, early smoking
is associated with a significantly lower probability of being a homeowner, supporting the idea
that early smoking is revealing something of the individual’s discount rate. There is an obvious
23I exclude years-of-schooling, including log wage instead. If years-of-schooling is included it is not significant
and alters the smoking coefficient very slightly.
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problem in looking at health measures when early smoking is an explanatory variable in that
there may be direct consequences of the early smoking on the health outcome, hence the need
to look at health related behaviours rather than outcomes. Table 3.11 contains the results of
probit regression of having a dental check up in the past year, and having an eye check in the
past year, using the same explanatory variables as in the home-ownership probit. Having regular
dental and eye check-ups involve trading off future benefits (preventing ill health and associated
costs) for current costs (time and expense of appointments) and thus should be influenced by the
individual’s rate of time preference. As can be seen in these tables, controlling for characteristics
and log wage, individuals who were early smokers are 4.0% less likely to have had a dental check
up and 2.9% less likely to have had an opticians check up in the past year, each significant at
the 1% level. Though these are not perfect indicator measures, with potential problems in each
case, they do add to the evidence that the early smoking-education link is capturing the effect
of the individual’s rate of time preference.
Given all of the tests I have conducted, I am satisfied that smoking at age 16 is a valid
instrument for education, and conclude therefore that the OLS estimates are underestimating
the return to education. I am not claiming to recover the ‘true’ return to education and the
underlying schooling demand equation. What I have done is estimate the return to education,
negating the discount rate bias present in OLS by using smoking at 16 in the schooling equation
to generate some variation in schooling which is uncorrelated with the wage equation error term
– something that the dual instruments allow me to test (see section (3.10)). Moreover, I am
removing the ability bias that is present in OLS estimates, because the instrument is orthogonal
to ability – individuals of all abilities can have a high discount rate because of their rate of
time preference. (Ability and discount rate are only correlated when we condition on level of
schooling.) Therefore I am confident that the instrumental variables estimation has removed
the bias from the OLS, allowing a consistent estimate of the return to education.
My estimate is a local average treatment effect. However, I argue that smoking at 16
demonstrates that the individual has a high discount rate because of their rate of time preference.
Thus when I estimate the return to education using smoking at 16 as an instrument, what I am
recovering is the average marginal return to education for the group of individuals who have
high discount rates not because they have poor access to finance, but because they have a rate
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of time preference that reflects that they favour the present.
The natural ‘local average treatment effect’ question is whether I should expect the average
marginal return to education to be higher or lower for individuals in this group than the average
marginal return to education in the population as a whole? Since individuals of all abilities
have rates of time preference that are reflected in a high discount rate, and we have seen that
smoking at 16 effects all across the (log wage residual proxying for) ability distribution, we do
not have the ‘problem’ that estimates using compulsory schooling laws are subject to: that they
identify returns for individuals with low education and who are (arguably) disproportionately of
low ability. If ability is distributed amongst the early smokers group in the same way that it is
amongst the population then these early smoker IV estimates are more appropriate for making
inferences about the return to education in the population as a whole than similar estimates
from IV studies which isolate minimum age school leavers. However that is not to say that
estimates derived from the raising of the school leaving age are unsound – only that they are
less useful in drawing inference on the average marginal return to education in the population
as a whole. What the RoSLA estimates do provide is an estimate of the return to education
for those individuals who wanted to leave full-time education at the minimum age – and from a
policy point of view this is an important parameter, especially as the Government has recently
raised the education leaving age to 17 (from 2013) and it is later to be raised to 18 (by 2015).
The return that I recover is purged of the effects of ability bias and discount rate bias. Both
Card (1994, 1998) and Lang (1993) conclude from looking at the broad literature on the effect
of ability bias, that ability bias if it is present has only a small biasing effect, Lang suggesting
that discount rate bias dominates such that OLS estimates are biased substantially downwards
and Card similarly concludes that the OLS are at least 10-to-30% biased downwards. This
early smoker IV evidence is consistent with this conclusion – estimating the return to education
controlling for ability bias and discount rate bias, we get an estimate that is approximately
three times higher than the OLS estimate. If we believe that ability has the same distribution
amongst the high discount rate group as it has in the population as a whole, it is more valid to
generalise to the population as a whole than perhaps is the case with using estimates recovered
from instrumental variables that affect only the low educated.
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3.9 Instrumenting Using the Raising of the School Leaving Age
(RoSLA)
Now to pursue this line of enquiry further, I will compare the estimate using the early smoking
instrument with an IV estimate derived using the raising of the minimum school leaving age.
The school leaving age was raised in England and Wales from 15 to 16 in 1973 such that if an
individual was 16 by the end of August 1973 he/she was allowed to leave school in the June of
1973, while if the individual was only 15 at the end of August 1973 he/she would have to remain
another year at school. This means that those born after August 1957, face a minimum school
leaving age of 16. In Scotland this reform took place in August 1976 therefore individuals born
after August 1960 face a minimum school leaving age of 16.
This information, plus an individual’s date of birth and country of residence, allows the
alternative IV estimate to be constructed. Rather than including the smoker at 16 indicator
in the first stage regression, I include a dummy to indicate whether the individual faced the
minimum school leaving age of 1624. As I am controlling for a quadratic in year-of-birth, the
smooth changes in schooling as a result of younger cohorts generally gaining more education
is controlled for, while the identification derives from the discontinuity induced by the RoSLA.
Figure 3.4 shows the proportion of individuals who have left school at or before age 15, by year
of birth for the majority of men in my sample25. As the figure shows, there is a steady decline in
the proportion of men who have left education at 15 or before, and though the relatively small
number of men born in any single year in my data means that it is a slightly volatile26 , the pattern
of steady decline is evident. In year-of-birth 1958, when the policy is in effect for all individuals,
we can see that there is a drop from 17.4% to 1.9% of men leaving at or before 15. The figure
remains low for the years thereafter, though with some volatility remaining. Contrasting this
is the upper line on the graph which shows the proportion of individuals who have left at age
16 or earlier. While similarly showing a decline as younger cohorts gain more education, the
24The minimum school leaving age was raised from 14 to 15, in 1947 for England and Wales, 1946 for Scotland,
however, in the sample of men that I use, there are only 73 individuals (3.22%) who face a minimum school
leaving age of 14 so I have concentrated on the later change to create an instrument.
25I have trimmed the sample to remove the small number of men born before 1931 and after 1970 due to the
small cell sizes, the graph contains the information for 83.9% of the English men in the sample. I have excluded
the small number of Scottish men for the purpose of this illustration as the RoSLA occured later for Scotland.
26As year-of-birth increases the cell sizes increase and for the years relevant to the RoSLA the numbers are
larger.
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proportion who have left by or at 16 continues after the RoSLA to show volatility, rising and
falling quite sharply in places. So while the small numbers of men born in any particular year
lead to volatility in each graph, it is evident that the RoSLA results in a discontinuity at the
point in which is was implemented, and it is from this discontinuity that I am able to construct
the IV estimates using RoSLA.
Table 3.12 contains the results for the RoSLA IV along with the OLS estimates (from Table
3.5). Column 1 contains the OLS results, column 2 is the result from the IV using smoking
at 16, while column 3 contains the first stage regression result using the raising of the school
leaving age as the instrument.
The main columns of interest are columns 2 and 3. Looking first at column 3, the raising
of the school leaving age is associated with an increase in education of 0.564 years and the
coefficient is precisely estimated with a robust standard error of 0.206 giving a t-statistic of
2.74. Again, it is noticeable that the R2 (0.227) is higher than has been found in similar studies.
The partial-R2 for the instrument in the first stage is 0.0044 which is smaller than for the early
smoker instrument but is exactly the same as that found by Harmon and Walker (1995) for
their first stage, and compares well with Bound et al. (1995). The F -statistics on instrument is
7.49 which is below Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule-of-thumb guide of 10, though taken with the
partial R2, the overall picture is not of a weak instrument. Moreover, the R2 and the F together
again suggest that the bias inherent in IV in finite samples will be lower than the OLS bias.
The size of the average increase in education, controlling for other covariates in the first stage,
is comparable with that found by Harmon and Walker (1995) (0.54 years for the 1947 RoSLA),
and slightly larger than that found by Oreopoulos using just the 1947 RoSLA (0.44 years).
Turning to column 2, we see that the estimated return to schooling is 10.2% when we
instrument using RoSLA. This is more than double the size of the OLS return though below the
other IV estimate. However it is not as precisely estimated, the robust standard error is 0.051
giving a t-statistic of 1.99, the p-value of this t-statistic is 0.046 therefore it is significant at the
5% level.
Again, as a robustness check to verify that the inclusion of the parental characteristics
variables are not driving the result, Table 3.13 displays the results for the more basic specification
excluding these background variables. In this more basic specification, the instrument is actually
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strengthened, the F -statistics on the exclusion of the instrument from the first stage increasing
to 9.98 (much closer to Staiger and Stock’s rule-of-thumb of 10) and the partial R2 of the
instrument is 0.0058 (increased from 0.0044 in the main specification), and the overall first stage
R2 is 0.113. The effect on the estimated return to education is minor – reducing from 10.2% to
10.0%, with a robust standard error of 0.042 giving a t-statistic of 2.41, making the estimate
signficant at the 5% level (p-value 0.016). Thus again the inclusion of parental characteristic
variables is not driving the result.
The question is whether this is evidence that using an institutional change – such as the
raising of the school leaving age to form an instrument – isolates the return to schooling for only
a specific group that is heavily weighted towards the low ability and those with high discount
rate particularly because of financial constraints?
If the group whose return is identified by the RoSLA instrument (which is by definition a
low education group) is comprised mainly of individuals of low ability rather than those who
have high discount rates because of poor access to finance, then we would expect that the return
for this group would be lower than the return we find with the smoker at 16 instrument –
as I have demonstrated that individuals of all abilities are in the early smokers group. The
imprecision of the estimate using RoSLA does not allow me to conclude that the estimate is
definitely smaller than the smoking at 16 IV estimate, however one test of the extent to which
RoSLA affects individuals of different abilities is to repeat the first stage regressions by quintile
of the residual log wage distribution that I used to illustrate the effect of smoking at 16 on
educational attainment in all quintiles of the distribution. The results from these regressions are
in right hand section of Table 3.8. If the contention is that RoSLA affects primarily low ability
individuals then we would expect that the effect would be quantitatively larger for the lowest
quintiles of the residual log wage distribution but falling in size and significance as we move up
the distribution.
Table 3.8 illustrates that the raising of the minimum school leaving age increases the number
of years of schooling by 1.04 years in the lowest quintile, which is 8.4% of the mean number of
years schooling for this group. Being almost exactly 1 year extra education this suggests that in
this lower quintile of the (proxy) ability distribution, all the individuals wished to leave school
at the minimum age. In the second lowest quintile RoSLA increases the number of years of
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schooling by 0.84 years which is 6.9% of the mean for this group. In the three quintiles above
this the increase in education associated with RoSLA is much smaller in absolute and relative
terms than in both of the lowest two quintiles but in none of these higher quintiles is the dummy
for minimum school leaving age of 16 close to being statistically significant.
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the low education group affected by
RoSLA are generally lower ability – if they were mainly high discount rate then we would
expect to see a similar effect across the residual log wage distribution.
The contention that the RoSLA group is weighted more towards low ability rather than
high discount rate individuals is supported by Carneiro and Heckman (2002). They find that
in the US, only 8% of American youths are credit constrained to the point that it affects their
post-secondary schooling. Moreover, they find that when ability is controlled for responses to
tuition costs are uniform across income groups. Low family income at the time when decisions
over post-secondary education are made does not appear to be a major constraint in the US.
Two recent studies in the UK have indicated that credit constraints do not prevent individuals
from participating in higher education. Chowdry et al. (2008) use a unique dataset from a
cohort comprising all state school pupils who were in the final year of compulsory schooling in
England in 2001-2002. These students have been followed from age 11 through to their higher
education participation decision at age 18 (in 2004-05) or age 19 (2005-06). The results indicate
that conditional on prior attainment, there is no difference in higher (university) education par-
ticipation rates between children of higher and lower socio-economic status (SES) – illustrating
for the UK, what Carneiro and Heckman find for the US. Similarly, Wyness (2008) studies the
effect of alterations to the funding of higher education in England – with the introduction of
fees and indeed top-up fees. Wyness finds that participation rates among the lower SES groups
have not declined following the introduction of tuition fees, which again supports the contention
that the RoSLA group in this country are not credit constrained.
If it is the case that those affected by RoSLA are high discount rate rather than low ability,
the IV results which use RoSLA may well be higher than the OLS estimates. However, the
evidence above and these conclusions from the Carneiro and Heckman, Chowdry et al. and
Wyness papers suggest that it is more likely to be the case that the group identified by RoSLA
are individuals of low ability rather than high discount rate. Comparing the RoSLA IV results
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with the early smoking IV results would support the idea that the RoSLA group are low ability
as the RoSLA IV estimates a lower return, though the imprecision of the IV estimates prevents
a concrete conclusion that the estimate is indeed lower using RoSLA.
3.10 Testing of the Instruments
Having more than one instrument means that I have an over-identified system – more moment
conditions than are necessary to identify the parameters of the model – which means that I can
test the instruments to establish whether the exclusion restrictions are valid. In other studies,
such as Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Evans and Montgomery (1994), multiple instruments
are used and tested. In each of these cases however, they essentially only have one mechanism
to generate the exogenous variation in education: including interactions of that mechanism (the
instrument) with other variables does not entail genuinely having multiple instruments. If the
mechanism is not valid then none of the ‘instruments’ are valid, the problem being that the
Hansen J -test of the exclusion restrictions involves assuming one of the instruments is valid in
order to test the others.
On the contrary, I have two independent sources of exogenous variation in education and so
can genuinely test the validity of the exclusion restrictions. As Murray (2006) points out, the
Hansen test is more compelling when one of the instruments is thought to be definitely valid,
and I believe that I am in this situation: there is a strong argument to suggest that the RoSLA
instrument is valid as it was an exogenous (to the individual) policy change.
Instrumenting using both the early smoking instrument and the minimum school leaving age
instrument and then performing the Hansen J -test results in a test statistic of 0.202, p-value
0.6529, which is a comprehensive failure to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are
valid. The first stage R2 is high at 0.250 and the F -statistics on the exclusion of the instruments
is 36.83 with a partial R2 on the instruments of 0.0332, all of which suggests that the instruments
are both strong and valid.
As can be seen in Table 3.14, the coefficient on each instrument in the first stage is almost
identical to the case when the instruments are used separately, and the estimated return to
education using both instruments together is 12.5% with a robust standard error of 0.019 giving
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a t-statistic of 6.66. The standard error is lower than is the case when either of the instruments
are used singly, so the extra variation in schooling that comes with using both instruments
results in a more precise estimate of the IV return to education.
The problem with this strategy is that using both instruments makes the interpretation
‘ugly’, to borrow Murray’s parlance. Though I am exploiting two sources of exogenous variation
in years-of-schooling, which is good for identification, the problem is interpreting exactly whose
return the resulting LATE estimator is capturing. It is not as straightforward as in the individual
instruments cases in which we identify the low ability/high discount rate individuals’ return –
using RoSLA – or the high discount rate (because of time preference) individuals’ return – using
early smoking. Given that the effects of each instrument in the first stage are similar to their
impacts when used separately, and that the early smoking instrument is the stronger and the
resulting IV estimate of the return is very close to the early smoking IV estimate, it appears
that this instrument is doing most of the work. In interpretation this would suggest the estimate
is more heavily weighted towards the return for the individuals who have high discount rates
because of their rate of time preference.
3.11 Conclusions
I have presented three IV estimates: the RoSLA estimate of 10.2%, the combined estimate of
12.5%, and the early smoking estimate of 12.9%, all of which whilst being statistically significant
are sufficiently imprecise for me to be unable to conclude are actually different from each other.
My analysis, looking at the effects on different quintiles of the proxy ability distribution, suggests
that the RoSLA estimate captures the return for the individuals who wanted to leave at the
minimum leaving age but were forced to stay longer – concurring with the earlier evidence
of Oreopoulos, Chevalier et al. and Harmon and Walker. I have argued that early smoking
is a behaviour engaged in by individuals of all abilities who have high discount rates due to
their rate of time preference, thus the IV estimate derived from this instrument is closer to an
average marginal return to education, purged of the bias of OLS. That both the RoSLA and
early smoking IV estimates are not statistically different to each other suggests that the RoSLA
LATE is also close to an average marginal return to education i.e. that the returns at the lower
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part of the distribution are similar to the average return. This follows Oreopoulos who finds
a return substantially higher than the estimated OLS return when implementing IV esitmates
based on RoSLA, and a RoSLA that affected a large proportion of the population.
I believe that the results that this and other IV studies find can be reconciled when we
consider the assumptions imposed by Mincer’s human capital earnings function as I (and others)
have estimated it. Implicit in this specification is the assumption that each additional year of
schooling has the same proportional effect on earnings i.e. concavity in the schooling-wage profile
is not modelled. Moreover, in interpreting IV estimates we need explicitly recognise that returns
to education vary across the population depending on characteristics such as family background
and ability (the βi vary). If different individuals have different returns to schooling at the same
level of schooling and if each individual’s return to schooling is strictly decreasing in their level
of schooling, then there is no unique causal effect of schooling.
While some authors27 have concentrated on “sheep-skin” effects creating non-linearities in
the returns to education, Lang (1993) finds a diminishing marginal product of education i.e.
concavity in the education-wage profile. The individuals affected by RoSLA may be of lower
ability, however, if all individuals have a higher marginal return to schooling at lower levels of
schooling then this is consistent with the estimate from the RoSLA IV being higher than the
OLS estimate. The early smoking instrument estimates the return for individuals who have a
higher than average discount rate, and therefore will have a higher than average return at the
point at which they have stopped acquiring more education. Therefore in this case it is not a
surprise that the estimated return is higher than the OLS. Moreover, the smoking at 16 group
have all levels of education, some higher than the minimum that the RoSLA individuals have
by definition, though there is more weight in the lower part of the schooling distribution among
early smokers and so the the average marginal return across these individuals will be close to
the RoSLA estimate. Thus in this light it is reasonable that both the smoking instrument and
the RoSLA instrument result in estimates of the return to education that are similar to each
other.
More generally there is a question as to why the OLS estimates are consistently found to be
below IV estimates – irrespective of the instrument chosen – when, as noted above, measurement
27For example, Park (1999) has looked at “sheep-skin” effects in the US.
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error in standard micro surveys could only sensibly account for a relatively small attenuation in
the OLS coefficient and moreover it appears from this study that ‘discount rate bias’ is not a
major factor biasing the OLS estimates downwards. The ‘discount rate bias’ story suggests that
the effect of discount rate to reduce education also independently increases wages. However,
when I test for the correlation between the discount rate (as captured by early smoking) and the
wage error the instrument is shown to be valid. Hence I do not believe that ‘discount rate bias’
is the major factor biasing the OLS estimates downwards. Given that all instruments estimate
a ‘local average treatment effect’, which may or may not be different to the average effect on the
treated, it appears that the instruments that have commonly been used – and the two that I use
here – isolate the treatment effect for groups of individuals who have a higher average return
to education at the point in the education distribution at which the instrument works, than
the global average estimated by OLS. Support for this conclusion also comes from Oreopoulos
(2006) who estimates that when the OLS is carried out only for those who left school at 16 or
less, the estimated coefficient is similar to his IV estimates which use RoSLA. If I replicate this
approach and estimate the OLS regression only for those who left school at the minimum age the
estimated return is 19.7%. Whilst acknowledging that the endogeneity of years of schooling in
this regression is not dealt with, the much greater coefficient on years of schooling does suggest
that the linearity in returns assumption of the OLS esimated over the entire range of education
levels contributes significantly to the lowering of the OLS coefficient.
One conclusion is that in modelling the returns to education, while the endogeneity of school-
ing is clearly a problem, it is important to recognize that there are also issues regarding the
appropriateness of the linearity assumption and the reality of heterogeneous returns to educa-
tion across individuals. Thus for policy purposes in particular, it may not even be appropriate
to refer to the causal effect of education on earnings. In answering the question of the return,
we may need to focus on the individuals in question and the margin in question before we can
arrive at a valid answer.
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3.12 Tables
Table 3.1: Effect of schooling on probability of Current and Early Smoking
Current Smoker Smoker at 16
marginal fx z marginal fx z x-bar
years of schooling -0.027*** -7.24 -0.038*** -8.38 12.306
age 0.005 1.35 0.002 0.50 42.374
age2 0.000*** -2.99 0.000 -0.36 1939.210
year-of-birth -0.016*** -2.66 -0.002 -0.30 59.190 (=1955)
year-of-birth2 0.000*** 2.84 0.000 0.25 3647.300
region: North -0.032 -0.76 -0.033 -0.66 0.066
region: Yorkshire 0.037 0.99 0.031 0.69 0.098
region: North West 0.037 0.97 0.031 0.69 0.104
region: East Midlands 0.056 1.46 0.060 1.30 0.094
region: East Anglia 0.047 1.05 0.112* 1.94 0.043
region: South East 0.055* 1.72 0.047 1.23 0.285
region: South West -0.005 -0.12 0.059 1.29 0.097
region: Wales 0.062 1.36 0.006 0.11 0.053
region: Scotland 0.065 1.57 0.063 1.28 0.078
ethnicity: black -0.121 -1.27 -0.181 -1.39 0.006
ethnicity: asian 0.225*** 3.18 -0.176** -2.29 0.016
ethnicity: other -0.016 -0.16 -0.174 -1.55 0.008
father’s occ class: 1 -0.022 -0.74 -0.041 -1.17 0.141
father’s occ class: 2 -0.094** -2.39 -0.094* -1.88 0.058
father’s occ class: 3 0.013 0.28 -0.099* -1.81 0.035
father’s occ class: 4 -0.055 -1.28 -0.104** -2.10 0.047
father’s occ class: 5 0.012 0.46 -0.010 -0.33 0.236
father’s occ class: 6 0.022 0.49 -0.089* -1.79 0.042
father’s occ class: 7 0.006 0.13 -0.002 -0.03 0.032
father’s occ class: 9 0.009 0.29 0.016 0.43 0.094
father’s occ class: 10 -0.012 -0.39 -0.056* -1.67 0.151
mother’s occ class: 1 -0.017 -0.33 -0.026 -0.39 0.037
mother’s occ class: 2 0.070 1.07 0.003 0.04 0.027
mother’s occ class: 3 -0.050 -0.87 -0.036 -0.51 0.030
mother’s occ class: 4 -0.036 -0.84 -0.023 -0.42 0.089
mother’s occ class: 5 -0.023 -0.41 0.048 0.67 0.028
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.51 0.036 0.62 0.068
mother’s occ class: 7 -0.054 -1.16 -0.083 -1.48 0.060
mother’s occ class: 9 -0.017 -0.39 -0.057 -1.08 0.083
mother’s occ class: 10 -0.012 -0.33 -0.060 -1.29 0.532
‘nuclear family’ to 16 -0.062*** -2.86 -0.099*** -3.73 0.820
mid 1990s 0.002 0.22 0.000 0.06 0.223
late 1990s 0.037*** 2.90 0.035*** 2.85 0.200
post 2000 -0.006 -0.30 0.002 0.08 0.371
# individuals 2805 2805
# observations 33298 33298
obs. prob. 0.287 0.344
pred. prob. (at x-bar) 0.276 0.331
Notes: Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natutal parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
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Table 3.2: Smokers at 16/18 by quintile of the mean residual log wage distribution
Non-smoker Smoker Non-smoker Smoker
quintile at 16 at 16 Total at 18 at 18 Total
1 256 198 454 209 245 454
56.39% 43.61% 100.00% 46.04% 53.96% 100.00%
2 278 175 453 216 237 453
61.37% 38.63% 100.00% 47.68% 52.32% 100.00%
3 319 134 453 265 188 453
70.42% 29.58% 100.00% 58.50% 41.50% 100.00%
4 299 154 453 255 198 453
66.00% 34.00% 100.00% 56.29% 43.71% 100.00%
5 349 104 453 295 158 453
77.04% 22.96% 100.00% 65.12% 34.88% 100.00%
Total 1501 765 2266 1240 1026 2266
66.24% 33.76% 100.00% 54.72% 45.28% 100.00%
Notes: OLS log wage regression (Table 3.5 column 1) run on pooled panel dataset, residuals are
taken and the mean residual for each individual is calculated. These are then ranked into
5 quintiles as a measure of unobserved ability.
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Table 3.3: Sample Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
log wage 21256 2.214 0.437 0.848 3.407
years of schooling 21256 12.507 2.646 7 21
smoker at age 16 21256 0.315 0.465 0 1
minimum school leaving age was 16 21256 0.537 0.499 0 1
age 21256 39.991 10.757 19 65
cohort: born in the 1920s 21256 0.003 0.052 0 1
cohort: born in the 1930s 21256 0.050 0.219 0 1
cohort: born in the 1940s 21256 0.203 0.402 0 1
cohort: born in the 1950s 21256 0.274 0.446 0 1
cohort: born in the 1960s 21256 0.319 0.466 0 1
cohort: born in the 1970s 21256 0.146 0.354 0 1
cohort: born in the 1980s 21256 0.005 0.069 0 1
region: North 21256 0.068 0.252 0 1
region: Yorkshire 21256 0.097 0.296 0 1
region: North West 21256 0.106 0.308 0 1
region: East Midlands 21256 0.092 0.290 0 1
region: East Anglia 21256 0.043 0.202 0 1
region: South East 21256 0.280 0.449 0 1
region: South West 21256 0.100 0.300 0 1
region: Wales 21256 0.051 0.221 0 1
region: Scotland 21256 0.076 0.265 0 1
ethnicity: black 21256 0.004 0.062 0 1
ethnicity: asian 21256 0.016 0.124 0 1
ethnicity: other 21256 0.007 0.083 0 1
father’s occ class: 1 21256 0.139 0.346 0 1
father’s occ class: 2 21256 0.064 0.244 0 1
father’s occ class: 3 21256 0.038 0.191 0 1
father’s occ class: 4 21256 0.049 0.216 0 1
father’s occ class: 5 21256 0.234 0.423 0 1
father’s occ class: 6 21256 0.044 0.205 0 1
father’s occ class: 7 21256 0.032 0.177 0 1
father’s occ class: 8 21256 0.171 0.377 0 1
father’s occ class: 9 21256 0.086 0.280 0 1
father’s occ class: 10 21256 0.143 0.350 0 1
mother’s occ class: 1 21256 0.037 0.188 0 1
mother’s occ class: 2 21256 0.026 0.159 0 1
mother’s occ class: 3 21256 0.032 0.175 0 1
mother’s occ class: 4 21256 0.098 0.297 0 1
mother’s occ class: 5 21256 0.029 0.168 0 1
mother’s occ class: 6 21256 0.073 0.260 0 1
mother’s occ class: 7 21256 0.066 0.248 0 1
mother’s occ class: 8 21256 0.051 0.220 0 1
mother’s occ class: 9 21256 0.084 0.277 0 1
mother’s occ class: 10 21256 0.505 0.500 0 1
‘nuclear family’ to 16 21256 0.831 0.375 0 1
early 1990s 21256 0.195 0.396 0 1
mid 1990s 21256 0.213 0.409 0 1
late 1990s 21256 0.221 0.415 0 1
post 2000 21256 0.371 0.483 0 1
number of observations per person 2266 9.380 4.516 1 15
Notes: ‘nuclear family’ means living with both natural parents
Occupational class dummies: (1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical,
(4) clerical/secretarial, (5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales,
(8) plant/machine operative, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
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Table 3.4: Sample Summary Statistics, by Early Smoking Status
Smoker at 16 Non-Smoker at 16
Std. Std.
Variable Obs Mean Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Dev. Min Max
log wage 6696 2.120 0.423 0.878 3.395 14560 2.257 0.437 0.848 3.407
years of schooling 6696 11.646 2.081 8 21 14560 12.902 2.781 7 21
smoker at age 16 6696 1.000 0.000 1 1 14560 0.000 0.000 0 0
min. sch leaving age 16 6696 0.486 0.500 0 1 14560 0.561 0.496 0 1
age 6696 41.230 11.337 19 65 14560 39.421 10.431 19 65
cohort: born in the 1920s 6696 0.004 0.063 0 1 14560 0.002 0.046 0 1
cohort: born in the 1930s 6696 0.063 0.244 0 1 14560 0.044 0.206 0 1
cohort: born in the 1940s 6696 0.258 0.438 0 1 14560 0.177 0.382 0 1
cohort: born in the 1950s 6696 0.250 0.433 0 1 14560 0.284 0.451 0 1
cohort: born in the 1960s 6696 0.266 0.442 0 1 14560 0.344 0.475 0 1
cohort: born in the 1970s 6696 0.150 0.357 0 1 14560 0.145 0.352 0 1
cohort: born in the 1980s 6696 0.008 0.091 0 1 14560 0.003 0.057 0 1
region: North 6696 0.057 0.231 0 1 14560 0.073 0.260 0 1
region: Yorkshire 6696 0.103 0.304 0 1 14560 0.095 0.293 0 1
region: North West 6696 0.103 0.303 0 1 14560 0.107 0.309 0 1
region: East Midlands 6696 0.095 0.293 0 1 14560 0.091 0.288 0 1
region: East Anglia 6696 0.050 0.219 0 1 14560 0.039 0.193 0 1
region: South East 6696 0.272 0.445 0 1 14560 0.284 0.451 0 1
region: South West 6696 0.119 0.324 0 1 14560 0.091 0.288 0 1
region: Wales 6696 0.044 0.204 0 1 14560 0.055 0.228 0 1
region: Scotland 6696 0.082 0.274 0 1 14560 0.074 0.261 0 1
ethnicity: black 6696 0.001 0.037 0 1 14560 0.005 0.070 0 1
ethnicity: asian 6696 0.006 0.075 0 1 14560 0.020 0.140 0 1
ethnicity: other 6696 0.002 0.049 0 1 14560 0.009 0.094 0 1
father’s occ class: 1 6696 0.123 0.329 0 1 14560 0.146 0.353 0 1
father’s occ class: 2 6696 0.036 0.185 0 1 14560 0.077 0.266 0 1
father’s occ class: 3 6696 0.027 0.161 0 1 14560 0.043 0.203 0 1
father’s occ class: 4 6696 0.032 0.177 0 1 14560 0.057 0.231 0 1
father’s occ class: 5 6696 0.257 0.437 0 1 14560 0.223 0.416 0 1
father’s occ class: 6 6696 0.036 0.187 0 1 14560 0.048 0.213 0 1
father’s occ class: 7 6696 0.036 0.187 0 1 14560 0.031 0.172 0 1
father’s occ class: 8 6696 0.194 0.396 0 1 14560 0.161 0.367 0 1
father’s occ class: 9 6696 0.113 0.316 0 1 14560 0.074 0.261 0 1
father’s occ class: 10 6696 0.146 0.353 0 1 14560 0.142 0.349 0 1
mother’s occ class: 1 6696 0.031 0.173 0 1 14560 0.039 0.195 0 1
mother’s occ class: 2 6696 0.018 0.134 0 1 14560 0.030 0.169 0 1
mother’s occ class: 3 6696 0.028 0.166 0 1 14560 0.033 0.179 0 1
mother’s occ class: 4 6696 0.085 0.279 0 1 14560 0.104 0.305 0 1
mother’s occ class: 5 6696 0.043 0.204 0 1 14560 0.023 0.148 0 1
mother’s occ class: 6 6696 0.098 0.297 0 1 14560 0.062 0.240 0 1
mother’s occ class: 7 6696 0.051 0.221 0 1 14560 0.072 0.259 0 1
mother’s occ class: 8 6696 0.053 0.223 0 1 14560 0.050 0.218 0 1
mother’s occ class: 9 6696 0.092 0.288 0 1 14560 0.080 0.272 0 1
mother’s occ class: 10 6696 0.501 0.500 0 1 14560 0.507 0.500 0 1
‘nuclear family’ to 16 6696 0.795 0.404 0 1 14560 0.848 0.359 0 1
early 1990s 6696 0.196 0.397 0 1 14560 0.194 0.396 0 1
mid 1990s 6696 0.212 0.409 0 1 14560 0.214 0.410 0 1
late 1990s 6696 0.219 0.414 0 1 14560 0.222 0.415 0 1
post 2000 6696 0.373 0.484 0 1 14560 0.371 0.483 0 1
# obs. per person 765 8.753 4.650 1 15 1501 9.700 4.414 1 15
Notes: ‘nuclear family’ means living with both natural parents
Occupational class dummies: (1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical,
(4) clerical/secretarial, (5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales,
(8) plant/machine operative, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
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Table 3.5: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status
OLS IV: smoker at 16 IV: first stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
constant -0.754*** 0.250 -0.607** 0.287 -0.471 1.664
years of schooling 0.046*** 0.003 0.129*** 0.020 — —
smoker at 16 indicator — — — — -0.876*** 0.108
age 0.099*** 0.004 0.094*** 0.005 0.056*** 0.022
age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
year-of-birth -0.016** 0.007 -0.052*** 0.011 0.398*** 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.054 0.044 -0.103 0.272
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 -0.022 0.041 0.331 0.253
region: North West 0.054 0.032 0.023 0.040 0.402 0.253
region: East Midlands -0.010 0.032 -0.005 0.038 -0.034 0.235
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 -0.009 0.048 0.366 0.324
region: South East 0.142*** 0.028 0.082** 0.037 0.757*** 0.206
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.015 0.041 0.175 0.237
region: Wales -0.012 0.040 -0.019 0.045 0.081 0.285
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 -0.021 0.044 0.643** 0.262
ethnicity: black 0.114 0.105 0.115 0.117 -0.164 0.779
ethnicity: asian -0.136* 0.071 -0.312*** 0.105 1.965*** 0.485
ethnicity: other -0.048 0.103 -0.234** 0.119 2.067* 1.111
father’s occ class: 1 0.116*** 0.028 0.020 0.041 1.122*** 0.214
father’s occ class: 2 0.121*** 0.038 -0.077 0.065 2.268*** 0.291
father’s occ class: 3 0.089** 0.043 -0.043 0.058 1.499*** 0.321
father’s occ class: 4 0.065* 0.036 -0.053 0.051 1.320*** 0.305
father’s occ class: 5 0.038* 0.023 0.011 0.028 0.335** 0.170
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 -0.074 0.048 0.991*** 0.305
father’s occ class: 7 0.103*** 0.040 0.066 0.049 0.467 0.330
father’s occ class: 9 -0.021 0.029 0.028 0.035 -0.551*** 0.197
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.030 -0.012 0.186
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.035 0.061 0.112 0.411
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 -0.103 0.070 1.433*** 0.439
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.053 0.057 0.046 0.387
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.014 0.048 0.485 0.307
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.031 0.058 -0.117 0.417
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.029 0.045 0.054 0.311
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.057 0.048 -0.083 0.312
mother’s occ class: 9 -0.004 0.038 0.034 0.044 -0.461 0.284
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 -0.006 0.036 0.115 0.253
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 0.001 0.022 0.247* 0.136
mid 1990s -0.045*** 0.009 -0.050*** 0.010 0.067 0.046
late 1990s -0.065*** 0.014 -0.070*** 0.016 0.080 0.081
post 2000 -0.033 0.021 -0.040* 0.023 0.108 0.126
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.072 0.246
F-test on exclusion of smoking at 16 from first stage: 66.17; Partial R2 of instrument = 0.0289
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natutal parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
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Table 3.6: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status, Basic Specification
OLS IV: smoker at 16 IV: first stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
constant -0.849*** 0.247 -0.590** 0.280 -2.204 1.697
years of schooling 0.052*** 0.003 0.121*** 0.016
smoker at 16 indicator -1.087*** 0.113
age 0.098*** 0.004 0.094*** 0.005 0.067*** 0.023
age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
year-of-birth -0.014** 0.007 -0.048*** 0.011 0.466*** 0.042
year-of-birth2 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004 0.000
region: North 0.041 0.038 0.048 0.044 -0.124 0.286
region: Yorkshire -0.003 0.033 -0.018 0.039 0.269 0.265
region: North West 0.050 0.033 0.022 0.039 0.432 0.270
region: East Midlands -0.016 0.032 -0.006 0.037 -0.122 0.258
region: East Anglia 0.010 0.040 -0.006 0.047 0.318 0.338
region: South East 0.143*** 0.028 0.080*** 0.036 0.946*** 0.219
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.010 0.040 0.271 0.251
region: Wales -0.018 0.040 -0.019 0.044 0.003 0.305
region: Scotland 0.020 0.036 -0.023 0.043 0.688** 0.283
ethnicity: black 0.117 0.093 0.104 0.113 -0.015 0.751
ethnicity: asian -0.150** 0.070 -0.290*** 0.098 1.844*** 0.519
ethnicity: other -0.042 0.095 -0.221* 0.119 2.406** 0.996
mid 1990s -0.047*** 0.009 -0.049*** 0.010 0.040 0.050
late 1990s -0.068*** 0.014 -0.068*** 0.016 0.019 0.086
post 2000 -0.038* 0.021 -0.037 0.023 0.014 0.133
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.251 0.098 0.143
F-test on exclusion of instrument from first stage: 92.39; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0400
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
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Table 3.7: First Stage IV regression coefficients using Smoker at 16 indicator interacted with
year turned 16 indicator
Robust
Coeff. Std. Err. t p
Smoker at 16 x turned 16 pre-1965 -0.797*** 0.209 -3.82 0.000
Smoker at 16 x turned 16 post-1965 -0.904*** 0.120 -7.51 0.000
# observations 21256
R2 0.247
Notes: *** significant at 1% level; standard errors clustered at individual level and robust.
Turned 16 post-1965 includes those turning 16 from January 1965 onwards.
Other covariates included in these first stage regressions are those in Table 3.5.
Table 3.8: First Stage IV Regression coefficients on Smoker at 16 indicator and on Minimum
School Leaving Age of 16 indicator, by quintile of the mean residual log wage distribution
IV first stage, Early Smoking IV first stage, RoSLA
Coeff. on Robust Coeff. on Robust
quintile smoker 16 Std. Err. R2 MSLA=16 Std. Err. R2
1 -0.773*** 0.265 0.268 1.044** 0.510 0.262
#obs = 3684
mean years of schooling
12.41
2 -1.044*** 0.227 0.317 0.837* 0.458 0.292
#obs = 4285
mean years of schooling
12.09
3 -0.950*** 0.249 0.329 0.315 0.496 0.309
#obs = 4461
mean years of schooling
12.30
4 -0.747*** 0.213 0.257 0.398 0.388 0.240
#obs = 4496
mean years of schooling
12.28
5 -0.879*** 0.241 0.341 0.080 0.435 0.321
#obs = 4330
mean years of schooling
12.65
Notes: *** signficant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
Other covariates included in regressions are as Table 3.5.
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Table 3.9: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 18
Status
OLS IV: smoker at 18 IV: first stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
constant -0.754*** 0.250 -0.596** 0.293 -0.399 1.675
years of schooling 0.046*** 0.003 0.135*** 0.023 — —
smoker at 18 indicator — — — — -0.745*** 0.108
age 0.099*** 0.004 0.093*** 0.005 0.054** 0.022
age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
year-of-birth -0.016** 0.007 -0.054*** 0.012 0.399*** 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.054 0.045 -0.121 0.274
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 -0.024 0.042 0.319 0.254
region: North West 0.054 0.032 0.020 0.041 0.414 0.253
region: East Midlands -0.010 0.032 -0.005 0.038 -0.041 0.236
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 -0.011 0.050 0.392 0.324
region: South East 0.142*** 0.028 0.077** 0.039 0.760*** 0.209
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.014 0.042 0.138 0.238
region: Wales -0.012 0.040 -0.020 0.046 0.063 0.287
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 -0.025 0.046 0.600** 0.264
ethnicity: black 0.114 0.105 0.115 0.119 -0.212 0.774
ethnicity: asian -0.136 0.071 -0.325*** 0.112 2.081*** 0.511
ethnicity: other -0.048 0.103 -0.248** 0.124 2.112* 1.091
father’s occ class: 1 0.116*** 0.028 0.013 0.044 1.160*** 0.213
father’s occ class: 2 0.121*** 0.038 -0.092 0.071 2.327*** 0.292
father’s occ class: 3 0.089** 0.043 -0.053 0.063 1.514*** 0.326
father’s occ class: 4 0.065* 0.036 -0.062 0.054 1.362*** 0.309
father’s occ class: 5 0.038* 0.023 0.009 0.029 0.340** 0.170
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 -0.081 0.051 0.983*** 0.308
father’s occ class: 7 0.103*** 0.040 0.063 0.050 0.493 0.329
father’s occ class: 9 -0.021 0.029 0.032 0.036 -0.551*** 0.196
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.031 -0.008 0.186
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.034 0.063 0.062 0.411
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 -0.112 0.074 1.352*** 0.443
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.053 0.059 0.074 0.388
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.011 0.050 0.471 0.310
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.033 0.060 -0.199 0.420
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.029 0.046 0.021 0.313
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.058 0.049 -0.113 0.313
mother’s occ class: 9 -0.004 0.038 0.037 0.046 -0.489* 0.287
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 -0.007 0.037 0.088 0.256
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 -0.001 0.022 0.258* 0.135
mid 1990s -0.045*** 0.009 -0.050*** 0.010 0.066 0.046
late 1990s -0.065*** 0.014 -0.070*** 0.016 0.079 0.082
post 2000 -0.033 0.021 -0.040* 0.024 0.100 0.127
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.042 0.242
F-test on exclusion of smoking at 18 from first stage: 48.02; Partial R2 of instrument = 0.0236
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natutal parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
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Table 3.10: Effect of Early Smoking on Probability of Being a Home-owner, Probit Model
Home Owner
marginal fx z x-bar
log of hourly wage 0.204*** 16.15 2.196
smoker at 16 indicator -0.044*** -3.49 0.313
age -0.004 -1.03 39.430
age2 0.000*** 2.93 1682.770
year-of-birth 0.022*** 3.60 62.39 = 1958
year-of-birth2 0.000*** -3.20 4025.480
region: North -0.013 -0.42 0.069
region: Yorkshire -0.067** -2.22 0.096
region: North West 0.009 0.35 0.105
region: East Midlands -0.043 -1.48 0.090
region: East Anglia -0.038 -1.09 0.043
region: South East -0.127*** -4.96 0.287
region: South West -0.100*** -3.11 0.098
region: Wales -0.075** -2.00 0.050
region: Scotland -0.107*** -3.17 0.075
ethnicity: black -0.094 -1.57 0.006
ethnicity: asian 0.075** 2.25 0.017
ethnicity: other 0.045 0.72 0.007
father’s occ class: 1 0.040* 1.93 0.134
father’s occ class: 2 -0.004 -0.16 0.064
father’s occ class: 3 0.021 0.65 0.038
father’s occ class: 4 0.026 0.76 0.047
father’s occ class: 5 0.015 0.82 0.222
father’s occ class: 6 -0.028 -0.94 0.044
father’s occ class: 7 -0.013 -0.35 0.032
father’s occ class: 9 -0.087*** -3.08 0.080
father’s occ class: 10 -0.002 -0.12 0.177
mother’s occ class: 1 0.038 0.95 0.034
mother’s occ class: 2 -0.021 -0.47 0.029
mother’s occ class: 3 -0.046 -1.05 0.031
mother’s occ class: 4 -0.007 -0.21 0.094
mother’s occ class: 5 0.016 0.38 0.026
mother’s occ class: 6 0.017 0.52 0.073
mother’s occ class: 7 0.020 0.60 0.063
mother’s occ class: 9 -0.017 -0.49 0.078
mother’s occ class: 10 -0.034 -1.27 0.525
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.017 1.21 0.825
mid 1990s -0.004 -0.43 0.207
late 1990s -0.024* -1.66 0.224
post 2000 -0.057*** -2.86 0.385
observed prob. 0.829
predicted prob. (at x-bar) 0.863
# observations 24034
# individuals 2615
Notes: Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natutal parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
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Table 3.11: Effect of Early Smoking on Probability of Having Had a Dental or Optician Check-up
in the Last Year, Probit Models
Dental Check Opticians Check
marginal fx z marginal fx z x-bar
log of hourly wage 0.132*** 8.72 0.070*** 5.92 2.196
smoker at 16 indicator -0.040*** -2.67 -0.029*** -2.59 0.313
age 0.001 0.11 -0.007 -1.59 39.415
age2 0.000 1.46 0.000*** 3.55 1681.620
year-of-birth 0.039*** 5.49 0.006 1.03 62.41 = 1958
year-of-birth2 0.000*** -5.05 0.000 -0.88 4028.120
region: North 0.014 0.40 -0.004 -0.15 0.069
region: Yorkshire -0.006 -0.20 -0.007 -0.30 0.096
region: North West -0.034 -1.07 -0.015 -0.59 0.105
region: East Midlands -0.039 -1.21 -0.012 -0.49 0.090
region: East Anglia 0.110*** 2.79 -0.017 -0.57 0.043
region: South East -0.048* -1.81 -0.021 -1.02 0.287
region: South West -0.003 -0.10 0.009 0.39 0.098
region: Wales -0.058 -1.47 -0.008 -0.28 0.050
region: Scotland -0.045 -1.25 0.005 0.20 0.075
ethnicity: black 0.001 0.01 -0.014 -0.19 0.006
ethnicity: asian -0.151*** -2.71 0.051 1.13 0.017
ethnicity: other -0.042 -0.52 0.128 1.62 0.007
father’s occ class: 1 0.037 1.40 0.072*** 3.24 0.135
father’s occ class: 2 0.047 1.46 0.080*** 2.87 0.064
father’s occ class: 3 0.027 0.63 0.088** 2.57 0.038
father’s occ class: 4 0.047 1.24 0.010 0.37 0.047
father’s occ class: 5 0.013 0.54 0.022 1.16 0.222
father’s occ class: 6 0.026 0.75 0.044 1.42 0.044
father’s occ class: 7 0.058 1.30 0.040 1.07 0.032
father’s occ class: 9 -0.011 -0.35 0.016 0.66 0.080
father’s occ class: 10 0.026 1.02 0.022 1.01 0.178
mother’s occ class: 1 0.049 1.03 -0.016 -0.42 0.034
mother’s occ class: 2 0.059 1.15 -0.048 -1.10 0.029
mother’s occ class: 3 0.031 0.59 0.018 0.43 0.031
mother’s occ class: 4 0.061 1.63 -0.016 -0.49 0.094
mother’s occ class: 5 -0.016 -0.31 -0.018 -0.40 0.026
mother’s occ class: 6 0.008 0.22 -0.013 -0.41 0.072
mother’s occ class: 7 0.105 2.68 0.049 1.38 0.063
mother’s occ class: 9 -0.019 -0.49 -0.026 -0.85 0.078
mother’s occ class: 10 0.024 0.74 -0.014 -0.53 0.526
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.035*** 1.94 0.019 1.27 0.825
mid 1990s 0.003 0.26 0.010 0.85 0.207
late 1990s 0.010 0.56 0.028* 1.69 0.224
post 2000 0.018 0.67 0.023 0.94 0.386
observed prob. 0.631 0.307
predicted prob. (at x-bar) 0.636 0.302
# observations 24086 24086
# individuals 2615 2615
Notes: Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natutal parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
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Table 3.12: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using RoSLA
OLS IV: RoSLA IV: first stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
constant -0.754*** 0.250 -0.655** 0.280 -1.459 1.681
years of schooling 0.046*** 0.003 0.102** 0.051 — —
min. school LA=16 — — — — 0.564*** 0.206
age 0.099*** 0.004 0.095*** 0.005 0.056** 0.022
age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
year-of-birth -0.016** 0.007 -0.040* 0.023 0.427*** 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.051 0.041 -0.080 0.272
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 -0.014 0.040 0.320 0.256
region: North West 0.054 0.032 0.033 0.041 0.386 0.255
region: East Midlands -0.010 0.032 -0.007 0.035 -0.035 0.234
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 -0.001 0.047 0.324 0.327
region: South East 0.142*** 0.028 0.101** 0.051 0.741 0.208
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.017 0.038 0.114*** 0.240
region: Wales -0.012 0.040 -0.017 0.043 0.093 0.290
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 -0.005 0.050 0.658** 0.266
ethnicity: black 0.114 0.105 0.114 0.110 0.037 0.746
ethnicity: asian -0.136 0.071 -0.255* 0.139 2.146*** 0.515
ethnicity: other -0.048 0.103 -0.174 0.152 2.214** 1.074
father’s occ class: 1 0.116*** 0.028 0.051 0.069 1.162*** 0.216
father’s occ class: 2 0.121*** 0.038 -0.013 0.128 2.404*** 0.298
father’s occ class: 3 0.089** 0.043 0.000 0.093 1.585*** 0.333
father’s occ class: 4 0.065* 0.036 -0.015 0.083 1.440*** 0.308
father’s occ class: 5 0.038* 0.023 0.020 0.029 0.322* 0.172
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 -0.046 0.064 1.046*** 0.313
father’s occ class: 7 0.103*** 0.040 0.078 0.049 0.484 0.339
father’s occ class: 9 -0.021 0.029 0.012 0.044 -0.592*** 0.196
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.043 0.186
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.039 0.056 0.107 0.426
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 -0.065 0.094 1.378*** 0.454
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.054 0.053 0.007 0.395
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.027 0.050 0.453 0.317
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.025 0.054 -0.240 0.430
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.027 0.042 -0.070 0.322
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.057 0.044 -0.053 0.324
mother’s occ class: 9 -0.004 0.038 0.022 0.047 -0.491* 0.293
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 -0.003 0.034 0.103 0.264
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 0.010 0.026 0.330** 0.137
mid 1990s -0.045*** 0.009 -0.048*** 0.010 0.063 0.047
late 1990s -0.065*** 0.014 -0.068*** 0.015 0.075 0.083
post 2000 -0.033 0.021 -0.038* 0.023 0.094 0.129
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.177 0.227
F-test on exclusion of min. school LA=16 from first stage: 7.49; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0044
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natutal parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
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Table 3.13: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using RoSLA, Basic
Specification
OLS IV: RoSLA IV: first stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
constant -0.849*** 0.247 -0.668** 0.303 -3.375* 1.727
years of schooling 0.052*** 0.003 0.100** 0.042
smoker at 16 indicator 0.691*** 0.219
age 0.098*** 0.004 0.095*** 0.005 0.068*** 0.023
age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
year-of-birth -0.014** 0.007 -0.038* 0.022 0.501*** 0.042
year-of-birth2 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.000
region: North 0.041 0.038 0.046 0.041 -0.089 0.286
region: Yorkshire -0.003 0.033 -0.014 0.038 0.246 0.268
region: North West 0.050 0.033 0.030 0.041 0.418 0.273
region: East Midlands -0.016 0.032 -0.009 0.035 -0.129 0.258
region: East Anglia 0.010 0.040 -0.001 0.045 0.277 0.343
region: South East 0.143*** 0.028 0.099* 0.052 0.936*** 0.223
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.014 0.038 0.202 0.256
region: Wales -0.018 0.040 -0.019 0.042 0.022 0.314
region: Scotland 0.020 0.036 -0.010 0.048 0.710** 0.288
ethnicity: black 0.117 0.093 0.108 0.105 0.251 0.700
ethnicity: asian -0.150** 0.070 -0.248** 0.120 2.075*** 0.560
ethnicity: other -0.042 0.095 -0.167 0.149 2.566*** 0.939
mid 1990s -0.047*** 0.009 -0.048*** 0.010 0.036 0.050
late 1990s -0.068*** 0.014 -0.068*** 0.015 0.013 0.089
post 2000 -0.038* 0.021 -0.037* 0.022 -0.004 0.137
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.251 0.176 0.113
F-test on exclusion of instrument from first stage: 9.98; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0058
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
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Table 3.14: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status and RoSLA
OLS IV: both IV: first stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
constant -0.754*** 0.250 -0.613** 0.283 -0.157 1.663
years of schooling 0.046*** 0.003 0.125*** 0.019 — —
smoker at 16 indicator — — — — -0.874*** 0.107
min. school LA=16 — — — — 0.556*** 0.202
age 0.099*** 0.004 0.094*** 0.005 0.054** 0.022
age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
year-of-birth -0.016** 0.007 -0.050*** 0.011 0.399*** 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.053 0.044 -0.097 0.272
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 -0.021 0.040 0.347 0.253
region: North West 0.054 0.032 0.024 0.039 0.409 0.253
region: East Midlands -0.010 0.032 -0.006 0.037 -0.014 0.235
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 -0.008 0.048 0.398 0.325
region: South East 0.142*** 0.028 0.084** 0.036 0.767*** 0.207
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.015 0.040 0.192 0.236
region: Wales -0.012 0.040 -0.019 0.045 0.082 0.286
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 -0.019 0.043 0.705*** 0.263
ethnicity: black 0.114 0.105 0.115 0.116 -0.114 0.788
ethnicity: asian -0.136 0.071 -0.305*** 0.103 1.975*** 0.493
ethnicity: other -0.048 0.103 -0.226* 0.116 2.021* 1.080
father’s occ class: 1 0.116*** 0.028 0.024 0.040 1.118*** 0.213
father’s occ class: 2 0.121*** 0.038 -0.068 0.062 2.271*** 0.290
father’s occ class: 3 0.089** 0.043 -0.038 0.056 1.485*** 0.319
father’s occ class: 4 0.065* 0.036 -0.048 0.050 1.324*** 0.303
father’s occ class: 5 0.038* 0.023 0.012 0.027 0.322* 0.170
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 -0.070 0.046 0.968*** 0.303
father’s occ class: 7 0.103*** 0.040 0.067 0.048 0.501 0.330
father’s occ class: 9 -0.021 0.029 0.026 0.034 -0.542*** 0.194
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.030 0.000 0.185
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.036 0.060 0.079 0.414
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 -0.098 0.069 1.379*** 0.442
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.053 0.057 0.018 0.388
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.016 0.048 0.451 0.310
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.030 0.057 -0.104 0.414
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.028 0.045 0.030 0.313
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.057 0.047 -0.111 0.316
mother’s occ class: 9 -0.004 0.038 0.033 0.044 -0.488* 0.285
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 -0.005 0.036 0.099 0.256
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 0.002 0.022 0.251* 0.136
mid 1990s -0.045*** 0.009 -0.049*** 0.010 0.073 0.046
late 1990s -0.065*** 0.014 -0.070*** 0.016 0.092 0.081
post 2000 -0.033 0.021 -0.039* 0.023 0.120 0.126
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.088 0.250
F-test on exclusion of instruments from first stage: 36.83; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0332
Hansen’s J-test of overidentification = 0.202, p-value = 0.6529
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natutal parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
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Chapter 4
The Lifetime Public Premium in
Earnings: The View from Europe
4.1 Introduction
For a long time there has been debate both in society as whole and amongst labour economists,
concerning whether or not public sector workers enjoy a “public premium” in earnings, compared
to workers in the private sector. Understanding the differences in remuneration between the
sectors has implications for recruitment, incentive structures and the human capital of the
workforce in each sector, thus it is an important area of research. Studying the more recent
literature, it seems that though the premium can on the face of it be very large for public sector
workers, when differences between each sector’s workforce in terms of observed and unobserved
characteristics are taken into account, the premium either reduces substantially or disappears
all together.
The vast majority of the literature in this area of public pay gaps concentrates on cross-
sectional differences between the sectors in terms of earnings levels, and is concerned with
analysing the extent to which non-random selection into sectors can explain the observed dif-
ferences. However, the public and private sectors differ not only with regard to earnings level,
but also in terms of earnings mobility and job mobility. Acknowledgement of this, and the fact
that forward-looking individuals are likely to care about earnings mobility and job security in
addition to earnings levels, motivated an earlier paper by Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007). In
that paper, the authors contend that a more general assessment of the existence and magnitude
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of a “public premium” must be based not on comparisons of cross-sectional income flows but
rather on measures of the lifetime value of employment in each sector. To that end, Postel-Vinay
and Turon develop a dynamic model which simultaneously estimates individual income trajec-
tories, employment dynamics and selection into sector, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in
individual patterns of earnings level and earnings mobility, as well as heterogeneity with regard
to the propensity to become unemployed or to work in the public sector. The lifetime values
of jobs in each sector are constructed and cross-sector comparative analysis of these values is
undertaken.
As with the UK, we illustrate below that in many countries across Europe there are marked
differences between the public and private sector with regard to earnings mobility, earnings
volatility and job loss risk1, as well as earnings levels. Therefore in assessing public-private
pay gaps in Europe it is going to be equally important to base comparisons on a measure of
the lifetime value of employment in each sector rather than just on instantaneous income flows.
This is the first time that such an approach has been applied to European data.
We use the data from the European Community Household Panel over the period 1994-
2001; specifically we apply a dynamic model akin to Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) to data
from Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal2. We were concerned to
estimate the model within a common framework for each country, thus for each the specification
of the dynamic model is the same, and we achieve a good fit in terms of job mobility, earnings
distributions and earnings mobility in each of the six countries.
Our main findings can be summarised as follows. Firstly, after controlling for selection the
average public premium in lifetime values (defined as the present discounted value of future
earnings flows) would be positive in Germany, France, Spain and Portugal, but slightly below
zero in Italy and the Netherlands, if an individual was planning to remain employed for their
entire working life in either sector. Second, when allowing for the more realistic scenario of
movement between labour market sectors, and controlling for selection, the average public pre-
mium becomes approximately zero for Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. In Italy
and France there is on average a small positive public premium in lifetime values. This suggests
1Using the same data that we use here (the ECHP), Clark and Postel-Vinay (2004) show that across Europe
individuals perceive employment in the public sector to be more secure and less at risk in economic downturns
than private sector jobs.
2More on why these countries and no others were used in section 4.3 below.
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that in each country there is sufficient job mobility that individuals are quickly allocated to
their ‘natural’ sector. Thirdly, given that the public premium in lifetime values, in most of the
countries, remains uniform and close to zero as we move up the percentiles of the distribution,
this suggests that where we do observe somewhat greater earnings compression in the public
sector, it is due to a lower variance in the transitory component of earnings in the public sector.
The paper proceeds as follows: the related literature is reviewed in the next section, before a
descriptive analysis of each country’s data is presented in section 4.3. The statistical model to be
estimated is detailed in section 4.4, with the results analysed in section 4.5. The lifetime values
of employment in each sector are computed in section 4.6 allowing us to contrast the public-
private differences accounting for earnings and job mobility with straightforward cross-sectional
earnings differences. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
This paper relates to two different literatures: the public-private pay differences literature, and
also the literature on income mobility and lifetime inequality. Moreover, within the public-
private literature, this paper contributes by presenting an application of this dynamic modelling
approach for a number of countries – whereas previously it has only been estimated for the UK
– and also by deriving a set of estimates of public-private pay gaps across a number of major
European countries, estimated with a common model on data from a common longitudinal data
set.
As noted in the introduction, the majority of the public-pay gap literature concentrates
on cross-sectional differences in wages and on the extent to which these can be explained by
non-random selection into sector. In the UK for example, Disney and Gosling (2003) show
that the raw public premium in male earnings is high, however when they use an instrumental
variables approach – exploiting privatization to control for selection into the private sector – the
premium becomes insignificant. For Germany, Dustmann and van Soest (1998) use a number of
different specifications and consistently estimate that public sector wages are lower for all age
and education groups but that this gap decreases with both age and education. They obtain very
different results however if they do not take account of the endogeneity of sector choice or if the
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selection equation to take account of the endogeneity is only weakly identified. In addition they
find that individuals who are observed in the public sector would have higher average earnings
if they were to move to the private sector, however these workers’ public dispremium is smaller
than would be the case for those workers observed in the private sector – suggesting that workers
do select into the sector where they have a comparative advantage. These results support the
author’s earlier findings for German males (Dustmann and van Soest (1997)) and are stronger
given their robustness to model specification and controls for endogeneity.
More recently Melly (2005) has used quantile regression techniques and similarly found that
conditional wages in Germany are lower in the public sector for males, and that the condi-
tional distribution of wages is more compressed in the public sector – a finding that is common
throughout the literature and across (most) countries. Melly suggests that the public sector
effect on wages is not uniform across the wage distribution, with differences in characteristics
explaining more of the public-pay gap at the top of the distribution, with differences in unob-
servables explaining more at the bottom. This supports the need to control for unobservable
characteristics and their influence on sector selection and wages.
With respect to the Netherlands, Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993) deal with the endogeneity of
sector choice by using an endogenous switching model to estimate public-private pay differentials.
They refute earlier Dutch evidence of public sector underpayment, concluding that public sector
workers earn more in the public sector than they would in the private sector while the reverse
is true for private sector workers, indicating that workers sort into the sector affording them a
comparative advantage. Similarly Van Ophem (1993) uses a modified endogeneous switching
model and finds that while some categories of public sector workers earn more than corresponding
workers in the private sector, there are several categories of employment – both higher and lower
skilled – in which the public sector suffers a substantial dispremium. However, the results do
indicate that the individuals who select into the public sector earn more than a randomly selected
individual would earn in the public sector – therefore concurring with Hartog and Oosterbeek
that in the Netherlands public sector workers have a comparative advantage in this sector.
Recently Bargain and Melly (2008) have used a large sample from the French Labour Force
Survey – a rotating panel in which individuals are included for three successive years, with one
third of the sample replaced each year – to estimate the public-private pay difference. They use
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both a standard fixed-effects estimator to control for selection and also implement a fixed-effects
quantile regression model to evaluate the public effect at different quantiles of the distribution.
Bargain and Melly find that in France on average men select negatively into the public sector but
that the public (dis)premium becomes zero once selection on unobservables has been accounted
for. The quantile regression results suggest that the often found result of pay compression in
the public sector is partly due to positive selection of men into the public sector at the bottom
of the distribution, but negative selection into the public sector at the top of the distribution. A
positive premium being available for blue-collar workers, while the white-collars suffer a negative
public premium.
Lassibille (1998) decomposes public-private wage differentials in Spain into the contribution
of differences in worker characteristics and differences in the returns to those characteristics,
using separately estimated wage functions that control for selection into sector. He finds that the
public sector pays lower returns to education and experience, and thus the earnings advantage in
the public sector is higher for the lower skilled but lowers as we move up the skill distribution.
Lassibille also concludes that differences in worker characteristics are more important than
differences in the returns to these characteristics in explaining the public pay gap, and that there
is a public sector ‘mark-up’ in wages that is unrelated to characteristics, generally offsetting the
lower returns on human capital.
Explicit cross-country comparison of public-private wage differentials is rare, however Lu-
cifora and Meurs (2006) investigate public-pay gaps in Britain, France and Italy using non-
parametric (kernel) and quantile regression methods. For France and Italy they conclude that
the private sector use of collective bargaining and union power in these countries results in a
pay setting system based heavily on rewarding observable characteristics (education, experience),
which can explain the most part of the wage gap with the public sector. The quantile regression
analysis echoes Melly’s findings for Germany, suggesting that as we move up the distribution,
the proportion of the pay gap explained by observable characteristics increases, such that in the
lower quintiles differences in the unobserved characteristics of workers are more important in
explaining pay differences. These results for France and Italy are substantiated by Ghinetti and
Lucifora (2007) using ECHP data from the final wave, 2001.
Nevertheless, though these studies are informative and in some cases deal with the endogene-
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ity of sector choice through either functional form assumptions (Van Ophem) or an instrumental
variables approach (Dustmann and Van Soest, Hartog and Oosterbeek), they are still considering
only cross-sectional differences in instantaneous earnings between the sectors. This is equally the
case for those studies that employ a more sophisticated quantile regression approach considering
the effects at different points in the distribution
Cappellari (2002) is the only other study (bar Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007)) to address
differences in earnings dynamics between the public and private sector. He uses Italian adminis-
trative data, creating a panel that allows him to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity
in earnings levels and earnings growth rates. In the analysis, Cappellari considers cross-sector
differences in the autocovariance structure of log wages, finding that there is lower earnings
dispersion in the public sector yet greater persistence: thus while inequality is lower in the
public sector, initial earnings differences persist over the lifecycle. However, while considering
the importance of differences in earnings mobility and volatility as well as levels, Cappellari
deals with the public and private sectors separately, thus imposing the assumption of exogenous
selection of individuals into sectors and taking no explicit account of transitions between sectors
or into unemployment. As many studies attest to the critical importance of non-random sorting
of workers across sectors, we model the employment dynamics alongside the earnings dynamics
in order to form a more complete picture.
This paper also relates to the vast literature on empirical models of income dynamics and
their application to the study of lifetime income inequality. Within this broad literature there
are a number of approaches, though the majority of contributions (including ours) use flexible
reduced form models of either absolute or relative earnings mobility to decompose the earnings
process into a permanent and a transitory component. Differences between individuals in the
permanent component are interpreted as a measure of lifetime inequality (see inter alia Lillard
and Willis, 1978; Gottschalk and Moffit, 1993; Gottschalk, 1997; Bunchinsky and Hunt, 1999;
Bonhomme and Robin, 2004). A second line of attack is to take a more structural approach
derived from job search theory and analyze inequality in lifetime values and how this inequality
has evolved over time (see Bowlus and Robin, 2004; Flinn, 2002). While each of these papers
contributes to the body of evidence on lifetime inequality in earnings, none of them consider
lifetime differences between job sectors.
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So while there is a large literature considering the public-private pay gap in a cross-sectional
context, controlling for the non-random nature of sector choice, and a large literature considering
lifetime inequality in earnings using dynamic models, the marriage of the two is very rare, a gap
that this paper fills for Europe3.
4.3 Descriptive Data Analysis
4.3.1 The European Community Household Panel
We use data from the European Community Household Panel (henceforth ECHP) which is a
longitudinal survey of households and individuals carried out in 15 European Union countries
annually between 1994 and 2001.4 The ECHP was centrally designed and co-ordinated by the
Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat), and aimed to be representative of the
population of the EU, living in private households, at both the individual and household level.
The objective of the survey was to be both cross-sectionally and longitudinally representative,
each country’s sample evolving as new members join sample households through births or new
relationships and new households are formed by original survey members leaving one household
to start another. A great advantage of the ECHP design is the standardisation of the survey
across countries and over time, creating a consistent set of variables covering a wide range of
topics, and allowing comparisons to be made both across countries and over time.
Unfortunately, the cost of this comparability comes in the breadth of the survey within each
country, with prohibitively small sample sizes in some countries (see below).
Within each country, we restrict our sample to males in order to avoid issues around female
labour market participation, such as part-time work, maternity rights and home production. We
also drop from the sample anyone who is retired or otherwise economically inactive. Moreover,
we exclude individuals who have never entered the labour market i.e. young men who are yet
to leave full-time education. Among those who are working we restrict the sample to full-time
workers (full-time defined as working 30+ hours per week) and we only include the observations
for individuals aged from 20 to 60 in their first observation. We define three ‘sectors’ of labour
3The ‘gap’ in the literature for the UK having been addressed by the earlier Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007)
paper.
4Initially only the 12 countries that were members of the EU in 1994 were included: Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Greece, Portugal and Spain. In addition,
Austria, Finland and Sweden joined in waves 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
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market activity: employment in the private sector, employment in the public sector, and un-
employment.5 As we believe that individuals care about their total monthly earnings – which
depends on both their hourly wage and their monthly hours – we use current gross monthly
earnings,6 reported once per year and deflated using each country’s CPI. Within each country
the data is also detrended to remove common real income trends. We trim the earnings data by
treating earnings observations below the 2nd and above the 98th percentile of earnings within
each ‘education’x‘job sector’ cell as missing data.7
The rules governing inclusion in the sample, added to the relatively small population size
of some of the countries involved in the ECHP, results in sample sizes that are too small to
implement our model in Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Austria, Finland and Sweden.




For Germany the constructed sample retains 3026 men, who each have between 4 and 8 consec-
utive observations, 6.8 being the average.9 Of the 3026 men, 2208 (73.0%) are initially observed
in private sector employment, and remain in the sample for an average of 6.8 years. 612 indi-
viduals (20.2%) are initially observed in the public sector and are retained in the sample for 6.9
years on average. The remaining 206 men (6.8%) are initially unemployed and remain in the
sample for an average of 6.3 years.
The ECHP includes a standardised education measure – the ISCED classification10 – coded
into 3 categories: “high” is ISCED levels 5-7 and corresponds to all classes of tertiary level
education, “medium” is ISCED level 3, corresponding to upper-secondary (post-compulsory)
5In addition to those reporting themselves to be unemployed, the unemployment category includes: working
unpaid in a family enterprise, in education or training (though having been in the labour market at some point),
and doing housework, looking after children or other persons.
6The ECHP variable pi211mg, which is in the national currency of each country.
7We do not drop these observations only replace their earnings as missing. Therefore the individuals concerned
still convey information to the sample and contribute to the modelling of the labour market dynamics.
8Results using the UK sample in the ECHP, which is itself taken from the BHPS, concur with those found by
Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) when using a larger sample available in the British Household Panel Survey.
9There is some sample attrition, 14.4% after 4 years and 47.3% at 8 years, which we assume to be exogenous.
Some of the attrition is a consequence of our sample construction rules that treat individuals as censored from
the first time they have a gap in their response history (this affects 6.5% of the individuals in our sample).
10International Standard Classification of Education.
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education, and “low” is ISCED levels 0-2, corresponding to levels of education up to the end of
secondary schooling. In terms of education, the German sample breaks down overall as 27.2%
high, 61.4% medium, and 11.3% low11. This masks some differences between the job sectors, the
breakdown for the private sector being 25.4% high, 62.0% medium and 12.6% low, as compared
with the public sector: 35.0% high, 59.8% medium and just 5.2% low. The public sector therefore
attracting markedly more high educated and fewer low educated individuals. In terms of age
and labour market experience, the public sector workers are on average a little older than those
in the private sector (41.7 years old versus 39.4) and on average have slightly more experience12
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Figure 4.1: Germany: Unemployment rate, males, 1991-2001, and Sample public sector share
To illustrate the evolution of the German labour market over time, Figure 4.1 shows the male
unemployment rate13 for the years 1991-2001 (top panel), thus covering the years preceding our
sample as well as the sample years themselves, and the public sector share of total employment
for our sample (bottom panel). Both are reasonably stable over the time of our sample, the
unemployment rate rising in the early nineties before levelling out at around 9% from 1994
11See appendix C.1 for a tabulation of the education breakdown for each country.
12‘Labour market experience’ or more accurately ‘potential labour market experience’ is defined as current age
minus the age when the individual first entered the labour market.
13For each country the unemployment rate is calculated using data from the Labour Force Survey.
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onwards. The public sector share of total employment falls slowly from around 23% at the start
of the sample to just under 20% by 2001.
Differences in Earnings
Earnings levels. We now illustrate public-private differences in earnings through a number of
simple regressions, see Table 4.1. For each country we will be looking at (log) current gross
monthly earnings. Differences in monthly work hours for full-time workers could lead us to
understate any positive public premium in hourly wages and differences in cross sectional wage
variances. However, in Germany the public and private sectors have very similar hours distri-
butions – median weekly work hours is 40 for each – though with the public sector exhibiting
less variance in hours (standard deviation of weekly hours is smaller by around one hour and a
quarter).
The first column of Table 4.1 shows that the raw public pay gap in our sample is 5.2 log
points (around 5.3%) in favour of the public sector. However this positive premium appears to
be driven to a large extent by selection. When controlling for a quadratic in potential labour
market experience and education band (column 2) the public premium falls to 1.4 log points and
is statistically insignificant. Moreover, allowing the effects of education and experience to differ
between the sectors (column 3), results in a statistically significant negative public premium
of 18.8 log points (17.1%). This negative public premium is reduced for the medium educated
compared with the high or low educated and also is reduced in experience. Allowing for fixed
individual effects14 in a specification conditioning on just the quadratic in experience (column
4) reduces the size of the negative public premium and it is not significant. However introducing
the interactions of the public sector dummy with education and the quadratic in experience in
the fixed effects model (column 5) finds the public premium to be −13.2 log points (−12.4%) and
significant. This is in line with the findings of Dustmann and van Soest (1998) who consistently
find a significant negative public premium, reducing in age (experience), and robust to various
modelling assumptions. Believing the final (column 5) fixed effects specification, we conclude
that the returns to experience are greater in the public sector, such that the public premium
traces an inverted U-shape in experience with a maximum estimated at 25 years. For levels of
14The reported fixed-effect regressions use the within-estimator. First differenced estimates are very similar for
Germany.
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experience between 16 and 34 years there is in fact a small positive public premium.
Earnings dispersion. The standard deviation of log earnings in the public sector (0.324) is
smaller than in the private sector (0.358), while the 90:10 percentile ratio of raw earnings are
2.323 and 2.522 respectively. Conditional on age and education these ratios are 2.129 (public)
and 2.394 (private). These figures indicate a greater degree of wage compression in the public
sector.
Earnings mobility. The regression results and the analysis of the earnings distributions
show that the public and private sectors differ in terms of their earnings levels and the cross-
sectional distribution of earnings. Moreover, there are differences in terms of earnings mobility,
as illustrated in the upper panel of Table 4.2 which shows the transition matrices between
quintiles of the unconditional log earnings distribution from one year to the next for the public
and private sectors respectively.15 The matrices show that there is greater persistence in earnings
rank amongst those individuals continuously employed in the public sector than amongst those
continuously employed in the private sector. To further describe the persistence in earnings
levels, the lower panel of the Table contains the corresponding transition matrices for the rank
of earnings residuals after conditioning on education and a quadratic in (potential) labour market
experience. Again we see the greater level of persistence of earnings rank in the public sector.
Bearing in mind that the earnings distribution is more spread in the private than the public
sector, transitions between earnings quintiles in the private sector represent larger changes in
earnings than similar transitions in the public sector, further underscoring the greater mobility of
earnings in the private sector. In addition, we computed the 1-lag auto-covariance of normalised
log earnings for each individual, having conditioned on education and a quadratic in (potential)
labour market experience.16 For individuals employed in the private sector in consecutive periods
the mean auto-covariance is 0.811 whereas the corresponding figure for the public sector it is
higher at 0.944, again illustrating the greater persistence in earnings in the public sector.
15 The transitions relate to individuals who are employed in the same sector in year t-1 and year t. It is possible
to look at longer lags in our sample (up to 7 lags) however the numbers of individuals who are continuously
employed in either sector at longer lags is not sufficiently large to allow robust inference.
16We constructed normalised log earnings by first regressing log earnings (yit for individual i at date t) on the
covariates from the column 2 specification in Table 4.1, thus obtaining a predictor of mean earnings ŷit. We then
regressed the squared residuals from this latter regression on that same set of covariates to obtain a predictor of
earnings variance σ̂2it. We then constructed earnings disturbances as (yit − ŷit) /σ̂it. Following this we calculated
the one-period auto-covariance between these disturbances, and compare the average for those in the public sector
for both periods with those in the private sector for both periods.
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Differences in Job Mobility
The transition matrix below shows the changes in employment sector between one wave and the
next, with rows referring to sector in year t-1, columns to sector in year t:
Private Public Unemp.
Private 94.1 1.2 4.5
Public 6.6 91.1 2.1
Unemp. 36.8 5.2 57.8
It is clear that movement directly from the private sector to the public sector is very uncom-
mon: only 1.2% of individuals initially employed in the private sector move to the public sector
the next year; however movements in the opposite direction are more frequent (6.6%). The
annual transition rate into unemployment from the private sector (4.5%) is more than double
the corresponding figure for the public sector (2.1%), suggesting more job losses from the private
sector.17 This greater security of employment in the public sector is also reflected in the differing
probabilities of ever being observed in unemployment depending on observed initial sector. Of
those first observed employed in the private sector 20.5% are recorded as unemployed at least
once in their following observations, compared with only 7.8% for those initially employed in
the public sector.
Of those unemployed, 57.8% remain unemployed in the next year, 36.8% gaining employment
in the private sector, while just 5.2% of those unemployed in year t-1 are in public sector
employment in year t. Of the 707 individuals (23.4% of the sample) ever observed unemployed
during the time-span of the sample, 23.9% report being unemployed for 3 or more consecutive
interviews during the sample. The 1-year re-employment probability for these “long-term”
unemployed is considerably worse at 13.5% than it is for the “short-term” unemployed who have
a 70.4% chance of finding a job in the following year. Thus unemployment persistence is quite
high overall and there is some evidence that it is concentrated on the “long-term unemployed”.
As well as differential re-employment rates according to whether the individual is a “long-
term unemployed” type, there is also evidence of attachment to the public sector: an unemployed
individual who has most recently been employed in the public sector is much more likely to
17These are not pure job loss rates as voluntary quits are included in movements from employment to unem-
ployment.
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find employment in the public sector in the next year than an individual who’s most recent
employment was in the private sector. Of the unemployed who were most recently in the public
sector 8.3% return to public sector employment the next year, whereas for those unemployed




The sample constructed for the Netherlands includes 2213 men, each with between 4 and 8
observations, with the average being 6.6.18 Of these 2213 men, 1638 (74.0%) are first observed
in the private sector and remain in the sample for an average of 6.6 years. A further 519
individuals (23.5%) are initially observed in the public sector and are retained in the sample for
6.7 years on average. The remaining 56 men (2.5%) are first encountered in unemployment and
remain in the sample for an average of 5.6 years.
With regard to education, the Netherlands sample breaks down overall as 24.8% “high”,
55.1% “medium” and 20.0%“low”. There are however, considerable differences between the
sectors in terms of education composition: the private sector breaking down as 20.9% high,
57.2% medium and 21.9% low, whereas the corresponding public sector figures are respectively
41.5%, 45.2% and 13.3%. The public sector thus attracts substantially more better educated
workers and fewer medium and low educated workers than the private sector. In terms of age
and labour market experience, the public sector employees are on average more than three-and-
a-half years older (43.4 years old versus 39.7) and have more (potential) experience (23.6 years
compared to 20.7 years).
Figure 4.2 illustrates the evolution of the Netherlands labour market over time, the top panel
plotting the male unemployment rate for the years 1990-2001 (thus encapsulating our sample
time frame plus the preceding 4 years), while the lower panel shows the public sector share of
total employment in our sample. The unemployment rate is steady at around 5-6% prior to the
start of the sample period in 1994, but then falls gradually over the following years to be around
18There is some sample attrition, 16.0% after 4 years and 53.3% at 8 years, which we assume exogenous. Some
of the attrition is a result of our sample selection rules that censor individuals from the first gap in their response
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Netherlands: public share of total employment (sample)
Figure 4.2: Netherlands: Unemployment rate, males, 1991-2001, and Sample public sector
share
3% in 2001. The public sector share of total employment remains largely stable in the sample,
though falling steadily from 25% in 1994 to just under 22% in 2001.
Differences in Earnings
Earnings levels. Table 4.3 describes public-private differences in earnings levels through a num-
ber of simple regressions, where again the dependent variable is the log of current gross monthly
earnings. The hours distributions for full-time workers are similar for each sector, though median
weekly hours is slightly less in the public sector (38 versus 40); therefore by looking at monthly
earnings we will slightly under-estimate any positive public premium in hourly wages. As we
might expect, the distribution of hours in the public sector is less spread than in the private
sector, the standard deviation of weekly hours is smaller by approximately one hour and a half.
The first column of Table 4.3 shows that the raw public pay gap in the Netherlands sample
is 9.4 log points (9.8%) in favour of the public sector. However, selection effects are clearly im-
portant as when we control for a quadratic in potential labour market experience and education
band (column 2) the public pay premium is estimated to be −3.3 log points (−3.2%) and sig-
nificant. Moreover, when we allow the effects of education and experience to differ between the
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sectors (column 3) the public premium is estimated to be −9.7 log points (−9.3%) and remains
significant. This is the public premium for “high” education workers, and the premium for “low”
education workers is not significantly different, however, for “medium” band educated men the
premium is estimated to be almost exactly zero. The public premium does not however vary
with experience. Estimating the model including individual-level fixed effects19 and controls for
a quadratic in potential labour market experience (column 4), the public premium is estimated
to be −0.2 log points and is not statistically significant. Introducing interactions between the
public sector dummy and education and the quadratic in experience results in a positive esti-
mate of the public premium of 4.5 logs points (4.6%) though the estimate is imprecise (t=1.46)
According to this latter (column 5) fixed effects specification, returns to experience are higher
in the private sector for all levels of experience, and as such the small positive public premium
is eroded with experience, the premium tracing a U-shape in experience with an estimated min-
imum at 36 years. The public premium is negative for all levels of experience greater than 12
years.
Earnings dispersion. The standard deviation of log earnings in the public sector (0.298) is
smaller than in the private sector (0.322) and the slightly greater compression of pay in the
public sector is also reflected in the 90:10 percentile ratios of raw earnings which are 2.098 and
2.317 respectively. The corresponding ratios conditional on age and education are 1.800 (public)
and 1.962 (private), further illustrating the greater degree of pay compression in the public
sector.
Earnings mobility. The sections above illustrate that the public and private sectors differ in
terms of the cross-sectional distribution of earnings. In addition, there are differences in terms
of earnings mobility, as illustrated in the upper panel of Table 4.4 which shows the transition
matrices between quintiles of the unconditional log earnings distribution from one year to the
next for the public and private sectors respectively.20 These matrices show that there is greater
persistence in earnings rank amongst those individuals continuously employed in the public
sector than amongst those continuously employed in the private sector. Moreover, the lower
panel of the Table, which shows the transitions for log earnings residual rank after conditioning
19The reported fixed effects results are estimated using the within estimator. First differenced estimates are
similar for the Netherlands.
20See footnote 15.
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on education and a quadratic in (potential) labour market experience, illustrate the same pattern
of greater earnings persistence in the public sector.
Since the earnings distribution is slightly more compressed in the public sector than in
the private sector, transitions between earnings quintiles in the private sector represent larger
changes in earnings than similar transitions in the public sector, further underscoring the greater
mobility of earnings in the private sector. In addition, we computed the 1-lag auto-covariance
of normalised log earnings for each individual, having conditioned on education and a quadratic
in (potential) labour market experience. For individuals employed in the private sector in
consecutive periods the mean auto-covariance is 0.874 whereas for the public sector this figure
is higher at 0.884, again illustrating the greater persistence in earnings in the public sector.
Differences in Job Mobility
The following transition matrix shows the changes in employment sector between one wave and
the next, with rows referring to sector in year t-1, columns to sector in year t:
Private Public Unemp.
Private 96.5 1.9 1.4
Public 7.8 90.8 1.3
Unemp. 40.3 6.8 52.7
Few individuals (1.9%) initially employed in the private sector move directly to employment
in the public sector from one year to the next, and though movements in the opposite direction
are more common, still only 7.8% of individuals employed in the public sector in year t-1 move
into the private sector in year t. The average annual transition rate into unemployment is slightly
greater in the private sector, 1.4%, compared with 1.3% in the public sector. This similarity
in unemployment risk is also reflected in the different probabilities of ever being observed in
unemployment depending on the sector in which the individual is first observed. For men initially
observed in the private sector, the probability of ever experiencing unemployment in the sample
is 7.4%, which is only slightly above the corresponding probability for those first observed in the
public sector, 6.6%. Just over half (52.7%) of the unemployed remain so in the following period,
with 40.3% exiting to private sector employment, the other 6.8% gaining employment in the
public sector. Of the 212 individuals (9.6% of the sample) who ever experience unemployment
156
during the sample, 20.8% report being unemployed for 3 or more consecutive periods during
the time-span of the sample. These “long-term” unemployed have only an 8.5% probability
of finding a job in the next period, whereas for the “short-term” unemployed the probability
is 84.5%. Thus though aggregate unemployment persistence is not that high, with just under
half of the unemployed in any year finding employment by the next interview, the persistence
appears to be highly concentrated on the “long-term” unemployed.
There is evidence of attachment to the public sector in the different rates of entry to public
sector employment from unemployment, depending on whether the unemployed individual’s last
employment was in the public sector. Of the unemployed whose most recent employment was in
the public sector, 19.5% re-entered public sector employment by the time of the next interview.
For those unemployed whose most recent employment was in the private sector, the public sector
entry probability is just 4.2%.21
4.3.4 France
Basic Sample Description
For France the sample constructed retains 2281 men, each with between 4 and 8 observations,
6.2 observations on average.22 Of the 2281 individuals, 1566 (68.7%) are initially observed in
private sector employment and remain in the sample for an average of 6.2 years. A further 547
(24.0%) individuals are first observed employed in the public sector and remain in the sample
for 6.3 years on average. The remaining 168 men (7.4%) are first observed unemployed and they
remain in the sample for an average of 5.6 years.
In terms of education, the France sample breaks down overall as 25.8% “high”, 45.7%
“medium” and 28.5% “low”. There is a difference between the sectors in terms of education
composition: the private sector having 23.8% high educated workers, 46.5% medium and 29.7%
low, with the corresponding public breakdown 33.3%, 43.5%, 23.2%. So the proportions of
medium educated workers are very similar between the sectors, with the main difference being
that the public sector attracts more high educated and fewer low educated workers. The public
21These public sector entry rates have to be treated with care as very few people are observed unemployed in
any single year and of these around one fifth have not been observed in employment before. As a result the public
sector entry rates for those most recently observed in the public sector derive from only 41 individuals.
22There is some sample attrition, 26.0% after 4 years and 60.7% at 8 years, we assume this to be exogenous.
Some of the attrition is the result of our sample construction rules which treat an individual as censored from the
first gap in their response history (this affects 21.4% of our sample).
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sector workers are also on average a couple of years older than those in the private sector (41.7
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Figure 4.3: France: Unemployment rate, males, 1991-2001, and Sample public sector share
To illustrate the pattern of the French labour market over time, Figure 4.3 plots the un-
employment rate for the years 1991-2001 (top panel) thus covering our sample period plus the
years leading up to it, and the public share of total employment in our sample (bottom panel).
The unemployment rate was rising steadily from 7% in 1991 to almost 11% by 1994 and the
start of our sample. During the sample period the unemployment rate remains largely stable
around 10% before slightly dropping down towards the end of the millennium. The public share
of total employment however remains almost totally constant through the sample time frame,
26% to the nearest percent in each year.
Differences in Earnings
Earnings levels. The public-private differences in earnings levels are now described through
the simple regressions in Table 4.5 in which the dependent variable is the log of current gross
monthly earnings. The hours distributions for full-time workers are similar for each sector (both
have median weekly hours of 39) though as we might expect, the public sector hours distribution
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has less variation, considerably less in fact: the standard deviation of weekly hours is smaller
by just over two hours.
Column 1 of Table 4.5 shows that the raw public pay gap in the French sample is 12.5 log
points (13.3%) in favour of the public sector. Some of this positive public premium is the result
of selection however, as conditioning on education band and a quadratic in (potential) labour
market experience (column 2), reduces the premium to 4.1 log points (4.2%) though it remains
strongly significant. This significant positive premium appears to be driven by those in the
“low” education band, as when we allow for different public premia depending on education
and experience (column 3), the coefficient on the public sector dummy becomes insignificantly
different to zero, while the interaction term for low educated public sector workers is strongly
significant, the coefficient of 0.131 suggesting a 13.9% public premium for these workers. This
concurs with the findings of Bargain and Melly (2008) who only find a positive public premium for
blue collar workers. Allowing for fixed individual effects23 and conditioning on just the quadratic
in experience (column 4), the estimated public premium is no longer significant. Introducing
the interaction between the public dummy and the quadratic in experience (column 5), the
public premium is estimated to be 3.8 log points but has a large standard error (t=0.55). The
interaction between public and experience-squared is significant and suggests that the public
premium is initially falling for the first decade or so of work before rising as the individual
acquires more labour market experience. This fixed effects specification (column 5) suggests that
returns to experience are lower in the public sector for the first half of a working lifetime such
that the small positive public premium initially falls with experience (minimum of zero premium
estimated at 13 years experience) before rising again as public sector returns to experience
increase above private returns in the second half of a working lifetime.24
Earnings dispersion. The standard deviation of log earnings is lower in the public sector
than in the private sector (0.396 versus 0.430) illustrating the greater wage compression in the
public sector. This is supported by the 90:10 ratios of raw earnings which are 2.730 (public) and
3.068 (private) with corresponding figures conditional on age and education of 2.404 and 2.688
23The reported fixed-effects regressions use the within-estimator. First differenced estiamtes are very similar
for France.
24It should be borne in mind that in the fixed effects regressions, the basic public premium is identified from
only 58 individuals (2.62% of the sample) who are observed in both sectors during the life of the sample.
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respectively.
Earnings mobility. Looking at the regressions and the dispersion of earnings, we see that
the public and private sectors differ in terms of their cross-sectional earnings distributions.
Moreover, the sectors differ with respect to earnings mobility, as illustrated in the top panel
of Table 4.6 which shows the transition matrices between unconditional raw earnings quintiles
from one year to the next for the public and private sectors respectively.25 The matrices show
that there is greater persistence in the lower earnings quintiles rank amongst those individuals
continuously employed in the public sector than amongst those continuously employed in the
private sector, whereas in the higher earnings quintiles the level of persistence is very similar in
each sector. This pattern is also exhibited in the transition matrices for ranks of log earnings
conditional on education and a quadratic in (potential) labour market experience (lower panel
of the Table).
As the earnings distribution is slightly more compressed in the public sector than in the
private sector, transitions between earnings quintiles in the public sector do not represent quite
so large changes in earnings as similar transitions in the public sector, thus the fact that private
and public sector mobility is similar would indicate larger rises (falls) in earnings in the private
sector. The 1-lag auto-covariance of normalised log earnings, having conditioned on education
and a quadratic in (potential) labour market experience, is markedly greater for individuals
employed in the public sector for consecutive periods (mean of 0.950) than it is for individuals in
the private sector for consecutive periods (mean of 0.828). This also suggests greater persistence
in earnings in the public sector.
Differences in Job Mobility
The transition matrix below shows the changes in employment sector between one wave and the
next, with rows referring to sector in year t-1, columns to sector in year t:
Private Public Unemp.
Private 96.9 0.3 2.7
Public 0.8 98.2 0.8
Unemp. 33.4 4.6 61.8
25See footnote 15.
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It is immediately clear that movements directly from one employment sector to the other
from one year to the next are exceedingly rare: only 0.3% of individuals employed in the private
sector in year t-1 are employed in the public sector in year t, with movements in the opposite
direction relatively more frequent but still extremely rare (0.8%). The average annual rate of
transition into unemployment from the private sector while low at 2.7% is still more than three
times the corresponding job loss rate for the public sector (0.8%), suggesting that job security
is greater in the public sector. This greater job security of the public sector is also shown in
the probability of ever being observed unemployed if an individual is initially observed in public
sector employment, which is only 4.2%. The corresponding figure for the private sector is 10.8%.
Unemployment persistence is quite high, 61.8% of those who are unemployed in year t-1
remain unemployed in year t. Only 4.6% of the unemployed will exit to public sector employment
by the next interview, whereas 33.4% exit to employment in the private sector. This aggregate
rate of entering public sector employment after being unemployed disguises a difference between
those whose most recent employment prior to becoming unemployed was in the public sector
and those whose most recent employment was in the private sector. The public employment rate
of the unemployed who have most recently been employed in the public sector is 9.1% whereas
for those who were in the private sector before becoming unemployed, the chance of gaining
public sector employment is only 3.3%, indicating that there is a certain degree of public sector
attachment.26
Of the 360 individuals (15.8% of the sample) who are ever observed unemployed during the
time-span of the sample, 27.5% report being unemployed in three or more consecutive interviews.
The 1-year re-employment rate for these “long-term” unemployed is considerably lower, 15.6%,
than it is for “short-term” unemployed who have a 67.5% chance of gaining employment by the
next interview.
26The figure for public sector re-employment has to be treated with caution as it relates to only 44 individuals




The Italy sample retains 2820 men, each with between 4 and 8 observations, the average being
6.4.27 Of these 2820 individuals, 1639 (58.1%) are initially observed in private sector employment
and remain in the sample for an average of 6.4 years. There are 786 men (27.9%) who are first
observed in the public sector and remain in the sample for 6.6 years on average. The other
395 individuals (14.0%) are initially unemployed and remain in the sample for an average of 5.9
years.
In terms of education, the Italy sample breaks down overall as 9.0% “high” education level,
51.6% “medium” and 39.4% “low”. The overall break down masks some substantial differences
between the two sectors: the private sector comprises 6.6% high, 50.0% medium and 43.4%
low educated workers, compared with 14.3%, 56.6% and 29.2% respectively for high, medium
and low educated workers in the public sector. Thus the public sector attracts better educated
workers, with more than double the proportion of high educated workers compared with the
private sector, a greater proportion of medium educated also, with a much smaller proportion of
low educated workers. Public sector workers are on average markedly older than private sector
workers (43.3 years old compared to 37.8) and have more potential labour market experience
(average of 24.5 years compared to 20.2).
Figure 4.4 illustrates the evolution of the Italian labour market over time, the top panel
showing the unemployment rate for our sample period and the 4 years preceding it, the bottom
panel showing the public sector share of total employment in our sample. The unemployment
rate is largely stable at around 7.5% for the years preceding our sample period (which begins
in 1994) before rising to just over 8.5% in 1994 and remaining around this level throughout the
majority of the sample before declining back down towards 7.5% in the final years of the sample.
The public share of total employment in the sample remains almost constant, declining slightly
over the sample period from around 34% in 1994 to 32% in 2001.
27There is some sample attrition, 19.2% after 4 years and 60.7% at 8 years, which we assume to be exogenous.
Some of the attrition is a consequence of our sample construction rules which treat an individual as censored from
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Figure 4.4: Italy: Unemployment rate, males, 1991-2001, and Sample public sector share
Differences in Earnings
Earnings levels. Table 4.7 describes public-private differences in earnings levels through a num-
ber of simple regressions, where again the dependent variable is the log of current gross monthly
earnings. There is a definite difference between the sectors in terms of their hours distribution
for full-time workers, with the public sector working fewer hours on average: median 36 hours
per week compared with 40 in the private sector; therefore we will tend to underestimate any
positive public premium in hourly wage. There is also less of a spread in hours in the public
sector, the standard deviation in weekly hours is lower by around fifty-five minutes.
The first column of Table 4.7 shows that the estimated raw public pay gap in the data is
8.6 log points (9.0%) in favour of the public sector. However, conditioning on education band
and a quadratic in potential labour market experience (column 2) the estimated premium is
not significantly different to zero. This changes when we allow the effect of the public sector
to vary according to education band and experience (column 3), the public premium is then
estimated to be statistically significant and 21.0 log points (23.4%), though falling with experi-
ence. This specification suggests that the premium does not vary depending on the education
band. Estimating the model with individual-level fixed effects controlling for a quadratic in ex-
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perience (column 4) the public premimum is not significantly different from zero.28 Introducing
interactions of the public sector dummy with the quadratic in experience (column 5), the public
premium is still not statistically significant but is estimated to be around 5.4 log points (5.5%),
with a large standard error resulting in a t-statistic of only 1.15.29 This latter fixed effects
specification (column 5) suggests that returns to experience are greater in the private sector at
all levels of experience, such that the small public premium traces a U-shape in experience, be-
coming negative at 12 years of experience and remaining negative thereafter, with an estimated
minimum of −4.4 log points at 34 years of experience.
Earnings dispersion. In each sector the standard deviation of log earnings is almost identical,
0.293 in the private sector as compared with 0.296 in the public sector. The 90:10 percentile
ratios in raw earnings suggest however that the private sector distribution is more spread, 2.058
(private) against 1.944 (public), with corresponding figures conditional on age and education
being 1.897 (private) and 1.844 (public) respectively. These figures indicate that the extent of
wage compression is similar in each sector though still greater in the public sector.
Earnings mobility. The analysis of earnings level and dispersion suggest that in Italy the
public and private sectors differ in terms of their earnings levels while the overall compression
of earnings is similar for each. Moreover, the sectors differ with respect to earnings mobility,
as illustrated in the top panel of Table 4.8 which shows the transition matrices between the
quintiles of the unconditional raw earnings distributions from one year to the next for the public
and private sectors respectively.30 In these matrices we can see that there is greater persistence
in rank in all of the earnings quintiles for those individuals continuously employed in the public
sector compared with those continuously employed in the private sector, though in the higher
earnings quintiles the level of persistence is very similar. This pattern is also exhibited in
the transition matrices for ranks of log earnings conditional on education and a quadratic in
(potential) labour market experience (lower panel of the Table) and contributes to a picture of
generally greater earnings persistence in the public sector.
Given that the earnings distributions are very similarly spread in each sector, the greater
28The reported fixed effects regressions use the within-estimator. First differenced estimates for column 4
produces very similar results.




frequency of transitions between earnings quintiles in the private sector suggests greater earnings
mobility in the private sector in terms of the actual earnings received. Moreover, computing
the 1-lag auto-covariance of normalised log earnings for each individual, having conditioned
on education and a quadratic in (potential) labour market experience, we find greater auto-
covariance of earnings for individuals employed in the public sector for successive periods. The
mean auto-covariance for these individuals is 0.882, compared to 0.736 for individuals employed
in the private sector for successive periods.
Differences in Job Mobility
The transition matrix below shows the changes in employment sector between one wave and the
next, with rows referring to sector in year t-1, columns to sector in year t:
Private Public Unemp.
Private 95.2 1.9 2.7
Public 4.8 94.0 1.0
Unemp. 21.9 4.7 73.3
Movement directly from private sector employment in year t-1 to public sector employment
in year t is very rare: only 1.9% of individuals initially in private sector employment are observed
the following year employed in the public sector, though movements in the opposite direction
are more frequent (4.8%). The annual rates of transition into unemployment are small for each
sector, though the private sector rate (2.7%) is more than double the public (1.0%) suggesting
greater job security in the public sector. This greater security of public sector employment is
also reflected in the probability of ever being observed out of employment depending on the
sector the individual is first observed in: of those initially observed in the public sector, only
3.7% are ever observed unemployed during the course of the sample, whereas for those first
observed in the private sector, 11.5% are subsequently observed unemployed.
Of the unemployed in year t-1, 73.3% remain unemployed in year t. 21.9% gain employ-
ment in the private sector, while just 4.7% move into public sector employment. Of the 612
individuals (21.7% of the sample) ever observed unemployed during their sample observations,
51.3% record being unemployed for three or more of their consecutive interviews. This “long-
term” unemployed status has a great effect on the annual re-employment probability, reducing
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it to 12.8% compared with a 69.2% 1-year re-employment rate for the “short-term” unemployed.
Thus unemployment persistence overall is high, with almost three-quarters of the unemployed
remaining so in the next interview, and there is some evidence that this is particularly the case
for the “long-term” unemployed.
In addition to differing re-employment probabilities according to “long-term” unemployment
status, there is some evidence of public sector attachment: an unemployed individual whose most
recent employment was in the public sector has a 15.8% chance of gaining a public sector job in
the next period, compared with only a 3.3% chance for those unemployed whose most recently
observed employment was in the private sector. The overall re-employment rate for those whose
most recent employment was in the private sector is however slightly higher (33.6%) than it is
for those most recently employed in the public sector (28.6%).
4.3.6 Spain
Basic Sample Description
For Spain the sample comprises 2622 men, each with between 4 and 8 observations, with an
average of 6.3 observations.31 Of the 2622 individuals, 1646 (62.8%) are initially observed in
private sector employment and remain in the sample for an average of 6.4 years. There are 524
men (20.0%) originally observed in the public sector, and they are each in the sample for 6.5
years on average. The remaining 452 individuals (17.2%) are initially unemployed, and they are
retained in the sample for an average of 5.9 years.
In terms of education, the Spain sample breakdown overall is 33.6% “high”, 23.0% “medium”
and 43.4% “low”. However this masks vast differences in educational composition between the
sectors. For the private sector the breakdown is 28.7%, 23.2% and 48.1% for high, medium and
low respectively, whereas for the public sector it is 51.0%, 21.1% and 27.9%. Thus the public
sector contains a much greater proportion of high educated workers and a much lower proportion
of low educated workers than the private sector. The proportion in the medium education band
is very close for each sector, all of the difference being in the top and bottom of the respective
distributions. Additionally, the public sector workers are on average older than those in the
31There is some sample attrition, 20.5% after 4 years and 58.9% at 8 years, which we assume to be random.
Some of the attrition is a result of our sample construction rules which treat an individual as censored from the
first gap in their response history (this affects 10.0% of our sample).
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private sector (41.8 years old versus 38.6) and have more (potential) labour market experience
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Figure 4.5: Spain: Unemployment rate, males, 1991-2001, and Sample public sector share
Figure 4.5 illustrates the evolution of the Spanish labour market over time, showing the
unemployment rate for the years 1990-2001 (top panel), thus covering the years immediately
preceding our sample as well as the sample years themselves, and the public sector share of total
employment in our sample (bottom panel). We can see from the figure that in the years leading
up to the start of the sample in 1994, the unemployment rate in Spain was rising quite sharply
from around 12% in 1990 to almost 20% in 1994. During the course of the sample however,
unemployment falls steadily and is down to 7.5% by 2001. The public sector share of total
employment is stable at around 25-26% for the first three years of our sample before dropping
slightly in 1997 (to 23%) and then continuing to fall such that is was just under 21% in 2001.
Differences in Earnings
Earnings levels. We now illustrate the public-private differences in earnings through a number
of simple regressions, see Table 4.9. Again, in each case the dependent variable is the log of
current gross monthly earnings. Between the sectors there are some differences in the monthly
work hours distributions for full-time workers. Though the median weekly work hours are the
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same for each sector (40 hours), in the private sector there are very few workers who work below
the median hours and a large spike at the median with a few smaller concentrations of workers
working more hours than this. For the public sector there is a smaller mass at the median and
more mass at points below median hours, with much fewer working more than the median hours.
Therefore we will under-estimate any positive public premium in hourly wages. Moreover, the
public sector exhibits much less variance in hours (standard deviation of weekly hours is smaller
by almost one hour and a half).
Column 1 of Table 4.9 shows that the raw public pay gap in our sample is very large, 26.7
log points (30.6%), in favour of the public sector. This is unsurprising given the great differences
in educational, and to a lesser extent age, composition of the respective workforces. Controlling
for education and a quadratic in experience (column 2), the premium is reduced to 9.7 log
points (10.2%). Allowing the public effect to differ according to education band and experience
(column 3), we find no different effect of public sector employment dependent on education
but the premium does vary with experience, from 27.0 log points (30.9%) prior to any labour
market experience, to a low of 8.5 log points (8.9%) at 28 years experience. Estimating with
individual-level fixed effects and controlling for just a quadratic in experience (column 4), the
public premium is not significantly different to zero.32 However, when we add to this fixed effects
specification the interaction terms between the public dummy and experience and its square, the
public premium is significant and estimated to be 16.2 log points (17.6%). Believing this latter
fixed effects specification, we conclude that the returns to experience are consistently lower in
the public sector, the initially large public premium tracing a U-shape in experience, turning
negative after 25 years of experience and remaining negative for almost all the rest of a working
lifetime. The estimated minimum of the public premium is −1.7 log points (−1.7%) and comes
at 37 years of experience.
Earnings dispersion. There is a greater degree of wage compression in the public sector,
illustrated in the standard deviation of log earnings, which is 0.395 in the public sector compared
to 0.427 in the private sector. The 90:10 percentile ratios in raw earnings, 2.803 and 2.965 for the
public and private sectors respectively, support this conclusion, as do the corresponding ratios
32The reported fixed-effects regressions use the within-estimator. The first differenced estimate is very similar
for Spain specification 4.
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controlling for age and education: 2.354 for the public sector and 2.706 for the private sector.
Earnings mobility. The regression results and analysis of the earnings distributions show
that there are differences between the public and private sectors in terms of earnings levels
and cross-sectional distributions. Furthermore, the extent of earnings mobility differs between
the two sectors, as illustrated by Table 4.10 which shows the transition matrices between un-
conditional log earnings quintiles from one year to the next for the public and private sectors
respectively.33 These matrices show that persistence in earnings rank is greater amongst indi-
viduals continuously employed in the public sector compared to those continuously employed in
the private sector; and this is especially true at the lower end of each distribution. Moreover,
the lower panel of the Table, which shows the transitions for log earnings residual rank after
conditioning on education and a quadratic in (potential) labour market experience, illustrate
the same pattern of greater earnings persistence in the public sector.
Since the earnings distribution is less compressed in the private than in the public sector,
transitions between quintiles in the private sector represent greater rises (falls) in earnings than
similar transitions in the public sector, which further emphasizes the difference in earnings
mobility between the sectors. Comparing the average one-lag auto-covariance of normalised log
income, after controlling for education and a quadratic in (potential) labour market experience,
the greater auto-covariance for individuals employed for consecutive periods in the public sector
(0.890 versus 0.751, the corresponding figure for the private sector) adds to the picture of more
persistent earnings in the public sector.
Differences in Job Mobility
The transition matrix below shows the changes in employment sector between one wave and the
next, with rows referring to sector in year t-1, columns to sector in year t:
Private Public Unemp.
Private 91.8 1.6 6.5
Public 7.4 89.9 2.5
Unemp. 39.2 5.4 55.3
33See footnote 15.
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From the table it is apparent that movements directly from private sector employment to
public sector employment in the following year is rare, only 1.6% of those in the private sector
in year t-1 are employed in the public sector in year t, however movements from public-to-
private happen with greater frequency (7.4%). The annual transition rate into unemployment
is, for the public sector, less than half what it is for the private sector (2.5% public versus 6.5%
private) suggesting greater job security in the public sector. This is further underscored by the
differing probabilities of ever being observed in unemployment depending on the sector in which
an individual is first observed. Of those first observed in the private sector, 25.6% are ever
subsequently observed unemployed, while for individuals first observed in the public sector, the
figure is only 8.2%.
Of the unemployed in year t-1, 55.3% remain unemployed the following year, with 39.2%
exiting to private sector employment, and the other 5.4% finding employment in year t in the
public sector. There are 917 individuals (35.0% of the sample) who are ever observed unemployed
during the time-span of the sample. Of these, 28.8% report being unemployed in three or more
consecutive interviews during the course of their observations. These “long-term” unemployed
have an 18.9% chance of finding employment in the next period, while for the “short-term”
unemployed the average annual re-employment rate is much higher at 73.0%. Thus though
unemployment persistence is quite low overall, it appears to be concentrated on the “long-term”
unemployed.
There is also evidence of public sector attachment, in the differing public sector re-employment
probabilities between the unemployed whose most recent observed employment was in the public
sector and those whose most recent employment was in the private sector. For the former group,
the probability of gaining a public sector job by the next year is 17.2% while for the latter group




The constructed sample for Portugal comprises 2242 men, each with between 4 and 8 consecutive
observations, with an average of 6.6 observations.34 Of these 2242 individuals, 1638 (73.1%) are
first observed in private sector employment and remain in the sample for 6.5 years on average.
A further 447 (19.9%) are initially observed in the public sector and are retained in the sample
for an average of 6.8 years. The remaining 157 individuals (7.0%) are first observed unemployed
and remain in the sample for 6.1 years on average.
With respect to education, the Portugal sample overall comprises 7.8% “high” educated,
15.6% “medium” educated and 76.6% “low” educated individuals. This overall picture conceals
some marked differences between the public and private sectors: the breakdown for the public
(resp. private) sector is 15.6% high, 20.0% medium, 64.4% low (6.0% high, 14.4% medium, 79.6%
low). Thus the public sector attracts markedly higher educated workers with a substantially
larger proportion of high educated workers and a greater proportion of medium educated workers.
Moreover public sector workers are on average more than 4 years older than private sector workers
(41.5 years old versus 37.3) and have more than 3 years more potential labour market experience
on average (23.7 years versus 20.4).
To illustrate the evolution of the Portuguese labour market over time, Figure 4.6 shows the
unemployment rate from 1990-2001 (top panel), covering our sample period and the 4 years
prior to it, and the public share of total employment for our sample (bottom panel). In the
years prior to the start of the sample (in 1994), the unemployment rate rises gently from just
above 3% in 1990 to just below 6% in 1994. During the sample period it is initially stable before
falling relatively sharply between 1997 and 1998 and then continues to fall more gently to be
just above 3% once again at the end of the sample period (2001). The public share of total
employment in our sample falls over the sample window, from just under 25% in 1994 to just
above 20% in 2001, with a large part of this fall being in 1998. Portugal was undergoing a period
of privatisations through the mid-1990s and this is reflected in the fall in the public share of
34There is some sample attrition, 18.4% after 4 years, 52.32% at 8 years, which we assume to be exogenous.
Some of the sample attrition is a result of our sample construction rules which treat an individual as censored
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Figure 4.6: Portugal: Unemployment rate, males, 1991-2001, and Sample public sector share
employment in the mid-to-late-1990s.
Differences in Earnings
Earnings levels. Public-private differences in earnings are now illustrated through a number
of simple regressions, see Table 4.11. Again, in each case the dependent variable is the log of
current gross monthly earnings. There are marked differences between the sectors in terms of
hours worked by full-time workers, despite each having a median of 40 hours work per week. In
the private sector there are very few workers who work below the median hours and a large spike
at the median, and another smaller spike above the median at around 45 hours per week. For the
public sector there is a smaller mass at the median and more mass below it, with another spike
at 35 hours. Therefore we will tend to under-estimate any positive public premium in hourly
wages. In terms of variance both sectors are very similar, the standard deviation of weekly hours
is larger by about 12 minutes in the public sector.
The first column of Table 4.11 shows that the raw public pay gap in out sample is 29.5 log
points (34.3%) in favour of the public sector. However, it appears that this is driven to a large
extent by selection: controlling for education band and a quadratic in (potential) experience
(column 2), the positive public premium is reduced to 10.9 log points (11.5%) but is still sta-
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tistically significant. Allowing the effect of public sector employment to vary with education
band and experience (column 3) suggests that the premium does not vary with education but is
affected by experience, the premium before any labour market experience being significant and
negative (−17.2 log points) but increasing with experience. Allowing for individual fixed-effects
and controlling for a quadratic in labour market experience (column 4), the public premium is
estimated to be almost zero and not statistically significant.35 Augmenting this specification to
allow interactions between the public dummy and the quadratic in experience (column 5) we
again estimate the public premium to be almost zero and not statistically significant.
Earnings dispersion. Unlike in the other countries that we consider, there is much greater
earnings dispersion in the public sector than in the private sector in Portugal. The standard
deviation of log earnings is 0.392 in the private sector, while in the public sector it is 0.511.
The greater spread of earnings in the public sector is also reflected in the 90:10 percentile ratios
of raw earnings, which are 2.563 for the private sector but 3.806 for the public sector. The
corresponding ratios conditional on age and education are 2.281 and 2.626 respectively for the
private and public sectors. Thus there is more earnings dispersion in the public sector than in
the private sector, even after controlling for age and education.
Earnings mobility. The regressions and analysis of the earnings distributions show that
there are differences between the public and private sectors in terms of earnings levels and
cross-sectional distributions. Moreover, the extent of earnings mobility differs between the two
sectors, as illustrated by Table 4.12 (top panel) which shows the transition matrices between
unconditional log earnings quintiles from one year to the next for the public and private sectors
respectively.36 The matrices show persistence in earnings rank to be much greater amongst
individuals continuously employed in the public sector compared to those continuously employed
in the private sector. This is confirmed in the lower panel of the Table which shows the transition
matrices for ranks of the residual of log earnings conditional on education and a quadratic in
(potential) labour market experience. Persistence is consistently greater for those continuously
employed in the public sector.
Though the private sector earnings distribution is more compressed than that of the public




sector, these relatively large differences in rank transitions suggest that the private sector exhibits
a greater degree of earnings mobility than the public sector. So the public sector has a larger
range of earnings but individual’s earnings within that range are more persistent, whereas in
the private sector the range of earnings is somewhat smaller but there is more movement of
individual earnings within this range. Furthermore, computing the one-lag auto-covariance of
normalised log income, after controlling for education and a quadratic in (potential) labour
market experience, we find greater auto-covariance for those employed for consecutive periods
in the public than those employed for consecutive periods in the private sector (0.929 versus
0.816).
Differences in Job Mobility
The transition matrix below shows the changes in employment sector between one wave and the
next, with rows referring to sector in year t-1, columns to sector in year t:
Private Public Unemp.
Private 94.8 2.5 2.6
Public 10.6 88.4 0.9
Unemp. 35.8 7.7 56.4
It is clear from this table that movements from the private sector in one year, directly to
the public sector in the next are rare: only 2.5% of individuals employed in the private sector
move to the public sector by the next interview. However, movements from the public to the
private sector are considerably more frequent (10.6%). The average annual transition rate into
unemployment from the private sector is 2.6% while from the public sector it is around a third
of this, 0.9%, suggestive of greater job security in the public sector. This impression is re-
enforced looking at the differing probabilities of ever being observed unemployed dependent on
the sector that an individual was first observed in: those initally observed in the private sector
are subsequently observed in unemployment with a probability of 14.0%, whereas for those first
observed in the public sector it is only a 3.4% probability.
Of the unemployed in year t-1, 56.4% remain unemployed in year t, 35.8% exiting unemploy-
ment by transitting into the private sector, 7.7% into the public sector. Of the 402 individuals
(17.9% of the sample) ever observed in unemployment during the course of the sample, just un-
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der a quarter (24.9%) record being unemployed in three or more consecutive interviews at some
point during their observations. These “long-term” unemployed have a much lower probability
of exiting unemployment each year (14.5%) than the “short-term” unemployed who find a new
job by the next year with a probability of 72.2%. Thus the persistence in unemployment appears
to be concentrated on the “long-term” unemployed.
There is also some evidence of public sector attachment, with the probability of an unem-
ployed individual whose most recent employment was in the public sector finding a public sector
job, much higher (24.3%) than the corresponding probability for an individual whose most recent
employment was in the private sector (5.3%).37
4.3.8 Summary of Descriptive Analysis
All of the above descriptive analyses help to establish a picture of the sample for each country
in our data. There are clearly differences in the labour market structure and dynamics between
the countries, however some common patterns emerge:
• In all countries there are differences not only in mean earnings between the public and
private sector but also with respect to earnings and job mobility.
• For Germany the data suggests a negative public premium but that returns to experience
are greater in the public sector such that the public penalty reduces and is in fact a small
positive premium for the middle years of a working life. In contrast, in France there is
a positive public premium that initially falls with experience, before rising at later years
of experience, always remaining a positive public premium. In both the Netherlands and
Italy there is a small positive public premium but returns to experience are lower in the
public sector such that after just over a decade of experience in each country, the public
premium turns negative and remains so for the rest of a working life-time. In Spain the
public premium is initially relatively large and positive but reduces in experience and turns
negative for the second half of a working life. In Portugal the cross-sectional regressions
suggest a small positive public premium for average levels of experience, though the fixed
effects estimates find little difference between the sectors.
37It has to be borne in mind however that there are only 37 individuals observed unemployed who had most
recently been observed in the public sector.
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• In almost all countries (Portugal excepted) we find the earnings distribution to be more
compressed in the public sector, to a greater or lesser extent, and that there is less earnings
mobility in this sector. In Portugal we do find less earnings mobility in the public sector
but that it is the private sector that has greater pay compression.
• For all countries, the average annual rate of transition into unemployment is lower for
the public sector than it is for the private sector, and in all cases bar the Netherlands
the public sector rate is less than half of that of the private sector. The average annual
re-employment rates differ according to whether the individual is “long-term” unemployed
and in each country there is evidence of public sector attachment, with individuals whose
most recent employment was in the public sector having a considerably greater probability
of finding a public job in the next period than those who were most recently employed in
the private sector.
It clear that in all countries, the public and private sectors differ in cross-sectional earnings
levels and both earnings and employment dynamics – all elements that will be important to
forward looking agents. As was argued forcefully by Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007), compar-
isons of cross-sectional income distributions are not very informative in the presence of income
mobility. This point is even more pertinent in the case of comparing the income distributions
of the public and private sectors, when there are cross sector differences in income mobility.
Hence the need in assessing any public-private pay gap to take account of all relevant aspects
of the differences between the sectors in order to accurately characterise the difference between
employment in the public sector and employment in the private sector.
4.4 A Model of Employment and Wage Dynamics,
Between and Within Each Sector
4.4.1 General Structure
In each country, the constructed dataset is a set of N individuals, indexed i = 1,. . .N , each of
whom we follow for Ti consecutive years (where 4 ≤ Ti ≤ 8, for all i). Each year we observe the
individual’s job sector (private sector employed, public sector employed, unemployed) and if they
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are working we observe their monthly earnings. If an individual is unemployed we do not observe
his unemployment income, and therefore for the purposes of constructing lifetime expected
values we have to impute an unemployment earnings value according to their characteristics
and the national unemployment replacement rates38 more details in section 4.6. We also have
information on the individuals time-invariant characteristics, therefore a typical observation for









• yi = (yi1, . . . , yiTi) is the observed sequence of individual i’s log earnings flows.
• Si = (Si1, . . . , SiTi) is the observed sequence of individual i’s labour market states at the
various interview dates. We define the three distinct labour market states: employment in
the private sector, employment in the public sector and unemployed. Sit indicates which
of the three states above individual i is in at date t.
• zvi =
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is a sequence of time-varying individual characteristics. In our appli-
cation we only consider (polynomials in) potential labour market experience, defined as
the current date less the date at which individual i left full-time education.
• Finally, zfi is a set of individual fixed characteristics. It includes education level (the 3
ISCED levels) and the year in which the individual first entered the labour market. Hence
zvi is deterministic conditional on z
f
i .
In addition to the individual observed heterogeneity as captured by zvi and z
f
i , we allow time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity to influence individual’s wages and selection into the various
labour market states. The specific form we allow this heterogeneity to take is outlined in section
4.4.2 below, for now we simply append the set ki of time-invariant unobserved characteristics to
the individual’s data vector xi.
We aim to simultaneously estimate transitions between unemployment and employment,
transitions between the public and private sector, and earnings trajectories within and between
employment sectors. Omitting the parameters that condition the various parts of the model
in order to keep the terms concise, we define the individual’s contributions to the complete
38These rates were obtained from the OECD data portal.
39Throughout the paper vectors will be denoted by boldface characters.
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likelihood, that is the likelihood of (xi, ki) including unobserved variables, as:
Li (xi, ki) = `i
(






























straightforward, it is the observed sample distribution of individual characteristics zfi . Since
zvi is deterministic conditional on z
f
i there is no need for it to feature in this last term. This







, is the distribution of the unobserved individual heterogeneity ki given observed
characteristics zfi . The second term is the likelihood of an individual’s labour market history








, with the variable individual characteristics,
zvi ,now explicitly conditioning the labour market history. Finally the first term in the individual
likelihood contribution is the likelihood of earnings history given their labour market history and
individual heterogeneity, `
(






. The first three terms in the individual likelihood
depend on various subsets of the model’s parameters. We obtain estimates of those parameters




Li (xi, ki) dki
]
. That is to say, we will deal
with the unobserved heterogeneity by integrating the individual’s sample log likelihood over the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in order to determine their likelihood contribution, and
then maximise the sample log-likelihood summed over all N individuals. We will now outline the
specifics of the modelling of each component of (4.1), to make the methodology clear, beginning
with the treatment of unobserved individual heterogeneity.
4.4.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity
In addition to the observed heterogeneity modelled in Li (xi, ki) via z
f
i , we consider two types




i ). The first dimension of this heterogeneity, k
m
i ,
relates to the individual’s propensity to be unemployed or to work in the public sector, therefore
captures something of their mobility between sectors (and will be referred to henceforth as
their ‘mobility class’). The second dimension, kyi , refers to heterogeneity in terms of earnings
(hereafter referred to as ‘wage class’) through its impact on both earnings levels and earnings
mobility. Both kmi and k
y
i are time-invariant random effects which are allowed to be correlated in
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an arbitrary manner. The mobility class, kmi , conditions all the parameters of the model relating
to employment and sector history, while the wage class, kyi , conditions the parameters relating to
earnings history both in terms of levels and mobility. Allowing for different unobserved mobility
classes deals with the problem that some people have a higher propensity to work in the public
sector (or to be unemployed), hence the selection problem outlined in section 4.3. Moreover,
the inclusion of earnings heterogeneity via a time-invariant wage class term helps to capture the
persistence in earnings rank, which is not always possible to characterise with fairly low order
Markov processes. We refer to mobility and wage classes as we employ a finite mixture approach
to modelling the unobserved heterogeneity in which each individual can belong to one of Km
mobility classes and Ky wage classes40. Therefore in total there are K = Km×Ky classes. The
























To be more specific, we model each component of (4.2) as a multinomial logit with Ky and Km
outcomes respectively. All of the details of the model specification are gathered in Appendix
C.2.
4.4.3 Labour Market Mobility
The second component of Li (xi, ki) in (4.1) concerns the individual’s labour market mobility.
The transitions between the three labour market states (public sector employed, private sector
employed and unemployed) are allowed to depend only on the individual’s state in the previous
observation and on observed and unobserved characteristics, thus labour market states are mod-
elled as following a conditional first-order Markov chain. It is useful at this point to introduce
the indicators eit and pubit which respectively denote the individuals employment state and job
sector at the date-t interview. Specifically, eit = 1 if i is employed at the date-t interview, 0
if unemployed; pubit is only defined if eit = 1, with pubit = 1 if individual i is employed in
the public sector, and 0 if he is employed in the private sector. We thus model the complete
(within panel) labour market histories in two stages: the probability of employment at the date-t
40We implement this approach following Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007), the finite mixture approach providing
a tractable method to account for unobserved heterogeneity.
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interview (eit = 1), given last period sector and individual heterogeneity, and the probability
of public sector employment at the date-t interview (pubit = 1), given employment at date-t



































Both elements of (4.3) are modelled as logits.
Once we know the individual i’s labour market state at time t−1, Si,t−1, their labour market




0 ←− unemployed −→
eit
1 employed private sector employed public sector
The joint conditional probability (4.3) characterises the transitions between labour market
states and therefore defines Pr
{








. There is a standard initial conditions
problem in as much as we have to specify the distribution of the initial labour market state, Si1,
i.e. model the the joint probability of (ei1,pubi1). We allow this joint probability to depend




































































41Note the assumption implicit in (4.3) that only the date-(t− 1) component of zvi—i.e. individual i’s potential
experience at date t− 1—enters the set of conditioning variables for job mobility between dates t− 1 and t.
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where the components of the latter product are given by (4.3).
4.4.4 Earnings Process
The first term in Li (xi, ki) (equation (4.1)) involves the modelling of individual earnings tra-
jectories. We only have earnings information for individuals who are observed in employment,
which means that earnings information is censored for periods in which an individual is unem-
ployed, complicating the likelihood somewhat. We assume log earnings trajectories yi to be the
realisation of a Markov process of continuous random variables Yt. Given the limitation of the
sample dimensions, both in terms of N and T , the preferred specification for the order of the
Markov process is second-order, thus the earnings process of the model will be expounded under
this assumption. Though we have up to eight years in each of the panel datasets, and we require
only three years of data to identify a second-order Markov process plus an additional year to
identify the unobserved heterogeneity, the relatively small N dimension of the data means that
a second-order process is the best fit.
Again, so as not to overload the equations, we temporarily omit the conditioning variables
and individual index. The likelihood of a given earnings trajectory over T periods can be written
as:
` (y) = ` (y2, y1) ·
T∏
t=3
` (yt | yt−1, yt−2) = ` (y2, y1) ·
T∏
t=3
` (yt, yt−1, yt−2)
` (yt−1, yt−2)
. (4.6)
Given the assumption that earnings follow and second-order Markov process the likelihood
function involves products of bi- or tri-variate densities. We assume that marginal earnings dis-
tributions to be Normal, conditional on observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity. Thus
both the earnings mean and variance are allowed to depend on both observed and unobserved
heterogeneity as well as current sector and previous labour market status — recall that earnings
are only available for individuals in employment thus current employment status eit is equal to
1 for all individuals who have µ (·) defined for period t:






i ∼ N (µit, σ
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it)





















where µ (·) and σ (·) are given functions (see Appendix C.2 for a fully detailed presentation
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of all our specification assumptions). Now we introduce the normalised log-earnings as y˜it =
yit−µit
σit

















These τ ’s are individual-specific and are allowed to vary with observed and unobserved hetero-






















As outlined above, earnings information is only available at date-t if the individual is employed
at date-t, therefore eit = 1 and ei,t−1 = 1 for each of the observations used to identify the
τ1 (·) function, hence these employment indicators are not arguments of the function. The τ2 (·)
function requires in addition that ei,t−2 = 1 in order for that observation to contribute to the
identification of the function, therefore neither is ei,t−2 an argument of the τ2 (·) function. Again,
τ1 (·) and τ2 (·) are functions specified in Appendix C.2.
Now, with the assumptions and notation introduced in equations (4.7) to (4.9), we can
specify the likelihood of the typical individual’s earnings trajectory yi defined in (4.6). This
will depend on the earnings information available, as we observe earnings at date-t only for
those in employment. If earnings information is available at the date-t interview, then there are
four possibilities regarding the presence of earnings information at the date-t− 1 and date-t− 2
interviews:
• Case A: date-(t− 1): yes; date-(t − 2): yes
• Case B: date-(t − 1): yes; date-(t− 2): no
• Case C: date-(t − 1): no; date-(t− 2): yes
• Case D: date-(t − 1): no; date-(t− 2): no
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Which case an individual’s date-t observation is will determine whether that term in the
product in (4.6) is ` (yt | yt−1, yt−2), ` (yt | yt−1), ` (yt | yt−2) or simply ` (yt).
In the complete earnings information scenario, an individual has case (A) for all t >= 3, that
is they have earnings information not only at the date-t interview but also, (t− 1) and (t− 2)










































is the n-variate normal pdf with mean 0 and covariance matrix τ (n). However,
given that in each country, individuals move between employment and unemployment through
the course of the panel (indeed we would not be able to identify the mobility parameters were
they not to) it is necessarily not possible that we have case A for all individuals for all t >= 3.
In the more general case, the individual’s trajectory is built from a product that cannot be
captured in as elegant an expression as equation (4.10). In each case however the individual’s
earnings trajectory likelihood is built from products of uni-, bi- and tri-variate normal densities
and has the general form of equation (4.6).
For a case (B) observation at date-t, an individual has earnings information at date-t and
also at date-(t − 1) but not at date-(t − 2). In this case the likelihood of that observation is
computed as:















where ϕ (.) is the univariate standard normal pdf.
Similarly for a case (C) observation at date-t, an individual has earnings information at date-
t and also at date-(t− 2) but not at date-(t− 1). In this case the likelihood of that observation
is computed as:















Finally, for a case (D) observation, the individual has earnings information only at the date-t
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× ϕ (y˜t) (4.13)
Clearly, for all individuals their first earnings observation is a case (D), and if they are
observed employed in the following year that observation will be a case (B) observation.
We are effectively assuming that normalised log earnings follow a familiar AR(2) process,
though we build in more flexibility than a standard second-order Markov process in that we
allow the τs to depend on observed (and unobserved) individual characteristics in (4.9). This
has the dual appeal of (a) helping to more accurately fit the observed mobility of income ranks,
and (b) informing one of the key questions that we aim to address: namely how income mobility
varies across individuals and across sectors. The τs offer an index of income mobility which we
will use to shed light on this key question.
It is acknowledged that an implicit assumption of the model as outlined above, is that
transitory shocks to the earnings process are independent of the transitory shocks to the processes
determining mobility between the labour market sectors. To put this another way, we assume
that the individual earnings process only affects individual mobility between states through
either observed characteristics (e.g. education and experience) or through the time-invariant
unobserved individual random effects kmi and k
y
i , and not through any transitory (unobserved)
shocks. This assumption leads to the separability of the likelihood function into a part relating
to labour market mobility and a separate part relating to the earnings process.
4.4.5 Likelihood Maximisation
Having established the specifications for the individual contributions to the complete likelihood,





















i ) are integrated out of
the complete likelihood (4.1).
Given that this sample log-likelihood is highly non-linear and that there is a large number
184
of parameters to be estimated, maximisation cannot be completed in a single step. We proceed
by employing a sequential version of the EM algorithm. The advantage of this procedure is
that it is computationally more stable given arbitrary starting values and is more tractable
than a direct frontal maximisation of the total sample likelihood (4.14). Furthermore, it can
be shown that under the assumptions of identification of the model parameters and numerical
convergence of the algorithm, that the two stage approach converges to a consistent estimator of
the parameters (see Bonhomme and Robin, 2004). It does have the drawback in that it converges
to an estimator which differs from the maximum-likelihood estimator and is not efficient – for
two reasons: firstly because it is a two-step procedure, and secondly because of the sequential
nature of the optimisation we do not use all of the information and thus lose some efficiency.
Appendix C.4 details the EM algorithm procedure.
4.5 Results
The results of the model estimation for each country are now presented. Firstly, we present an
assessment of the fit of the model for each country, in order to establish that the model does a
good job of replicating cross-sectional earnings statistics in each country, and also importantly
that it fits the dynamics of the labour market and earnings well. Following this the results in
each country are separately presented. Subsequently section 4.6 will develop a more systematic
analysis of selection into the public sector and the differences between the sectors in terms of
earnings flows and lifetime values. The model is estimated under the assumption that within
each country, individual unobserved heterogeneity can be modelled with three mobility classes
and two wage classes. We were guided in the choice of these numbers by balancing the various
concerns of descriptive accuracy, computational tractability and model fit. In addition, we were
keen to adopt a common framework that could be applied equally to all countries. The common
model for all countries comes at a certain price however, in that the model has to give a good fit
to each and every country. We believe that three mobility classes and two wage classes provides
the best solution given these competing concerns.
This gives us six classes in total, which means that for each country there are 86 parameters
to estimate42. Tables of the coefficient estimates and standard errors are reported in Appendix
42Of these 86, 48 relate to the mobility estimation, 38 relate to the earnings estimation
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C.3. However, rather than commenting on six countries times 86 coefficients directly, we chose
in the subsequent results sections to concentrate on more easily interpreted statistics – such as
the predicted mean earnings and predicted τs – that can illuminate the various components of
the model.
4.5.1 Model Fit
We begin the discussion of the model results by examining how well the statistical model of
section (4.4) fits the data and captures the dynamics of labour market states and earnings in
each country. In order to do this, we simulate the model in each country and then compare the
model-generated data outcomes with the real data. To achieve this, within each country, we
replicate our panel 6 times (i.e. as many times as there are unobserved heterogeneity classes in
total) so that we have one set of observations per person per unobserved heterogeneity class.
We use the estimated job mobility and earnings processes to simulate individual labour market
and earnings trajectories for each (individual×class) in the sample. We then produce simulated
descriptive statistics, weighting each {individual i, class (km, ky)} observation by the probability
that individual i belongs to mobility class km and wage class ky, given individual’s observed
characteristics xi: Pr {k
m
i = k
m, kyi = k
y | xi}.
Worker Allocation and Mobility Between States
Looking at the cross-sectional statistics for all countries, it seems that the model fits the observed
pattern of worker allocation to states – private sector employment, public sector employment
and unemployment – very well indeed. Tables 4.25, 4.28, 4.31, 4.34, 4.37 and 4.40 compare
the sectoral composition of classes, and the class composition of sectors, for the observed and
model-generated data, illustrating this very good fit for each country43. Moreover, as the left
panel of each table shows, for each country it is the case that in the real data there are non-
trivial proportions of the population in each of the three mobility classes, suggesting that three
unobserved heterogeneity types is a good approximation to reality.
As our main concern in this paper is to examine the differences between the public and
43There is a discrepancy for the Netherlands between the predicted and observed proportion of the unemployed
who are km = 1 or km = 3, however, the unemployed represent only 2.7% (386) of the sample observations,
making it difficult to perfectly fit the three different unobserved mobility classes on so few individuals.
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private sectors, taking into account selection into these sectors and the different job loss rates
and earnings dynamics between the sectors, it is of primary importance that we fit the dynamics
of labour mobility well. Tables 4.13 to 4.18 illustrate the observed and simulated cross-job-state
transition matrices for each of the countries at intervals of one and five years44. As discussed
above, one of the criteria in deciding the model specification was to have a common statistical
model that could be applied to all countries and fit well. As such, the specification chosen fits
the observed job mobility better in some countries than in others. Looking at the upper panel
of each table, we can see that transitions from t − 1 to t are generally fitted very well, in all
cases the maximum absolute distance between the observed rate and the model-predicted rate
being less than 10%-points and in most cases much less than that. In addition to the maximum
distance between the observed and predicted figures in any of the nine entries in each 3×3
matrix, we report the maximum absolute distance between the observed and predicted figures
relating to the 2×2 matrices formed by excluding the unemployment column and row of each
matrix. This shows how well the model is fitting persistence in sector for those employed, and
the movement between them. In each case, for the t − 1 to t transitions, we fit these 2×2
matrices very well, the error being of the order of around 1%-point for three of the countries
and more towards 2%-points for the other three. This shows that we are fitting the employment
sector persistence well in all countries; the prediction errors are due to an under-prediction
of unemployment persistence to a greater (France, Netherlands, Portugal) or lesser (Germany,
Spain, Italy) extent. Specifically, we under predict the unemployment persistence because we
are over-predicting the rate of re-employment into the private sector – the rate of re-employment
into the public sector is fitted well in each country.
Looking at the longer-lag transitions, from t− 5 to t, it is clear that the under-prediction of
unemployment persistence continues to be a problem in France in particular and now Germany.
In the other countries the maximum distance between predicted and observed figures ranges
from 3.1%-points (Spain) to 7.5%-points (Portugal), which whilst not perfect show that the fit
of the model does not deteriorate too much at longer lags45. Two comments: the poorer fit at
44With up to 8 observations for some individuals in each dataset, in theory we could look at 7-year lags for
each country, however as there are relatively small numbers of individuals who have 8 observations, the cell sizes
in the predicted data preclude robust observed matrices at longer than 5 lags.
45In fact for the Netherlands and Spain the maximum distance in the 3×3 matrices is smaller for the longer lag
than the 1-period lag.
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the longer lag for France and Germany, is partly caused by the small numbers of individuals in
the observed data who are unemployed at the t− 5 period, just 126 in the case of France (290
Germany) which is five times fewer (four times fewer for Germany) than the number observed
unemployed in the t − 1 period for the upper panel calculations. This inevitably makes it
more difficult to fit the transitions accurately when the observed figures are calculated from
relatively small cell sizes. Secondly, for France, Germany, Italy and Spain, the 2×2 matrices
distances continue to be small, of the order of 2 to 3%-points, indicating that we are fitting the
persistence in and movement between sectors for employees pretty well. For the Netherlands
(6.5%-points) and Portugal (7.5%-points) we predict unemployment persistence reasonably well
at the longer lag but slightly under-predict the movement between the public and private sectors.
In sum, these Tables indicate that the statistical model does a satisfactory job in all countries
of fitting the observed transitions between the labour market states, both at short and longer
lags, and in some countries in particular (Italy, Spain) does an very good job indeed.
Earnings Dispersion and Earnings Mobility
For our approach to the assessment of public-private differences over the lifetime to succeed,
the other aspect which we need to fit well in each country is the cross-sectional earnings profile
and the mobility of earnings. Concentrating initially on the former, Figures 4.7 to 4.12 plot the
observed and predicted log earnings densities for the whole sample and also for the private and
public sectors separately. These figures also include the wage class-specific densities, in each case
normalised at the relative size of each class within each sector. In our model specification we
settled on having two wage classes, and as can be seen in the upper panel of each of the Tables
4.26, 4.29, 4.32, 4.35, 4.38 and 4.41, within each country there is a substantial proportion of
individuals in each class. For Germany, the Netherlands and France there is an even distribution
between the classes whereas for Italy, Spain and Portugal one class has notably more weight
than the other.
Looking first at the total picture for each country, bottom left panel of each figure, we can see
that in each country the model fits the observed wage distribution well – though again, given the
common model specification across all countries, inevitably the fit is better in some countries
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Figure 4.12: Portugal: Earnings Densities
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that the mixture of two normal densities in each country fits the observed wage density in each
country pretty well. The wage class-specific densities illustrate both the prevalence of each wage
type in each country, through the relative size of that class’s density, and also how the wage
classes within a country relate to each other in terms of earnings mean and distribution. Still
concentrating on the overall pictures for each country, it is clear that while in some countries
overall the wage classes have similarly shaped earnings distributions (Germany, Netherlands,
Portugal), for other countries (Italy and Spain) one wage class clearly has higher earnings than
the other. Turning now to the sector-specific densities, we can see that where the overall fit is
good the sector-specific fits are also good. For France and Spain the public sector fit is better
than the private sector fit, and in no case is there a large discrepancy between the observed
and predicted densities. We can also observe that within countries, there are differences in the
public and private sector densities between the wage classes. For example in Italy, wage class
1 has a higher mean than wage class 2, and we can see from the sector-specific densities that
wage class 1 types in either sector earn more on average and have a less skewed and peaked
distribution. It is a similar story for Spain. Overall the fit of cross-sectional earnings densities
is arguably satisfactory for all countries.
Again, for the purposes of our analysis, it is important not only to fit the cross sectional
distributions of earnings well but also the mobility of earnings. Above we compared the observed
job mobility in the sample with simulated job mobility using the coefficients generated by the
statistical model. When we performed these simulations, we simulated full individual labour
market histories – i.e. featuring both earnings and job state transitions – with earnings evolving
according to the process outlined in the specification. We can therefore compare the predicted
earnings quintile transition matrices with those obtained from the real data. Again we do this
at lags of both one and five years, see Tables 4.19 to 4.24.
Concentrating firstly on the 1-period transition matrices (upper panel of each table), the
maximum discrepancy across all countries and cells of the matrices is 9.7%-points, the minimum
largest discrepancy being 4.0%-points. Given the relatively parsimonious specification of income
means, variances and covariances, and that we have only six unobserved heterogeneity classes in
total, this is a very good fit. Moreover, as we move to longer lags, (lower panel of each table),
though there is an increase across the board in the maximum absolute distance between the
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observed and predicted figures, the increases are not large for most of the countries. France and
Spain are exceptions to this. For France, the difference as we move from one lag to five lags
is an increase in maximum distance from 4.0%-points – the lowest for 1-lag – to 11.8%-points.
Though this increase is large relative to the one-period lag, it is still a reasonable fit at the longer
lag. With respect to Spain, the five-lag maximum distance of 14.7% is slightly larger than we
would hope, but relative to the one-period lag is not actually that much of a loss in precision –
the model does less well at fitting earnings mobility in Spain at all lags, though arguably it is
still a satisfactory fit.
Taken in consideration with the fit of cross-sectional job sector, job sector mobility and the
cross-sectional earnings distribution, the earnings mobility fit of the model suggests that for each
country our statistical model does a good job of capturing the observed levels and dynamics
in each country and supports the specification. This is pleasing given that we have estimated
the same specification on each and every country, with a small number of latent heterogeneity
classes and only a second order Markov earnings process.
As already alluded to, the choice of specification involved balancing competing criteria and
was constrained by the wish to estimate a common model for all countries, and thus having to
develop a model that could fit the country with the smallest N×T dimensions as well as the
largest.
Possible Alternative Specifications
It is clear from the observed data that earnings are highly persistent in each country, and the
assumptions of our model give two mechanisms through which this persistence is captured:
the 2nd-order Markov process for the evolution of earnings, and the time-invariant unobserved
wage classes. The combination of these assumptions goes a long way to capturing the observed
persistence in each country. However, if we look at the prediction errors for each country, in
Tables 4.19 to 4.24, we see that for both the one-period earnings transitions and the five-period
transitions, the model in general under -predicts the persistence in earnings. For some countries,
persistence in the lowest quintile(s) of earnings is actually over-predicted, especially at the
longer time lag, however the majority of cells in the main diagonal of each country’s matrices
are under-predicted by the model – indicating that we over -predict earnings mobility to some
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extent in each country. This aspect of the model could potentially be improved by altering the
two assumptions relating to the earnings process, either by increasing the order of the Markov
earnings process or by increasing the number of latent earnings heterogeneity classes. However,
given the nature of our estimation procedure, the computational cost of expanding the model
in either of these directions is very high. There is a trade-off between the amount of “built-in”
persistence resulting from the order of the Markov process, and the additional earnings auto-
correlation introduced by the time-invariant unobserved earnings classes. The choice we made of
a 2nd-order Markov process with two wage classes was guided, as ever, by a number of competing
concerns including computational tractability, parsimony, model fit and the aim to estimate the
same model specification for each country. Given these concerns, the model specification has to
be guided by the N×T dimensions of each of the datasets we have: in each country we have a
relatively small N dimension – between 2213 (Netherlands) and 3026 (Germany) individuals –
balanced by a longer T dimension – each individual having at least 4 and up to 8 observations.
Increasing the order of the Markov process beyond 2 would require each individual to have at
least 5 observations, which would further cut the sample size in each case. Given the restrictions
imposed by the estimation samples, a specification with a 2nd-order Markov process is the most
appropriate. In terms of the number of unobserved earnings heterogeneity classes, again the
relatively small N dimensions of the datasets dictates that two wage classes gives the best fit.
It is natural given three labour market states – private, public, unemployed – to have three
mobility classes, thus adding an additional wage class consequently increases the total number
of unobserved classes by 3, quickly testing the limits of the data46. The current specification is
the compromise that best meets the various competing considerations.
There are a number of possible alternative strategies that are computationally tractable.
For example, removing the unobserved earnings classes altogether would provide a model that
is computationally quick and easy to estimate, however in testing of various model formats
Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007), consistently found that such models grossly over-predict both
job and earnings mobility at lags beyond one or two years. Similarly, restoring the assumption
46The N/T ratio of the dataset plays a critical role in determining the best specification. For example, Postel-
Vinay and Turon (2007) had a larger N and T dimension, and were able to get a very good fit with a 2nd-order
Markov process, 3 latent wage classes and 3 latent mobility classes; whereas Bonhomme and Robin (2004) used
similar estimation techniques but were constrained to a 1st-order Markov process as the T -dimension of their data
was only 3 years, but balanced by a very large N dimension.
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of unobserved earnings classes but reducing the order of the Markov process for earnings to just
1st-order is simpler and quicker to estimate, but again results in substantially larger prediction
errors – as compared with the 2nd-order process – at the longer lags. Given that the purpose
of our paper is to use the model to construct the lifetime values of individual labour market
trajectories, having as good a fit as possible of the earnings mobility is extremely important.
Thus the specification using a 2nd-order Markov process, 2 time-invariant unobserved wage
classes and 3 time-invariant unobserved mobility classes, appears to be the right compromise
for our purposes.
We next present the results of the model for each country, focusing first on the distribution of
mobility types across labour market states and the differing predicted job loss rates between the
sectors. We then look at the earnings results of the model, assessing the existence and magnitude
of any public premium in earnings, controlling for selection effects. We do this by predicting
earnings for each individual in each sector given their observed and unobserved characteristics
and the coefficients estimated from our statistical model.
4.5.2 Germany
Labour Market States
Looking at the left (‘Observed’) panel of Table 4.25, we see that just over half of the sample
are mobility class km = 2 types, with the remainder even split between km = 1 and km = 3.
Selection into labour market state is very much correlated with mobility type, with km = 2
(resp. km = 3) types selecting overwhelmingly into the private (resp. public) sector, while
km = 1 is a mixture of mainly private sector workers, though with a higher unemployment rate
among this type than the other two. For Germany, we will refer to the km = 1 types as ‘high
unemployment’, km = 2 as ‘private worker’ and km = 3 as ‘public worker’ types.
The upper panel of Table 4.26 shows the human capital characteristics of each mobility type.
Following the descriptive analysis in which we found that the public sector attracted more high
educated and slightly more experienced workers, we similarly find that compared to the ‘private
worker’ type, the ‘public worker’ type have a higher proportion of high education workers (37.2%
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versus 28.4%) and slightly more experience (18.0 years versus 16.6). The ‘high unemployment’
type have higher than average experience (20.5 years) but substantially lower education than




















0 10 20 30 40
 








Solid=private sector, Dashed=public sector
Figure 4.13: Germany: Job Loss Risk
Figure 4.13 illustrates the difference in predicted job loss risk for each sector against expe-
rience. The left-hand “whole sample” panel is clean of selection effects as we calculate these
average predicted job loss rates at each year of experience assuming each individual is in each
sector. For each sector the job loss risk traces a U-shape in experience, rising from 25 years of
experience onwards. Interestingly the job loss risk is higher in the public than the private sector
for all levels of experience. When we allow for selection – calculating the job loss probability for
each sector using only individuals observed to be in that sector in the first period of the data –
while the private risk remains unchanged, there is a large downward shift of the public sector job
loss risk, it approximately halves for almost all levels of experience. This suggests that there is
positive selection into the public sector, with higher employment individuals selecting into this
sector. We know that the public sector attracts more educated and experienced individuals, and
that the mobility type that predominate in the public sector (km = 3) have low unemployment




In Germany the sample individuals divide pretty evenly between the earnings classes, 52.5% into
ky = 1, 47.5% into ky = 2. Table 4.27 shows that the wage class 1 earn more on average than
wage class 2 in both the private sector (+2 log points more) and the public sector (+1 log point
more). Wage class 1 have a small negative public premium (−1 log point), whereas on average
wage class 2 earn the same in each sector. The most notable difference between the classes is
that compared with the ky = 2 types, the ky = 1 types have much lower dispersion of earnings
in each sector (8 log points lower in each sector).
The upper panels of Figure 4.14 plot mean earnings along with the 10th and 90th percentiles
of earnings, against experience for each wage class and sector. The bottom left panel shows the
same profile but for the whole sample, when we control for selection effects i.e. we include each
sample member in each sector and therefore compare the cross-sectional profiles in potential
earnings in each sector. The bottom right panel shows the picture when we only include in the
private sector the predicted private sector earnings of an individual who is observed in the real
data to be in the private sector in the initial period; the corresponding public sector distribution
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Figure 4.14: Germany: Earnings-Experience Profiles
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The first thing to notice about these plots is the difference in returns to experience between
the sectors, or more specifically how flat the experience profiles are for the private sector for
both wage classes. For each class the public profiles are much steeper initially before levelling
off after approximately 20 years of work experience and then tapering off towards the end of the
working lifetime. Interestingly the dispersion of wages does not seem to be dependent on the
experience level, the 10th and 90th percentile lines maintaining their relative positions over the
years in all panels. We can see the lower dispersion of earnings in each sector for wage class 1
compared with wage class 2 from the relative closeness of the mean, 10th and 90th percentiles in
the top left panel, compared with the top right.
The difference in public premium between the classes is not very large (−1 log point for ky = 1
compared with no premium for ky = 2), and for each wage class the reduction in dispersion is
approximately the same (−1 log point reduction in the standard deviation of earnings).
Turning to the bottom left panel of the figure, the average potential public premium con-
trolling for selection is −0.8 log points, with a reduction in earnings standard deviation in the
public sector also of 1.2 log points, tallying with what we find for each class. This fits with
the finding of Dustmann and van Soest (1998), who find a negative public premium reducing
in experience. The average public premium when we do not control for selection, bottom right
panel, is larger at 4.7 log points (similar to the finding in Table 4.1). Looking at the bottom two
panels of the figure illustrates that non-random selection into sector is important in explaining
the public premium: there is positive selection into the public sector which explains the observed
raw positive public premium, and why it disappears when selection is controlled.
One measure of earnings mobility is given by the 1-lag auto-covariance of earnings distur-
bances (the τ1it coefficient in the statistical model), and this is plotted against experience for
each sector×wage class in Figure 4.15.
For each wage class we can see that earnings are more persistent in the public than the
private sector, and that in each sector earnings persistence increases with experience. This is
particularly the case for the ky = 1 types who have a rapid increase in earnings persistence,
regardless of sector, during the first 10 years of work, before this growth in persistence slows
and grows at a similar more modest rate as in wage class 2. The ky = 2 types have a greater
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Figure 4.15: Germany: Auto-covariance of Normalised Earnings
similarly for wage class 1 the difference in persistence between the sectors does not alter with
experience. Given that the sample is split fairly evenly between the wage classes, the picture
for the sample as a whole is a mixture of the two upper panels, with greater persistence in the
public sector, increasing with experience. The similarity between the lower left and right panels
indicates that selection does not have a discernible impact on this metric of earnings persistence.
The bottom panel of Table 4.26 shows the breakdown of observable characteristics for each
wage class. Given that the difference in earnings between the classes is not that substantial
it is unsurprising to find that in terms of education and experience, each class has a similar
composition. The slightly higher earning class (ky = 1) actually have lower education on average,
though this appears to be offset by more experience. The lower panel of this table also shows
the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity classes. Each of the Km × Ky = 6 classes
contain a non-negligible proportion of the sample, so all combinations are found in the data.
Nevertheless, the two dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity are not independent, for example,
the ky = 1 wage class have the higher private earnings, and are over-represented among the




The ‘Observed’ panel of Table 4.28 shows the sectoral composition of the mobility types and
the mobility composition of the sectors for the Netherlands. Almost two-thirds of the sample
are captured by mobility type 3, with an even split of the remainder between types 1 and 2. It
is clear that mobility type has a large correlation with labour market state: this largest type
km = 3 is almost totally private sector employed (98.31%) with the rest unemployed, no public
sector at all (henceforth referred to as the ‘private worker’ type). Similarly type km = 1 is
even more exclusively public sector, with less than 1% in unemployment and no private sector
workers (referred to as the ‘public worker’ type). The km = 2 types collect those not so attached
to either sector, and has by far the highest unemployment rate of all of the types (referred to
as the ‘high unemployment’ type).
In terms of the observable characteristics of each mobility type, given the comprehensive
sorting of types into sectors, unsurprisingly we find that the education and experience charac-
teristics of the ‘private worker’ and ‘public worker’ types, mirror very closely the breakdowns
by sector outlined in section 4.3.3, with the ‘public’ types having a significantly higher (lower)
proportion of high (low) education workers, and having more potential labour market experience.
For the Netherlands, the unemployment rate is low and in each sector and for each the job
loss risk traces a U-shape in experience, as illustrated in the “whole sample” panel of Figure
4.16. The job loss risk is very similar in each sector controlling for selection, higher for the public
sector at the very lowest and highest levels of experience but lower through the majority of the
working lifetime. Comparing this picture with the right-side panel, which allows selection into
sectors, we see that selection does not have a substantial effect on the job loss risk for either
sector, aside from reducing the public risk at higher levels of experience.
Earnings
For the Netherlands there is a fairly even split in the sample between the earnings classes, 51.8%
into ky = 1, 48.2% into ky = 2. From Table 4.30 we see that wage class 1 types earn more on
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Figure 4.16: Netherlands: Job Loss Risk
premium, while the wage class 2 has an +4 log point public premium on average, such that this
class earns on average 12 log points more in the public sector than wage class 1. For each wage
class there is a lower standard deviation of log earnings in the public sector, by 2 to 3 log points.
Again, Figure 4.17 plots mean earnings, the 10th and 90th percentiles of earnings, against
experience for each wage class and sector separately, and for the “whole sample” and the “whole
sample, with selection”.
The figure visually confirms the finding of Table 4.30, that for wage class 1 there is a negative
public premium while for wage class 2 it is a positive public premium. Moreover, the figure
illustrates that for wage class 1, the negative public premium is evident not just at the mean
but at both the 10th and 90th percentiles also. For wage class 2 there is a premium in the mean
at all levels of experience, and at the 10th percentile, while for the 90th percentile the premium
is only evident at higher experience levels. For each sector and class, the dispersion of earnings
does not seem to depend on experience as for each of the top panels, and indeed for the lower
panels also, the mean and the 10th and 90th percentile curves are approximately parallel.
With regard to returns to experience, it appears that for each class the public sector returns
are slightly higher, such that the public dis-premium for ky = 1 is decreased in experience while
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Figure 4.17: Netherlands: Earnings-Experience Profiles
Looking at the “whole sample” figures, the average potential public premium controlling for
selection is a small negative, −2.9 log points, with a 2.1 log point reduction in the standard
deviation of earnings in the public sector, again suggestive of greater pay compression in the
public sector. Graphically we can see the greater public pay compression by the relative closeness
of the mean and the 10th and 90th percentile lines for the public sector compared with the private
sector, the public sector’s 10th (resp. 90th) percentile being above (below) that of the private
sector, squeezing the distribution. When we allow for selection into sector, there is a large effect
on the average premium, which rises to 8.9 log points (similar to the findings of Table 4.3). Thus
sorting into employment sector is clearly non-random, there is positive selection into the public
sector, which affects the apparent public premium. This echoes both Hartog and Oosterbeek
(1993) and Van Ophem (1993) who each find workers in the public sector have a comparative
advantage in this sector.
The 1-lag auto-covariance of earnings disturbances are plotted against experience for each
sector×wage class in Figure 4.18, to illustrate earnings persistence differences.
For wage class 1 we see that earnings are highly persistent in both sectors, and more so for
the public sector than the private, with persistence increasing slightly with experience. For wage
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Figure 4.18: Netherlands: Auto-covariance of Normalised Earnings
lower – much lower initially before rising with experience to close the gap somewhat by 40 years
of experience. We know from section 4.5.1 that in the Netherlands we under -predict earnings
persistence in all but the lowest quintile at 1-lag, and this is particularly the case for the public
sector for wage class 2. This is the area where the model does not fit the data very well, such
that the τ1it for wage class 2 is under-estimated in the public sector and over-estimated in the
private sector – and we see the effects of this in the figure. The observed data for this wage class
suggests slightly higher persistence in the public sector but the bad fit of the model in this area
reverses that finding. Looking at the bottom left, “whole sample”, panel we see that the lower
estimated public persistence in wage class 2 weights the overall public persistence down such that
the private sector has higher persistence by this measure, over the sample. Comparing the lower
two panels it appears that selection does not have an effect on this measure of private sector
persistence, though it does for the public sector, with more low earnings persistence workers
selecting into this sector – though we have to bear in mind the poor fit of the model in this area
and interpret with caution.
The lower panel of Table 4.29 breaks down wage classes in terms of observable and unob-
servable characteristics. Neither wage class has a clear advantage in earnings capacity overall
and it is therefore not surprising that they have very similar education and experience profiles:
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each has a similar proportion with high education, wage class 2 having slightly more medium
education and fewer low education, while wage class 1 has slightly more experience. With regard
to the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity classes, all Km×Ky = 6 classes are popu-
lated, though the correlation between earnings types and mobility types is by no means perfect.
The mobility type km = 3 is the most prevalent in the sample (63.6%) so it is no surprise that
this mobility class dominates within each wage class, though being slightly under-represented
amongst wage class 1, and thus over-represented among wage class 2.
4.5.4 France
Labour Market States
Starting with the sectoral composition of the mobility types, we see from the left panel (‘Ob-
served’) of Table 4.31 that around half of the sample are km = 3, with approximately two-thirds
of the rest of the sample type 2, the remainder being type 1. Again there are clear patterns of
selection into sector for the differing mobility types, the km = 1 class having by far the highest
unemployment rate, and being hugely over-represented amongst the unemployed: only 14.3% of
the sample are type 1, yet 84.4% of the unemployed are of this type (henceforth referred to as
the ‘high unemployment’ type). The km = 3 type select largely into the private sector, while
the km = 2 mobility class are very much the ‘public’ sector types (and will be referred to as
such).
With regard to their individual observed characteristics, the ‘high unemployment’ type
clearly have much less experience than the other types (average of just 7.9 years compared
to 24.2 (‘public worker’) and 17.0 (‘private worker’)), though they have a high proportion of
highly educated types. This type seems to capture a mixture of younger men, who are either
highly educated private sector workers just starting out or are unemployed. Unsurprisingly, the
‘private worker’ type have characteristics very similar to the observed characteristics of private
sector workers outlined in the descriptive analysis.
The left-side, “whole sample”, panel of Figure 4.19 illustrates the average predicted job loss
risks for each level of experience assuming each individual in each sector. The familiar U-shape
in experience is evidence for each sector, however the startling thing about this figure is that
though the public sector has a lower job loss risk for the first 25 years of experience, thereafter it
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rises very rapidly and is approximately four times higher (at 20% risk) for 35 years of experience
than in the private sector. However, when we allow for selection into sector (right-side panel) we
see a dramatic reduction in the public sector job loss risk for levels of experience over 20 years,
in fact it plateaus out just above zero. This is almost certainly captures something of the effect
of tenure in the public sector in France in which jobs for life are guaranteed once a certain level
of experience is accrued. It is also because of the human capital of public sector workers, who
have greater education and experience. In addition, as Table 4.31 illustrates, the public sector
draws most of its workers from mobility type km = 2, who have by far the lowest unemployment
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Figure 4.19: France: Job Loss Risk
Earnings
As is the case for Germany and the Netherlands, in France individuals are evenly divided between
the wage classes with sample weights of 48.3% for ky = 1 and 51.7% for ky = 2. On average each
class earns almost the same in the private sector (9.40 for class 1, 9.39 for class 2), but while
wage class 2 has an average public premium of −1 log point, for wage class 1 the premium is
+7 log points (see Table 4.33). Both classes have a small reduction in earnings dispersion in the
public sector, the standard deviation of log earnings being 1 log point lower in the public sector
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for each class. Wage class 1 have greater earnings dispersion overall, 3 to 4 log points higher in
each sector than is the case for wage class 2. So wage class 1 have higher average earnings in
each sector but also higher earnings dispersion.
To get a visual comparison of the distributions by wage class and sector, and for the sample
as a whole both with and without selection controlled for, Figure 4.20 plots mean earnings, the
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Figure 4.20: France: Earnings-Experience Profiles
The top two panels illustrate the finding in Table 4.33 that the public premium is higher
for ky = 1 types, with the mean higher in the public sector at all levels of experience, and
similarly for the 10th percentile. While there is some greater public pay compression for wage
class 1, shown by the lower 90th percentile of earnings in the public sector, even this ceases to
be the case at later years of experience. In contrast for wage class 2, the various lines for the
two sectors are much closer together, the public sector curves below the corresponding private
sector curves initially before cutting through and opening up a premium at the mean, 10th and
90th percentiles of the distribution at the later years of experience.
For each class it appears that the slightly lower average dispersion of earnings in the public
sector is stable throughout the working lifetime, as in all panels the within each sector the mean,
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10th and 90th percentile lines are approximately parallel.
Looking now at the lower left “whole sample” panel, the average potential public premium
controlling for selection is +3.0 log points, with a 1.5 log point reduction in the standard devi-
ation of log earnings in the public sector – consistent with the reduction for the wage classes,
and adding some limited evidence for the phenomena of greater pay compression in the public
sector. Returns to experience seem to be similar initially before the public sector returns in-
crease above the private such that a premium opens up in the mean, 10th and 90th percentiles
for higher levels of experience. Turning to the “whole sample, with selection” panel, the average
public premium in log earnings is 12.4 log points, similar to the observed data when we do not
control selection (see Table 4.5). There is a public premium for all levels of experience and at
each of the illustrated parts of the distribution, tending to increase in experience. This increase
in premium at the mean, 10th and 90th percentiles, suggests positive selection into the public
sector and that this selection explains around three-quarters of the raw public premium.
Now to illustrate the differences in the persistence of earnings between the sectors and wage
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Figure 4.21: France: Auto-covariance of Normalised Earnings
There is a high persistence in earnings for wage class 1 in each sector, and increasing with
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experience, with public sector persistence higher than private sector. For wage class 2 there is
greater persistence in earnings in the public sector also, though for each sector the persistence
in earnings for this class is slightly lower than for wage class 1, with a much more concave profile
in experience. Again, given the even division of the sample between the wage types it is as
expected that the overall picture (lower left panel) is a combination of the two classes: higher
public persistence throughout, with persistence in both sectors increasing in experience, slightly
more so in the private sector such that the persistence gap is closed somewhat over the work
life. Comparing this picture with the lower right panel in which selection is not controlled for,
illustrates that there is a small effect of selection on this measure of persistence, with the gap
between the sectors reducing (public still has higher persistence), suggesting that the individuals
who select into the private sector have higher earnings persistence in this sector than those who
do not select into the private sector.
Table 4.32 shows the breakdown of the observable and unobservable characteristics of each
wage class, in its lower panel. While potential labour market experience differs only somewhat
– wage class 1 has approximately three-quarters of a year more – the education distributions
are distinct: wage class 1 having simultaneously a greater proportion of high education (30.9%
versus 21.1%)) and low education workers (38.5% versus 19.2%), with wage class 2 having
approximately double the proportion with medium education (59.8% versus 30.6%). The greater
proportion of low educated in class 1 may help to explain the greater average public premium in
this wage class. This would fit with Bargain and Melly’s (2008) finding that blue collar workers
gain the most from public sector employment.
With respect to the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity classes, each of the
Km × Ky = 6 classes have at least 5% of the sample. Interestingly each wage class has a
similar breakdown in terms of mobility class membership, wage class 1 having slightly more of
the ‘private worker’ mobility class (and less of the ‘high unemployment’ class (km = 1)) which
is somewhat surprising given that wage class 1 have a higher potential public premium. This
suggests that workers select into the public sector not just because of a comparative advantage
in potential earnings – ‘public service motivation’ may be a reason why individuals who do not




Looking at the ‘Observed’ panel of Table 4.34, we see that just under half of the sample are
mobility type km = 1, with the majority of the other half being km = 2 type, and only around
one-sixth of the total sample falling into type km = 3. As with the other nations, there are
clear patterns of selection into sector according to mobility type, though perhaps less so than in
other countries. Of the km = 1 class, 89.9% are private sector employees, and have the lowest
unemployment rate, only 4.1%. Mobility classes 2 and 3 are each more of a mixture, with class 3
having similar percentages (just under 30%) in each of the private and public sectors with and a
slightly larger proportion (43.2%) unemployed. Class 2 has a substantially lower unemployment
rate (17.6%) and more than double the proportion of workers in the public sector than the
private. Thus the types can be broadly categorised as ‘private worker’ (km = 1), ‘public worker’
(km = 2) and ‘high unemployment’ (km = 3).
As we would expect, where a mobility class is dominated by workers selecting into a certain
sector, the individual observed characteristics of that class are reflective of the sector these
workers predominantly select into. The ‘private worker’ type, has a similar education distribution
to the private sector workers described in section 4.3.5, a small proportion high education, with
the majority (55.9%) medium or low educated (36.9%). Though more of the unemployed are
mobility type 3, the fact that mobility types 2 (40.5%) and mobility type 1 (13.3%) do make up
non-trivial proportions of the unemployed reduces the average experience in each of these types,
and dramatically so, as these two types collect the unemployed who have very low experience.
The mobility type 3 unemployed are disproportionately the older unemployed which inflates the
average experience of this type.
With respect to job loss risk, Figure 4.22 illustrates that controlling for selection (left-side
panel) for each sector the job loss risk falls almost universally with experience, rising only in
the latter years. The job loss risk in the public sector is slightly lower (0.02%-points) for all
levels of experience. Comparing the picture when we allow for selection into sector (right-side
panel) we see that for the public sector the job loss risk remains largely unchanged, slightly
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Figure 4.22: Italy: Job Loss Risk
that it is only just above the public sector rate for experience levels above 10 years. We know
that average education and experience is higher amongst the public sector workers, hence an
effect to lower the unemployment rate in the selected sample, however for the private sector,
we have seen (Table 4.34) that the private sector contains many km = 1 workers who have a
very low unemployment propensity, and it is selection into the private sector on this unobserved
characteristic that plays a role in reducing the private sector job loss risk.
Earnings
Compared with the other nations studied thus far, Italy has a more uneven division of the sample
between the wage classes with sample weights of 43.6% for ky = 1 and 56.4% for ky = 2. As
can be seen in Table 4.36, wage class 1 has a higher average potential earnings than wage class
2 in the private sector (8.01 versus 7.86) and the public sector (8.03 versus 7.88). Wage class 1
also has higher dispersion of earnings in each sector as measured by the standard deviation of
log earnings: 0.34 (class 1) versus 0.26 (class 2) in the private sector with corresponding figures
of 0.33 and 0.24 for the public sector. In terms of public premia, wage class 1 types (the ‘high
earners’) earn a 2 log point higher average in the public sector compared with the private sector,
and the same is true of wage class 2.
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These differences are visually confirmed in the top two panels of Figure 4.23, the small
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Figure 4.23: Italy: Earnings-Experience Profiles
We can see that for each sector, wage class 2 has a much more compressed earnings distribu-
tion than wage class 1, the 10th and 90th percentiles of earnings much closer to the mean in the
right side panel. The top two panels also show how the wage class 1 mean and the percentiles
shown are higher than the corresponding curves for wage class 2, irrespective of sector.
It is striking that the returns to experience appear substantially higher in the private sector
than the public sector in Italy, for both wage classes, especially in the early years of the working
lifetime. For each class, between 20 and 30 years of experience these higher private sector returns
taper off but not before they have eliminated the initial public premium. Again, the dispersion
of earnings in each class does not seem to be a function of experience, each panel of Figure 4.23
showing that each set of lines for the mean, 10th and 90th percentiles of earnings maintain their
positions relative to each other as experience increases.
The average potential public premium across the whole sample, controlling for selection,
(lower left panel), is a modest 2.1 log points with the standard deviation of earnings reduced by
1.4 log points, consistent with the findings for each wage class. However, non-random sorting
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into wage classes is very important as when we allow for selection into sector, the average public
premium rises to 10.4 log points (which is slightly higher but consistent with the finding in Table
4.7).
Using the the 1-lag auto-covariance of earnings disturbances as a measure of earnings persis-
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Figure 4.24: Italy: Auto-covariance of Normalised Earnings
As we are accustomed to finding, the earnings persistence is greater in the public sector than
the private sector for each wage class, and for each class and sector, persistence in earnings is
increasing steadily in experience. The ‘higher earners’ (ky = 1) exhibit lower earnings persistence
in each sector than the lower earnings class, and the gap between persistence in the public and
private sector is greater for these ‘higher earners’ and does not close over the lifetime. For the
lower earning class, the difference in persistence between the public and private sectors is small
initially and even closes slightly with experience to be almost eliminated for very high level of
experience.
Given the sample weights in favour of wage class 2, the “whole sample” picture is closer to
the wage class 2 picture. The gap between the sectors in terms of persistence remains stable
over the lifetime, the private sector persistence only slightly closer to the higher public sector
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level for 40 years experience compared than it is for zero experience. Comparison of the “whole
sample” and the “whole sample, with selection” panels suggests that selection does not have a
large impact on this particular measure of earnings persistence.
The lower panel of Table 4.35 shows the breakdown of observable and unobservable charac-
teristics for each wage class. Unsurprisingly the ‘higher earner’ wage class have a substantially
greater proportion of highly educated workers (13.9% versus 5.3%) and a lower proportion of
low educated workers (32.7% versus 44.6%), whilst also having more than 5 years more potential
labour market experience on average (20.6 years versus 15.1). The joint distribution of unob-
served heterogeneity classes shows that each of the Km × Ky = 6 classes are populated by at
least 5% of the sample. Each wage class has a similar proportion of km = 1 types, differing
mainly in their proportion of mobility types 2 and 3. The ‘lower earner’ wage class has a greater
proportion of km = 2 types who are the ‘public worker’ types – perhaps collecting the lower
earning public sector workers – while the ‘higher earner’ wage class collects a greater proportion
of the ‘high unemployment’ mobility type. Though the dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity
are not independent, the correlation is not straightforward. Again this suggests that potential
earnings premia are not the only motivation behind selection into the public sector.
4.5.6 Spain
Labour Market States
The left panel of Table 4.37 shows the sectoral×mobility class breakdown for the observed sample
data, revealing that just under 60% of the sample sort into mobility class 3, with the remainder
evenly split between classes 1 and 2. The vast majority (93.4%) of class 1 are public sector
attached workers, while not quite so dramatic a sorting happens for class 3, 87.8% of whom
select into the private sector. The km = 2 mobility class is more of a mixture, with by far
the highest unemployment rate of the three classes, and the majority of the unemployed being
drawn from this class. (Hence the mobility classes will be referred to as 1 ‘public worker’, 2
‘high unemployment’ and 3 ‘private worker’).
With respect to the observable human capital characteristics of the classes, the ‘private
worker’ type have an education breakdown that almost perfectly mirrors the private sector
breakdown from section 4.3.6, and the ‘public worker’ type similarly has an education profile –
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with more than double the proportion of high educated than the ‘private type’ – which is very
similar to the public sector breakdown observed in the descriptive analysis. Potential experience
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Figure 4.25: Spain: Job Loss Risk
In terms of job loss risk, when controlling for selection into sector we can see from the left-
panel of Figure 4.25 that job loss risk traces a U-shape in experience, with very little difference
between the predicted risk in either sector. When we allow selection into sectors however, both
the public and the private sector job loss risks reduce at almost all levels of experience, with
the largest effect being on the public sector risk. From 10 years experience onwards the workers
who selected into the public sector have a lower job loss risk by around 0.05% points. From
the descriptive analysis we know that a much greater proportion of the public sector workers
in Spain have high education compared with the private sector (51.0% versus 28.7%) and have
more experience on average (23.0 years versus 21.6) and this clearly has an effect on the differing
job loss risks in the selected sample. Moreover, as discussed above the public sector also has
a high proportion of km = 1 mobility type workers who have very low rates of unemployment
(3.23%), reinforcing the effects on job loss risk of the observed human captial.
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Earnings
For Spain, like Italy, the sample division between the wage classes is quite uneven: 43.3% are
ky = 1, 57.7% are ky = 2. In respect of earnings levels, the smaller wage class 1 are the ‘higher
earners’, see Table 4.39. Wage class 1 types earn more than wage class 2 in both the private
sector (12.33 versus 12.16) and the public sector (12.42 versus 12.29). We can see that wage class
2 earn a greater public premium (+13 log points against +9) thus the earnings gap between the
types reduces in the public sector. For both classes, the higher public earnings are accompanied
by a lower spread of earnings in the public sector, the standard deviation of log earnings being
4 log points (resp. 2 log points) lower in the public sector for wage class 1 (resp. wage class 2).
Figure 4.26 plots the mean, 10th and 90th percentiles of earnings in each sector against
experience: in the upper two panels separately by wage class, and in the lower panels plots for
the “whole sample” i.e. assuming each individual is in each sector, and for the “whole sample,
with selection” in which we only include predicted earnings in the private (resp. public) sector
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Figure 4.26: Spain: Earnings-Experience Profiles
The top two panels illustrate the findings of Table 4.39. We can see that at each of the
included points of the distribution (mean, 10th, 90th percentile) the wage class 1 ‘high earners’
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have higher earnings than wage class 2 for almost all experience levels, regardless of the sector.
Moreover, in each sector the wage class 1 returns to experience are notably greater than those
of wage class 2, who have much flatter trajectories, particularly so for the public sector. Also in
terms of returns to experience, within each class they are notably higher in the private sector,
at least for the 25 to 30 years of work experience. In terms of the public premium for each wage
class, we can see that the premium is in evidence not just at the mean but at the 10th and 90th
percentiles of earnings also – so public sector earnings are higher across the board for both wage
classes. As noted, the dispersion of earnings in the public sector is lower for each class than it
is in the private sector, and the figure confirms that this is because of the higher premiums at
the 10th percentile and the mean as compared with the 90th percentile, thus the public lines are
slightly closer because of this relative compression at the top of the distribution. It is notable
that experience does not seem to alter the extent of earnings dispersion, as for each panel the
lines, within a sector are approximately parallel.
Across the “whole sample”, the average potential public premium in earnings is +11.1 log
points, with a 3.4 log point reduction in the standard deviation of log earnings for the public
sector, suggesting greater pay compression in the public sector. Graphically the figure illustrates
that the public premium in earnings is in evidence not only at the mean but at the 10th and
90th percentiles of earnings also – as we would expect given this finding in each class – and the
slightly greater compression of earnings in the public sector is reflected in these lines being closer
for the public sector than the corresponding curves for the private sector. Similarly we see again
that the returns to experience are greater in the private sector for at least the first 25 years of
experience. Allowing for self selection into each sector, lower right panel, the public premium is
much increased at every illustrated point of the distribution – averaging 27.1 log points (which
fits well with the finding in the descriptive analysis of Table 4.9). Clearly non-random sorting
into employment sector plays a large part in explaining the public premium in earnings, though
the left panel suggests that even controlling for positive selection into the public sector, there
is still a substantial public premium. The findings echo those of Lassibille, in there existing a
public premium even when selection is controlled but that returns to human capital are lower
in the public sector.
Again, to illustrate the differences in the persistence of earnings between the sectors and
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wage classes, we can plot the 1-lag auto-covariance of earnings disturbances against experience;
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Figure 4.27: Spain: Auto-covariance of Normalised Earnings
We can see that for each wage class, the estimated persistence of earnings is higher in the
public sector than in the private sector, but beyond this the similarity between the classes
is somewhat limited. For wage class 1, the ‘higher earners’, there is extremely high earnings
persistence for both sectors, public slightly above the private sector, and that this does not
alter with experience – in each sector the persistence is almost constant across all levels of
experience. In contrast, for wage class 2 the initial earnings persistence at zero experience is
for each sector approximately just two-thirds the level for wage class 1, but increases steadily
in experience such that the gap is approximately halved for each sector vis-a-vis corresponding
sector for wage class 1 by the end of the working lifetime. The overall picture, lower left panel,
is weighted more heavily towards the more prevalent wage class 2 types, and as starts with each
sector having persistence quite close to that of wage class 2 though higher due to the influence
of the high wage class 1 persistence. As with each class, the public sector has slightly higher
persistence, and for each sector, persistence increases with experience at a similar rate such that
the differential in persistence between the sectors is maintained. Comparison of the lower left and
lower right panels suggests that selection into sector matters for this measure of persistence, in
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that while the private sector curve is barely altered, it seems that those with higher public sector
earnings persistence select into that sector, shifting the public curve upwards and increasing the
gap between the sectors.
In the lower panel of Table 4.38 we have the education and experience breakdown for each
of the wage classes, as well as the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity classes. Unsur-
prisingly given the higher earnings of wage class 1 in each sector, we find that ky = 1 types have
much higher education on average than ky = 2 types (40.7% of ky = 1 are high educated, 26.0%
medium, compared with 28.1% high and 20.7% medium) and around 4 more years of potential
labour market experience (20.3 years versus 16.4).
In terms of unobserved heterogeneity, we find that only five of the Km ×Ky = 6 classes are
populated: there is negligible weight in the ky = 1, km = 2 class. This is a combination of the
‘high earner’ wage class with the ‘high unemployment’ mobility class, so it is clearly no accident
that this combination is not found in the sample data. Given the large public premium in each
wage class, it is not surprising either to find a strong correlation between the ‘high earner’ wage
class and the ‘public worker’ mobility class i.e. ky = 1, km = 1.
4.5.7 Portugal
Labour Market States
Looking at the ‘Observed’ data panel of Table 4.40 we see that 62.4% of the sample are mobility
class 2, with the remainder split unevenly between class 1 (25.5%) and class 3 (12.1%). The
most notable sector selection pattern across the mobility types, is that km = 2 types are almost
exclusively in the private sector (94.5%) with the remainder unemployed, with no public sector
workers of this type (we will refer to this type as ‘private worker’). The public sector draws
its workers almost completely from mobility class 1 (‘public worker’), though within this class
there are also private sector workers and an unemployment rate of 8.2%. The smallest mobility
class, km = 3, has the highest unemployment rate (23.8%) and is over-represented amongst the
unemployed (hence ‘high unemployment’ type).
In terms of observable characteristics, the ‘private worker’ class, unsurprisingly closely mirror
the education breakdown of the private sector, with the vast majority (81.8%) low educated,
and the majority of the remainder only medium educated. Similarly the ‘public worker’ class
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almost identically reflects the education composition of the public sector with 16.0% high, 20.8%
medium and 63.2% low educated. The ‘high unemployment’ mobility class attracts the more
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Figure 4.28: Portugal: Job Loss Risk
As Figure 4.28 illustrates, we find the usual U-shape in experience traced by both the public
and the private job loss risk when we control for selection, in the “whole sample” left-side panel.
For all but the early years of experience, the public sector job loss risk is consistently lower than
the private sector risk, and is approximately three-quarters of the level of risk of the private
sector at around 2.5% job loss risk from 15 to 35 years of experience. When we allow for selection
into sector, the effect on the private sector job loss risk is minimal. With regard to the public
sector however the reduction in risk is substantial, with the risk approximately halving for years
of experience above 15-20. Again we know that the public sector has workers with higher human
capital levels (15.6% are high education in the public sector, compared with 6.0% of the private
sector) and this appears to drive the selection effect.
Earnings
The Portugal sample is split unevenly between the two wage classes, with sample weights of
45.7% for ky = 1 and 52.3% for ky = 2. As we can see from Table 4.42, wage class 2 has
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slightly higher average potential earnings in the public sector (11.84 versus 11.81 for wage class
1), however in the private sector the gap is much larger in the wage class 2 types’ favour: 11.79
versus 11.70 for wage class 1. Thus wage class 1 are ‘low earners’ type and particularly low
private earners. The public premium in average potential earnings for wage class 1 is +11 log
points, while for wage class 2 it is a more modest +5 log points. Consistent with the findings
of the descriptive analysis of subsection 4.3.7, the earnings dispersion is actually higher in the
public sector than the private sector, and this is the case for each wage class: wage class 1
increasing the standard deviation of log earnings from 0.38 log points (private sector) to 0.45
(public). The ‘high earner’ wage class 2 types also have higher dispersion than wage class 1 in
each sector: 0.45 log points (private), 0.53 (public).
These patterns are illustrated in Figure 4.29 which plots mean earnings, the 10th and 90th
percentiles of earnings, against experience for each wage class and sector separately and for the
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Figure 4.29: Portugal: Earnings-Experience Profiles
We can see the greater dispersion of earnings in the public sector for each wage class through
the greater distances between the mean, 10th and 90th percentiles of earnings, especially for wage
class 2. Moreover we can see how wage class 1 have lower earnings than wage class 2 in the
private sector, and how this results in the greater public premium for wage class 1. It is also
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clear that while for wage class 1, the public premium is evident over all levels of experience in
the mean and at the 90th percentile, it is not initially in the 10th percentile. Similarly for wage
class 2, the premium at the 90th percentile is across all experience levels but for the mean it
is only after 10 years of experience that the premium is evident and at the 10th percentile the
public sector earnings are below the private sector throughout. For each wage class the returns
to experience are greater in the public sector for at least the first half of a working lifetime,
before tapering off and being comparable to private returns in the second half. The dispersion
of earnings does not appear to be a function of experience as we see that in each panel for each
sector the lines for the mean, 10th and 90th percentiles are approximately parallel.
The average premium in potential earnings across the whole sample, controlling for selec-
tion, is 7.4 log points (illustrated lower left panel) with the standard deviation of log earnings
increasing in the public sector by 7.6 log points, consistent with the findings for each wage class
and the sample weights. Allowing selection into sector, the premium is vastly increased to 31.2
log points (which is slightly higher but still consistent with the premium found when not con-
trolling selection in descriptive analysis of Table 4.11). Clearly the selection into sector is very
important in explaining the raw public premium in earnings, with approximately three-quarters
of the average premium explained by selection of workers into the public according to positive
characteristics.
Again using the 1-lag auto-covariance of earnings disturbances as an index of earnings per-
sistence, we examine how the classes and sectors differ over the working life time in Figure
4.30.
For each wage class we find that earnings are more persistent in the public sector, with the
difference between public and private sector persistence narrowing somewhat over the course of
the work lifetime. The classes differ markedly in their persistence profiles, wage class 1 having
substantially lower persistence than wage class 2 (the higher private sector earners) at the start
of the lifetime, but with a much steeper increase in experience such that after 10-15 years of
experience wage class 1 persistence is higher for each sector than wage class 2.
As the sample is weighted more towards wage class 2, the aggregate picture, lower left panel,
is more like the wage class 2 profile with less of a steep increase in persistence with experience.
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Solid=private sector, Dashed=public sector
Figure 4.30: Portugal: Auto-covariance of Normalised Earnings
selection it appears that those with slightly higher private sector persistence select into this
sector, while those with slightly lower public sector persistence select into that sector.
Finally, the lower panel of Table 4.41 illustrates the education and experience breakdown
for the wage classes, as well as the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity classes.
We find that a greater proportion of the ‘higher earners’ (ky = 2) are high educated (9.3%
compared with 6.0% for wage class 1) and have on average 2 years more experience than the
wage class 1 type (18.4 years versus 16.4). Almost all of the Km × Ky = 6 classes contain a
non-negligible proportion of the sample, the exception being the combination ky = 1, km = 3:
which is a combination of the high public premium wage class and the ‘high unemployment’
mobility class, so perhaps not a surprise that it is not a combination found very much in the
data. Though these two dimensions of heterogeneity are not independent, the correlations are
not straightforward, with for example as many of the lower private earnings types as those with
higher private earnings amongst the mobility class (km = 2) which is mainly private sector
workers.
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4.5.8 Summary of Results
The results from the model estimation, controlling for non-random selection of workers into
employment sectors, can be summarized as follows:
• Public Premium: There is a small average public pay premium in France (+3.0 log
points) and Italy (+2.1), and larger premia in Spain (11.1 log points) and Portugal (7.4).
The public premium is small and negative for Germany (−0.8 log points) and the Nether-
lands (−2.9).
• Returns to Experience: The returns to experience are greater in the public sector than
the private sector for Germany, the Netherlands, France and Portugal. As such the average
predicted public premium increases with experience – in Germany the negative premium
turns positive after 15 years of experience, in the Netherlands the negative premium reduces
to zero by 40 years of experience. Conversely, in Italy and Spain the private sector has
higher returns to experience, thus the public pay premium falls with experience, turning
negative after 15 years of experience in Italy, but remaining positive albeit reduced for all
levels of experience in Spain.
• Earnings Persistence: For each country (except the Netherlands), earnings persistence
is greater in the public sector than in the private sector, and is increasing with experience
for each sector. For the Netherlands, persistence increases with experience in each sector
but is estimated to be higher in the private sector47.
• Earnings Dispersion: The standard deviation of log earnings is lower in the public sector
for Germany (by 1.2 log points), the Netherlands (1.0), France (1.5), Italy (1.4) and Spain
(3.4). For Portugal the standard deviation of log earnings is higher in the public sector by
7.6 log points.
• Job Loss Rates: Predicted job loss rates are lower in the public sector, for for the greater
part of the experience range if not all, in the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Portugal. In
France the predicted public sector job loss rate is lower for the first 25 years of experience,
47Though with the caveat that the fit of earnings persistence is not as good in the Netherlands as elsewhere.
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then higher thereafter, while in Germany the predicted public job loss rate is higher for
all levels of experience.
There is however a very marked effect of selection on these findings and it appears in each
country that there is selection into the public sector on characteristics that increase earnings.
For all countries, when we allow non-random selection into sectors we find a positive average
premium in earnings, ranging from 4.7 log points (Germany) to 31.2 log points (Portugal). For
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, selection also increases the persistence of earnings in the
public sector relative to the private sector, while in the other countries selection does not affect
persistence of earnings. Job loss rates are also differentially affected by selection for all countries:
in each case the private sector job loss rate is largely unchanged by selection whereas the public
sector predicted job loss rate is substantially lowered for the selected sample. In sum, selection
into the public sector is clearly important in explaining the higher level of earnings, greater
persistence of earnings and lower job loss risk in the public sector.
4.6 The Public Pay Gap: Earnings and Lifetime Values
As alluded to above, in this section we develop a more systematic analysis of selection into the
public sector and the differences between the sectors in terms of earnings flows and lifetime
values. The first thing we do is construct the lifetime values and then consider the differences
across sectors. We then engage in some counterfactual simulations in which individuals are
simulated for a ‘lifetime’ in each sector, and consider the differences under such counterfactual
assumptions. Before presenting the results for each country, we first establish the mechanics of
the lifetime values construction.
4.6.1 Construction of Lifetime Values
The notion of lifetime value that we shall use here is simply the present discounted sum of
future income flows, which is the relevant measure when individuals are either risk-neutral or
can perfectly insure. Using our estimated coefficients for earnings distributions, and earnings
and job mobility, we can carry out simulations of employment and earnings trajectories for the
individuals in our sample until retirement age which we assume to happen at a level of experience
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denoted TR. We assume that after retirement a given individual enjoys a present discounted sum
of future earnings stream of VR (defined below). Given these assumptions, the lifetime value at








βs−t · exp (ys) + β
TR−t · VR, (4.15)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor and exp (yt) is the earnings flow that the individual receives
at experience level t; yt designates log earnings.
As raised in subsection 4.4.1, the fact that we do not observe earnings when an individual
is unemployed means that for the purposes of constructing a lifetime value – allowing for move-
ment into and out of unemployment, and at different rates according to the sector – we need
to make some assumptions regarding replacement rates (δ) for unemployment earnings. We
use figures from the OECD on gross replacement rates, which themselves are averages over a
number of different demographic/family structure categories, and replace an individual’s earn-
ings in unemployment at time t with δ times their predicted private sector earnings given their
characteristics and experience at time t, where the δ are the country-specific rates48. At each
level of experience t, current log earnings yt are conditional on the individual’s characteristics
and labour market state, as set out in the statistical model of section 4.4 and more specifically
spelled out in Appendix C.2.
For all countries we set the discount factor to β = 0.95 per annum. The value of retirement,
VR, is defined as VR =
1−β20
1−β × RR × exp (yTR−1), where RR designates the replacement ratio.
Thus we assume that after retirement, individuals receive a constant flow of income equal to RR
times their last earnings in employment and discount this flow over a residual life expectancy of
twenty years. We calibrate the value of RR to 0.40 and the experience level at retirement to 45
years. While these values will be a more accurate reflection of reality in some countries more
than others, again in the interest of having a common framework for all countries, we impose
these common parameters.
One caveat that must be flagged at this point, is that in conducting this lifetime simulation
exercise, we have to assume that, in each country, the economic environment is stationary. We
48These rates are: Germany 25%, Netherlands 50%, France 40%, Italy 25%, Spain 35%, Portugal 40%.
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assume that agents anticipate getting older and experiencing wage mobility and job mobility
given their current wage and job status, but that they do not anticipate any changes in the model
parameters over the remainder of their working lives. For this to be a reasonable assumption it
requires our sample time period in each case to be a fairly representative of the average state
of the business cycle. As was demonstrated in section 4.3, it is more or less the case in each
country that the economic environment is reasonably stable, though with some country specific
fluctuations. Whilst it is unlikely that the economic environment does remain stable throughout
their working life, the assumption of stability is the best guess individuals may make when
forming expectations of their lifetime earnings stream.
Within each country, in order to investigate the role of differences in earnings mobility
between the sectors in generating public premia in log earnings flows and lifetime values, we run
a series of counterfactual simulations in which we constrain the probability of moving between
sectors or into unemployment to be zero. That is, we assign individuals to a ‘job for life’ in
each sector and simulate their earnings trajectories. In this case, the only sources of differences
in lifetime values are therefore difference in cross sectional earnings and differences in earnings
mobility across the sectors. The first part of the analysis for each country therefore looks at the
role of earnings mobility.
In each of the sections, we look at the public premium both in log earnings flows and in
log lifetime values at each percentile of their distributions. The public premium in this case is
defined as the difference between the log earnings (resp. log lifetime value) in the public sector
and the private sector at each percentile point in the distribution.
For each section and country we have two pictures: one is the “whole sample” and the other
is the “whole sample, with selection”. The left panel, “whole sample”, refers to the case where
we simulate a separate lifetime in each job sector for each individual in the sample, thus we get
a their potential earnings flow and lifetime value in each sector, with every individual in the
sample included in each sector. In this way we control for selection effects as we have a ‘copy’
of each individual in each sector. We then calculate the difference in the public and private
sector distribution of log earnings and log lifetime values at each percentile. The “whole sample,
with selection” panel refers to the situation in which we categorise an individual to be a ‘private
sector worker’ if in the real data we first observe them in the private sector, and those we first
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observe in the public sector we categorise to be a ‘public sector worker’. We then use only the
simulated working lifetime in the private (resp. public) sector for those we have assigned as
private (resp. public) sector workers. Thus we allow for selection into sector, and then compare
the distributions, calculating the public premium in log earnings and log lifetime values in the
same way as for the “whole sample” case. Therefore the “whole sample, with selection” picture
plots the “raw” (unconditional) difference between the distribution in each sector.
Following this, we repeat the analysis, but this time simulating job as well as earnings
mobility. We do this by adopting an alternative definition of sector-specific lifetime values: we
again simulate one ‘lifetime’ in each sector for each individual, but rather than imposing that the
individual remain in that initial job sector for the entire working life, we impose only that the
individual be in that sector for the initial period. We then simulate earnings trajectories allowing
the individual to move between sectors, according to their predicted transition probabilities.
Thus we analyse the role of job mobility. The “whole sample” and “whole sample, with selection”
cases here are constructed exactly as described above for the ‘job for life’ scenario i.e. when
allowing selection, it is the sector in which the individual was first observed that defines whether
they are a ‘private (resp. public) sector worker’. The difference from the ‘job for life’ case being
that a ‘private sector worker’ included in the private distribution when calculating the public
premium is only constrained to be in the private sector for the initial period, after that they
may move in and out of each labour market state.
4.6.2 Germany
The Role of Earnings Mobility
Figure 4.31 shows the public premium both in terms of log earnings flows – calculated for first
period earnings – and log lifetime values by percentiles in their respective distributions, given
the ‘job for life’ assumption49. Looking at the “whole sample” picture we can see that in terms
of predicted earnings, the public premium is zero at the lowest percentiles and then falls steadily
as we move up the distribution such that there is a negative premium of almost 5 log points
at the top of the distribution. The pattern of the public premium falling as we move up the
distribution is consistent with there being greater pay compression in the public sector. The
49The extremes of each distribution are trimmed to focus on the main story of each figure.
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picture for lifetime values is very similar, the premium tracing almost exactly the same shape
as we move up the distribution, though with the whole curve shifted up by around 5 log points.
As such, the initial public premium in log lifetime values is approximately 5 log points but then
steadily falls to be almost zero at the very top of the distribution. The fact that there is a
positive public premium in lifetime values across the whole range, suggests that the negative
public premium in initial cross-sectional earnings is offset by the earnings mobility differences:
as shown in section 4.5.2, the returns to experience are higher in the public sector, such that
the initial negative public premium in earnings falls and then reverses for the second part of
a working life time. This is taken into account in the lifetime values and this seems to be the





































Figure 4.31: Germany: The Public Gap, ‘Jobs for Life’
Looking at the “whole sample, with selection” panel, we see that when we allow selection,
the public premium in earnings shifts up considerably so that there is a positive public premium
at all points of the distribution. This suggests that selection is important and that there is
positive selection into the public sector, individuals who have greater potential earnings and
employability select into the public sector. As commented on above, the premium falls as we
move up the distribution, consistent with the well observed phenomena of pay compression in
the public sector, though it still averages around +5 log points (consistent with the descriptive
statistics in Table 4.1). In terms of lifetime values, the premium with selection increases and
slightly flattens out so there is not so much compression at the top of the distribution as there is in
the log earnings premium. We saw in subsection 4.3.2 that the public sector workers have greater
education than private sector and this is reflected in the the public premia in log earnings and
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lifetime values when selection into sector is allowed. This confirms the findings of the previous
section in which we found a negative public premium when controlling for selection, turning to a
small positive premium when selection is allowed, and also echoes the positive selection findings
of Dustmann and van Soest (1998).
The Role of Job Mobility
Now we repeat the analysis of the previous section, but this time simulating job as well as earn-
ings mobility, adopting the alternative definition of sector-specific lifetime values as described
above. Figure 4.32 shows the public premia based on this new definition of lifetime values, again
there is the picture for the “whole sample” and that “with selection”. Note that the earnings
premium is the same in each case for Figure 4.32 as it is for Figure 4.31 as in each case the





































Figure 4.32: Germany: The Public Gap
The first thing to notice looking at the left panel of Figure 4.32 is that the public premium
in lifetime values which was positive for all points under the ‘job for life’ assumption averaging
around +3 log points, is now negative across the entire distribution, averaging just −0.2 log
points in the upper 4 quintiles. It appears that job mobility has a strong effect to equalize
lifetime values. The fact that the premium in lifetime values when we use the whole sample of
individuals in each sector, is approximately zero for all but the lowest quintile of the distribution
suggests that individuals move quickly into their ‘natural’ sector i.e. the one in which they have
highest propensity to be observed in given their unobserved heterogeneity. Even if started in the
‘wrong’ sector they will quickly move into their ‘natural’ sector and thus the lifetime values will
be calculated over very similar trajectories regardless of the starting sector, and the premium
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will be close to zero. At the lower end of the distribution individuals experiencing a negative
public premium find it harder to get back into the private sector, hence the slightly greater
negative premium at the lower end of the distribution. If we look at the km = 1 individuals –
who are predominantly found in the private sector or are unemployed – they spend on average
only 2.2 years in the public sector if they start there but for 65.2% of them, the movement is into
unemployment when they do move out of the public sector. Clearly this will hit their earnings
(we simulate their unemployment income to be 25% of their private sector earnings in Germany)
and contribute to the negative premium at the lower part of the distribution. On average it is
7.4 years before they get into the private sector if they have started in the public sector; this
compares with just 1.8 years for the km = 2 or ‘private sector attached’ individuals. The km = 3
or ‘public attached workers’ by constrast remain in the public sector on average for 14.5 years
if they start there. It certainly seems that the German labour market is sufficiently mobile to
allocate workers to their ‘natural’ sector quickly even if placed in the ‘wrong’ sector initially.
The fact that the premium in lifetime values is consistent across the distribution suggests
that the greater pay compression in public sector earnings is driven by lower variance of the
transitory component of earnings in the public sector. When taking lifetime values these tran-
sitory components are averaged, thus cross-sector differences in the variance of this component
are mitigated. That the compression in lifetime values is similar in each sector suggests that it
is this transitory component – rather than differences in the permanent component of earnings
– that is driving the greater public earnings compression. Allowing selection i.e. only including
in the private (resp. public) sector simulated lives of individuals who in the real data are ob-
served initially in the private (resp. public) sector, we see again the dramatic selection effect on
lifetime values. The negative premium for the lowest part of the distribution is turned into a
large positive premium, and even excluding the lowest quintile, the public premium in lifetime
values averages +11.5 log points.
4.6.3 Netherlands
The Role of Earnings Mobility
Beginning again with the ‘job for life’ assumption simulations, Figure 4.33 shows the public
premium both in terms of log earnings flows and log lifetime values by percentiles in their
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respective distributions for the Netherlands. Looking first at the “whole sample” picture, we
can see that in terms of earnings flows, there is initially a near zero public premium but that this
steadily falls as we move up the percentiles of the distribution such at the top of the distribution
the public premium is −7.9 log points. This again is consistent with there being greater pay
compression in the public sector, as was illustrated for the Netherlands in the earnings results.
Again the picture for lifetime values is similar, the curve shifted up by around 2.5 to 3 log points.
The public-premium in lifetime values is initially around +5 log points but falling consistently,
and becomes negative at exactly the mid-point of the distribution. This suggests that at the
lower end of the distribution, the negative public premium in earnings is offset by the higher
returns to experience in the public sector such that the public sector enjoys a premium in lifetime
values in the first part of the distribution. However, as we move up the percentiles, the public
sector earnings dis-premium dominates and the public premium in lifetime values is negative
– at the top of the distribution, the public premium in lifetime values is −6.3 log points. The
relatively steeper slope of the premium in lifetime values suggests that there is more relative


































Figure 4.33: Netherlands: The Public Gap, ‘Jobs for Life’
Turning to the “whole sample, with selection” panel, we see that allowing selection shifts the
public premium in earnings up considerably, such that at all points in the distribution there is
a positive public premium, averaging at +9.4 log points (consistent with figures in the earnings
results section and the descriptive analysis). The fact that the premium is largely level across
the distribution, only falling in the top quintile suggests that pay compression is only affecting
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the top of the distribution once selection is accounted for. This implies that there is more
positive sorting into the public sector across the middle and upper quintiles compared with
the lower quintiles. The changes between the left and right panels of the figure suggests that
selection into sector is very important, and this is also shown with respect to lifetime values. The
public premium in lifetime values follows a similar transformation, remaining positive across the
distribution and largely flat – averaging +5.8 log points despite falling in the top-most quintile.
Clearly the selection is positive into the public sector, as the left-panel indicates that without
selection there would be a negative premium for the entire distribution of earnings and for the
upper half of the distribution of lifetime values. In subsection 4.3.3 we saw that the public sector
has a markedly higher educated workforce and this is reflected in the effect of allowing selection
on the lifetime value and log earnings public premia.
The Role of Job Mobility
Simulating job as well as earnings mobility, and adopting the alternative definition of sector-
specific lifetime values as described in subsection 4.6.1, gives the results shown in Figure 4.34.
Again we can note that the earnings premium is the same in each case for Figure 4.34 as it is for





































Figure 4.34: Netherlands: The Public Gap
Comparing the “whole sample” panel of Figure 4.34 with the corresponding panel of Figure
4.33, we see that the downward sloping premium in lifetime values – starting positive but
reversing halfway through the distribution – that characterised the ‘job for life’ picture, has
been replaced with a premium that is almost constant throughout the distribution at just under
zero. The suggestion is that job mobility has a strong equalizing effect on the lifetime public
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premium that averages just −0.4 log points as it varies around zero for the whole distribution.
This suggests that in the Netherlands, individuals quickly move into their preferred sector, such
that even if they are not initially in that sector, they quickly transit to it, and the lifetime value
is therefore calculated over very similar trajectories, irrespective of the starting sector: hence
the premium is approximately zero.
If we look specifically at the different mobility types of worker in the data the picture is
very clear and as we would expect given the characteristics we explored in section 4.5.3. The
km = 1 mobility types, the ‘public sector’ type, if initially placed in the private sector spend
on average only 1.6 years in that sector before transiting, with 99.4% of the transitions being
straight to the public sector. By contrast the ‘private sector’ types, km = 3, will remain in
the private sector 24.3 years on average if started there, with the majority (70.1% of cases)
remaining in the private sector until retirement. The ‘lower employment’ km = 2 types who
are found in all three states but have more attachment to the private than public sector, will
remain in the private sector for 6.8 years if started there, or remain in the public sector for
3.0 years if started there – not surprising to find them in the middle compared to the other
types who are so overwhelmingly attached to one or other sector. The corresponding figures for
starting in the public sector reflect the same story: ‘public sector’ types who start there will stay
for 16.0 years on average, while ‘private sector’ types starting in the public sector will remain
there for only 1.0 year on average, with the km = 2 types remaining 3.0 years if started in the
public sector. In terms of unemployment replacement value, for the Netherlands we estimate
a replacement rate of 50% using the OECD figures. However, as unemployment is rare in the
sample and short-lived, differing job loss rates between the sectors do not have a dramatic effect
on lifetime value differences. The results from this suggest that the Netherlands labour market
is sufficiently efficient that individuals who have a strong attachment to one sector over the other
are very quickly allocated into jobs in their preferred sector. Again the fact that we have greater
earnings compression but not greater lifetime values compression in the public sector suggests
that it is differences in the variance of the transitory component of earnings that influences the
observed differences in earnings dispersion between the public and private sectors.
Allowing for selection into sector (right panel), we see that the zero premium in lifetime
values remains for the lower part of the distribution, before becoming positive and rising to a
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peak of +5.8 log points before dropping slightly through the final quintile. This again shows
that selection is important, individuals selecting into the sector that maximises their earnings
potential.
4.6.4 France
The Role of Earnings Mobility
Starting with the ‘job for life’ assumption simulations, Figure 4.35 shows for France the public
premium both in terms of log earnings flows and log lifetime values by percentiles in their
respective distributions. The left panel refers to the “whole sample” picture, i.e. controlling
for selection, and we can see that in terms of earnings flows, there is initially a positive public
premium of +5.5 log points, but that this declines evenly as we move up the distribution, such
that at the very top the premium is just +1.0 log points. Again, this is evidence therefore of there
being greater pay compression in the public sector, though it is interesting that in France (in
contrast to Germany and the Netherlands) there remains a positive premium in log earnings even
at the very top of the distribution, albeit much reduced. The pattern for the log lifetime values
premium is very similar, but as with Germany and the Netherlands, the premium is everywhere
higher, in this case by approximately 3.4 log points. The fact that there is a positive public
premium in earnings across the distribution, and that the returns to experience are generally
higher over the lifetime in the public sector contributes to the lifetime values premium at all































Figure 4.35: France: The Public Gap, ‘Jobs for Life’
The right panel,“whole sample, with selection”, shows that when we allow selection, the
public premium in earnings is increased across the entire distribution by an average of 9.8 log
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points, and becomes somewhat flatter, varying around its average of 12.5 log points (which
again concurs with the figures found in the earnings results section and the descriptive analysis
of subsection 4.3.4). With respect to the lifetime values public premium, the effect of selection is
not as dramatic, the premium increasing by an average of 5.6 log points across the distribution,
and also becoming slightly flatter – in fact the log earnings premium and log lifetime values
premium almost lie on top of each other when we allow selection. The flattening of the lifetime
values premium suggests that in terms of lifetime values there is not as much compression in
public sector relative to the private sector as there is for earnings. Recalling from subsection
4.3.4 that the public sector has slightly older and better educated workers, it is to be expected
that allowing selection results in the higher premium in earnings and lifetime values and concurs
with the findings of the earnings section above.
The Role of Job Mobility
Once again we now turn to the outcomes when we simulate job as well as earnings mobility,
adopting the alternative definition of sector-specific lifetime values as described in subsection
4.6.1. Figure 4.36 shows the effect of now simulating job mobility in addition to earnings mobility,



































Figure 4.36: France: The Public Gap
Looking at the left panel, “whole sample”, the first thing to notice from Figure 4.36 is that
the public premium in lifetime values which was universally positive and between +14.8 and
+4.5 log points, is now initially slightly negative at the lower part of the distribution before
turning positive and averaging +1.96 log points for the upper four quintiles. This much smaller
positive public premium in lifetime values for the majority of the distribution suggests that in
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the French labour market it does matter which sector is the starting sector, therefore the market
is not as efficient in moving people into their ‘natural’ sector. As was established in section 4.5.4,
across the sample there is a positive public premium, and transitions between states are rare
– there is not much movement. This means that when individuals are started in the public
sector, they will remain there and enjoy that public premium for a considerable length of time
before transiting to their ‘natural’ sector if they are not the ‘more public’ type (km = 3). This
is backed up by the duration statistics: the km = 1 (‘low employment’), km = 2 (‘more public’),
and km = 3 (‘private worker’) types spend respectively 20.6, 20.6 and 17.7 years in the public
sector if started there. Thus the lifetime value is calculated over quite different trajectories
depending on starting sector. This has the effect of preserving the public premium in lifetime
values (if individuals quickly transited into their ‘natural’ sector the premium in lifetime values
would be equalized by the job mobility – as it is by-and-large in Germany and the Netherlands).
There is also a similar effect at the bottom of the distribution as we found in Germany: that if
starting in the public sector some individuals experience a negative public premium in lifetime
value. The difference in this case is that it is not that other types quickly move into their ‘natural’
sector but some take longer – as we have seen, all mobility types remain in the public sector for
a relatively long time period if starting there. Rather, the negative premium is because for the
‘low employment’ and the ‘private worker’ types, the movement from the public sector when
started there is not into the private sector but into unemployment. We calibrate unemployment
earnings in France to be 40% of private sector earnings, and as unemployment persistence is
high for these types, the effect on lifetime value is high at the bottom of the distribution.
Allowing selection into sector, right-side panel of Figure 4.36, we see two things. Firstly,
there is a large premium in lifetime values across all quantiles of the distributions: on average
+26.4 log points: selection is clearly very important; the left panel suggests that in general there
is a public premium in lifetime values, and this right picture suggests that those who benefit most
from the public premium select into that sector. Secondly, the negative premium at the bottom
of the distribution is now a large positive premium. This suggests that we observe people in
their ‘natural’ sector in the first period in most cases such that we do not have people spending




The Role of Earnings Mobility
Figure 4.37 shows the public premium both in terms of log earnings flows and log lifetime
values by percentiles in their respective distributions, maintaining the ‘job for life’ assumption.
Looking at the “whole sample” picture we can see that in terms of predicted earnings, the
public premium is positive, starting at around +7.7 log points, before falling steadily as we
move up the percentiles such that at the highest percentile the premium is just +1.3 log points.
Again, this pattern of a falling public premium as we move up the distribution is consistent
with there being greater pay compression in the public sector. With regard to lifetime values,
the picture is somewhat different, with a small negative public premium across the most part of
the distribution, turning to a small positive premium only in the highest quintile. Overall the
average public premium in lifetime values is −0.5 log points. We know from the earnings results
of subsection 4.5.5 that earnings–experience profile is much steeper in the private sector, and








































Figure 4.37: Italy: The Public Gap, ‘Jobs for Life’
Turning to the “whole sample, with selection” panel, we see that when we allow selection,
the public premium in earnings is increased across the distribution, the initial downward slope
is somewhat flatter, before levelling out across the middle part of the distribution and then
rising in the upper quantiles. This suggests that there is a good deal of positive selection into
the public sector occurring, with those who have greater earnings potential in the public sector
locating in that sector. Moreover we know that the public sector in Italy has more educated
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workers (14.3% high education, 56.6% medium for the public sector, compared with 6.6% high,
50% medium for the private sector). In terms of lifetime values, the right-panel of Figure 4.37
illustrates that some of the individuals first observed in the public sector, and thus selected into
the public sector for this analysis, actually have low lifetime values in the public sector, such
that the premium is negative in the lowest half of the distribution. The picture is reversed for
the upper half of the distribution: individuals in the top half of the lifetime values distribution
in the public sector have higher values than individuals in the top half of the private sector
distribution. The slope in the lifetime values premium suggests that lifetime values are more
evenly spread amongst those selected into the private sector, with the public sector exhibiting
a wider range.
The Role of Job Mobility
Now we repeat the analysis of the previous section, but this time simulating job mobility as well
as earnings mobility, adopting the alternative definition of sector-specific lifetime values. Figure
4.38 shows the effect of simulating job mobility in addition to earnings mobility, on the public



































Figure 4.38: Italy: The Public Gap
Concentrating first on the “whole sample” panel, the first thing to notice from Figure 4.38 is
that the public premium in lifetime values which was small and negative for the most part of the
distribution in the ‘job for life’ case, is now positive across the distribution (averaging +2.7 log
points). The premium is close to zero for the majority of the distribution, which suggests that the
Italian labour market is quite efficient at quickly moving individuals into their ‘natural’ sector
such that the trajectories for a ‘lifetime’ in each sector are actually calculated over similar labour
238
market state history, regardless of which sector the individual is initially placed in. Starting in
the public sector does seem to have positive benefits for some individuals who have the lowest
lifetime values, the greater persistence of earnings in the public sector, coupled with the public
premium compounding over a lifetime. For example, the km = 3 mobility types, who have the
lowest employment attachment, if started in the public sector will remain there on average for
8.8 years before transiting, with 32.5% of these transition being to employment in the private
sector, only 41.4% being to unemployment. In contrast, when started in the private sector,
these mobility types will spend on average only 3.9 years in the private employment before
transitting, with 82.5% of those transitions being into unemployment. In unemployment, we
simulate individuals to earn only 25% of their private earnings, thus we can see that for these
low employment individuals, beginning in the public sector will have an effect on their time
spent in unemployment and thus have a significant effect on their lifetime values – this helps
to explain why there is such a large public premium in lifetime values at the bottom of the
distribution.
When we allow selection into sector, right-side panel of Figure 4.38, we see a very similar
picture to the “whole sample, with selection” picture under the ‘job for life’ assumption – from
the twentieth percentile upwards the picture are almost identical. This again suggests that job
mobility is sufficiently high in Italy that individuals are quickly sorted into their ‘natural’ sector
and that there is not a great deal of subsequent movement, such that the ‘job for life’ and the
unmobility constrained pictures are not very different. We know that the job loss rates from each
sector in Italy are relatively low (2.7% private sector, 1.0% public), and the rate of movement
between the sectors is also relatively low (4.8% of workers moving from public to private sector
from t−1 to t, 1.9% moving the other way), which confirms the picture of employment stability.
Job mobility does seem to mitigate the negative public premium in lifetime values at the lowest
part of the distribution, reducing it for all in the lowest quintile.
4.6.6 Spain
The Role of Earnings Mobility
Again we begin the analysis by looking at the simulations run under the ‘job for life’ assumption.
Figure 4.39 shows for Spain the public premium both in terms of log earnings flows and log
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lifetime values by the quantiles of in their respective distributions. The public premium in
earnings is positive throughout the distribution – averaging +11.9 log points – initially as much
as +19.1 log points, falling to +4.0 log points at the top of the distribution. This downward
pattern consistent with the phenomena of greater pay compression in the public sector. We have
seen in the earnings results section that in Spain the greater pay compression in the public sector
is very pronounced, the standard deviation of log earnings lower by 3.4 log points in the public
compared with the private sector. With respect to lifetime values, the public premium is positive
across the distribution – averaging +7.8 log points – and is almost flat, with a little variation, up
as high as +10.7 log points at the bottom of the distribution, though it is never below +7.1 log
points at any point. The flatter curve suggests much lower public sector compression in terms
of lifetime values than is exhibited in earnings. This may be explained by the higher returns to




































Figure 4.39: Spain: The Public Gap, ‘Jobs for Life’
The “whole sample, with selection” (right) panel, shows that when we allow selection, the
public premium in earnings is increased across the entire distribution by more than +10 log
points, now averaging across the distribution at +28.8 log points (comparable with the findings
in the results and descriptive analysis sections). The downward slope in the earnings premium
is not quite so high when allowing for selection, the premium falling from +31.6 log points to
+19.3 log points as we move from the lowest quantile to the highest. In terms of lifetime values,
again allowing selection results in a higher public premium than in the case where we control
for the selection, the premium is higher than it was at the lower end of the distribution (+14.4
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compared with +10.7), and then rises up to +23.4 log points in the middle of the distribution
before falling again down to around +15.7 log points at the top. Thus both in terms of earnings
and lifetime values, selection effects are important: this is not surprising given the descriptive
analysis of subsection 4.3.6 which showed that the public sector has a much greater proportion of
high education workers (51.0% public, compared to 28.7%, private), and that the public sector
also has more experienced workers. However, the “whole sample” picture does suggest that even
controlling for selection, there is across the distribution, a large public premium in earnings and
lifetime values – again echoing Lassibille (1998).
The Role of Job Mobility
We now look at the simulations when job mobility is simulated in addition to earnings mobility,
adopting the alternative definition of sector-specific lifetime values; Figure 4.40 shows the public

































Figure 4.40: Spain: The Public Gap
The “whole sample” (left) panel of Figure 4.40 shows that the relatively large public premium
in lifetime values under the ‘job for life’ assumption is almost totally eroded away when we allow
job mobility, averaging just +1.1 log points over the distribution. This suggests that the Spanish
labour market is mobile, such that whichever sector workers are initially placed in, they soon
move to their ‘natural’ sector and therefore the trajectories over which their lifetime values are
calculated in each (starting) sector will be very similar. This is illustrated by the time each type
of worker spends in a sector when simulated to begin there: the ‘public worker’ type km = 1 will
remain in the pubic sector for 13.2 years on average if started there, compared to 2.3 years for
the km = 2 ‘low employment’ types, and only 1.5 years for the ‘private worker’ types, km = 3.
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Conversely, if started in the private sector, the ‘public worker’ types will remain there only 4.0
years on average, ‘low employment’ 3.8 years, whereas the ‘private worker’ types will remain for
17.2 years on average. Thus workers either remain a long time in their initial sector if in their
‘natural’ sector to begin with, or move quite quickly out if they are in the ‘wrong’ sector. As
with Germany and the Netherlands, for Spain the greater earnings compression witnessed in the
public sector, is not evident in the lifetime values. This suggests that the relative compression
in the public sector earnings is due to a lower variance of the transitory component of earnings
for the public sector, rather than lower permanent inequality in the public sector. Allowing
selection into sector, the right-side panel of Figure 4.40, the public premium in lifetime values is
greatly increased, averaging +25.4 log points across the distribution. As with earnings, there is
evidence of greater compression in the public sector, the lifetime value premium starting above
its average before stabilizing at the average over the middle quintiles of the distribution, and
then falling in the upper quantiles, ending at +16.7 log points in the very highest quantile. The
evidence from this right panel suggests that Spain’s labour market sorts those with higher public
sector earnings potential into this sector, such that the public premium allowing selection is very
high.
4.6.7 Portugal
The Role of Earnings Mobility
As ever, we start by looking at the simulations run under the ‘job for life’ assumption, with
Figure 4.41 illustrating for Portugal the public premium both in terms of log earnings flows
and log lifetime values by the quantiles of in their respective distributions. Unlike the other
countries under consideration, Portugal exhibits a lower degree of pay compression in the public
sector, and as such we might expect any public premium in earnings to be smaller at the lower
end of the distribution but rising. This is exactly what we see in the “whole sample” panel of
Figure 4.41. Initially the public premium is −11.9 log points, but this rises as we move up the
distribution, becoming positive in the second quintile, and continues to rise steadily, such that
it is +16.0 log points at the top of the distribution. With regard to lifetime values, we see the
same compression pattern: the public premium in lifetime values rises steadily as we move up
the distribution, but unlike earnings, the lifetime value premium is always positive, starting at
242
+5.3 log points and rising as high as +22.6 before dropping slightly at the very highest decile.
The premium in earnings in the public sector is compounded by the greater returns to experience
in the public sector such that the premium in lifetime values is even greater than in earnings

































Figure 4.41: Portugal: The Public Gap, ‘Jobs for Life’
Looking now at the “whole sample, with selection” panel, we see that allowing selection, the
public premium in earnings is increased across the entire distribution, the average across the
distribution increasing from +6.8 log points, to +30.7 log points. This average is pulled up by
a larger increase at the top of the distribution than the more modest +14.3 log point increase
at the very bottom of the distribution. As the public sector contains markedly older and more
experienced workers, and with more high and medium educated workers, it is not surprising
that even simulating ‘jobs for life’ the picture not controlling selection is so positive in favour of
the public sector.
The Role of Job Mobility
Again we next turn to the simulation results when job mobility is simulated in addition to earn-
ings mobility, adopting the alternative definition of sector-specific lifetime values as described in
section 4.6.1. The public premium in earnings flows and lifetime values is shown in Figure 4.42.
The left-side panel,“whole sample”, of Figure 4.42 shows that for all but the very lowest
quantiles, the public premium in lifetime values is drastically reduced when we simulate move-
ment between sectors. Beginning at around the same level as when we do not simulate job
mobility (+5.4 log points) the premium then falls, averaging just +1.7 log points over the entire


































Figure 4.42: Portugal: The Public Gap
efficient to sort workers into the sector where they have the highest employability and earnings
potential, quickly enough that regardless of the starting sector, individuals have a similar labour
history trajectory, hence there is not much of a premium for the public sector. As we saw in
subsection 4.5.7, the km = 1 mobility types are very much ‘public workers’ whereas the km = 2
mobility types are strongly attached to the private sector. The efficiency of the labour market
sorting can be seen in the duration each of these types spends in the public (resp. private) sector
when simulated to start there: the ‘public workers’ remain in the public sector for an average
of 10.3 years when started there, compared with just 1.3 years for the ‘private workers’. In
contrast, when starting in the private sector the ‘public’ types will remain on average 4.4 years,
while the ‘private’ type will remain 22.3 years on average. Clearly the relative speed with which
workers become reallocated contributes substantially to the erosion of the high public premium
in lifetime values. As with Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, for Portugal the fact that the
greater earnings compression in private sector earnings is not witnessed in lifetime values would
tend to suggest that the difference in earnings inequality between the sectors owes to a greater
variance of the transitory component of earnings in the public sector. Over the lifetime these
transitory components are averaged out and thus the difference in compression is not apparent
in lifetime values.
When we allow selection into sector, the right panel of Figure 4.42 illustrates that those with
the higher public premiums select into this sector, shifting the lifetime value premium upwards,
and mirroring very closely the ‘job for life’ selection panel. This indicates that once in their
‘natural’ sector individuals remain in employment there, such that the simulation of mobility
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does not much alter the picture – the job loss rates are low for each sector in Portugal, and it
appears that as a result the ‘job for life’ assumption is not far from the reality when we do not
control for selection.
4.6.8 Summary of The Public Pay Gap in Lifetime Values Results
The conclusions of this analysis of public-private pay gaps in lifetime values can be summarised
as follows:
• Germany: Under the ‘job for life’ assumption there is on average a small positive premium
in lifetime values averaging out to be +2.5 log points across the distribution. Simulating
movement of individuals between job states and into/out of unemployment, the premium
is approximately zero.
• The Netherlands: Under the ‘job for life’ assumption there is a small positive public
premium, averaging +2.0 log points in the first half of the distribution, but a small negative
premium, averaging −2.1 log points in the top of half of the distribution. Simulating
movement between labour market states, the premium is approximately zero across the
distribution.
• France: Assuming jobs for life in either sector, the public premium in lifetime values is
high and positive across the distribution, averaging +6.3 log points. Simulating movement
into/out of each sector, the premium is small and positive across the majority of the
distribution, averaging +1.8 log points.
• Italy: In the ‘job for life’ scenario, there is a small, negative public premium in lifetime
values across the most part of the distribution, averaging at −0.6 log points. Allowing
for movement between the labour market sectors, this premium becomes positive or zero,
averaging at +2.7 log points.
• Spain: Under the ‘job for life’ assumption there is a considerable public premium in
lifetime values, stable across the distribution and averaging +7.7 log points. Simulating
movement between the employment sectors and into/out of unemployment this shifts down
to a stable value around +1.1 log points.
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• Portugal: Assuming jobs for life in either sector, the public premium in lifetime values is
always positive and rising as we move up the distribution, averaging to be +13.0 log points.
Simulating movement between labour market states reduces this premium considerably and
is close to zero for the most part of the distribution, averaging +1.7 log points.
The over-arching conclusion from this is that movement between labour market states has
a substantial effect on the public premium in lifetime values. Allowing movement between the
sectors, we conclude that for France and Italy there is a positive public premium in potential
lifetime values across almost all of the distribution. For Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and
Portugal however we conclude that the labour market is sufficiently mobile within each country
that even if started in the ‘wrong’ sector, a worker will transit to their ‘natural’ sector in short
enough time that their lifetime value whichever sector they start in is approximately the same.
This results in an approximately zero public premium in lifetime values for these countries. We
can also see that for countries in which there is greater earnings compression in the public sector
– which is all of them to a greater or lesser extent, bar Portugal – this greater compression
is not evidenced in the lifetime values premium which is generally uniform as we move up the
distribution. This suggests that the greater earnings compression in the public sector may be due
to a greater variance in the transitory component of earnings in the private sector – increasing
the cross-sectional pay dispersion in this sector. Over a lifetime the transitory components are
averaged out, thus the dispersion is reduced. If the differences in earnings compression were
being driven by differences in the variance of the permanent component of earnings, we would
expect that to remain when we take lifetime values. That the compression is not witnessed in
the lifetime values premium suggests that it is the difference in transitory earnings between the
sectors that drives the compression in the public sector.
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4.7 Conclusions
Regardless of country, the literature on public-private pay differences tends to focus on cross-
sectional differences in earnings, and the extent to which they can be ‘explained away’ by
selection. However, as the sectors also differ in terms of earnings mobility and job mobility, these
factors also need to be taken into account in any assessment of the public-pay gap. In a dynamic
environment forward looking agents care about their job security and earnings dynamics and
anticipate that these differ between the sectors and this will affect their assessment of the lifetime
value of potential employment in either sector. To derive a more informative comparison of pay in
the public and private sectors, we apply a flexible model of earnings and employment dynamics,
where the individual earnings and employment trajectories are conditioned by unobserved as
well as observed individual heterogeneity.
We estimate the model on ECHP data for Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain and
Portugal. In each of the countries we are able to fit well the observed cross-sectional distribution
of workers into sectors and the cross sectional earnings distributions, and importantly also the
patterns of labour market mobility and earnings mobility. Then within each country, using
the estimated coefficients from the model for that country, we simulate individual working life
histories and earnings for all of the individuals in the country’s dataset and compute the present
discounted values of their lifetime earnings flows and compare these across sectors.
The main findings are as follows. Firstly, that if individuals were to remain in employment for
all of their working life in a sector then the average public premium in lifetime values would be
positive in Germany, France, Spain and Portugal (and large in the latter two cases), whereas in
Italy and the Netherlands the average public premium would be slightly below zero. If however,
individuals are allowed to move between the sectors in the simulations, then the average public
premium becomes approximately zero for Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. In
Italy and France there is on average a small positive public premium in lifetime values when
job mobility is simulated. The conclusion we draw from this is that in each country there is
sufficient job mobility, that individuals are quickly sorted into their ‘natural’ sector. The finding
that the public premium in lifetime values, in most of the countries, remains uniform and close
to zero as we move up the percentiles of the distribution suggests that where we do observe
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somewhat greater earnings compression in the public sector, it is due to a lower variance in the
transitory component of earnings in the public sector.
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4.8 Descriptive Tables
Dependent variable: log monthly earnings
Specification number ...































































Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.004 0.173 0.178 0.042 0.046
Observations 18183 18183 18183 18183 18183
Individuals 2963 2963 2963 2963 2963
Notes: All years pooled.
Specifications 1, 2, and 3: OLS. Specifications 4 and 5: within estimator.
Reference categories are “Private sector job” and “High education”.
Standard Errors in parentheses.
Table 4.1: Germany Public-Private differences: mean earnings
Private sector Public sector





76.1 18.7 3.3 1.8 0.2
17.7 56.8 19.8 5.1 0.6
3.5 19.9 53.8 20.2 2.7
1.0 4.1 20.1 60.1 14.7
0.1 0.8 2.0 12.8 84.3


79.8 17.0 2.1 0.7 0.4
9.8 64.3 22.7 2.5 0.7
2.0 17.8 60.1 19.1 1.1
0.5 1.0 15.0 70.7 12.9
0.2 0.3 1.5 10.6 87.6






78.1 16.4 3.7 1.3 0.6
16.5 57.5 18.7 6.0 1.3
3.2 19.6 52.8 20.5 3.9
1.2 4.6 21.7 56.0 16.6
0.3 1.1 3.9 15.6 79.1


79.8 17.2 1.8 0.9 0.4
11.9 65.3 19.3 3.0 0.5
0.8 14.8 63.7 18.8 1.9
0.8 2.2 18.7 63.7 14.6
0.2 0.7 2.0 12.6 84.6

Notes: Sector-specific earnings quintiles.
Top panel: unconditional raw earnings quintiles;
Lower panel: quintiles of residual from regression of log earnings on experience,
experience2 and education.
Table 4.2: Germany Public-Private differences: mobility of earnings ranks
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Dependent variable: log monthly earnings
Specification number ...































































Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.015 0.356 0.360 0.118 0.120
Observations 13614 13614 13614 13614 13614
Individuals 2175 2175 2175 2175 2175
Notes: All years pooled.
Specifications 1, 2, and 3: OLS. Specifications 4 and 5: within estimator.
Reference categories are “Private sector job” and “High education”.
Standard Errors in parentheses.
Table 4.3: Netherlands Public-Private differences: mean earnings
Private sector Public sector





77.9 18.3 3.2 0.5 0.1
13.9 64.3 18.1 3.3 0.5
1.8 15.1 64.8 16.6 1.9
0.5 1.6 13.2 71.2 13.5
0.0 0.4 0.8 9.5 89.4


83.8 15.1 1.1 0.0 0.0
13.3 67.2 17.1 2.0 0.4
0.8 13.5 67.7 16.2 1.8
0.2 2.0 14.3 72.3 11.3
0.0 0.0 0.9 9.8 89.3






78.0 16.3 3.8 1.3 0.6
16.7 60.4 18.3 3.9 0.7
2.9 18.8 57.1 17.6 3.6
0.8 3.1 18.2 61.5 16.4
0.3 0.5 2.1 15.9 81.2


86.4 11.7 1.5 0.4 0.0
14.8 65.9 16.8 2.1 0.4
1.6 17.0 62.1 17.0 2.2
0.6 2.2 19.0 64.7 13.5
0.2 0.0 2.1 14.4 83.3

Notes: Sector-specific earnings quintiles.
Top panel: unconditional raw earnings quintiles;
Lower panel: quintiles of residual from regression of log earnings on experience,
experience2 and education.
Table 4.4: Netherlands Public-Private differences: mobility of earnings ranks
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Dependent variable: log monthly earnings
Specification number ...































































Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.017 0.419 0.423 0.098 0.102
Observations 12773 12773 12773 12773 12773
Individuals 2217 2217 2217 2217 2217
Notes: All years pooled.
Specifications 1, 2, and 3: OLS. Specifications 4 and 5: within estimator.
Reference categories are “Private sector job” and “High education”.
Standard Errors in parentheses.
Table 4.5: France Public-Private differences: mean earnings
Private sector Public sector





71.4 22.9 4.7 0.7 0.2
17.3 58.3 21.5 2.9 0.1
2.8 16.5 58.7 20.4 1.7
0.9 1.9 14.2 69.2 13.9
0.2 0.5 1.6 10.1 87.7


74.6 21.4 3.2 0.7 0.0
13.0 62.3 21.7 2.1 0.9
1.6 12.9 62.4 20.0 3.1
0.9 2.1 10.3 71.7 15.0
0.0 0.6 2.6 9.6 87.2






75.9 18.9 3.4 1.4 0.5
18.2 54.4 22.1 4.3 1.1
3.0 21.1 53.5 21.0 1.4
1.3 4.6 18.6 59.9 15.5
0.6 1.7 2.4 13.9 81.4


75.2 20.4 3.3 0.9 0.2
14.3 62.6 19.0 4.0 0.4
3.2 15.8 55.0 21.9 4.1
1.3 3.0 17.7 60.3 17.8
0.2 1.1 3.2 14.1 81.5

Notes: Sector-specific earnings quintiles.
Top panel: unconditional raw earnings quintiles;
Lower panel: quintiles of residual from regression of log earnings on experience,
experience2 and education.
Table 4.6: France Public-Private differences: mobility of earnings ranks
251
Dependent variable: log monthly earnings
Specification number ...































































Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.018 0.314 0.321 0.043 0.044
Observations 15361 15361 15361 15361 15361
Individuals 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645
Notes: All years pooled.
Specifications 1, 2, and 3: OLS. Specifications 4 and 5: within estimator.
Reference categories are “Private sector job” and “High education”.
Standard Errors in parentheses.
Table 4.7: Italy Public-Private differences: mean earnings
Private sector Public sector





62.3 23.9 8.8 4.5 0.5
20.1 45.4 23.9 8.7 1.9
6.8 20.1 44.6 22.6 6.0
1.9 6.7 20.4 52.2 18.9
0.6 0.6 4.3 17.3 77.2


66.8 20.9 7.3 4.3 0.7
19.4 48.4 22.0 8.4 1.9
5.6 21.8 47.6 21.8 3.1
2.5 6.9 21.8 52.3 16.5
0.5 1.5 3.2 15.2 79.7






62.0 21.1 9.9 4.9 2.1
21.0 44.6 22.1 9.4 2.9
8.3 23.3 38.9 20.7 8.9
3.5 9.0 23.9 46.6 17.1
1.6 2.7 5.7 18.9 71.2


71.6 16.6 7.4 3.2 1.3
20.0 50.4 19.2 8.0 2.5
4.6 22.3 47.3 20.2 5.6
1.9 8.7 23.2 47.6 18.6
1.0 1.5 4.2 21.2 72.0

Notes: Sector-specific earnings quintiles.
Top panel: unconditional raw earnings quintiles;
Lower panel: quintiles of residual from regression of log earnings on experience,
experience2 and education.
Table 4.8: Italy Public-Private differences: mobility of earnings ranks
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Dependent variable: log monthly earnings
Specification number ...































































Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.067 0.352 0.353 0.066 0.069
Observations 13854 13854 13854 13854 13854
Individuals 2538 2538 2538 2538 2538
Notes: All years pooled.
Specifications 1, 2, and 3: OLS. Specifications 4 and 5: within estimator.
Reference categories are “Private sector job” and “High education”.
Standard Errors in parentheses.
Table 4.9: Spain Public-Private differences: mean earnings
Private sector Public sector





53.3 30.2 13.0 3.2 0.3
21.4 40.5 29.4 8.0 0.7
7.3 23.3 41.5 25.0 3.0
1.7 5.6 17.6 54.0 21.1
0.3 0.4 1.8 15.6 81.9


68.5 26.8 4.2 0.5 0.0
21.1 53.2 22.6 2.9 0.2
3.3 18.6 52.7 23.6 1.9
0.2 2.2 20.8 55.5 21.4
0.2 0.6 2.2 18.1 78.9






63.7 23.7 8.4 3.6 0.6
20.8 41.6 25.6 9.1 2.5
5.1 25.5 37.6 25.9 5.9
2.7 6.9 23.5 44.8 22.1
0.5 2.2 4.7 18.9 73.7


72.5 21.6 5.1 0.4 0.4
22.2 46.9 25.1 5.1 0.8
5.6 23.0 46.5 20.8 4.2
0.6 8.1 21.6 50.9 19.0
0.6 0.4 2.7 21.3 75.0

Notes: Sector-specific earnings quintiles.
Top panel: unconditional raw earnings quintiles;
Lower panel: quintiles of residual from regression of log earnings on experience,
experience2 and education.
Table 4.10: Spain Public-Private differences: mobility of earnings ranks
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Dependent variable: log monthly earnings
Specification number ...































































Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.077 0.457 0.461 0.080 0.081
Observations 13320 13320 13320 13320 13320
Individuals 2193 2193 2193 2193 2193
Notes: All years pooled.
Specifications 1, 2, and 3: OLS. Specifications 4 and 5: within estimator.
Reference categories are “Private sector job” and “High education”.
Standard Errors in parentheses.
Table 4.11: Portugal Public-Private differences: mean earnings
Private sector Public sector





69.3 20.3 7.0 2.7 0.7
14.4 58.7 18.5 6.5 1.9
3.7 17.6 59.1 16.8 2.8
1.4 3.6 14.3 68.5 12.2
0.6 0.7 2.3 11.2 85.2


82.6 15.0 1.7 0.2 0.5
11.5 70.3 15.4 2.3 0.5
1.9 13.6 70.0 13.8 0.7
0.0 1.1 8.4 78.5 12.0
0.0 0.0 0.2 7.6 92.2






75.1 17.0 4.5 2.4 1.0
17.4 54.8 18.8 6.8 2.4
3.4 20.7 54.9 16.3 4.8
1.6 4.3 18.5 60.5 15.4
0.8 1.3 3.7 15.4 78.9


78.3 17.1 2.8 1.4 0.5
14.3 63.8 18.4 2.6 0.9
2.1 14.5 67.0 13.4 3.0
1.3 2.0 11.6 70.8 14.3
0.0 0.5 0.9 10.8 87.8

Notes: Sector-specific earnings quintiles.
Top panel: unconditional raw earnings quintiles;
Lower panel: quintiles of residual from regression of log earnings on experience,
experience2 and education.




state at t− 1 state at t state at t
↓ private public unemp. private public unemp.
Private 94.1 1.2 4.5 95.2 1.1 3.6 Max distance: 5.3
Public 6.6 91.1 2.1 6.1 91.9 1.9 Max distance, 2x2: 1.1
Unemp. 36.8 5.2 57.8 41.2 6.2 52.5
state at t− 5
↓
Private 89.4 2.8 7.7 90.9 2.9 6.1 Max distance: 12.6
Public 20.9 76.4 2.6 18.3 78.4 3.1 Max distance, 2x2: 2.6
Unemp. 62.0 10.6 27.2 74.6 8.7 16.6
Table 4.13: Germany: Fit to Job Mobility Data
Observed Predicted
state at t− 1 state at t state at t
↓ private public unemp. private public unemp.
Private 96.5 1.9 1.4 96.8 2.0 1.1 Max distance: 7.7
Public 7.8 90.8 1.3 6.5 92.6 0.7 Max distance, 2x2: 1.8
Unemp. 40.3 6.8 52.7 48.0 6.9 45.0
state at t− 5
↓
Private 94.2 3.2 2.4 94.2 4.0 1.6 Max distance: 6.5
Public 19.4 79.6 0.8 12.9 85.8 1.1 Max distance, 2x2: 6.5
Unemp. 79.0 6.4 14.5 81.5 8.9 9.5
Table 4.14: Netherlands: Fit to Job Mobility Data
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Observed Predicted
state at t− 1 state at t state at t
↓ private public unemp. private public unemp.
Private 96.9 0.3 2.7 97.8 0.3 1.8 Max distance: 9.1
Public 0.8 98.2 0.8 0.6 98.7 0.5 Max distance, 2x2: 0.9
Unemp. 33.4 4.6 61.8 41.5 5.7 52.7
state at t− 5
↓
Private 92.8 1.7 5.3 95.9 1.4 2.5 Max distance: 21.9
Public 5.4 93.0 1.4 4.2 95.1 0.6 Max distance, 2x2: 3.1
Unemp. 57.9 5.5 36.5 69.9 15.4 14.6
Table 4.15: France: Fit to Job Mobility Data
Observed Predicted
state at t− 1 state at t state at t
↓ private public unemp. private public unemp.
Private 95.2 1.9 2.7 96.0 1.8 2.1 Max distance: 2.9
Public 4.8 94.0 1.0 4.4 94.6 0.8 Max distance, 2x2: 0.8
Unemp. 21.9 4.7 73.3 24.1 5.3 70.4
state at t− 5
↓
Private 90.3 6.6 2.9 91.5 6.3 2.0 Max distance: 3.6
Public 13.8 85.1 1.0 16.2 82.7 1.0 Max distance, 2x2: 2.4
Unemp. 51.5 12.9 35.5 53.4 14.6 31.9
Table 4.16: Italy: Fit to Job Mobility Data
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Observed Predicted
state at t− 1 state at t state at t
↓ private public unemp. private public unemp.
Private 91.8 1.6 6.5 92.6 1.7 5.5 Max distance: 5.0
Public 7.4 89.9 2.5 6.6 91.4 1.9 Max distance, 2x2: 1.5
Unemp. 39.2 5.4 55.3 43.8 5.7 50.3
state at t− 5
↓
Private 92.1 2.8 4.9 90.7 4.2 4.9 Max distance: 3.1
Public 18.0 80.5 1.3 15.1 83.6 1.1 Max distance, 2x2: 3.1
Unemp. 67.8 10.5 21.5 70.5 8.3 21.0
Table 4.17: Spain: Fit to Job Mobility Data
Observed Predicted
state at t− 1 state at t state at t
↓ private public unemp. private public unemp.
Private 94.8 2.5 2.6 95.2 2.4 2.2 Max distance: 6.1
Public 10.6 88.4 0.9 8.5 90.6 0.7 Max distance, 2x2: 2.2
Unemp. 35.8 7.7 56.4 41.5 8.0 50.3
state at t− 5
↓
Private 91.5 4.2 4.1 91.5 6.0 2.4 Max distance: 7.5
Public 25.3 74.0 0.5 18.0 81.5 0.4 Max distance, 2x2: 7.5
Unemp. 69.9 12.5 17.4 72.9 16.3 10.6
Table 4.18: Portugal: Fit to Job Mobility Data
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Observed Predicted





75.0 19.5 3.5 1.5 0.4
15.5 59.6 19.4 4.7 0.6
3.4 20.9 53.2 20.3 2.0
0.7 4.2 19.2 62.6 13.0
0.1 0.9 1.7 13.4 83.7


73.7 19.7 4.8 1.4 0.1
17.0 54.3 21.1 6.4 1.0
3.5 20.3 50.0 22.1 3.8
1.0 4.6 21.6 53.0 19.6








62.1 19.7 10.1 5.9 1.9
21.3 43.5 24.2 9.6 1.2
5.9 24.6 43.2 22.3 3.7
2.6 9.6 27.8 46.1 13.6
0.2 1.3 2.7 21.8 73.7


56.0 24.5 9.5 6.4 3.3
23.5 38.1 23.5 9.4 5.2
11.9 22.0 33.9 24.5 7.5
4.8 10.3 24.0 39.0 21.6




Note: earnings quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
Table 4.19: Germany: Fit to Wage Mobility Data
Observed Predicted





79.8 16.8 2.4 0.8 0.1
15.7 65.4 16.0 2.4 0.3
1.9 16.1 64.3 16.0 1.5
0.4 1.8 16.7 70.0 10.8
0.1 0.2 0.8 11.1 87.6


81.1 16.6 1.9 0.2 0.0
15.4 62.2 19.8 2.3 0.1
1.6 19.1 57.9 19.9 1.3
0.1 2.1 18.9 63.5 15.2








63.8 21.2 10.8 2.0 2.0
26.1 45.0 20.3 7.2 1.0
3.8 31.8 43.0 16.0 5.2
1.6 4.6 24.5 53.3 15.8
0.0 1.0 2.1 20.6 76.1


67.7 24.8 5.3 1.6 0.3
21.4 44.4 24.4 7.3 2.1
6.5 21.0 41.9 24.5 5.8
0.8 7.4 23.0 47.9 20.8




Note: earnings quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
Table 4.20: Netherlands: Fit to Wage Mobility Data
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Observed Predicted





75.3 20.8 3.2 0.3 0.1
18.0 60.0 19.4 2.1 0.2
2.7 17.5 60.1 17.5 1.9
0.9 2.4 15.7 66.7 14.0
0.2 0.9 1.6 12.8 84.3


78.0 18.5 2.6 0.6 0.0
16.4 58.6 21.6 2.9 0.2
2.0 20.0 56.1 20.0 1.6
0.3 2.6 18.6 63.1 15.1








67.1 24.2 6.3 2.2 0.0
20.0 50.6 23.8 4.2 1.2
4.0 23.8 42.5 24.2 5.2
2.3 6.6 14.6 57.5 18.8
0.8 2.2 3.5 16.2 77.0


63.5 24.9 7.8 3.3 0.3
22.7 44.4 23.9 7.2 1.6
5.5 22.5 40.5 26.1 5.1
2.4 6.2 24.5 45.7 21.0




Note: earnings quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
Table 4.21: France: Fit to Wage Mobility Data
Observed Predicted





63.9 21.5 9.1 4.5 0.9
22.5 45.9 21.6 7.9 1.9
7.8 22.8 45.2 19.2 4.7
2.1 7.1 24.1 50.1 16.4
0.5 1.5 4.0 18.5 75.4


67.4 24.7 5.7 1.7 0.1
22.3 45.1 24.7 6.3 1.3
5.0 23.0 43.4 23.4 5.0
1.0 5.8 22.9 48.4 21.6








49.8 21.0 17.0 7.6 4.3
30.0 29.2 24.2 12.1 4.2
12.4 27.1 33.3 17.1 9.9
6.6 10.0 23.0 38.6 21.5
2.0 3.4 9.1 22.4 62.9


48.9 26.9 14.0 6.6 3.4
24.4 30.8 26.9 12.2 5.4
10.9 24.8 28.3 23.3 12.4
6.4 10.2 22.7 33.6 26.9




Note: earnings quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
Table 4.22: Italy: Fit to Wage Mobility Data
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Observed Predicted





59.2 28.5 10.1 1.8 0.2
23.7 43.3 27.1 5.3 0.4
6.9 23.6 45.2 21.9 2.2
0.9 4.1 18.2 59.3 17.3
0.1 0.3 1.8 16.4 81.1


67.4 25.0 6.3 1.0 0.0
20.3 44.6 27.3 6.7 0.9
4.8 22.8 41.7 26.3 4.1
0.6 5.3 22.6 49.6 21.6








47.6 32.4 12.9 6.0 0.9
23.1 38.8 25.7 10.4 1.7
10.8 23.9 37.4 23.9 3.8
2.5 9.0 20.2 45.2 22.8
0.0 1.4 1.8 19.7 76.9


47.2 31.1 14.6 5.9 1.0
22.2 31.0 30.3 13.2 3.0
13.9 19.8 27.5 27.3 11.2
7.2 10.0 18.4 35.9 28.3




Note: earnings quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
Table 4.23: Spain: Fit to Wage Mobility Data
Observed Predicted





72.5 18.5 5.8 2.6 0.3
16.0 60.1 17.2 5.5 0.9
4.5 19.3 57.3 17.3 1.4
1.4 2.9 16.1 69.3 10.0
0.3 0.8 1.4 7.8 89.4


77.2 19.1 3.1 0.4 0.0
17.3 56.3 20.7 5.2 0.2
2.9 19.4 55.8 19.6 2.0
0.5 4.3 18.7 61.6 14.7








47.1 30.5 11.5 9.7 1.0
31.4 32.7 17.6 15.9 2.1
12.0 30.6 31.3 19.3 6.5
3.6 7.6 25.1 48.5 14.9
0.4 2.0 3.7 11.6 82.1


57.8 25.1 9.8 4.8 2.3
23.0 37.9 25.3 10.8 2.8
11.3 22.7 35.8 24.6 5.3
5.7 11.8 22.1 40.8 19.4




Note: earnings quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
Table 4.24: Portugal: Fit to Wage Mobility Data
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Sectoral composition of classes
Observed Predicted
% of sample % private % public % unemp. % of sample % private % public % unemp.
km = 1 22.83 74.72 7.48 17.80 22.83 75.93 7.75 16.32
km = 2 54.84 95.81 0.00 4.19 54.84 95.72 0.00 4.28
km = 3 22.33 15.07 82.94 2.00 22.33 14.33 84.30 1.37
100.00 100.00
Class composition of the sectors
Observed Predicted
% of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3 % of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
Private 72.97 23.38 72.01 4.61 73.03 23.74 71.88 4.38
Public 20.22 8.44 0.00 91.56 20.59 8.59 0.00 91.41
Unemp. 6.81 59.70 33.75 6.55 6.38 58.42 36.78 4.81
100.00 100.00
Table 4.25: Germany: Mobility Class and Sector composition, Real and Simulated
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Mobility classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. %ky = 1 %ky = 2
km = 1 14.76 68.16 17.08 20.45 29.27 70.73
km = 2 28.36 59.53 12.11 16.63 59.10 40.90
km = 3 37.20 59.24 3.55 17.99 60.05 39.95
Total 27.23 61.43 11.34 17.81 52.50 47.50
Wage classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
ky = 1 25.39 59.26 15.35 18.03 12.73 61.74 25.54
ky = 2 29.27 63.83 6.90 17.56 34.00 47.22 18.78
Total 27.23 61.43 11.34 17.81 22.83 54.84 22.33
Table 4.26: Germany: Composition and Joint Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity
Classes
ky = 1 ky = 2
% of sample 52.50 47.50
Mean private (log) wage 8.46 8.44
Std. dev., private wage 0.31 0.39
Mean public (log)wage 8.45 8.44
Std. dev., public wage 0.30 0.38
Table 4.27: Germany: Wage Classes Mean Earnings
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Sectoral composition of classes
Observed Predicted
% of sample % private % public % unemp. % of sample % private % public % unemp.
km = 1 18.41 0.00 99.39 0.61 18.41 0.00 98.77 1.23
km = 2 17.99 63.14 28.65 8.21 17.99 63.90 28.32 7.78
km = 3 63.60 98.31 0.00 1.69 63.60 98.59 0.00 1.41
100.00 100.00
Class composition of the sectors
Observed Predicted
% of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3 % of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
Private 73.88 0.00 15.38 84.62 74.20 0.00 15.50 84.50
Public 23.45 78.02 21.98 0.00 23.28 78.11 21.89 0.00
Unemp. 2.67 4.23 55.39 40.37 2.52 8.96 55.53 35.51
100.00 100.00
Table 4.28: Netherlands: Mobility Class and Sector composition, Real and Simulated
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Mobility classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. %ky = 1 %ky = 2
km = 1 43.21 43.86 12.93 21.76 76.63 23.37
km = 2 32.67 43.88 23.46 15.27 46.73 53.27
km = 3 17.26 61.57 21.17 17.98 46.08 53.92
Total 24.81 55.13 20.06 18.19 51.82 48.18
Wage classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
ky = 1 25.51 45.30 29.18 18.31 27.22 16.23 56.55
ky = 2 24.05 65.70 10.25 18.06 8.93 19.89 71.17
Total 24.81 55.13 20.06 18.19 18.41 17.99 63.60
Table 4.29: Netherlands: Composition and Joint Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity
Classes
ky = 1 ky = 2
% of sample 51.82 48.18
Mean private (log) wage 8.70 8.69
Std. dev., private wage 0.35 0.32
Mean public (log)wage 8.61 8.73
Std. dev., public wage 0.33 0.29
Table 4.30: Netherlands: Wage Classes Mean Earnings
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Sectoral composition of classes
Observed Predicted
% of sample % private % public % unemp. % of sample % private % public % unemp.
km = 1 14.26 39.79 16.38 43.83 14.26 39.70 15.75 44.55
km = 2 32.86 42.02 57.67 0.31 32.86 42.46 57.27 0.27
km = 3 52.87 92.91 5.09 1.99 52.87 93.50 4.53 1.96
100.00 100.00
Class composition of the sectors
Observed Predicted
% of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3 % of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
Private 68.61 8.27 20.13 71.60 69.06 8.20 20.21 71.59
Public 23.98 9.74 79.03 11.23 23.47 9.58 80.21 10.21
Unemp. 7.41 84.38 1.39 14.23 7.48 84.95 1.17 13.87
100.00 100.00
Table 4.31: France: Mobility Class and Sector composition, Real and Simulated
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Mobility classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. %ky = 1 %ky = 2
km = 1 30.65 34.99 34.36 7.91 38.85 61.15
km = 2 17.18 46.46 36.36 24.20 48.44 51.56
km = 3 29.89 48.08 22.03 17.00 50.66 49.34
Total 25.82 45.68 28.50 18.07 48.25 51.75
Wage classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
ky = 1 30.93 30.60 38.47 18.46 11.48 33.00 55.52
ky = 2 21.06 59.75 19.19 17.70 16.85 32.74 50.41
Total 25.82 45.68 28.50 18.07 14.26 32.86 52.87
Table 4.32: France: Composition and Joint Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity Classes
ky = 1 ky = 2
% of sample 48.25 51.75
Mean private (log) wage 9.40 9.39
Std. dev., private wage 0.45 0.41
Mean public (log)wage 9.47 9.38
Std. dev., public wage 0.43 0.40
Table 4.33: France: Wage Classes Mean Earnings
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Sectoral composition of classes
Observed Predicted
% of sample % private % public % unemp. % of sample % private % public % unemp.
km = 1 49.08 89.49 6.41 4.11 49.08 89.88 6.33 3.79
km = 2 34.76 24.18 58.24 17.58 34.76 24.83 57.84 17.33
km = 3 16.16 29.26 27.54 43.20 16.16 30.04 28.38 41.58
100.00 100.00
Class composition of the sectors
Observed Predicted
% of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3 % of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
Private 57.06 76.98 14.73 8.28 57.60 76.59 14.98 8.43
Public 27.84 11.29 72.72 15.99 27.80 11.18 72.33 16.49
Unemp. 15.11 13.34 40.45 46.20 14.60 12.75 41.25 46.00
100.00 100.00
Table 4.34: Italy: Mobility Class and Sector composition, Real and Simulated
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Mobility classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. %ky = 1 %ky = 2
km = 1 7.16 55.92 36.91 17.99 43.59 56.41
km = 2 12.11 51.69 36.20 16.04 32.62 67.38
km = 3 8.16 38.03 53.81 19.14 67.43 32.57
Total 9.04 51.56 39.40 17.50 43.63 56.37
Wage classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
ky = 1 13.88 53.47 32.65 20.58 49.04 25.99 24.97
ky = 2 5.30 50.08 44.62 15.11 49.12 41.55 9.33
Total 9.04 51.56 39.40 17.50 49.08 34.76 16.16
Table 4.35: Italy: Composition and Joint Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity Classes
ky = 1 ky = 2
% of sample 43.63 56.37
Mean private (log) wage 8.01 7.86
Std. dev., private wage 0.34 0.26
Mean public (log)wage 8.03 7.88
Std. dev., public wage 0.33 0.24
Table 4.36: Italy: Wage Classes Mean Earnings
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Sectoral composition of classes
Observed Predicted
% of sample % private % public % unemp. % of sample % private % public % unemp.
km = 1 20.03 3.37 93.39 3.23 20.03 3.36 92.93 3.72
km = 2 21.62 47.84 4.46 47.69 21.62 47.18 5.22 47.60
km = 3 58.35 87.79 0.53 11.68 58.35 87.09 0.56 12.35
100.00 100.00
Class composition of the sectors
Observed Predicted
% of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3 % of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
Private 62.24 1.09 16.62 82.30 61.69 1.09 16.53 82.38
Public 19.98 93.61 4.83 1.56 20.07 92.76 5.62 1.62
Unemp. 17.77 3.64 58.01 38.35 18.24 4.08 56.40 39.52
100.00 100.00
Table 4.37: Spain: Mobility Class and Sector composition, Real and Simulated
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Mobility classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. %ky = 1 %ky = 2
km = 1 58.50 23.57 17.92 19.53 69.64 30.36
km = 2 25.23 18.38 56.40 21.90 0.00 100.00
km = 3 28.09 24.58 47.33 16.19 50.32 49.68
Total 33.56 23.04 43.40 18.09 43.31 56.69
Wage classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
ky = 1 40.71 26.04 33.25 20.30 32.21 0.00 67.79
ky = 2 28.10 20.74 51.15 16.41 10.73 38.13 51.14
Total 33.56 23.04 43.40 18.09 20.03 21.62 58.35
Table 4.38: Spain: Composition and Joint Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity Classes
ky = 1 ky = 2
% of sample 43.31 56.69
Mean private (log) wage 12.33 12.16
Std. dev., private wage 0.45 0.40
Mean public (log)wage 12.42 12.29
Std. dev., public wage 0.41 0.38
Table 4.39: Spain: Wage Classes Mean Earnings
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Sectoral composition of classes
Observed Predicted
% of sample % private % public % unemp. % of sample % private % public % unemp.
km = 1 25.45 17.14 74.68 8.18 25.45 14.11 77.29 8.60
km = 2 62.43 94.45 0.00 5.55 62.43 94.26 0.00 5.74
km = 3 12.11 68.93 7.29 23.77 12.11 70.39 5.88 23.73
100.00 100.00
Class composition of the sectors
Observed Predicted
% of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3 % of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
Private 71.68 6.09 82.27 11.65 70.97 5.06 82.93 12.01
Public 19.89 95.56 0.00 4.44 20.39 96.51 0.00 3.49
Unemp. 8.43 24.71 41.13 34.16 8.65 25.31 41.45 33.24
100.00 100.00
Table 4.40: Portugal: Mobility Class and Sector composition, Real and Simulated
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Mobility classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. %ky = 1 %ky = 2
km = 1 16.03 20.78 63.18 17.80 46.49 53.51
km = 2 3.52 14.73 81.75 15.81 50.28 49.72
km = 3 12.25 9.26 78.49 25.33 20.25 79.75
Total 7.76 15.61 76.63 17.47 45.68 54.32
Wage classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
ky = 1 5.96 16.48 77.55 16.35 25.91 68.72 5.37
ky = 2 9.27 14.88 75.85 18.41 25.08 57.15 17.78
Total 7.76 15.61 76.63 17.47 25.45 62.43 12.11
Table 4.41: Portugal: Composition and Joint Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity Classes
ky = 1 ky = 2
% of sample 45.68 54.32
Mean private (log) wage 11.70 11.79
Std. dev., private wage 0.38 0.45
Mean public (log)wage 11.81 11.84
Std. dev., public wage 0.45 0.53




In this thesis I have addressed three questions concerned with the formation of human capital
and how it is rewarded in the labour market. Chapters 2 and 3 are related by my interest in how
education affects individual’s outcomes, both in the short and longer-term, and the implications
this has for policy. Chapter 4 addresses another related question in labour economics, concerning
the existence of inequalities between the public and private sectors of the labour market in how
individuals are remunerated over a working lifetime.
My aim in Chapter 2 was to evaluate whether the policy of introducing free early education
places for all 3-year olds has had any impact on test results when children reach age seven, and
moreover whether there has been any additional effect in the geographical areas deemed most
in need of free early education places.
The policy evaluation regressions revealed that it is only in the poorer LEAs that there are
identifiable policy effects – so the areas that the Government targeted were affected by the
policy’s introduction. In terms of how the policy affected results, though the policy increased
provision for 3-year olds in the non-schools sector – comprised largely of private sector places
– there were no measured robust effects of this increase on results in reading or writing either
overall or for either the more or less deprived LEAs when estimated separately.
My main finding is that in the poorer LEAs, there is a small but significant and robust
positive effect of take-up by 3-year olds of free early education places in maintained nursery and
primary schools, on the percentage of children attaining at least the expected level in Key Stage
1 reading and writing. The effects are quite small in magnitude: a 10%-point increase in take-up
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leading to an improvement in results of approximately one-third of a within standard deviation.
However, these effects are comparable in size to reducing average KS1 class size by almost one
child in the case of reading, and three-quarters of a child in the case of writing. My findings
are in line with the EPPE study which suggests that children attending maintained settings for
pre-school perform better on school entry and at age 7.
There is also tentative evidence that in the better-off LEAs there is a significant and robust
positive effect of the take-up by 4-year olds of free early education places in maintained nursery
and primary schools, on the percentage of children attaining a higher than expected level in KS1
reading, writing and maths. The effects are still small in absolute terms but represent increases
of three-quarters of a within standard deviation (reading), half of a within standard deviation
(writing) and one third of a within standard deviation (maths), for a 10%-point increase in
take-up. As the majority of 4-year olds attending a free early education place in a maintained
nursery or primary school attend a reception or infant class in a primary school, these results
indicate that, in the better off LEAs, increasing the proportion of children who start primary
school early has a positive effect on KS1 results increasing the percentage of children who exceed
expected levels of attainment. Nevertheless this is a cautious conclusion due to concerns over
an upward bias in the estimated coefficient.
With respect to policy, the conclusion is clear that it is increased take-up in the maintained
nursery and primary schools that are associated with improved test performance. This therefore
suggests that expansion of the capacity of these providers, rather than channelling government
funding to private providers, is the way to improve attainment – giving a clear lead for early
years education policy. The magnitude of the improvements in educational outcomes suggests
that results improvement alone may not necessarily be a justification for such universal provi-
sion. However, the externalities associated with early education, including the behavioural and
socialisation gains and the development of non-cognitive skills which then facilitate and enhance
learning, also need to be considered. In addition, this policy works in conjunction with other
policies which aim to improve the labour market attachment of parents, particularly single par-
ents, and there are wider benefits to children, parents and society as a whole when parents are
helped back into work.
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In the third chapter, I assess the extent to which different instrumental variable estimates
of the return to education capture different ‘local average treatment effects’ and which is most
appropriate for making inference about the return to education in Britain. I present three IV
estimates: using RoSLA (10.2%), both RoSLA and early smoking (12.5%), and early smoking
alone (12.9%). All of which are substantially higher than the OLS estimate of 4.6%. Moreover,
these IV estimates whilst being statistically significant are sufficiently imprecise for me to be
unable to conclude are actually different from each other. My analysis suggests that the RoSLA
estimate captures the return for the individuals who wanted to leave at the minimum leaving
age but were forced to stay longer, whereas I have argued that early smoking is a behaviour
engaged in by individuals of all abilities who have high discount rates due to their rate of time
preference. I conclude that the IV estimate derived from the early smoking instrument is closer
to an average marginal return to education, purged of the bias of OLS. That both the RoSLA
and early smoking IV estimates are not statistically different to each other suggests that the
RoSLA LATE is also close to an average marginal return to education and therefore that the
returns at the lower part of the distribution are similar to the average return.
For future work, it is important to recognize that there are issues surrounding the appropri-
ateness of the linearity assumption and the reality of heterogeneous returns to education across
individuals when modelling the return to education – indeed it may not even be appropriate to
refer to the causal effect of education on earnings.
At the same time, from a policy perspective it has arguably never been more important to
understand and have an accurate assessment of how education affects wages, as the Government
introduces changes to the minimum education leaving age: raising it first to 17 (2013) and then
to 18 (2015). Moreover, linking to my fourth chapter, it is important to evaluate the effect of
education not just on instantaneous earnings but on the employment and earnings dynamics
over a lifetime. This is an area of research to which I am keen to contribute, modelling the
effects of education over a lifetime.
My final substantive chapter looks at public-private pay differences in Germany, the Nether-
lands, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Rather than concentrating on cross-sectional differences
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in earnings levels, the chapter applies a flexible model of earnings and employment dynamics,
where the individual earnings and employment trajectories are conditioned by unobserved as
well as observed individual heterogeneity. The present discounted values of lifetime earnings
flows for each individual in each sector are compared. This allows a more complete picture of
inequalities between the sectors, taking account of the fact that forward looking individuals care
not only about earnings levels but also earnings and job mobility, which also differ markedly
between the sectors.
For each country the model does a good job of fitting the observed cross-sectional distribution
of workers into sectors and the cross sectional earnings distributions, and importantly also the
patterns of labour market mobility and earnings mobility.
The most important finding is that when we simulate movement between employment sectors
in addition to earnings trajectories, the average public premium in lifetime values is approxi-
mately zero for Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal, whereas in Italy and France
there is a small positive public premium. The conclusion we draw from this is that in each
country there is sufficient job mobility, that individuals are quickly sorted into their ‘natural’
sector.
We also find that in most of the countries, the public premium in lifetime values remains
uniform and close to zero as we move up the percentiles of the distribution. This suggests that
where we do observe somewhat greater earnings compression in the public sector, it is due to a
lower variance in the transitory component of earnings in the public sector.
The conclusions drawn from this chapter suggest that inequality between the public and
private sectors in terms of earnings levels and compression are largely reflections of the different
human capital and preferences of the labour force in each sector. For most of the countries in
the study, the labour market is sufficiently mobile to allocate workers to their ‘natural’ sector
relatively quickly.
For future work, this methodology can be adapted to look at the inequality in outcomes
between other socio-economic groups over time. This could be applied to looking at difference
in gender pay, or differences in pay related to broad educational groups, as alluded to above.
Each of these are likely to be fruitful areas of future research.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 2
A.1 Data Appendix
A.1.1 Sources of Data
The figures that I have for the number of 3 year olds and 4 year olds taking free early education
places are collected from different sources before being published in the DfES reports that I take
them from. Since 1996, the Annual Schools Census has collected data on 3 and 4-year olds in
schools each January. For each age, 3 and 4, the ASC records the number of children of that
age at 31st December in the previous year attending nursery or primary school part-time or
full-time. All such children are counted as receiving a free early education place.
Information on the number of 3 and 4-year olds taking up free places in the ‘other’ sector
comprising other maintained settings, private, voluntary and independent schools is derived from
the Nursery Education Grant Data Collection Exercise. This NEG data collection exercise has
been carried out by the DfES annually since January 1999, and for each age, 3 and 4, records
the part-time equivalent number of children of that age at 31st December the previous year,
receiving the free early education place.
The two main DfES publications I use are:
“Statistics of Education: Provision for children under five years of age in England - January
2002”, National Statistics Bulletin for the DfES, Issue No. 08/02, December 2002.
“Provision for children under five years of age in England: January 2004 (Final)”, National
Statistics Statistical First Release for the DfES, SFR 39/2004, October 2004.
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A child attending maintained nursery school or a nursery or infant class in a maintained
primary school is counted as taking a free early education place, according to these DfES publi-
cations. In some cases the information recorded in the annually reported publications of pupils
under 5-years of age in maintained schools in England is not rounded whereas the free early edu-
cation places data in the above publications are rounded. This is the case for 1998 and 1999 data
for 3-year olds and the 1998, 1999 and 2000 data for 4-year olds. Therefore in these cases I use
the annual publications for the number of children in maintained nursery and primary schools.
In each case it is the Annual Schools Census that the data comes from, the only difference is
whether it is rounded or not. The annual publications used therefore are:
“Pupils Under Five Years of Age in Schools in England - January 1998”, Statistical Bulletin
10/98, October 1998.
“Pupils Under Five Years of Age in Maintained Schools in England - January 1999”. Sta-
tistical First Release for the DfES, 8/1999, May 1999.
“Statistics of Education: Provision for children under five years of age in England - January
2000”, National Statistics Bulletin for the DfES, Issue No. 01/01, January 2001.
The headcount data from the Annual Schools Census tells us how many children use places
– it is the number of children receiving at least one funded session, which means attending
nursery/primary school at least once per week part-time; while the part-time equivalent places
data tells us how many half-day places are funded. These two measures are not totally equivalent.
However, at the national level, there is the data on the number of children who receive early
education funded by the NEG – so a measure equivalent to the headcount measure. When this
is compared to the part-time equivalent number of places funded the discrepancy is small in
every year bar 2003, which suggests that it is reasonable to treat the two sector measurements
as comparable. Indeed this is explicit in the discussion of trends in the DfES publications and is
the line taken by Brewer et al. (2005) when analysing differential take-up of places in each sector,
by deprivation level. For 2003, the discrepancy is larger, the difference between the number of
3-year old children receiving at least one funded session and the PTE number of places being
approximately 18% of the number of children receiving at least one funded session. However,
I robustness check my results by excluding 2003 data for 3-year olds when I exclude the 2006
results data, and almost all of the results remain.
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The comparability of the nursery and primary school attendee data and the NEG PTE
number of places in the ‘other’ sector relies on either (a) the PTE number of places being ap-
proximately equal to the number of children who receive at least one session - i.e. the assumption
is that children use their full entitlement; or (b) the school/nursery attendees are using their full
entitlement i.e. attending nursery/primary school part-time at least. The figures nationally for
the comparison of PTE places in the ‘other’ sector and children receiving at least one funded
session in the other sector show that for all years (bar 2003), the assumption (a) holds at the
national level which is an encouraging indication that it is fair to make this assumption. If we
assume that children attending a nursery or primary school for their early education do attend
part-time (i.e. take up their 5-session allocation) then we do not have to worry about assumption
(a) because if all children attending nursery/primary school attend part-time then this tells us
the PTE number of places in this sector and is directly comparable with the ‘other’ sector figure
that we have. Given that both (a) and (b) appear to be close approximations to reality, it is fair
to assume, as the Government and other authors do, that we can directly compare the numbers
in each sector. It is worth noting that if a child takes a place in a maintained nursery/primary
school for at least part of their free early education, it is not possible to then redeem other
sessions at a private provider – which makes it even more likely that children attending nursery
and primary schools do so at least for their 5 sessions otherwise they lose their entitlement.
The fact that 3- and 4-year old children attending a maintained nursery or primary school
part-time are counted as having a free early education place is made explicit in the publication:
“Statistics of Education: Provision for children under five years of age in England - January
2002”, National Statistics Bulletin for the DfES, Issue No. 08/02, December 2002: paragraph
19, p. 6.
Part-time in nursery or primary school means that the child does not attend both morning
and afternoon for 5 days per week, this is outlined in “Pupils Under Five Years of Age in Schools
in England - January 1998” (Statistical Bulletin Number 10/98). We do not know whether the
children attend half day for 5 days a week, but given that they do attend either part-time or
full-time, we only need the average to be half day for 5 days a week to make it a comparable
measure to the PTE that we have in the ‘other’ sector.
It is important to recognise that there are problems with each measure – both the maintained
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schools sector measure and the ‘other’ sector measure – but that they are approximately equal
and comparable. Indeed this is implicitly assumed in both the Government and other authors’
analysis of the data.
A.1.2 Variables Construction
For the main variables of interest – the take-up rate of places in each sector by 3-year olds – the
data is explicitly recorded for each year without exception. For 4-year olds in the years 2002
and 2004, this is also the case (it is the case also in 2003 but, aside from the robustness checks,
2003 is not used for 4-year olds data as this corresponds to the year 2002 data that is missing
for 3-year olds).
However, for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001, the reported NEG data for 4-year olds comprises
the part-time equivalent number of funded places in the ‘other’ sector plus the number of 4-year
olds attending a nursery or primary school. Therefore using the ASC data on the number of
4-year olds attending nursery or primary schools and the total from the NEG data, it is possible
to estimate the number of 4-year olds receiving their free early education place in the ‘other’
sector, which is what I do. As mentioned, for the years 2002 and 2004, the figures are explicitly
separated for 4-year olds in the 2004 DfES publication thus we do not have to estimate them.
Within each LEA, comparing the number of children taking a place in each sector for 4-year
olds in 2002 and 2004 when these are reported explicitly, with the numbers for 1999, 2000 and
2001 which I calculate, the figures are very close. This is true in terms of actual numbers and
in relative percentages. Therefore I am confident that this approach to estimating the number
of places taken by 4-year olds in the ‘other’ sector for the first three years, is valid.
When children are 4 years old, it is much more likely that they are indeed attending nursery
or primary school at least part-time, and the numbers that I have on the number of 4-year
olds in nursery and primary school count each child if they are attending part-time or full-time
(there is no double counting of full-time children). If we make the assumption that 4-year olds
are attending at least part-time and having that part-time place funded, then when we take
the number of 4-year olds attending nursery or primary schools from the NEG total, we will be
left with the number of part-time NEG funded places in the ‘other’ sector. The school measure
and the total NEG measure will be capturing the same thing, attendance part-time in early
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education. Therefore we do not need to worry that one is measuring at least one session and
the other is measuring part-time attendance (i.e. taking all of 5 sessions or being included as
0.6 if taking only 3) as both will be measuring the number of children attending part-time.
There are a small number of cases (22 out of the 575 main sample observations) in which
the total number of funded places recorded in the NEG data for 4-year olds when compared
with the nursery and primary school attendance data for 4-year olds implies a negative number
of places in the ‘other’ sector. In these cases, the ‘other’ sector places were set to zero. This
will only be the case if we do have some 4-year olds who are not attending school part-time, in
which case the number receiving at least one session in school will be more than the number of
funded places in school leading to this negative when the school attendees are taken from the
NEG total. As noted, this is only the case in 22 of 575 observations.
A.1.3 Childcare Availability Variables
The figures on availability of places in day nursery, playgroup or with childminders refer to
places available for children under 8-years old. However, it is fair to assume that the majority of
provision is utilised by children of pre-compulsory school age. Playgroups in particular are almost
exclusively for the use of children aged 3 and 4, therefore I formalise this as an assumption and
use the information on population aged 3 and 4 in the LEA and the total number of playgroup
places to calculate the number of playgroup places available per 100 children aged 3 and 4. As
day nursery and childminder places can be used by children of all ages from birth to 4, I assume
that the proportion allocated to children age 3 or 4 is equal to the population proportion aged
3 or 4 and calculate the number of places per 100 children aged 3 or 4 on that basis.
A.1.4 Example of how birth month affects school start date
As set out in the data section, the birth month of a child within a year determines the exact
time that they are able to start school – for children born in the same calendar year there are
two possible school year groups that they could be in. For example, for children born in the
calendar year 1994, all of whom would be recorded as 3-year olds in the January 1998 early
education place data, the situation is as follows:
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Date of Birth Turn 3 Turn 4 Turn 5
1st Jan 1994 to 1st Jan 1997 to 1st Jan 1998 to 1st Jan 1999 to
31st March 1994 31st March 1997 31st March 1998 31st March 1999
Entitled to a free Still in free early Start Reception in Sept 1998 or Jan 1999
place from 1st April 1997 education place therefore finish R in July 1999
and finish Y2 in July 2001.
1st April 1994 to 1st April 1997 to 1st April 1998 to 1st April 1999 to
31st Aug 1994 31st Aug 1997 31st Aug 1998 31st Aug 1999
Entitled to a free Still in free early Start Reception in April 1999 or Jan 1999
place from 1st Sep 1997 education place or Sept 1998 therefore finish R in July 1999
and finish Y2 in July 2001.
1st Sep 1994 to 1st Sep 1997 to 1st Sep 1998 to 1st Sep 1999 to
31st Dec 1994 31st Dec 1997 31st Dec 1998 31st Dec 1999
Entitled to a free Still in free early Start Reception in Sept 1999
place from 1st Jan 1998 education place therefore finish R in July 2000
and finish Y2 in July 2002.
Therefore irrespective of whether the LEA’s policy is to start children in the academic term
or academic year that they turn 5 years old, the children born in the first eight months of the
year will be in one year group, taking their KS1 assessments 3 years after they are recorded as
3-year olds, with the children born later in the year taking their KS1 assessments 4 years after
they are recorded as 3-year olds. The key thing is that terms in reception class adjust, such that
all children start year 1 in September when they are age 5.
A.1.5 Samples
The main estimation sample consists of 120 of the 150 LEAs in England. Of these 120, 115
were in existence with entirely the same boundaries and jurisdiction for the entire period from
1998-2003. The remaining 5 LEAs1 were in existence for the entire time period but had their
boundaries changed between the 1998 data and subsequent years. For these latter 5 LEAs,
though their boundaries are changed, their early education place data and population data refer
to the correct geographical areas so this is not a problem.
The second estimation sample includes an additional 10 LEAs who were either boundary
changing LEAs2 or new LEAs in 19983. The seven LEAs that are new in 1998, have free
early education place take-up data – applied via apportionment by the DfES – and population
data, however they do not have any childcare availability data for 1998. Rather than making
1Cambridgeshire, Kent, Lancashire, Nottinghamshire and Shropshire.
2Cheshire, Devon and Essex.
3Blackburn with Darwen, Blackpool, Medway, Nottingham (City), Peterborough (City), Telford and Wrekin,
Thurrock.
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assumptions about these LEAs in 1998 and mapping data to them from their ‘parent’ LEAs, I
exclude the 1998 observation of these seven new LEAs. Similarly, the 1998 observations of the
three additional boundary changer LEAs added in this sample are excluded due to differences
in the geographical areas that their early education variables and childcare availability variables
refer to in 1998.
Therefore, though the second sample adds 10 LEAs, for each of them their 1998 observation
is excluded. This obviously unbalances the panel somewhat hence the exclusion of these LEAs
from the main sample.
As with the main estimation sample, in the second sample, each LEA again contributes
between 3 and 5 observations with a mean of 4.72 observations per LEA for the level 2B or
higher analysis, and a mean of 3.87 observations per LEA for the level 3 or higher analysis.
In this second sample, three of the additional 10 LEAs are from the pathfinder group, so they
comprise 60 of 130 LEAs in this sample, which is 46% of the sample of LEAs.
There are 2 LEAs (City of London and Isles of Scilly) that are never used because they never
have sufficient data. The remaining 18 that are not in the main or second samples are excluded
because they have missing data in one or more years and thus cannot provide 5 observations to
keep the panel largely balanced.
The final sample (3) used is the “all observations” sample, in which any observations from
an LEA that has all the necessary variables for the regression is included, though continuing
to exclude the 1998 observations of the 10 LEAs introduced in the second sample. This means
that information from 148 of the 150 LEAs is used with each contributing between 2 and 5
observations, with an average of 4.59 observations per LEA for the level 2B or higher analysis,
and 3.82 observations per LEA for the level 3 or higher analysis. Clearly the panel is unbalanced
in this case, and potentially biased by differential attrition, however as a robustness check of the
results this sample is included. With 148 LEAs included, all 65 of the group first to receive the
NEG for 3-year olds are included, making up 44% of the sample of LEAs.
The only problem for the 5 LEAs who are part of the main estimation sample but do have
their boundaries changed between the 1998 and 1999 data (Cambridgeshire, Kent, Lancashire,
Nottinghamshire and Shropshire) is that for 1998 their childcare availability variables refer to
the LEA before the boundaries were re-drawn. However, they are included in the main sam-
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ple because I have additional population data from 1998 for the geographical areas that these
childcare variables pertain to, so that their childcare availability rate variables can be created
with the population in the denominator referring to the correct geographical area. Moreover,
as the variables are all rates, I consider them to have sufficient reliability to be included in
the main sample. This additional population data that I have for the population aged 3 and
4 and the population aged under-5 calculated from the contemporary nursery attendance pub-
lication (“Pupils Under Five Years of Age in Schools in England – January 1998”, Statistical
Bulletin 10/98, October 1998) and the contemporary day care places publication (“Statistics
of Education: Children’s Day Care Facilities at 31 March 1998 England”, DfES, 1999). These
publications provided information for the pre-boundary change areas, hence the population fig-
ures in these publications refer to the same geographical areas as the childcare variables. For
the free early education places take-up, the geographical area referred to is the post-boundary
change area as are the National Statistics population estimates, hence there is no problem with
the creation of these variables.
For all other LEAs there was no change in boundaries for any time during the panel, therefore
their childcare data as well as their early education place data refers to the same geographical
area as do the National Statistics population estimates, hence there is never a problem with the
variables creation for these LEAs.
The problem for the three boundary changers that are not in the main sample and have
their 1998 observation excluded when they are used in the second sample is that the contem-
porary nursery attendance and day care place availability publications do not refer to the same
geographical areas as each other thus the populations estimated as age 3 and 4, and under 5
are not for comparable areas. The nursery data that could be used to estimate the population
aged 3 and 4 refers to the pre-change boundaries, whereas the day care places data refers to the
boundaries post-change. For this reason we have to exclude these LEAs from the main sample
and exclude their 1998 observation when they are used in the second sample.
The problem for the seven ‘new’ LEAs (Blackburn with Darwen, Blackpool, Medway, Not-
tingham (City), Peterborough (City), Telford and Wrekin, Thurrock) who are included in the
second sample, though with their 1998 observation excluded, is that they do not have any child-
care data available in 1998. These LEAs have a parent LEA from whom they could have data
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mapped to them for 1998, however this creates additional problems of the applicability of this
data and so it was decided to exclude their 1998 observation and only include them in the second
sample.
There are a number of other LEAs that are newly created in 1998 but whose parent LEA
does not have data for 1998 to map to them, hence their exclusion. In theory they have no less
data than the 7 who are included in sample 2 but to include them all would seriously unbalance
the panel and we always have the option of including the 7 LEAs with mapped data.
Of the 19 newly created LEAs in 1998, all have free early education place data but differ in
their childcare data availability: Six have childcare data and are therefore included in the main
estimation sample (sample 1): Halton, Plymouth (City), Southend, Torbay, West Berkshire,
Wokingham.
Seven do not have the childcare data but could potentially have data mapped to them:
Blackburn with Darwen, Blackpool, Medway, Nottingham (City), Peterborough (City), Telford
and Wrekin, Thurrock.
One is excluded because of later missing data: Warrington.
Five do not have childcare data and there is not a parent LEA with data to map to them:
Bracknell Forest, Reading, Slough, Windsor and Maidenhead, Herefordshire.
Tables A.1 and A.2 list the LEAs in each sample; Table A.3 lists the LEAs that were in the
‘pathfinder’ group of poorer LEAs who were first to receive the Nursery Education Grant for
3-year olds.
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Table A.1: Local Education Authorities: in Main Sample
Barking and Dagenham Hertfordshire Rochdale
Barnet Hillingdon Rutland
Barnsley Hounslow Salford
Bath and NE Somerset Isle of Wight Sandwell
Bedfordshire Islington Sefton
Bexley Kensington and Chelsea Sheffield
Birmingham Kent* Shropshire*
Bolton Kingston-upon-Hull (City) Solihull
Bournemouth Kingston-upon-Thames Somerset
Bradford Kirklees South Gloucestershire












Derby (City) Middlesbrough Sutton
Derbyshire Newcastle upon Tyne Swindon
Doncaster Newham Tameside
Dorset Norfolk Torbay
Dudley North East Lincolnshire Tower Hamlets
Durham North Lincolnshire Wakefield
Ealing North Somerset Walsall
East Riding of Yorkshire North Tyneside Waltham Forest
East Sussex North Yorkshire Wandsworth
Gateshead Northumberland Warwickshire
Greenwich Nottinghamshire* West Berkshire
Hackney Oldham West Sussex
Halton Oxfordshire Westminster (City)
Hammersmith and Fulham Plymouth (City) Wigan
Hampshire Poole Wiltshire
Haringey Portsmouth Wirral
Harrow Redcar and Cleveland Wokingham
Havering Richmond-upon-Thames York (City)
Note: * indicates the five boundary changing LEAs during the sample period; all others have
unchanged boundaries throughout.
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Table A.2: Local Education Authorities: in additional samples
Sample 2
boundary LEA 1998
5-year changer New LEA childcare data




Blackburn with Darwen no yes Lancashire
Blackpool no yes Lancashire
Medway no yes Kent
Nottingham (City) no yes Nottinghamshire
Peterborough (City) no yes Cambridgeshire
Telford and Wrekin no yes Shropshire
Thurrock no yes Essex
‘All Observations’ Sample 3
boundary LEA 1998
5-year changer New LEA childcare data
Local Education Authority unchanging post-1998 in 1998 mapped from
Bracknell Forest yes no yes
Brighton and Hove yes no no
Bristol (City) yes no no
Enfield yes no no
Gloucestershire yes no no
Hartlepool yes no no
Herefordshire yes no yes
Milton Keynes yes no no
Northamptonshire yes no no
Reading yes no yes
Redbridge yes no no
Rotherham yes no no
Slough yes no yes
Trafford yes no no
Warrington yes no yes Cheshire
Windsor and Maidenhead yes no yes
Wolverhampton yes no no
Worcestershire yes no yes
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Table A.3: The poorer LEAs first to receive the policy
LEA sample 1 sample 2 LEA sample 1 sample 2
Barking and Dagenham yes yes Manchester yes yes
Barnsley yes yes Middlesbrough yes yes
Birmingham yes yes Newcastle upon Tyne yes yes
Blackburn with Darwen no yes Newham yes yes
Blackpool no yes North East Lincolnshire yes yes
Bolton yes yes North Tyneside yes yes
Bradford yes yes Northamptonshire no no
Brent yes yes Nottingham (City) no yes
Brighton and Hove no no Oldham yes yes
Camden yes yes Plymouth (City) yes yes
Cornwall yes yes Rochdale yes yes
Coventry yes yes Rotherham no no
Doncaster yes yes Salford yes yes
Durham yes yes Sandwell yes yes
Ealing yes yes Sefton yes yes
Gateshead yes yes Sheffield yes yes
Greenwich yes yes South Tyneside yes yes
Hackney yes yes Southwark yes yes
Halton yes yes St Helens yes yes
Hammersmith and Fulham yes yes Stockton on Tees yes yes
Haringey yes yes Stoke on Trent yes yes
Hartlepool no no Sunderland yes yes
Hounslow yes yes Tameside yes yes
Isle of Wight yes yes Telford and Wrekin no yes
Islington yes yes Tower Hamlets yes yes
Kingston upon Hull (City) yes yes Wakefield yes yes
Kirklees yes yes Walsall yes yes
Knowsley yes yes Waltham Forest yes yes
Lambeth yes yes Wandsworth yes yes
Leeds yes yes Westminster (City) yes yes
Leicester (City) yes yes Wirral yes yes
Lewisham yes yes Wolverhampton no no
Liverpool yes yes
A.2 Results Distributions
Figure A.1 (below) shows for each subject and each level kernel density plots of the distribution
of results for the main sample of LEAs over the entire time period of the data, with a normal
density curve overlaid in each case. Looking at the top row, we can see that for L3 or higher,
the distribution of LEA results is close to normal, with the reading and maths distributions
very similar. Writing L3 or higher results are almost perfectly normally distributed with a lower
mean than the other subjects at this level, but a tighter spread of results around the mean. For
L2B or higher results, the lower row shows that again results are distributed for each subject
close to a normal distribution but in each case there is a left skewing of the distribution.
Figures A.2 to A.7 show kernel density plots of the overall distributions (both groups of LEAs
together) for each subject and each level, with each year plotted separately. Looking at Figure
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A.2 we can see that for reading L3 or higher, the shape of the distribution is approximately the
same in each year, but that there is movement of the distribution over time – 2003 and 2004 are
very similar but there is a definite shift above (2002) and below (2006) in the other two years.
Similarly, Figure A.3 shows that the shape of the distribution of reading L2B or higher results
remains largely the same over time, though there are definite shifts in certain years, but less
clearly than in the L3 or higher results.
Looking at Figures A.4 and A.5, we see that for writing the story is very similar, L3 or higher
results having a common shape each year but with clear shifts of the distribution in different
years. L2B or higher results for writing has largely the same shaped distribution each year,
though with more variation than is the case for reading at this level. Again, though there is
movement in the position of the distribution in the different years, it is not as marked as in the
L3 or higher results.
Again for Maths, figures A.6 and A.7 show that while the shape of the distribution of results
looks very similar in each year, there are very definite shifts of the distribution over time. This
is particularly the case for maths at L3 or higher, where there is a large leftward shift in the
distribution in 2006.
298





















































































































% of LEA’s children achieving L2B or higher in KS1 assessment
299














10 20 30 40 50
% of LEA’s children attaining L3+
year = 2002 year = 2003
year = 2004 year = 2006














50 60 70 80
% of LEA’s children attaining L2B+
year = 2001 year = 2002
year = 2003 year = 2004
year = 2006
300












0 5 10 15 20 25
% of LEA’s children attaining L3+
year = 2002 year = 2003
year = 2004 year = 2006














45 50 55 60 65 70
% of LEA’s children attaining L2B+
year = 2001 year = 2002
year = 2003 year = 2004
year = 2006
301
















10 20 30 40 50
% of LEA’s children attaining L3+
year = 2002 year = 2003
year = 2004 year = 2006
















60 65 70 75 80 85
% of LEA’s children attaining L2B+
year = 2001 year = 2002
year = 2003 year = 2004
year = 2006
302
A.3 Robustness: Policy Evaluation Regressions
Tables 2.11 – 2.13 in the main body of the paper report the results from the simple panel
regression model in which results in each subject (reading, writing, maths) at each level (2B or
higher and 3 or higher) are regressed on a dummy for the free early education places for 3-year
olds policy being in operation and a set of year dummies. The results presented in the main
body of the paper are for both the model in which there is a single policy dummy and that in
which there are separate policy dummies for the poorer and the better off LEAs, in each case
for the main estimation sample (sample 1). The Tables below below present the same sample
1 results but also include alongside the results of the same regressions for the larger samples 2
and 3 as a robustness check of the sample 1 results.
The second sample differs from the main estimation sample in that it includes an additional
10 LEAs who are excluded from sample 1 as they have a boundary change mid-1998 or are new
mid-1998 and therefore have either slightly different areas of reference for their 1998 observation
or only have a 1998 observation through data apportioned by the DfES from their “parent”
LEAs. In order to avoid the issues around these observations, I exclude the 1998 observation
for these 10 LEAs and as this necessarily further unbalances the panel, I exclude these 10 LEAs
from the main estimation sample.
The final sample (sample 3) is the “all observations” sample, in which any observations from
an LEA that has all the necessary variables for the regression is included, though continuing
to exclude the 1998 observations of the 10 LEAs introduced in the second sample. This means
that information from 148 of the 150 LEAs is used.
The second set of tables (Tables A.10 to A.15) then go on to do report the same results –
each subject at each level for each sample – but with the data from results year 2006 excluded,
to confirm that the results still hold when we exclude this data. I run this robustness check
because for the years 2001 to 2004, the published results refer to the children’s attainments in
a standard national task/test, thus this is a consistent dependent variable. From 2005 onwards
however, the assessment altered slightly to be a teacher assessed level for the child – based on
their performance in the standard national task/test but also taking into account the teacher’s
own knowledge of the child. Clearly this is something that could potentially affect results,
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and could affect things differentially across LEAs depending on the teachers’ attitudes within
each LEA. In light of the potential problems caused by this alteration in assessment method, I
robustness check the results by running the regressions both with and without 2006 results data
included.
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Table A.4: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Reading L2B+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) -0.007 -0.117 -0.108
0.276 0.270 0.252
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.156 -0.223 -0.286
0.320 0.306 0.287
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.138 -0.019 0.055
0.336 0.335 0.315
year=2002 -0.128 -0.125 -0.016 -0.129 -0.125 -0.011
0.162 0.164 0.157 0.162 0.164 0.156
year=2003 0.119 0.171 0.238 0.189 0.220 0.321
0.239 0.239 0.224 0.228 0.226 0.216
year=2004 1.791*** 1.895*** 1.934*** 1.783*** 1.892*** 1.928***
0.317 0.310 0.299 0.319 0.312 0.301
year=2006 2.471*** 2.585*** 2.672*** 2.463*** 2.582*** 2.664***
0.354 0.344 0.334 0.355 0.345 0.335
constant 67.969*** 67.805*** 67.858*** 67.969*** 67.805*** 67.854***
0.140 0.142 0.136 0.140 0.141 0.135
R2 within 0.397 0.390 0.395 0.398 0.390 0.397***
R2 between 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.109 0.044 0.110***
R2 overall 0.045 0.045 0.05 0.065 0.057 0.071***
ρ 0.910 0.908 0.905 0.908 0.907 0.903***
#obs 575 614 692 575 614 692***
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148***
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
305
Table A.5: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Writing L2B+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) 0.255 0.208 0.071
0.362 0.352 0.335
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.422 0.431 0.271
0.447 0.431 0.417
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.093 0.002 -0.112
0.413 0.405 0.382
year=2002 0.885*** 0.887*** 0.944*** 0.885*** 0.886*** 0.939***
0.212 0.210 0.198 0.212 0.211 0.198
year=2003 3.221*** 3.258*** 3.386*** 3.143*** 3.154*** 3.292***
0.310 0.308 0.293 0.315 0.310 0.294
year=2004 2.804*** 2.858*** 3.054*** 2.813*** 2.865*** 3.061***
0.407 0.396 0.382 0.406 0.396 0.382
year=2006 1.454*** 1.477*** 1.807*** 1.463*** 1.485*** 1.816***
0.459 0.443 0.426 0.460 0.444 0.427
constant 57.752*** 57.544*** 57.558*** 57.752*** 57.544*** 57.562***
0.166 0.169 0.163 0.166 0.169 0.162
R2 within 0.355 0.348 0.350 0.356 0.350 0.351
R2 between 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.069 0.116 0.056
R2 overall 0.047 0.041 0.048 0.032 0.025 0.032
ρ 0.880 0.880 0.876 0.882 0.883 0.879
#obs 575 614 692 575 614 692
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
306
Table A.6: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Maths L2B+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) -0.250 -0.384 -0.311
0.285 0.285 0.271
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.722** -0.796** -0.842***
0.331 0.323 0.304
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.205 -0.004 0.176
0.330 0.333 0.319
year=2002 -0.110 -0.092 -0.115 -0.111 -0.091 -0.102
0.159 0.159 0.148 0.159 0.159 0.147
year=2003 -2.265*** -2.221*** -2.248*** -2.045*** -2.028*** -1.999***
0.213 0.212 0.199 0.224 0.222 0.205
year=2004 -0.149 -0.003 0.038 -0.173 -0.016 0.019
0.350 0.352 0.336 0.346 0.349 0.333
year=2006 -2.605*** -2.481*** -2.472*** -2.630*** -2.496*** -2.498***
0.372 0.368 0.353 0.365 0.363 0.346
constant 74.984*** 74.886*** 74.993*** 74.985*** 74.884*** 74.981***
0.131 0.132 0.125 0.128 0.130 0.123
R2 within 0.438 0.434 0.432 0.451 0.443 0.447
R2 between 0.002 0.012 0.006 0.284 0.250 0.267
R2 overall 0.068 0.075 0.072 0.138 0.132 0.144
ρ 0.889 0.883 0.882 0.884 0.879 0.877
#obs 575 614 692 575 614 692
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.7: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Reading L3+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) 0.184 0.133 0.179
0.235 0.223 0.204
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.425† 0.482* 0.333
0.266 0.250 0.240
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.062 -0.043 0.100
0.301 0.287 0.269
year=2003 -2.208*** -2.190*** -2.114*** -2.322*** -2.353*** -2.182***
0.174 0.166 0.154 0.182 0.171 0.168
year=2004 -1.784*** -1.710*** -1.541*** -1.833*** -1.778*** -1.566***
0.287 0.275 0.258 0.277 0.264 0.252
year=2006 -4.587*** -4.489*** -4.350*** -4.635*** -4.555*** -4.375***
0.317 0.307 0.289 0.312 0.299 0.285
constant 29.046*** 28.856*** 28.895*** 29.046*** 28.857*** 28.896***
0.112 0.107 0.107 0.112 0.106 0.107
R2 within 0.610 0.604 0.585 0.611 0.607 0.585
R2 between 0.013 0.01 0.022 0.233 0.285 0.151
R2 overall 0.083 0.083 0.08 0.058 0.049 0.064
ρ 0.917 0.916 0.911 0.919 0.92 0.913
#obs 464 503 570 464 503 570
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 † p=0.116
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Table A.8: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Writing L3+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) -0.057 -0.109 -0.169
0.325 0.311 0.290
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.728† -0.766* -0.819**
0.448 0.423 0.396
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.282 0.224 0.163
0.342 0.333 0.311
year=2003 6.625*** 6.641*** 6.743*** 6.941*** 6.947*** 7.033***
0.292 0.279 0.254 0.335 0.312 0.281
year=2004 6.268*** 6.318*** 6.466*** 6.403*** 6.445*** 6.573***
0.396 0.380 0.353 0.406 0.386 0.356
year=2006 4.612*** 4.676*** 4.810*** 4.746*** 4.801*** 4.913***
0.413 0.390 0.354 0.423 0.396 0.358
constant 8.911*** 8.761*** 8.789*** 8.909*** 8.760*** 8.788***
0.155 0.146 0.138 0.152 0.144 0.135
R2 within 0.76 0.759 0.766 0.764 0.764 0.77
R2 between 0.007 0.005 0.015 0.187 0.156 0.17
R2 overall 0.353 0.349 0.364 0.41 0.399 0.413
ρ 0.780 0.783 0.778 0.765 0.770 0.765
#obs 464 503 570 464 503 570
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 † p=0.107
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Table A.9: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Maths L3+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) -0.469 -0.479 -0.377
0.346 0.331 0.321
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.825** -0.778** -0.754**
0.407 0.387 0.357
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.289 -0.327 -0.184
0.389 0.371 0.365
year=2003 -2.002*** -2.080*** -2.076*** -1.834*** -1.941*** -1.908***
0.251 0.241 0.228 0.290 0.277 0.252
year=2004 -2.803*** -2.783*** -2.669*** -2.731*** -2.725*** -2.606***
0.422 0.405 0.382 0.425 0.408 0.381
year=2006 -9.516*** -9.476*** -9.446*** -9.445*** -9.419*** -9.386***
0.447 0.424 0.397 0.452 0.428 0.398
constant 30.592*** 30.442*** 30.517*** 30.591*** 30.441*** 30.516***
0.138 0.129 0.120 0.137 0.128 0.119
R2 within 0.841 0.844 0.842 0.842 0.845 0.843
R2 between 0.016 0.014 0.003 0.185 0.141 0.115
R2 overall 0.384 0.386 0.387 0.412 0.409 0.414
ρ 0.849 0.851 0.846 0.842 0.845 0.840
#obs 464 503 570 464 503 570
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.10: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Reading L2B+; 2006 excluded
Data from 2006 excluded. Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) -0.130 -0.181 -0.232
0.288 0.277 0.260
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.168 -0.210 -0.271
0.321 0.306 0.287
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.055 -0.126 -0.158
0.365 0.355 0.331
year=2002 -0.101 -0.099 0.007 -0.101 -0.099 0.008
0.161 0.161 0.154 0.161 0.161 0.153
year=2003 0.191 0.214 0.305 0.208 0.227 0.323
0.236 0.232 0.220 0.230 0.224 0.215
year=2004 1.939*** 1.989*** 2.080*** 1.916*** 1.973*** 2.057***
0.316 0.306 0.296 0.329 0.319 0.309
constant 67.945*** 67.786*** 67.837*** 67.945*** 67.786*** 67.836***
0.126 0.128 0.122 0.126 0.129 0.121
R2 within 0.309 0.313 0.313 0.309 0.313 0.313
R2 between 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.010 0.001 0.020
R2 overall 0.026 0.024 0.029 0.031 0.028 0.034
ρ 0.925 0.926 0.925 0.924 0.926 0.924
#obs 456 485 545 456 485 545
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.11: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Writing L2B+; 2006 excluded
Data from 2006 excluded. Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) 0.131 0.126 -0.008
0.385 0.369 0.354
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.403 0.430 0.277
0.448 0.430 0.416
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.407 -0.453 -0.545
0.436 0.422 0.394
year=2002 0.901*** 0.893*** 0.937*** 0.903*** 0.894*** 0.930***
0.212 0.210 0.197 0.212 0.210 0.197
year=2003 3.280*** 3.288*** 3.402*** 3.154*** 3.147*** 3.269***
0.313 0.305 0.288 0.316 0.307 0.290
year=2004 2.935*** 2.944*** 3.123*** 3.098*** 3.113*** 3.286***
0.426 0.410 0.394 0.421 0.406 0.389
constant 57.739*** 57.544*** 57.562*** 57.738*** 57.544*** 57.567***
0.149 0.152 0.146 0.149 0.152 0.145
R2 within 0.453 0.451 0.456 0.459 0.459 0.463
R2 between 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.057 0.085 0.041
R2 overall 0.061 0.053 0.061 0.038 0.031 0.039
ρ 0.894 0.897 0.894 0.898 0.901 0.898
#obs 456 485 545 456 485 545
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.12: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Maths L2B+; 2006 excluded
Data from 2006 excluded. Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) -0.599** -0.694** -0.654**
0.294 0.290 0.276
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.752** -0.805** -0.839***
0.329 0.321 0.302
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.295 -0.484 -0.304
0.354 0.350 0.336
year=2002 -0.095 -0.080 -0.102 -0.096 -0.080 -0.097
0.159 0.157 0.146 0.159 0.157 0.146
year=2003 -2.071*** -2.050*** -2.072*** -2.000*** -1.999*** -1.985***
0.209 0.204 0.190 0.222 0.217 0.200
year=2004 0.217 0.320 0.390 0.125 0.259 0.284
0.361 0.359 0.341 0.352 0.354 0.337
constant 74.961*** 74.867*** 74.970*** 74.961*** 74.867*** 74.966***
0.119 0.121 0.114 0.119 0.121 0.114
R2 within 0.408 0.421 0.427 0.412 0.423 0.432
R2 between 0.053 0.073 0.062 0.160 0.144 0.166
R2 overall 0.062 0.069 0.068 0.087 0.086 0.095
ρ 0.910 0.910 0.908 0.909 0.908 0.907
#obs 456 485 545 456 485 545
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.13: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Reading L3+; 2006 excluded
Data from 2006 excluded. Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 3 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) 0.191 0.204 0.187
0.228 0.215 0.199
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.373 0.436* 0.296
0.265 0.249 0.240
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.000 -0.040 0.070
0.311 0.293 0.277
year=2003 -2.181*** -2.195*** -2.094*** -2.267*** -2.303*** -2.142***
0.172 0.162 0.154 0.181 0.170 0.167
year=2004 -1.772*** -1.762*** -1.541*** -1.756*** -1.740*** -1.526***
0.278 0.262 0.252 0.280 0.264 0.253
constant 29.028*** 28.834*** 28.871*** 29.028*** 28.834*** 28.872***
0.089 0.084 0.083 0.089 0.084 0.083
R2 within 0.471 0.482 0.437 0.474 0.487 0.438
R2 between 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.181 0.210 0.104
R2 overall 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.007 0.005 0.011
ρ 0.948 0.950 0.944 0.949 0.951 0.945
#obs 345 374 423 345 374 423
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.14: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Writing L3+; 2006 excluded
Data from 2006 excluded. Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 3 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) -0.433 -0.450 -0.465
0.338 0.319 0.297
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.776* -0.809* -0.865**
0.449 0.423 0.397
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.076 -0.073 -0.041
0.341 0.332 0.306
year=2003 6.812*** 6.809*** 6.888*** 6.974*** 6.976*** 7.066***
0.300 0.283 0.256 0.336 0.313 0.282
year=2004 6.631*** 6.646*** 6.753*** 6.601*** 6.612*** 6.699***
0.406 0.385 0.355 0.398 0.380 0.347
constant 8.908*** 8.756*** 8.778*** 8.908*** 8.756*** 8.777***
0.135 0.129 0.121 0.134 0.128 0.120
R2 within 0.853 0.853 0.857 0.855 0.855 0.860
R2 between 0.035 0.028 0.042 0.103 0.088 0.113
R2 overall 0.432 0.425 0.441 0.457 0.448 0.467
ρ 0.816 0.819 0.814 0.810 0.814 0.809
#obs 345 374 423 345 374 423
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.15: The Effect of Free Early Education Place Policy on Maths L3+; 2006 excluded
Data from 2006 excluded. Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 3 year panel
Model #1 Model #2
Independent Variable sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
policy (t) -0.444 -0.469 -0.359
0.374 0.357 0.341
policy ‘poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.858** -0.808** -0.778**
0.410 0.389 0.360
policy ‘better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.013 -0.113 0.087
0.451 0.430 0.421
year=2003 -1.994*** -2.066*** -2.068*** -1.799*** -1.908*** -1.881***
0.265 0.253 0.237 0.293 0.279 0.254
year=2004 -2.836*** -2.802*** -2.706*** -2.872*** -2.835*** -2.764***
0.447 0.429 0.402 0.446 0.428 0.402
constant 30.575*** 30.422*** 30.499*** 30.574*** 30.422*** 30.499***
0.120 0.112 0.104 0.118 0.111 0.102
R2 within 0.521 0.531 0.496 0.529 0.537 0.505
R2 between 0.076 0.086 0.034 0.321 0.276 0.235
R2 overall 0.094 0.098 0.085 0.154 0.143 0.141
ρ 0.889 0.891 0.884 0.884 0.887 0.88
#obs 345 374 423 345 374 423
#groups 120 130 148 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, lower figure ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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A.4 Robustness: Models #1 & #2
The main estimation sample consists of 120 of the 150 LEAs in England. For analysis of level 2B
or higher results there are 575 observations in total, with each LEA contributing between 3 and
5 observations, with a mean of 4.79 observations per LEA. For level 3 analysis there are a total
of 464 observations, with each LEA contributing between 3 and 4 observations with a mean of
3.87 observations per LEA. The reason for the slight unbalancing of the panel is that there are
some observations (25 in the 5-year panel, 16 in the 4-year panel) that are data mis-reporting
or coding errors resulting in large outlying values, which I exclude. The exclusion of some LEAs
results in the loss of a number of the group of 65 LEAs who were first given the NEG for 3-year
olds. Remaining in the sample of 120 LEAs are 57 of the most deprived 65 LEAs, thus they
make up 47% of the estimation sample of LEAs.
The second estimation sample includes an additional 10 LEAs who were either boundary
changing LEAs4 or new LEAs in 19985. The seven LEAs that are new in 1998, have free
early education place take-up data – applied via apportionment by the DfES – and population
data, however they do not have any childcare availability data for 1998. Rather than making
assumptions about these LEAs in 1998 and mapping data to them from their ‘parent’ LEAs, I
exclude the 1998 observation of these seven new LEAs. Similarly, the 1998 observations of the
three additional boundary changer LEAs added in this sample are excluded due to differences
in the geographical areas that their early education variables and childcare availability variables
refer to in 1998. Therefore, though the second sample adds 10 LEAs, for each of them their 1998
observation is excluded. This obviously unbalances the panel somewhat hence the exclusion of
these LEAs from the main sample.
As with the main estimation sample, in the second sample, each LEA again contributes
between 3 and 5 observations with a mean of 4.72 observations per LEA for the level 2B or
higher analysis, and a mean of 3.87 observations per LEA for the level 3 or higher analysis. In
this second sample, three of the additional 10 LEAs are from the first 65 group, so they comprise
60 of 130 LEAs in this sample, which is 46% of the sample of LEAs.
There are 2 LEAs (City of London and Isles of Scilly) that are never used because they never
4Cheshire, Devon, Essex
5Blackburn with Darwen, Blackpool, Medway, Nottingham (City), Peterborough (City), Telford and Wrekin,
Thurrock
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have sufficient data. The remaining 18 that are not in the main or second samples are excluded
because they have missing data in one or more years and thus cannot provide 5 observations to
keep the panel largely balanced.
Finally sample 3 is the “all observations” sample, in which any observations from an LEA that
has all the necessary variables for the regression is included, though continuing to exclude the
1998 observations of the 10 LEAs introduced in the second sample. This means that information
from 148 of the 150 LEAs is used with each contributing between 2 and 5 observations, with an
average of 4.59 observations per LEA for the level 2B or higher analysis, and 3.82 observations
per LEA for the level 3 or higher analysis. Clearly the panel is unbalanced in this case, and
potentially biased by differential attrition, however as a robustness check of the results this
sample is included. With 148 LEAs included, all 65 of the group first to receive the NEG for
3-year olds are included, making up 44% of the sample of LEAs.
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Table A.16: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Reading L2B+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t) 0.037** 0.017 0.046** 0.018 0.045** 0.018
3-year olds early educ take-up, ‘other’ sector (t) 0.000 0.008 -0.006 0.007 -0.003 0.007
4-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t+1) -0.013 0.046 -0.023 0.045 -0.026 0.043
4-year olds early educ take-up, ‘other’ sector (t+1) -0.001 0.023 -0.010 0.023 -0.002 0.023
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.015 0.037 0.006 0.040 -0.002 0.037
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.052 0.049 0.037 0.048 0.040 0.045
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.011 0.017 -0.010 0.017 -0.019 0.015
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.651*** 0.161 -0.574*** 0.158 -0.543*** 0.149
year=2002 -0.168 0.163 -0.174 0.166 -0.155 0.166
year=2003 0.230 0.213 0.240 0.218 0.205 0.212
year=2004 1.969*** 0.267 2.046*** 0.275 1.962*** 0.263
year=2006 2.895*** 0.458 3.096*** 0.476 2.974*** 0.454
constant 83.634*** 5.509 82.254*** 5.555 81.991*** 5.307
R2 within 0.432 0.421 0.420
R2 between 0.007 0.037 0.034
R2 overall 0.012 0.000 0.000
ρ 0.919 0.922 0.920
#obs 575 614 679
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.17: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Reading L2B+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.059** 0.024 0.072*** 0.025 0.058** 0.027
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.037 0.023 0.044* 0.024 0.043* 0.023
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.013 0.015 -0.012 0.013 -0.010 0.012
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.003 0.007 -0.003 0.008 -0.001 0.007
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.005 0.058 -0.004 0.053 -0.007 0.051
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.021 0.068 -0.050 0.072 -0.047 0.066
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.027 0.038 0.010 0.040 0.009 0.041
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.000 0.028 -0.013 0.029 0.002 0.030
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.014 0.036 0.004 0.039 -0.004 0.037
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.060 0.052 0.044 0.050 0.046 0.047
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.012 0.016 -0.010 0.016 -0.018 0.015
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.057** 0.026 -0.056** 0.026 -0.042* 0.024
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.046* 0.027 -0.030 0.026 -0.025 0.024
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.668*** 0.164 -0.571*** 0.159 -0.552*** 0.150
year=2002 -0.222 0.171 -0.224 0.178 -0.199 0.178
year=2003 0.248 0.236 0.208 0.234 0.212 0.226
year=2004 1.935*** 0.315 1.987*** 0.306 1.952*** 0.288
year=2006 2.843*** 0.524 3.021*** 0.515 2.948*** 0.484
constant 85.024*** 5.254 83.227*** 5.286 83.042*** 5.127
R2 within 0.447 0.433 0.428
R2 between 0.189 0.282 0.238
R2 overall 0.053 0.161 0.114
ρ 0.941 0.958 0.948
#obs 575 614 679
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.18: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Writing L2B+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.070** 0.031 0.072** 0.03 0.071*** 0.027
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.012 0.020 -0.003 0.022 -0.013 0.024
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.005 0.017 0.002 0.015 0.005 0.015
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.012 0.011 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.010
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.056 0.061 -0.022 0.057 -0.027 0.056
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.009 0.073 -0.023 0.079 -0.009 0.071
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.029 0.057 0.000 0.052 -0.014 0.055
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.020 0.033 0.012 0.034 0.041 0.034
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.008 0.045 0.005 0.047 -0.007 0.041
childcare places available: childminder (t) -0.060 0.060 -0.060 0.056 -0.052 0.052
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.009 0.019 -0.010 0.020 -0.018 0.018
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.047 0.029 -0.042 0.029 -0.028 0.028
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.061 0.039 -0.041 0.037 -0.025 0.035
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.948*** 0.228 -0.909*** 0.223 -0.784*** 0.221
year=2002 0.754*** 0.230 0.754*** 0.228 0.708*** 0.222
year=2003 3.433*** 0.350 3.393*** 0.336 3.363*** 0.315
year=2004 3.084*** 0.426 3.103*** 0.408 3.110*** 0.384
year=2006 2.048*** 0.717 2.091*** 0.698 2.156*** 0.654
constant 84.247*** 6.243 82.664*** 6.584 78.821*** 6.624
R2 within 0.410 0.397 0.380
R2 between 0.162 0.216 0.108
R2 overall 0.189 0.064 0.010
ρ 0.869 0.925 0.907
#obs 575 614 679
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.19: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Maths L2B+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.021 0.037 -0.005 0.042 -0.010 0.039
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.014 0.034 -0.005 0.036 0.010 0.040
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.020 0.014 -0.013 0.012 -0.013 0.012
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.018** 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.009
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.022 0.054 -0.001 0.051 -0.002 0.050
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.060 0.049 0.027 0.056 0.041 0.050
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.056 0.040 0.007 0.045 -0.003 0.045
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.028 0.029 -0.032 0.029 -0.029 0.025
childcare places available: day nursery (t) -0.033 0.038 -0.039 0.043 -0.025 0.039
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.067 0.047 0.044 0.047 0.048 0.043
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.022 0.018 -0.015 0.017 -0.012 0.016
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.010 0.023 -0.004 0.024 -0.011 0.024
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.052* 0.029 -0.028 0.031 -0.028 0.028
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.425** 0.164 -0.311* 0.177 -0.267 0.167
% of non-white children (t+3) -0.120*** 0.045 -0.124*** 0.047 -0.093** 0.044
year=2002 0.041 0.186 0.042 0.188 -0.028 0.180
year=2003 -1.766*** 0.236 -1.854*** 0.256 -1.984*** 0.246
year=2004 0.200 0.340 0.241 0.348 0.194 0.335
year=2006 -2.023*** 0.535 -1.907*** 0.552 -2.118*** 0.530
constant 88.156*** 4.680 84.937*** 5.350 82.674*** 5.165
R2 within 0.482 0.458 0.456
R2 between 0.627 0.553 0.562
R2 overall 0.599 0.541 0.554
ρ 0.809 0.777 0.767
#obs 574 613 678
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.20: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Reading L3+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.033 0.043 0.072 0.044 0.052 0.037
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.024 0.037 -0.013 0.038 -0.003 0.036
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.000 0.012 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.010
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.003 0.010 -0.002 0.010 0.000 0.009
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.055 0.050 -0.058 0.044 -0.060 0.040
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.159** 0.069 0.123* 0.071 0.090 0.072
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.047 0.033 0.018 0.036 0.000 0.037
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.011 0.040 0.007 0.039 0.004 0.033
childcare places available: day nursery (t) -0.012 0.040 -0.012 0.045 0.002 0.041
childcare places available: childminder (t) -0.020 0.043 -0.038 0.045 -0.047 0.043
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.015 0.020 -0.002 0.019 -0.005 0.018
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.031 0.028 -0.039 0.027 -0.023 0.026
median weekly gross pay, male f-t workers (t) 0.009* 0.005 0.011** 0.005 0.012*** 0.005
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.779*** 0.166 -0.649*** 0.165 -0.531*** 0.170
year=2003 -2.007*** 0.190 -2.153*** 0.184 -2.128*** 0.175
year=2004 -1.557*** 0.274 -1.685*** 0.265 -1.578*** 0.254
year=2006 -4.220*** 0.510 -4.340*** 0.493 -4.452*** 0.471
constant 41.508*** 6.189 37.643*** 6.100 35.799*** 5.591
R2 within 0.655 0.644 0.615
R2 between 0.453 0.384 0.331
R2 overall 0.462 0.413 0.364
ρ 0.932 0.900 0.895
#obs 464 503 566
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.21: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Writing L3+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.016 0.039 0.026 0.043 0.023 0.036
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.011 0.028 -0.005 0.029 -0.012 0.030
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.016 0.015 -0.010 0.013 -0.008 0.013
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.008
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.008 0.069 -0.021 0.064 -0.017 0.061
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.157** 0.077 0.128* 0.076 0.139** 0.063
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.020 0.045 -0.020 0.043 -0.029 0.044
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.001 0.039 -0.002 0.038 0.020 0.032
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.029 0.044 0.025 0.042 0.030 0.036
childcare places available: childminder (t) -0.034 0.063 -0.052 0.062 -0.068 0.056
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.039* 0.023 -0.038* 0.022 -0.041** 0.019
manufacturing jobs rate (t) 0.082** 0.041 0.081** 0.040 0.076** 0.037
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.45** 0.174 -0.418** 0.167 -0.343** 0.159
year=2003 6.890*** 0.33 6.804*** 0.305 6.835*** 0.279
year=2004 6.582*** 0.406 6.469*** 0.379 6.511*** 0.352
year=2006 4.927*** 0.598 4.847*** 0.559 4.776*** 0.524
constant 13.768* 7.005 14.347** 6.461 11.946** 5.799
R2 within 0.779 0.775 0.781
R2 between 0.321 0.271 0.245
R2 overall 0.396 0.384 0.354
ρ 0.894 0.869 0.886
#obs 464 503 566
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.22: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Maths L3+
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.016 0.043 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.032
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.051 0.039 -0.046 0.039 -0.035 0.039
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.025† 0.015 -0.018 0.012 -0.014 0.012
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.003 0.013 -0.003 0.012 -0.002 0.011
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.014 0.061 -0.01 0.053 -0.005 0.051
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.155** 0.072 0.134* 0.069 0.094 0.068
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.029 0.041 0.01 0.039 -0.008 0.040
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.020 0.047 -0.026 0.044 -0.032 0.037
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.010 0.050 0.006 0.050 0.027 0.045
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.050 0.069 0.037 0.065 0.047 0.058
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.007 0.029 0.002 0.026 -0.001 0.024
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) 0.028 0.036 0.03 0.035 0.036 0.032
median weekly gross pay, male f-t workers (t) 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.006
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.726*** 0.170 -0.632*** 0.163 -0.467** 0.183
% of non-white children (t+3) 0.005 0.086 0.023 0.081 0.059 0.076
year=2003 -1.869*** 0.307 -2.051*** 0.296 -2.203*** 0.281
year=2004 -2.819*** 0.432 -2.938*** 0.406 -3.038*** 0.382
year=2006 -9.270*** 0.671 -9.396*** 0.642 -9.896*** 0.622
constant 40.709*** 6.550 37.987*** 6.320 33.702*** 6.047
R2 within 0.850 0.851 0.849
R2 between 0.427 0.312 0.06
R2 overall 0.575 0.544 0.395
ρ 0.825 0.809 0.846
#obs 463 502 565
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, † p=0.102
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A.5 Robustness: Models #1 & #2, Free Places Only
The panel used for the main estimation is a 5-year panel, with results data annually from the
years 2001 to 2006, though with data from 2005 missing due to the non-availability of childcare
place provision variables in 2002. Consequently, if I exclude the childcare availability variables
from the model, this allows the free early education place take-up data from 2002 (and results
from year 2005) to be utilised – thus making it a 6-year panel. I do this as a robustness check of
the results – to show that adding in an extra year of data, and removing the childcare control
variables, does not qualitatively or quantitatively alter the nature of the results. Tables A.23 to
A.29 report the results of various model estimations when I exclude the childcare variables and
therefore extend the panel to be 6 years for the level 2B or higher results estimations. For the
level 3 or higher results estimations, excluding the childcare variables extends the panel from 4
years to 5 years.
Results are shown not only for the main estimation sample but also for samples 2 and 3 that
are included as robustness checks of the main results.
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Table A.23: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Reading L2B+ Model #1
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 6 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t) 0.027* 0.014 0.036** 0.016 0.037** 0.016
3-year olds early educ take-up, ‘other’ sector (t) 0.005 0.007 -0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007
4-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t+1) -0.012 0.043 -0.021 0.042 -0.027 0.040
4-year olds early educ take-up, ‘other’ sector (t+1) -0.014 0.023 -0.018 0.022 -0.010 0.021
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.419*** 0.154 -0.360** 0.150 -0.343** 0.139
year=2002 -0.101 0.160 -0.111 0.160 -0.021 0.156
year=2003 0.208 0.199 0.217 0.200 0.246 0.189
year=2004 1.854*** 0.255 1.912*** 0.275 1.891*** 0.239
year=2005 3.617*** 0.298 3.746*** 0.291 3.682*** 0.278
year=2006 2.776*** 0.379 2.923*** 0.378 2.873*** 0.359
constant 78.611*** 5.181 77.468*** 5.137 77.365*** 4.789
R2 within 0.532 0.533 0.533
R2 between 0.043 0.076 0.068
R2 overall 0.024 0.010 0.016
ρ 0.919 0.921 0.917
#obs 708 758 858
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.24: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Reading L2B+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 6 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.044* 0.024 0.054** 0.024 0.047* 0.026
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.022 0.017 0.030 0.018 0.033* 0.018
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.002 0.015 -0.001 0.013 0.000 0.012
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.006 0.007 -0.001 0.007 0.002 0.007
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.007 0.051 0.002 0.048 -0.009 0.047
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.032 0.065 -0.056 0.070 -0.047 0.063
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.041 0.054 -0.032 0.046 -0.031 0.044
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.004 0.029 -0.011 0.028 0.002 0.027
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.019 0.024 -0.020 0.024 -0.017 0.022
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.036 0.025 -0.022 0.023 -0.017 0.022
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.424*** 0.157 -0.357** 0.149 -0.348** 0.138
year=2002 -0.169 0.171 -0.167 0.172 -0.069 0.170
year=2003 0.168 0.219 0.153 0.211 0.225 0.203
year=2004 1.796*** 0.286 1.841*** 0.268 1.873*** 0.260
year=2005 3.552*** 0.330 3.674*** 0.310 3.669*** 0.298
year=2006 2.693*** 0.418 2.829*** 0.403 2.846*** 0.386
constant 79.237*** 5.104 78.184*** 5.070 78.042*** 4.739
R2 within 0.546 0.537 0.535
R2 between 0.324 0.338 0.284
R2 overall 0.089 0.151 0.065
ρ 0.949 0.959 0.944
#obs 708 758 858
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.25: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Writing L2B+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 6 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.065** 0.029 0.065** 0.028 0.058** 0.024
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.011 0.017 -0.002 0.020 -0.006 0.023
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.012 0.019 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.017
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.016 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.009
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.074 0.055 -0.054 0.051 -0.058 0.049
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.007 0.068 -0.041 0.076 -0.036 0.067
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.040 0.074 -0.036 0.062 -0.050 0.060
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.023 0.032 0.005 0.032 0.018 0.027
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.013 0.028 -0.012 0.027 -0.004 0.025
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.057 0.035 -0.036 0.033 -0.019 0.032
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.605*** 0.213 -0.585*** 0.206 -0.532*** 0.194
year=2002 0.795*** 0.219 0.811*** 0.217 0.841*** 0.208
year=2003 3.338*** 0.321 3.336*** 0.307 3.367*** 0.278
year=2004 2.861*** 0.364 2.900*** 0.346 2.988*** 0.323
year=2005 2.833*** 0.459 2.927*** 0.438 3.063*** 0.400
year=2006 1.708*** 0.563 1.784*** 0.549 1.928*** 0.510
constant 75.986*** 5.924 75.505*** 6.122 73.866*** 5.817
R2 within 0.376 0.363 0.369
R2 between 0.284 0.156 0.006
R2 overall 0.289 0.008 0.022
ρ 0.850 0.903 0.886
#obs 708 758 858
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.26: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Maths L2B+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 6 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.016 0.036 -0.006 0.037 -0.005 0.036
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.012 0.028 -0.005 0.030 0.007 0.034
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.002 0.016 0.000 0.013 -0.004 0.012
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.016** 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.008
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.040 0.052 -0.024 0.049 -0.032 0.051
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.027 0.048 0.003 0.055 0.010 0.051
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.020 0.064 -0.041 0.054 -0.047 0.052
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.007 0.024 -0.015 0.024 -0.016 0.020
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) 0.012 0.021 0.015 0.021 0.002 0.021
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.033 0.029 -0.012 0.029 -0.011 0.027
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.233 0.159 -0.167 0.161 -0.151 0.153
% of non-white children (t+3) -0.122** 0.054 -0.123** 0.054 -0.090* 0.050
year=2002 0.002 0.170 0.022 0.168 -0.003 0.156
year=2003 -1.962*** 0.226 -1.995*** 0.224 -2.037*** 0.210
year=2004 -0.006 0.303 0.060 0.298 0.139 0.285
year=2005 -1.236*** 0.385 -1.120*** 0.374 -1.209*** 0.364
year=2006 -2.313*** 0.460 -2.203*** 0.453 -2.231*** 0.435
constant 84.531*** 4.697 82.427*** 5.017 81.506*** 4.721
R2 within 0.403 0.393 0.387
R2 between 0.632 0.581 0.564
R2 overall 0.597 0.559 0.543
ρ 0.796 0.770 0.768
#obs 707 757 857
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.27: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Reading L3+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.041 0.045 0.072* 0.042 0.050 0.038
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.025 0.031 -0.014 0.031 -0.004 0.031
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.009
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.002 0.009 -0.001 0.009 0.000 0.008
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.051 0.051 -0.057 0.045 -0.051 0.041
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.130** 0.058 0.089 0.065 0.065 0.062
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.013 0.041 -0.021 0.036 -0.034 0.035
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.021 0.033 0.006 0.032 -0.001 0.028
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.004 0.024 -0.012 0.023 -0.005 0.021
median weekly gross pay, male f-t workers (t) 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.007* 0.004
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.511*** 0.150 -0.434*** 0.144 -0.362** 0.147
year=2003 -2.035*** 0.169 -2.155*** 0.161 -2.093*** 0.155
year=2004 -1.514*** 0.253 -1.617*** 0.239 -1.452*** 0.233
year=2005 -3.036*** 0.347 -3.108*** 0.324 -3.089*** 0.305
year=2006 -4.195*** 0.445 -4.300*** 0.419 -4.287*** 0.393
constant 36.333*** 5.332 34.897*** 5.302 33.465*** 4.856
R2 within 0.589 0.580 0.554
R2 between 0.458 0.381 0.331
R2 overall 0.466 0.408 0.361
ρ 0.908 0.885 0.883
#obs 589 639 727
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.28: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Writing L3+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.005 0.035 0.005 0.034 0.012 0.029
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.015 0.028 -0.008 0.028 -0.014 0.029
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.001 0.018 0.004 0.015 0.004 0.014
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.008
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.003 0.056 -0.014 0.055 -0.015 0.052
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.105* 0.062 0.068 0.066 0.077 0.055
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.101* 0.061 -0.096* 0.052 -0.098* 0.051
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.006 0.043 -0.012 0.039 0.003 0.032
manufacturing jobs rate (t) 0.045 0.032 0.045 0.029 0.045 0.028
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.148 0.157 -0.159 0.148 -0.108 0.142
year=2003 6.745*** 0.343 6.675*** 0.313 6.756*** 0.281
year=2004 6.438*** 0.391 6.344*** 0.358 6.444*** 0.331
year=2005 5.933*** 0.468 5.827*** 0.427 5.889*** 0.391
year=2006 4.849*** 0.528 4.762*** 0.485 4.810*** 0.449
constant 8.277 5.450 10.296* 5.222 8.285* 4.814
R2 within 0.736 0.734 0.741
R2 between 0.321 0.273 0.254
R2 overall 0.425 0.423 0.402
ρ 0.834 0.799 0.816
#obs 589 639 727
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.29: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Maths L3+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: 5 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.026 0.044 0.040 0.037 0.034 0.030
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.042 0.030 -0.038 0.031 -0.031 0.030
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.009 0.016 -0.006 0.013 -0.005 0.012
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.003 0.011 -0.003 0.010 -0.002 0.009
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.023 0.055 -0.017 0.049 -0.011 0.046
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.165*** 0.061 0.140** 0.061 0.118* 0.060
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.016 0.053 -0.022 0.044 -0.033 0.042
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.014 0.036 0.002 0.032 -0.006 0.028
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) 0.026 0.028 0.031 0.027 0.032 0.024
median weekly gross pay, male f-t workers (t) 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.004
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.458*** 0.172 -0.407** 0.161 -0.310* 0.172
% of non-white children (t+3) -0.020 0.084 0.003 0.080 0.029 0.075
year=2003 -1.912*** 0.325 -2.083*** 0.306 -2.174*** 0.284
year=2004 -2.797*** 0.436 -2.920*** 0.407 -2.908*** 0.376
year=2005 -8.019*** 0.577 -8.153*** 0.538 -8.377*** 0.496
year=2006 -9.204*** 0.664 -9.359*** 0.624 -9.627*** 0.580
constant 35.509*** 6.000 34.319*** 5.777 31.254*** 5.607
R2 within 0.849 0.852 0.848
R2 between 0.441 0.349 0.226
R2 overall 0.551 0.543 0.487
ρ 0.872 0.836 0.838
#obs 588 638 726
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
333
A.6 Robustness: Model #2, Excluding 2006
The Tables A.30 to A.35 below report the regression results for the second specification of the
model looking at actual take-up rates of free early education places in each type of setting i.e.
the specification allowing different effects of take-up in the different types of LEA. The results
are reported for each subject at each level for each sample, but with the data from results year
2006 excluded, to confirm that the results still hold when we exclude this data. I run this
robustness check because for the years 2001 to 2004, the published results refer to the children’s
attainments in a standard national task/test, thus this is a consistent dependent variable. From
2005 onwards however, the assessment altered slightly to be a teacher assessed level for the child
– based on their performance in the standard national task/test but also taking into account
the teacher’s own knowledge of the child. Clearly this is something that could potentially affect
results, and could affect things differentially across LEAs depending on the teachers’ attitudes
within each LEA. In light of the potential problems caused by this alteration in assessment
method, I robustness check the results by running the regressions both with and without 2006
results data included.
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Table A.30: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Reading L2B+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3). Data from 2006 excluded
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.080*** 0.028 0.073*** 0.027 0.072*** 0.027
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.020 0.034 -0.017 0.035 -0.015 0.034
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.010 0.014 -0.010 0.012 -0.011 0.012
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.000 0.011 -0.006 0.010 -0.006 0.009
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.075 0.060 -0.074 0.054 -0.079 0.054
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.055 0.066 -0.068 0.066 -0.074 0.062
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.012 0.045 -0.001 0.045 0.004 0.045
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.014 0.033 -0.023 0.033 -0.002 0.034
childcare places available: day nursery (t) -0.023 0.042 -0.024 0.041 -0.018 0.037
childcare places available: childminder (t) -0.005 0.059 -0.001 0.055 0.024 0.052
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.006 0.020 -0.011 0.020 -0.016 0.019
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.081*** 0.029 -0.072** 0.029 -0.058** 0.028
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.044 0.028 -0.050* 0.027 -0.046* 0.025
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.208 0.229 -0.230 0.213 -0.232 0.192
year=2002 -0.166 0.168 -0.153 0.170 -0.158 0.168
year=2003 0.151 0.255 0.138 0.241 0.153 0.226
year=2004 1.885*** 0.344 1.919*** 0.318 1.900*** 0.301
constant 79.305*** 6.546 80.487*** 6.388 80.317*** 6.001
R2 within 0.353 0.355 0.346
R2 between 0.232 0.293 0.206
R2 overall 0.112 0.170 0.117
ρ 0.948 0.954 0.950
#obs 456 485 532
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.31: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Writing L2B+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3). Data from 2006 excluded
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.070* 0.037 0.057 0.036 0.062* 0.035
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.004 0.052 0.001 0.054 0.015 0.053
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.003 0.017 0.003 0.016 0.003 0.016
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.013 0.019 -0.012 0.017 -0.012 0.015
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.080 0.072 -0.058 0.068 -0.063 0.065
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.035 0.075 -0.047 0.075 -0.054 0.068
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.035 0.062 -0.015 0.064 -0.012 0.065
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.007 0.043 0.001 0.041 0.033 0.040
childcare places available: day nursery (t) -0.048 0.057 -0.041 0.055 -0.028 0.050
childcare places available: childminder (t) -0.114* 0.068 -0.082 0.066 -0.051 0.062
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.001 0.023 -0.012 0.025 -0.015 0.024
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.049 0.032 -0.036 0.032 -0.026 0.031
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.061 0.043 -0.063 0.041 -0.054 0.040
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.671* 0.339 -0.826** 0.325 -0.759** 0.306
year=2002 0.833*** 0.239 0.826*** 0.235 0.757*** 0.226
year=2003 3.423*** 0.381 3.400*** 0.363 3.365*** 0.337
year=2004 3.333*** 0.488 3.289*** 0.461 3.281*** 0.432
constant 81.032*** 8.663 84.429*** 8.553 81.971*** 8.258
R2 within 0.485 0.484 0.476
R2 between 0.019 0.121 0.045
R2 overall 0.080 0.002 0.002
ρ 0.895 0.918 0.910
#obs 456 485 532
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.32: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Maths L2B+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3). Data from 2006 excluded
Panel Regression Models: 4 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.076*** 0.029 -0.071** 0.030 -0.070** 0.029
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.049 0.043 -0.044 0.043 -0.029 0.047
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.027** 0.013 -0.020 0.013 -0.020 0.012
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.002 0.010 -0.005 0.009 -0.002 0.009
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.011 0.050 -0.004 0.050 0.007 0.048
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.038 0.045 0.022 0.045 0.015 0.040
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.020 0.045 0.023 0.046 0.016 0.045
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) -0.029 0.028 -0.025 0.028 -0.031 0.025
childcare places available: day nursery (t) -0.034 0.047 -0.034 0.044 -0.013 0.040
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.040 0.048 0.039 0.045 0.049 0.039
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.024 0.021 -0.026 0.020 -0.022 0.020
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.007 0.023 0.008 0.024 0.004 0.024
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.025 0.033 -0.026 0.032 -0.019 0.031
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.213 0.228 -0.212 0.213 -0.061 0.208
% of non-white children (t+3) -0.098* 0.051 -0.101** 0.051 -0.085* 0.049
year=2002 0.098 0.185 0.084 0.180 0.025 0.173
year=2003 -1.681*** 0.265 -1.789*** 0.253 -1.931*** 0.248
year=2004 0.452 0.393 0.380 0.374 0.303 0.360
constant 83.986*** 5.911 84.594*** 5.716 79.916*** 5.730
R2 within 0.440 0.444 0.446
R2 between 0.589 0.552 0.533
R2 overall 0.572 0.546 0.532
ρ 0.814 0.824 0.827
#obs 455 484 531
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.33: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Reading L3+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3). Data from 2006 excluded
Panel Regression Models: 3 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.062 0.055 -0.025 0.050 -0.047 0.047
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.100*** 0.032 -0.094*** 0.031 -0.046 0.049
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.002 0.012 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.010
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.005 0.009
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.031 0.062 -0.011 0.057 -0.023 0.051
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.167*** 0.057 0.155*** 0.057 0.094 0.067
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.007 0.045 0.009 0.043 -0.009 0.041
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.042 0.047 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.036
childcare places available: day nursery (t) -0.043 0.041 -0.027 0.040 0.009 0.040
childcare places available: childminder (t) -0.075 0.046 -0.089* 0.047 -0.056 0.039
childcare places available: playgroup (t) 0.010 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.016
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.014 0.026 -0.014 0.024 -0.004 0.027
median weekly gross pay, male f-t workers (t) 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.006
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.604*** 0.221 -0.498** 0.214 -0.226 0.221
year=2003 -1.853*** 0.215 -1.953*** 0.209 -2.031*** 0.200
year=2004 -1.363*** 0.316 -1.459*** 0.302 -1.544*** 0.286
constant 37.361*** 6.997 35.885*** 6.820 30.073*** 6.519
R2 within 0.528 0.533 0.465
R2 between 0.466 0.421 0.383
R2 overall 0.468 0.421 0.383
ρ 0.938 0.949 0.942
#obs 345 374 419
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.34: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Writing L3+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3). Data from 2006 excluded
Panel Regression Models: 3 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) 0.030 0.065 0.009 0.071 0.019 0.063
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) -0.014 0.043 -0.010 0.042 -0.001 0.046
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.026* 0.014 -0.019 0.014 -0.018 0.014
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.004 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.009
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.056 0.076 -0.065 0.071 -0.061 0.066
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.163** 0.070 0.158** 0.067 0.156** 0.066
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) -0.021 0.044 -0.003 0.044 -0.017 0.044
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.026 0.051 0.016 0.048 0.036 0.039
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.008 0.053 0.007 0.051 0.040 0.046
childcare places available: childminder (t) -0.062 0.084 -0.060 0.080 -0.063 0.068
childcare places available: playgroup (t) -0.026 0.031 -0.034 0.028 -0.024 0.027
manufacturing jobs rate (t) 0.044 0.053 0.022 0.047 0.004 0.043
average KS1 class size (t+3) 0.015 0.299 -0.011 0.282 -0.023 0.234
year=2003 6.865*** 0.351 6.752*** 0.325 6.791*** 0.299
year=2004 6.542*** 0.423 6.308*** 0.389 6.322*** 0.364
constant 3.904 9.552 6.052 9.280 5.368 7.955
R2 within 0.860 0.859 0.863
R2 between 0.262 0.219 0.203
R2 overall 0.336 0.288 0.280
ρ 0.950 0.959 0.958
#obs 345 374 419
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
339
Table A.35: The Effect of Free Early Education Places on Maths L3+ Model #2
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 3 or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3). Data from 2006 excluded
Panel Regression Models: 3 year panel
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
Independent Variable Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err. Coeff. Rob. St. Err.
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.129* 0.070 -0.103 0.063 -0.113*** 0.055
3-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.002 0.055 0.008 0.055 0.045 0.062
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t) -0.027* 0.015 -0.021* 0.012 -0.017 0.012
3-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t) 0.009 0.013 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.010
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.090 0.082 0.062 0.068 0.077 0.064
4-year olds EE take-up, sch sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.142† 0.086 0.122 0.083 0.048 0.083
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’poorer’ LEAs (t+1) 0.028 0.063 0.050 0.062 0.025 0.061
4-year olds EE take-up, ‘other’ sector ’better-off’ LEAs (t+1) 0.008 0.056 0.008 0.053 -0.005 0.043
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.034 0.063 0.045 0.058 0.087 0.055
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.002 0.067 0.007 0.061 0.039 0.052
childcare places available: playgroup (t) 0.012 0.029 0.012 0.026 0.018 0.026
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) 0.025 0.036 0.038 0.035 0.038 0.035
median weekly gross pay, male f-t workers (t) 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.008
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.077 0.328 -0.080 0.295 0.183 0.294
% of non-white children (t+3) -0.114 0.096 -0.115 0.094 -0.078 0.094
year=2003 -1.718*** 0.363 -1.851*** 0.345 -2.062*** 0.353
year=2004 -2.771*** 0.552 -2.837*** 0.523 -3.065*** 0.512
constant 27.024*** 9.771 27.836*** 9.314 21.429** 8.676
R2 within 0.544 0.550 0.520
R2 between 0.503 0.471 0.444
R2 overall 0.491 0.462 0.455
ρ 0.902 0.898 0.816
#obs 344 373 418
#groups 120 130 148
LEA level fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes
ρ is the fraction of the variance due to the fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, † p=0.103
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A.7 Between Estimates
Clearly there is a lot of between LEA variation in the independent and the dependent variables
– as witnessed in the descriptive statistics in section 6 of the paper. As outlined in the paper
section 5, the problem with attempts to exploit the cross-LEA variation is that we know that
the initial levels of the independent variables differ and do so in a way that is not uncorrelated
with results.
To stylise the facts, poorer LEAs have higher levels of take-up of places in the maintained
nursery and primary school settings, lower levels of childcare availability, and lower results. The
poorer LEAs also have the free places in the ‘other’ sector introduced first and this leads to these
LEAs having a higher average over time of provision in these settings. As a result, the between
estimates will lead to negative coefficients on the take-up of ‘other’ sector places. Moreover, as
the better off LEAs have higher results and more childcare places available, we will get positive
coefficients for these variables.
We cannot conclude causal effects of these independent variables as we believe that there
are unobserved characteristics of the LEAs, such as class-mix, and the attitudes and tastes of
parents in the LEAs, which influence the levels of these take-up/provision variables and also
affect the results variables, thus confounding attempts at causal inference.
In all of the following regressions – for each subject and level, for both the basic and aug-
mented specification – we see these priors confirmed. For each regression we see the same
pattern: a negative coefficient on ‘other’ sector take-up for 3-year olds, significant at the 1%
level and positive coefficients on playgroup place and childminder place provision, again almost
always at the 1% level of significance. In all cases there is a small negative coefficient on take-up
by 3-year olds of places in the maintained nursery and primary school settings, though only in
the case of writing L3 or higher is the coefficient significant and then only at the 10% level of
significance.
In terms of the effect of the take-up by 3-year olds of places in the ‘other’ sector, the
negative coefficient is driven by the unobserved characteristics of the LEAs which influence the
childcare/early education provision in the LEA and also influence the results. These LEAs
are poorer and as a result have lower private provision of places since, on the demand side,
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parents do not have a high valuation of early education and limited financial resources for this
area of expenditure and therefore demand less, whereas on the supply side there are risks to
private providers of setting up in these areas hence lower supply. As a result these are the LEAs
that the Government targeted to receive the nursery education grant to provide 3-year olds
with early education places a year earlier than in the other more prosperous LEAs. Therefore
in the between estimates we get this spurious relationship that private places have a negative
effect on KS1 assessment outcomes. In the second specification I can attempt to control for the
observed characteristics of LEAs – such as unemployment rate, manufacturing jobs rate, median
weekly gross pay – that are correlated with childcare/early education place provision/take-up
and results. Even controlling for these factors I still find a significant negative coefficient on
take-up in the non-maintained nursery and primary school settings. It does appear that the
unobserved characteristics are biasing the coefficient.
The data descriptives in the paper reveal that there is a stark contrast between the poorer
(‘pathfinder’) group of LEAs and the better off LEAs in terms of the use by 3-year olds of early
education places in the maintained nursery and primary school settings – mean take-up in the
poorer LEAs over the time period being 59.39% compared with 28.77% in the better off LEAs.
However, though this is a major difference between the groups of LEAs and also correlated with
the differences in results, the coefficient on this take-up rate is only significant in the writing
L3 or higher regressions. The reason for this is that 3-year olds take-up of nursery and primary
school places is strongly correlated with the playgroup place provision variable. 3-year olds take-
up of nursery and primary school places does have a strong and significant negative coefficient in
all of the regressions until the playgroup provision variable is introduced – playgroup provision
has such a strong correlation with both results (as well as 3-year olds take-up of nursery and
primary school places) that the coefficient on 3-year olds take-up of nursery and primary school
places whilst remaining negative, reduces in size and is not longer significant.
To confirm that the (fixed) unobserved characteristics of the LEAs are correlated with the
independent variables, I perform Hausman tests which determine whether the fixed effects or
random effects estimation is the appropriate method to use. The table below shows for each
subject and level, the Hausman test statistic for the null hypothesis that the difference in
coefficients between the random effects estimation of the model and the fixed effects estimation
342
Subject Level Specification Hausman test statistic p-value
Reading 3 or higher model #1 χ-squared (11) = 24.17 0.0121
model #2 χ-squared (17) = 27.07 0.0571
2B or higher model #1 χ-squared (12) = 53.88 0.0000
model #2 χ-squared (18) = 50.56 0.0001
Writing 3 or higher model #1 χ-squared (11) = 12.29 0.3424
model #2 χ-squared (16) = 17.85 0.3329
2B or higher model #1 χ-squared (12) = 30.99 0.0020
model #2 χ-squared (18) = 37.44 0.0046
Maths 3 or higher model #1 χ-squared (12) = 37.27 0.0000
model #2 χ-squared (18) = -35.90 chi2<0
2B or higher model #1 χ-squared (13) = 63.82 0.0000
model #2 χ-squared (19) = 9.02 0.9731
of the model is not systematic. We reject this null if the p-value on the test is less than 0.01,
less than 0.05 or less than 0.10 for conventional levels of significance.
We can see that for model #1 we reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance
in each case except reading L3 or higher, where the rejection is at the 2% level of significance
and writing L3 or higher where we fail to reject the null. In this latter case, failure to reject the
null means that fixed effects estimation is still consistent though it is not as efficient as random
effects estimation. For model #2 we continue to reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level for
reading and writing L2B or higher, and reject the null hypothesis at just outside the 5% level
for reading L3 or higher. However we continue to fail to reject the null for writing L3 or higher
and strongly reject the null for maths L2B or higher. For maths L3 or higher we can no longer
perform the test as the model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of
the Hausman test. Again it should be borne in mind that failure to reject the null indicates that
fixed effects estimation whilst still consistent may not be efficient.
It should also be borne in mind that for writing L3 or higher, the regressions implemented
using fixed effects estimation and using random effects estimation produce very similar coeffi-
cients for the significant control variables (hence the failure to reject the null) however for the
one significant variable of interest – take-up of places in the maintained nursery and primary
school settings by 4-year olds in the better off LEAs – the coefficient is biased down to 0.078
in the random effects model from 0.157 in the fixed effect model. This suggests that the un-
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observed fixed characteristics of the LEAs are negatively correlated with 4-year olds take-up of
places in nursery and primary school so that when we control for them in the fixed effects model
the coefficient on 4-year olds take-up of places in nursery and primary school increases. This
confirms the prior that there is selection into higher use of maintained settings, even within the
better off LEAs group, by characteristics associated with lower outcomes.
I believe the tests, the descriptive data and the between estimates provide justification for
estimating the model using fixed effects estimation.
Table A.36 to A.38 show the regression results for the between estimates of the basic speci-
fication and the specification including additional covariates, for each subject and each level.
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Table A.36: The Association Between Free Early Education Place Take-Up and Reading Attainment
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: Between Estimates
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
model # 1 model # 2 model # 1 model # 2
Rob. Rob Rob Rob
Independent Variable Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err.
3-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t) -0.033 0.034 -0.007 0.036 -0.034 0.035 -0.001 0.037
3-year olds early educ take-up, ‘other’ sector (t) -0.209*** 0.058 -0.162*** 0.059 -0.187*** 0.048 -0.152*** 0.049
4-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t+1) 0.018 0.064 0.046 0.067 0.018 0.064 0.017 0.063
4-year olds early educ olds take-up, ‘other’ sector (t+1) -0.079 0.082 -0.067 0.080 0.023 0.083 0.034 0.081
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.135 0.109 0.127 0.106 0.099 0.103 0.112 0.100
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.384*** 0.089 0.308*** 0.091 0.381*** 0.092 0.307*** 0.094
childcare places available: playgroup (t) 0.186*** 0.054 0.179*** 0.053 0.155*** 0.055 0.139** 0.056
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.267*** 0.095 -0.267*** 0.098
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.043 0.061
median weekly gross pay, male f-t workers (t) -0.006 0.006
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.578* 0.332 -0.787** 0.365 -0.150 0.333 -0.223 0.338
constant 77.823*** 11.360 85.008*** 11.841 24.950** 11.271 32.414*** 11.303
R2 within 0.227 0.193 0.314 0.322
R2 between 0.552 0.582 0.574 0.604
R2 overall 0.116 0.180 0.443 0.492
#obs 575 575 464 464
#groups 120 120 120 120
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.37: The Association Between Free Early Education Place Take-Up and Writing Attainment
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: Between Estimates
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
model # 1 model # 2 model # 1 model # 2
Rob. Rob Rob Rob
Independent Variable Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err.
3-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t) -0.056 0.040 -0.024 0.042 -0.051* 0.030 -0.049 0.031
3-year olds early educ take-up, ‘other’ sector (t) -0.248*** 0.068 -0.198*** 0.069 -0.147*** 0.040 -0.147*** 0.041
4-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t+1) 0.021 0.074 0.035 0.078 0.059 0.054 0.054 0.057
4-year olds early educ olds take-up, ‘other’ sector (t+1) -0.105 0.095 -0.091 0.093 -0.042 0.069 -0.041 0.070
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.158 0.126 0.150 0.124 0.028 0.086 0.028 0.086
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.368*** 0.103 0.286*** 0.106 0.115 0.077 0.113 0.078
childcare places available: playgroup (t) 0.168*** 0.063 0.162*** 0.061 0.079* 0.046 0.079* 0.046
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.278** 0.110
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.004 0.071 0.014 0.052
average KS1 class size (t+3) -0.662* 0.384 -0.772* 0.425 -0.071 0.279 -0.037 0.309
constant 72.737*** 13.14 77.818*** 13.788 12.100 9.445 11.353 9.900
R2 within 0.051 0.040 0.125 0.125
R2 between 0.491 0.520 0.315 0.316
R2 overall 0.111 0.163 0.002 0.002
#obs 575 575 464 464
#groups 120 120 120 120
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.38: The Association Between Free Early Education Place Take-Up and Maths Attainment
Dependent Variable: Percentage of children in the LEA’s maintained school achieving Level 2B or higher in Key Stage 1 assessment, year (t+3).
Panel Regression Models: Between Estimates
Level 2B or higher Level 3 or higher
model # 1 model # 2 model # 1 model # 2
Rob. Rob Rob Rob
Independent Variable Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err.
3-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t) -0.008 0.027 0.001 0.028 -0.017 0.033 0.019 0.034
3-year olds early educ take-up, ‘other’ sector (t) -0.192*** 0.047 -0.153*** 0.046 -0.186*** 0.045 -0.139*** 0.046
4-year olds early educ take-up, school sector (t+1) -0.106** 0.052 -0.056 0.052 -0.027 0.060 -0.014 0.058
4-year olds early educ olds take-up, ‘other’ sector (t+1) -0.112* 0.065 -0.107* 0.062 -0.003 0.077 -0.008 0.074
childcare places available: day nursery (t) 0.130 0.087 0.125 0.083 0.112 0.095 0.098 0.092
childcare places available: childminder (t) 0.277*** 0.072 0.220*** 0.072 0.329*** 0.086 0.236*** 0.088
childcare places available: playgroup (t) 0.097** 0.044 0.082* 0.042 0.080 0.053 0.097* 0.052
economic inactivity rate, working age males (t) -0.207*** 0.073 -0.247*** 0.089
manufacturing jobs rate (t) -0.126** 0.049
median weekly gross pay, male f-t workers (t) 0.010 0.007
average KS1 class size (t+3) 0.245 0.305 -0.061 0.306 0.553 0.354 0.453 0.347
% of non-white children (t+3) -0.099*** 0.017 -0.110*** 0.017 -0.067*** 0.019 -0.085*** 0.022
constant 76.184*** 9.347 85.635*** 9.345 13.390 10.838 13.340 11.296
R2 within 0.126 0.130 0.482 0.423
R2 between 0.680 0.713 0.579 0.615
R2 overall 0.424 0.499 0.535 0.528
#obs 574 574 463 463
#groups 120 120 120 120
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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B.1 Estimating HCEF using only those with 11 or more years
education
Table B.1: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status
OLS IV: smoker at 16 IV: first stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
constant -0.318*** 0.331 -0.845** 0.419 6.778 2.227
years of schooling 0.038*** 0.003 0.132*** 0.026 — —
smoker at 16 indicator — — — — -0.833*** 0.125
age 0.106*** 0.005 0.104*** 0.006 0.021*** 0.026
age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
year-of-birth -0.026** 0.009 -0.052*** 0.013 0.247*** 0.059
year-of-birth2 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000
region: North 0.061** 0.042 0.070 0.052 -0.081 0.298
region: Yorkshire 0.017 0.038 -0.020 0.049 0.440 0.285
region: North West 0.057 0.038 0.002 0.048 0.611 0.283
region: East Midlands -0.005 0.037 -0.011 0.045 0.107 0.268
region: East Anglia 0.008 0.044 -0.015 0.055 0.308 0.361
region: South East 0.149*** 0.032 0.082** 0.043 0.762*** 0.223
region: South West 0.023 0.038 0.014 0.047 0.175 0.261
region: Wales 0.008 0.046 -0.017 0.053 0.241 0.311
region: Scotland 0.039 0.040 -0.032 0.052 0.799** 0.292
ethnicity: black 0.132 0.113 0.115 0.129 0.055 0.716
ethnicity: asian -0.165* 0.070 -0.340*** 0.107 1.733*** 0.484
ethnicity: other -0.041 0.112 -0.279** 0.134 2.392* 1.103
father’s occ class: 1 0.125*** 0.031 0.036 0.045 0.909*** 0.231
father’s occ class: 2 0.144*** 0.039 -0.049 0.071 1.935*** 0.297
father’s occ class: 3 0.082** 0.044 -0.036 0.060 1.162*** 0.331
father’s occ class: 4 0.085* 0.040 -0.020 0.057 1.006*** 0.324
father’s occ class: 5 0.038* 0.026 0.016 0.033 0.227*** 0.200
father’s occ class: 6 0.020 0.038 -0.072 0.054 0.873*** 0.332
father’s occ class: 7 0.107*** 0.043 0.098 0.055 0.131 0.358
father’s occ class: 9 0.002 0.037 0.058 0.046 -0.585*** 0.252
father’s occ class: 10 0.035 0.031 0.034 0.037 -0.047 0.223
mother’s occ class: 1 0.019 0.056 0.007 0.073 0.098 0.454
mother’s occ class: 2 -0.017 0.057 -0.111 0.073 1.033*** 0.451
mother’s occ class: 3 0.025 0.052 0.064 0.064 -0.367 0.427
mother’s occ class: 4 0.024 0.043 0.005 0.055 0.238 0.345
mother’s occ class: 5 -0.018 0.057 0.004 0.072 -0.097 0.489
mother’s occ class: 6 0.003 0.044 0.036 0.055 -0.227 0.357
mother’s occ class: 7 0.026 0.046 0.067 0.058 -0.472 0.354
mother’s occ class: 9 -0.065 0.044 -0.011 0.055 -0.572 0.346
mother’s occ class: 10 -0.015 0.036 -0.004 0.046 -0.105 0.305
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.016 0.022 -0.009 0.026 0.180* 0.147
mid 1990s -0.049*** 0.010 -0.057*** 0.011 0.086 0.051
late 1990s -0.068*** 0.016 -0.077*** 0.018 0.111 0.088
post 2000 -0.033 0.023 -0.045* 0.027 0.144 0.136
# observations 16985 16985 16985
# individuals 1739 1739 1739
R2 0.278 0.040 0.218
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natutal parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
B.2 Estimating the HCEF using only one observation per per-
son in the first stage, Smoker at 16 IV
Table B.2: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status
OLS IV: smoker at 16 IV: first stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
constant -0.754*** 0.250 -0.541 0.351 -0.137 6.170
years of schooling 0.046*** 0.003 0.133*** 0.021 — —
smoker at 16 indicator — — — — -0.876*** 0.097
age 0.099*** 0.004 0.101*** 0.006 -0.004 0.083
age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.001
year-of-birth -0.016*** 0.007 -0.058*** 0.012 0.411*** 0.109
year-of-birth2 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.001
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.061 0.044 -0.187 0.238
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 0.006 0.039 0.136 0.223
region: North West 0.054 0.032 0.048 0.037 0.207 0.226
region: East Midlands -0.010 0.032 -0.001 0.037 -0.104 0.224
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 0.010 0.049 0.180 0.302
region: South East 0.142*** 0.028 0.102*** 0.035 0.610*** 0.186
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.030 0.037 0.037 0.217
region: Wales -0.012 0.040 -0.009 0.044 -0.042 0.270
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 0.014 0.040 0.362 0.229
ethnicity: black 0.114 0.105 0.096 0.166 -0.034 0.881
ethnicity: asian -0.136 0.071 -0.251*** 0.092 1.385*** 0.458
ethnicity: other -0.048 0.103 -0.180 0.140 1.615* 0.841
father’s occ class: 1 0.116*** 0.028 0.010 0.039 1.163*** 0.146
father’s occ class: 2 0.121*** 0.038 -0.094 0.069 2.314*** 0.209
father’s occ class: 3 0.089** 0.043 -0.033 0.056 1.369*** 0.236
father’s occ class: 4 0.065* 0.036 -0.077 0.056 1.439*** 0.219
father’s occ class: 5 0.038* 0.023 0.007 0.027 0.359*** 0.116
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 -0.073 0.046 0.933*** 0.189
father’s occ class: 7 0.103*** 0.04 0.057 0.048 0.490** 0.219
father’s occ class: 9 -0.021 0.029 0.025 0.037 -0.494*** 0.132
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.007 0.030 0.152 0.126
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.025 0.064 0.159 0.296
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 -0.108 0.071 1.379*** 0.313
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.032 0.063 0.179 0.312
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.04 0.008 0.049 0.491*** 0.225
mother’s occ class: 5 0.01 0.049 0.019 0.062 -0.044 0.263
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.04 0.030 0.049 0.031 0.228
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.054 0.049 -0.082 0.227
mother’s occ class: 9 -0.004 0.038 0.030 0.049 -0.439*** 0.201
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 -0.010 0.039 0.138 0.176
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 -0.006 0.023 0.290 0.097
mid 1990s -0.045*** 0.009 -0.039 0.015 -0.130 0.211
late 1990s -0.065*** 0.014 -0.056 0.023 -0.144 0.347
post 2000 -0.033 0.021 -0.023 0.034 -0.055 0.533
# observations 21256 13498 1432
# individuals 2266 1398 1432
R2 0.265 0.220 0.250
F-test on exclusion of instrument from first stage: 51.50; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0302
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natutal parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
IV second stage standard errors obtained by bootstrapping.
B.3 Estimating the HCEF using only one observation per per-
son in the first stage, RoSLA IV
Table B.3: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using RoSLA
OLS IV: RoSLA IV: first stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
constant -0.754*** 0.250 -0.533 0.377 -0.564 5.011
years of schooling 0.046*** 0.003 0.143** 0.058
smoker at 16 indicator — — — — 0.487*** 0.153
age 0.099*** 0.004 0.101*** 0.006 0.020 0.070
age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.001
year-of-birth -0.016*** 0.007 -0.062** 0.028 0.408*** 0.091
year-of-birth2 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.001
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.058 0.048 -0.132 0.192
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 0.000 0.045 0.142 0.178
region: North West 0.054 0.032 0.047 0.041 0.176 0.175
region: East Midlands -0.010 0.032 0.004 0.039 -0.139 0.174
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 0.007 0.054 0.121 0.243
region: South East 0.142*** 0.028 0.093* 0.049 0.609*** 0.141
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.026 0.039 -0.005 0.171
region: Wales -0.012 0.040 -0.006 0.047 -0.023 0.211
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 0.007 0.048 0.388** 0.185
ethnicity: black 0.114 0.105 0.102 0.181 0.123 0.788
ethnicity: asian -0.136 0.071 -0.270** 0.134 1.571*** 0.377
ethnicity: other -0.048 0.103 -0.202 0.173 1.756** 0.695
father’s occ class: 1 0.116*** 0.028 -0.004 0.078 1.217*** 0.149
father’s occ class: 2 0.121*** 0.038 -0.120 0.155 2.443*** 0.213
father’s occ class: 3 0.089** 0.043 -0.052 0.101 1.474*** 0.244
father’s occ class: 4 0.065* 0.036 -0.093 0.102 1.566*** 0.222
father’s occ class: 5 0.038* 0.023 0.001 0.035 0.359*** 0.118
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 -0.084 0.074 0.994*** 0.196
father’s occ class: 7 0.103*** 0.040 0.050 0.057 0.535** 0.223
father’s occ class: 9 -0.021 0.029 0.029 0.048 -0.522*** 0.133
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.003 0.034 0.210 0.128
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.025 0.073 0.132 0.303
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 -0.130 0.108 1.373*** 0.321
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.030 0.068 0.150 0.317
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 -0.001 0.058 0.485** 0.234
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.014 0.069 -0.112 0.274
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.027 0.052 -0.056 0.234
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.059 0.054 -0.080 0.233
mother’s occ class: 9 -0.004 0.038 0.037 0.061 -0.471** 0.208
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 -0.013 0.042 0.135 0.184
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 -0.011 0.033 0.376*** 0.097
mid 1990s -0.045*** 0.009 -0.039** 0.015 -0.161 0.209
late 1990s -0.065*** 0.014 -0.056** 0.023 -0.137 0.349
post 2000 -0.033 0.021 -0.024 0.034 -0.030 0.539
# observations 21256 13498 1398
# individuals 2266 1398 1398
R2 0.265 0.160 0.229
F-test on exclusion of instrument from first stage: 4.06; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0029
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natutal parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
IV second stage standard errors obtained by bootstrapping.
Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 4
C.1 Education Breakdown by Country
Germany Neth. France Italy Spain Portugal
Education Level % % % % % %
“high” 27.2 24.8 25.8 9.0 33.6 7.8
“medium” 61.4 55.1 45.7 51.6 23.0 15.6
“low” 11.3 20.1 28.5 39.4 43.4 76.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table C.1: Education Breakdown by Country
“High” education refers to ISCED levels 5-7, corresponding to any tertiary level education. “Medium”
level education refers to ISCED level 3 and corresponds to upper-secondary (i.e. post-compulsory) level
schooling, while “low” education refers to ISCED levels 0-2 and represents levels of education up to
the end of compulsory schooling. The Table shows that for Germany, the Netherlands, France and
Spain the proportion of “high” educated individuals is of a similar order of magnitude, however Italy and
Portugal have a considerably smaller proportion of individuals in the top educated bracket. As the ECHP
surveys are designed to be the same in each country and the education coding is a standard international
classification, this should be reflecting genuine differences in educational composition of each sample.
Ideally the proportion with “high” education would approximately similar in each country, which is not
the case, primarily due to Italy and Portugal. An alternative strategy would be to capture human capital
differences via occupational classification. The ECHP contains the International Standard Classification
of Occupation (ISCO-88) 1-digit level classification for individual’s occupations. The 1-digit ISCO-88
classification assigns occupations to one of 9 categories, from 1 “Legislators, senior officials, managers”,
through 5 “Service workers and shop and market sales workers”, to 9 “Elementary occupations”. Attempts
to combine these gradings into 3 broad levels of human capital attainment, with similar proportions of
individuals at each level in each country, were unsuccessful. Consequently, though dividing individuals
using the 3 category education variable does not result in absolute symmetry across countries, it is more
satisfactory than the possible alternative human capital measures based on occupational classification.
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C.2 Model Specification
In this appendix we describe in full detail the functional form assumptions of the model. To refresh the
notation and basic structure of the statistical model: each country’s sample is a set of N workers indexed














As outlined in Section 4.4 of the main body, there are three components to individual i’s contribution to
the complete likelihood (equation (4.1), referring respectively to unobserved heterogeneity, labour market
status history and earnings history. Below we set out the full specification of each of these components.
The choice of covariates to be included in each component was informed not only by the descriptive
analysis of section 4.3, but also by a concern for numerical tractability, parsimony and the aim to have
the same model specification estimated for each of the countries.
C.2.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity

























, which are both



































where κm1 and κ
y
1 are both normalised at zero.
C.2.2 Labour Market States




























































































As alluded to in subsection (4.4.3), each component is specified as a logit. Allowing Λ (x) = (1 + e−x)
−1
to designate the logistic cdf:
Pr
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We allow the unobserved mobility heterogeneity class kmi to affect the unemployment and public sector
probabilities only through altering the constant terms in the respective logits. This is because the number
of observed sector transitions is not sufficient in the sample for most of the countries to allow less restrictive
specifications – such as allowing this unobserved class to interact with experience or education – to be
estimated. We do however allow the effect of experience (and it’s square) to interact with previous state.





































As the exposition in the main body text Section (4.4.4) details much of the modelling of earnings tra-
jectories, what remains for this appendix is to set out the set of functions {µ (·) , σ (·) , τ1 (·) and τ2 (·)}
introduced in equations (4.7) and (4.9). Recall from Section (4.4.4) that only individuals who are em-
ployed at date-t have earnings information available at date-t, therefore eit = 1 for all observations used
to estimate the µ (·), and indeed the σ (·) function, and as such eit is not an argument of either function.














′ µ0 + [zvit ∗ pubit]′ µ1 + [kyi ∗ zvit]′ µ2 + [kyi · pubit]µ3, (C.26)
where the notation x ∗ y stands for all of the main effects and interactions of variables x and y, and x · y
stands for the single interaction term between x and y. Thus the specification of the µ (·) function allows
the effect of experience to differ across job sectors and wage classes, and the public sector effect is also
allowed to vary with wage class. Previous period unemployment and time-invariant heterogeneity can
affect the intercept only.
1Again the unobserved mobility heterogeneity class kmi can only alter the constant term in each equation, and
for the initial states we do not allow interactions of experience with previous state
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Turning to the log earnings variance function, we specify:


















Clearly the functional form posited for σ (·) is considerably more restrictive than we allow for the earnings
means. Specifically we do not include the time-invariant observed individual characteristics zfi amongst
the arguments of σ (·), thus we allow them to influence earnings variance only through their link to the
time-invariant wage class, kyi . Moreover, we do not allow interactions of the wage class with any of
the other arguments. Given the relatively small sample sizes available, and some experimentation with
allowing some interactions, between for example kyi and pubit, we find this specification to provide the
best fit for all of the countries in the data. Note that by specifying it as an exponential, we force the log
earnings variance to be positive.
Finally, we come to the specification of the earnings dynamics, which are governed by the functions
τ1 (·) and τ2 (·). Again recall that earnings at date-t are only available for individuals in employment at
that date and therefore eit = 1 and ei,t−1 = 1 for all observations contributing to the estimation of the
τ1 (·) function and as such are not arguments of the function. The first-order auto-correlation of earnings,























′ · ζ1 + [pubi,t−1 ∗ kyi ]′ · ζ2
 . (C.28)
This specification requires some clarification. Firstly, the transformation −1+ 2 ·Λ (·) which we apply to
a linear index in the explanatory variables is there to constrain τ1 (·), which is a correlation coefficient, to
lie within [−1,+1]. Second, as with the specification of σ (·) function, the number of interactions amongst
the covariates is limited to allowing different impacts of each covariate depending on the wage class. This
specification was decided upon following numerous trials involving different specifications with various
interactions permitted. The finding was that the vast increase in computation time that this entailed
for each country, did not bring any clear benefit in terms of greater precision of the fit, thus the current
more parsimonious specification was settled upon.
The correlation between normalised log earnings and normalised log earnings lagged twice, τ2 (·), is
more complex. First let us recall the notation introduced in Section 4.4.4’s equation (4.9), for the one-
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and τi,t,t−2 = τ2
(































i ) , (C.29)
with τ˜2 (k
y






simply specified as an wage class-specific constant within [−1,+1].
Note that τi,t−1,t−2 is simply the first lag of τi,t,t−1.
These latter equations require some comments. Firstly, we have to constrain τ2 (·) in such a way that,









is a consistent covariance matrix. This is the case provided that its determinant ∆it is positive (and





2τi,t,t−1τi,t−1,t−2τi,t,t−2. Solving for τi,t,t−2, we get:









Because ∆it is positive, τi,t,t−2 has to stay within the interval
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Initial unemployment probability: Pr
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km = 2 1.495
(1.077)




Initial probability of public sector: Pr
{














km = 2 −5.991
(0.327)

























Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 0.418
(0.555)
Public last period × Experience 0.100
(0.536)
Public last period × Experience2 −0.010
(0.113)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 1.158
(0.296)
Unempl. last period × Experience 0.344
(0.298)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 0.030
(0.064)
km = 2 −3.093
(0.107)




Prob. of public sector: Pr
{

















Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 3.639
(0.360)
Public last period × Experience 1.236
(0.377)
Public last period × Experience2 −0.189
(0.084)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 1.336
(0.512)
Unempl. last period × Experience 0.722
(0.548)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 −0.122
(0.126)
km = 2 −1.422
(0.169)
































ky = 2 −0.066
(0.010)
(ky = 2)×Experience 0.053
(0.010)
(ky = 2)×Experience2 −0.015
(0.002)











Public: pubit = 1 −0.157
(0.041)






Table C.4: Germany: Parameters of cross-sectional earnings means and standard deviations








(ky = 1)×(High Education) 1.136
(0.055)
(ky = 1)×(Medium Education) −0.592
(0.049)
(ky = 1)×Public 0.017
(0.079)
(ky = 1)×(Public last period) −0.326
(0.078)
(ky = 1)×(Experience (years/10)) −0.268
(0.014)
ky = 1 −2.526
(0.057)
(ky = 2)×(High Education) −3.063
(0.107)
(ky = 2)×(Medium Education) −0.721
(0.104)
(ky = 2)×Public −0.020
(0.089)
(ky = 2)×(Public last period) −0.428
(0.088)
(ky = 2)×(Experience (years/10)) −0.258
(0.018)
ky = 2 −0.975
(0.114)
Second-order earnings autocorrelation: τ˜2 (k
y
i )
ky = 1 −0.661
(0.025)
ky = 2 −0.568
(0.032)












































km = 2 −1.422
(0.103)




Table C.6: Germany: Parameters of unobserved heterogeneity (multinomial logit models)
C.3.2 Netherlands
Initial unemployment probability: Pr
{














km = 2 2.098
(0.687)




Initial probability of public sector: Pr
{














km = 2 −18.274
(304.200)

























Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 1.640
(0.591)
Public last period × Experience −2.245
(0.641)
Public last period × Experience2 0.535
(0.140)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 2.353
(0.428)
Unempl. last period × Experience 0.174
(0.501)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 0.104
(0.114)
km = 2 2.962
(0.395)




Prob. of public sector: Pr
{

















Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 3.144
(0.497)
Public last period × Experience 0.159
(0.484)
Public last period × Experience2 −0.082
(0.107)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 1.993
(0.737)
Unempl. last period × Experience −1.593
(0.952)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 0.383
(0.235)
km = 2 −2.723
(0.145)
































ky = 2 0.005
(0.009)
(ky = 2)×Experience −0.013
(0.009)
(ky = 2)×Experience2 −0.002
(0.002)











Public: pubit = 1 −0.375
(0.046)






Table C.9: Netherlands: Parameters of cross-sectional earnings means and standard deviations








(ky = 1)×(High Education) 1.113
(0.055)
(ky = 1)×(Medium Education) 1.150
(0.048)
(ky = 1)×Public −0.829
(0.083)
(ky = 1)×(Public last period) −0.652
(0.082)
(ky = 1)×(Experience (years/10)) −0.203
(0.020)
ky = 1 −3.190
(0.055)
(ky = 2)×(High Education) −2.171
(0.085)
(ky = 2)×(Medium Education) −2.286
(0.077)
(ky = 2)×Public 0.933
(0.103)
(ky = 2)×(Public last period) 0.950
(0.101)
(ky = 2)×(Experience (years/10)) −0.321
(0.020)
ky = 2 −1.143
(0.086)
Second-order earnings autocorrelation: τ˜2 (k
y
i )
ky = 1 −0.535
(0.033)
ky = 2 −0.576
(0.033)












































km = 2 1.513
(0.162)




Table C.11: Netherlands: Parameters of unobserved heterogeneity (multinomial logit models)
C.3.3 France
Initial unemployment probability: Pr
{














km = 2 −6.867
(0.764)




Initial probability of public sector: Pr
{














km = 2 1.894
(0.239)

























Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 1.098
(0.598)
Public last period × Experience −3.532
(0.987)
Public last period × Experience2 1.144
(0.278)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 1.970
(0.319)
Unempl. last period × Experience 0.022
(0.410)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 0.129
(0.103)
km = 2 −29.375
(5725.096)




Prob. of public sector: Pr
{

















Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 6.229
(0.820)
Public last period × Experience 2.975
(1.023)
Public last period × Experience2 −0.430
(0.261)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 2.390
(0.659)
Unempl. last period × Experience 0.348
(1.110)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 0.106
(0.327)
km = 2 1.709
(0.438)
































ky = 2 0.022
(0.013)
(ky = 2)×Experience −0.041
(0.013)
(ky = 2)×Experience2 0.017
(0.003)











Public: pubit = 1 −0.158
(0.045)






Table C.14: France: Parameters of cross-sectional earnings means and standard deviations








(ky = 1)×(High Education) −0.346
(0.052)
(ky = 1)×(Medium Education) 1.694
(0.055)
(ky = 1)×Public 0.402
(0.305)
(ky = 1)×(Public last period) −0.689
(0.305)
(ky = 1)×(Experience (years/10)) −0.387
(0.023)
ky = 1 −2.805
(0.068)
(ky = 2)×(High Education) −0.159
(0.073)
(ky = 2)×(Medium Education) −2.035
(0.062)
(ky = 2)×Public −0.364
(0.259)
(ky = 2)×(Public last period) 0.089
(0.259)
(ky = 2)×(Experience (years/10)) −0.318
(0.021)
ky = 2 −1.061
(0.077)
Second-order earnings autocorrelation: τ˜2 (k
y
i )
ky = 1 −0.655
(0.034)
ky = 2 −0.590
(0.033)












































km = 2 −0.589
(0.164)




Table C.16: France: Parameters of unobserved heterogeneity (multinomial logit models)
C.3.4 Italy
Initial unemployment probability: Pr
{














km = 2 1.895
(0.192)




Initial probability of public sector: Pr
{














km = 2 4.612
(0.186)

























Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 −0.967
(0.461)
Public last period × Experience −0.132
(0.532)
Public last period × Experience2 −0.072
(0.121)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 1.973
(0.283)
Unempl. last period × Experience 0.380
(0.356)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 −0.047
(0.083)
km = 2 2.674
(0.182)




Prob. of public sector: Pr
{

















Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 4.235
(0.434)
Public last period × Experience 1.361
(0.413)
Public last period × Experience2 −0.216
(0.088)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 1.736
(0.450)
Unempl. last period × Experience −0.353
(0.575)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 0.096
(0.142)
km = 2 1.699
(0.115)
































ky = 2 −0.016
(0.009)
(ky = 2)×Experience −0.059
(0.008)
(ky = 2)×Experience2 0.017
(0.002)











Public: pubit = 1 −0.009
(0.039)






Table C.19: Italy: Parameters of cross-sectional earnings means and standard deviations








(ky = 1)×(High Education) −0.160
(0.073)
(ky = 1)×(Medium Education) −0.252
(0.055)
(ky = 1)×Public −0.292
(0.111)
(ky = 1)×(Public last period) 0.005
(0.112)
(ky = 1)×(Experience (years/10)) −0.194
(0.024)
ky = 1 −1.170
(0.085)
(ky = 2)×(High Education) −1.056
(0.082)
(ky = 2)×(Medium Education) −0.398
(0.039)
(ky = 2)×Public 0.466
(0.098)
(ky = 2)×(Public last period) −0.594
(0.098)
(ky = 2)×(Experience (years/10)) −0.447
(0.020)
ky = 2 −1.527
(0.053)
Second-order earnings autocorrelation: τ˜2 (k
y
i )
ky = 1 −0.553
(0.034)
ky = 2 −0.531
(0.030)












































km = 2 0.484
(0.094)




Table C.21: Italy: Parameters of unobserved heterogeneity (multinomial logit models)
C.3.5 Spain
Initial unemployment probability: Pr
{














km = 2 4.071
(0.293)




Initial probability of public sector: Pr
{














km = 2 −6.305
(0.420)

























Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 0.568
(0.449)
Public last period × Experience −0.863
(0.439)
Public last period × Experience2 0.197
(0.092)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 1.406
(0.210)
Unempl. last period × Experience −0.025
(0.229)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 0.063
(0.051)
km = 2 3.201
(0.195)




Prob. of public sector: Pr
{

















Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 3.718
(0.511)
Public last period × Experience 0.409
(0.462)
Public last period × Experience2 −0.062
(0.094)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 2.007
(0.487)
Unempl. last period × Experience −0.672
(0.507)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 0.167
(0.112)
km = 2 −2.063
(0.150)
































ky = 2 0.323
(0.014)
(ky = 2)×Experience −0.300
(0.013)
(ky = 2)×Experience2 0.050
(0.003)











Public: pubit = 1 −0.130
(0.045)






Table C.24: Spain: Parameters of cross-sectional earnings means and standard deviations








(ky = 1)×(High Education) 0.164
(0.049)
(ky = 1)×(Medium Education) 0.173
(0.054)
(ky = 1)×Public −0.082
(0.106)
(ky = 1)×(Public last period) −0.032
(0.106)
(ky = 1)×(Experience (years/10)) 0.010
(0.020)
ky = 1 −3.234
(0.067)
(ky = 2)×(High Education) −0.008
(0.054)
(ky = 2)×(Medium Education) −0.025
(0.064)
(ky = 2)×Public 0.005
(0.097)
(ky = 2)×(Public last period) −0.090
(0.096)
(ky = 2)×(Experience (years/10)) −0.129
(0.021)
ky = 2 −1.413
(0.062)
Second-order earnings autocorrelation: τ˜2 (k
y
i )
ky = 1 −0.839
(0.030)
ky = 2 −0.517
(0.036)












































km = 2 14.183
(29.157)




Table C.26: Spain: Parameters of unobserved heterogeneity (multinomial logit models)
C.3.6 Portugal
Initial unemployment probability: Pr
{














km = 2 −0.580
(0.211)




Initial probability of public sector: Pr
{














km = 2 −20.459
(360.806)

























Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 0.997
(0.575)
Public last period × Experience −1.132
(0.661)
Public last period × Experience2 0.170
(0.146)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 2.876
(0.305)
Unempl. last period × Experience −0.138
(0.347)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 0.027
(0.074)
km = 2 0.156
(0.202)




Prob. of public sector: Pr
{

















Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 2.601
(0.335)
Public last period × Experience 0.931
(0.326)
Public last period × Experience2 −0.158
(0.068)
Unempl. last period: ei,t−1 = 0 2.117
(0.463)
Unempl. last period × Experience −0.328
(0.601)
Unempl. last period × Experience2 −0.011
(0.144)
km = 2 −3.435
(0.135)
































ky = 2 0.072
(0.010)
(ky = 2)×Experience −0.018
(0.010)
(ky = 2)×Experience2 0.002
(0.002)











Public: pubit = 1 0.490
(0.048)






Table C.29: Portugal: Parameters of cross-sectional earnings means and standard deviations








(ky = 1)×(High Education) 2.802
(0.082)
(ky = 1)×(Medium Education) 2.332
(0.058)
(ky = 1)×Public −0.431
(0.081)
(ky = 1)×(Public last period) −0.105
(0.082)
(ky = 1)×(Experience (years/10)) −0.366
(0.018)
ky = 1 −3.299
(0.046)
(ky = 2)×(High Education) −1.357
(0.071)
(ky = 2)×(Medium Education) −1.774
(0.057)
(ky = 2)×Public −0.516
(0.071)
(ky = 2)×(Public last period) −0.223
(0.072)
(ky = 2)×(Experience (years/10)) −0.301
(0.018)
ky = 2 −1.586
(0.051)
Second-order earnings autocorrelation: τ˜2 (k
y
i )
ky = 1 −0.248
(0.036)
ky = 2 −0.308
(0.037)












































km = 2 −0.079
(0.103)




Table C.31: Portugal: Parameters of unobserved heterogeneity (multinomial logit models)
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C.4 The EM Algorithm
In this appendix we fully detail the estimation procedure using the Expectation Maximization (EM)
algorithm.
C.4.1 General Description
From Appendix C.2 and the model description in Section (4.4) the set of parameters to be estimated
can be divided into two sub-sets: the parameters relating to labour market mobility process, denoted
by Θm, and the parameters relating to the earnings mobility process, Θy. The mobility process param-




k=1 , ψ0, χ0;ψ, χ
}
and includes all the parameters involved in equations (C.21),




k=1 , µ(·), σ(·), τ1(·), τ˜2(·)
}
, where in
{µ(·), σ(·), τ1(·), τ˜2(·)} we summarise all of the parameters of the corresponding functions, see equations
(C.26), (C.27), (C.28) and (C.29).
The structure of (4.1) allows the individual contributions to the complete likelihood to be decomposed
as Li (xi, ki; Θm,Θy) = Lmi (xi, k
m
i ; Θ




























Here the dependence of the various parts of the likelihood on the sets of parameters is made explicit.
This separability makes it possible to integrate earnings sequences (yi) and wage classes (k
y
i ) out of the
complete likelihood Li (xi, ki; Θm,Θy). This allows us to recover the parameters relating to the labour











. This maximisation can be achieved by a straight-
forward application of the EM algorithm for finite mixtures, described below (in sub-section: Estimation
of the Job Mobility Parameters Θm).
This first stage produces estimates of the labour market mobility parameters, which we fix at their











the relevant parameters Θy. Details of this part of the estimation are below (see sub-section: Estimation
of the Earnings Parameters Θy).
Estimation of the Job Mobility Parameters Θm
The standard EM-algorithm involves iterating two steps: the Expectation step and theMaximization
step:
E-step: For an arbitrary initial value Θmn of Θ
m, for each mobility class index km = 1, . . . , Km, and
for each individual i in the sample (for that country), compute the posterior probability that i belongs
376
to mobility class km given xi and Θ
m
n :
Pr {kmi = k
















M-step: Update Θmn to Θ
m
n+1 by maximizing the following augmented sample log-likelihood, weighted
by C.42:





Pr {kmi = k | xi; Θ
m
n } · log [L
m
i (xi, ki; Θ
m)] (C.43)
This maximization can be straightforwardly executed by running separate weighted logit regressions for
ψ and χ (the parameters relating to the employment sector equations, (C.24) and (C.25)) and a separate
weighted multinomial logit for the class weight parameters κmk , using (C.42) as the weights in each case.
In theory this algorithm converges to the maximum-likelihood estimator of Θm (see Dempster et al.,
1977); in practice, we stop iterating when the maximum relative change in any of the parameters in Θm
from one iteration to the next falls below 10−3 (i.e. less than a 0.1% change in any parameter between
successive iterations). At this point we have our estimate of Θˆm.
Estimation of the Earnings Parameters Θy
The next stage is to estimate the second subset of parameters, those which relate to earnings, Θy. The






Θm fixed at its estimated value from the first stage of the estimation procedure, Θˆm. However, given
the highly non-linear nature of Lyi (·) — see subsection 4.4.4 — even this maximisation is numerically
impractical. Thus at this point we use a sequential, limited information, version of the EM algorithm.
The procedure is as follows:
E-Step: For an arbitrary initial value Θyn of Θ
y, for each class index k = (km, ky), with km = 1, . . . ,
Km, ky = 1, . . . , Ky, and for each individual i in the sample (for that country), compute the posterior







m, kyi = k










M-step: This is the point at which our algorithm differs slightly from the standard EM algorithm.
We proceed as follows:











using (C.44) as weights. Denote the updated function µ (·) as µ̂n+1 (·).
2. Take the log of the squared residuals from the latter regression and perform a weighted OLS










, again using (C.44) as the weights, to update the variance
parameters σ (·). Denote the updated function as σ̂n+1 (·).
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is distributed bivariate normal with unit variances. We do this by
weighted maximum likelihood, again using (C.44) as weights. Then we similarly update τ˜2 (·)

















again distributed bivariate normal with unit variances. Note that τ1 (·) is involved in (C.29) and
that we replace it by τ̂1,n+1 for an update of τ˜2 (·).










, again using (C.44) as the
weights.
We iterate between these E- and M-steps until the maximum relative change in any of the parameters
in Θy from one iteration to the next falls below 10−3 (i.e. less than a 0.1% change in any parameter
between successive iterations).
378
